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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the ways representations of terrorism in Hollywood, 
German and British cinema embody what Slavoj Žižek describes as the post-
political, that is the current state of denial of alternatives within global politics 
and a directionlessness within cultural theory, which set in after the apparent 
defeat of the possibility of a radical alternative to capitalism. Moreover, this 
thesis proposes that films about terrorism are not only cultural expressions of 
the post-political, but also show the post-political condition to be problematic, 
displaying as they do symptoms such as the devaluation of human subjectivity 
and its concomitant failure to achieve progressive political change.  
Žižek’s philosophical approach as a method of interpreting the post-
political is applied to the films Munich (2005), Zero Dark Thirty (2012) The 
Baader Meinhof Complex (2008) Die Kommenden Tage/The Coming Days, 
(2010) Four Lions (2010) and Hunger (2008). As well as Žižek’s work, the 
writings of other critics and commentators and such as Frank Furedi, Thomas 
Elsaesser, Kenan Malik and others are drawn on. The aesthetic and formal 
properties of these films are read against Žižek’s texts on ideology critique, 
which are primarily directed at the post-political. The films shown exhibit 
expressions of the post-political in notions of empathy and sustainability, 
campness, and postmodern forms of narrative, which Žižek calls filling in 
gaps, and Žižek’s concept of ‘the act’.  
By mapping the post-political in Hollywood, British and German cinema 
this research assays the manner in which screen terrorism is symptomatic of 
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This thesis thematises the duality of film in the post-political and the post-
political in film. The aim is to show how terrorism, as a fantasy of the post-
political, and terrorists and terrorist deeds, as symptoms of the post-political, 
are played out in national cinemas. This analysis aims to determine how the 
experience of post-politics is experienced through the cinemas of Hollywood, 
the UK and Germany. In order to demonstrate this, the aesthetic and formal 
properties of terrorist films are read alongside critical work exploring how the 
post-political shapes social life, including mainly the work of philosopher 
Slavoj Žižek, but also the writings of critics such as Frank Furedi, Thomas 
Elsaesser, Kenan Malik and others.  
By necessity such a big topic takes in a wide spectrum of authors and 
ideas. Some time has to be taken to lay the groundwork for the thesis, to 
establish the themes and their context. This work represents an attempt to 
synthesise wide-ranging, disparate strands of thought, and advance an 
analysis of film through a novel prism, that is to engage with film through the 
context of the post-political as it is described by Žižek.  
The concept of the post-political is an attempt by several leftist thinkers, 
including Žižek,1 to describe a unique moment in the history of ideas. After the 
collapse of the Berlin Wall, the symbolic breakdown of communist ideology 
that was often held to be the historical negation of capitalism, the notion of 
the political has shifted profoundly in meaning. In the post-political, the 
binary opposites that distinguished left and right politics are gone. Instead, a 
consensus of liberal democracy is the aspiration.  
                                                            
1 Slavoj Žižek, The Ticklish Subject: Absent Centre of Political Ontology, 1st edn  




Concretely defined by Žižek, the post-political condition describes an 
ideological ‘deadlock’ that presents itself as the postmodern abandonment of 
the traditional leftist politics based on universal principles of emancipation.2  
In the process of abandoning totalising, grand theories, the post-political 
has also made postmodern dismissals of the concept of human agency and the 
history-making potential of humanity more common. The post-political, 
shaped by postmodern sensibilities, is described succinctly by Malik, whose 
writings are informed by his understanding that easily recognisable, 
emancipatory leftist politics is a thing of the past. Instead, he points to ‘the 
abandonment by many sections of the left of their traditional attachment to 
ideas of Enlightenment rationalism and secular universalism and their growing 
espousal of multiculturalism, identity politics and notions of cultural 
authenticity.’3 Human agency and human exceptionalism (in the Marxian 
sense of humanity’s ability to shape its own circumstances, and itself) he 
writes, ‘the attempt to master society, many feel, led directly to Auschwitz and 
the gulags. The result has been a growth of anti-humanism, of despair about 
human capacities, a view of human reason and agency as forces for 
destruction rather than for betterment.’4 
The turning away from the primacy of human agency that informs the 
post-political, which Malik describes, suffuses social cultural output which, in 
turn, reflects the notions of what it means to be a subject in the post-political. 
This study investigates how films are not only a construct of the post-political 
that shapes social and political thinking, but also how films thematise and 
embody the post-political that informs them.  
                                                            
2 e.g. Slavoj Žižek, Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism  
(London: Verso Books, 2013a) p.1006. 
3 Kenan Malik, About (2014) <http: //kenanmalik.wordpress.com/about/> [last access 4 
September 2014] 
4 Kenan Malik, ‘In Defence of Human Agency’, Consciousness, Genetics and Society (Ax: son 
Johnson Foundation, 2002) <http: 




This thesis approaches the complexity of terrorism on screen by utilising 
Žižek’s philosophical approach of ideology critique, which he mainly directs at 
contemporary post-politics and the apparent historical impasse it presents. 
Žižek is one of the, if not the, most ubiquitous of today’s leftist social 
theorists. His book publications (over ninety at the time of writing) and over a 
hundred articles, seem to indicate that his proficiency as a writer is built on 
Hegel’s idea of transformation of quantity into quality. This method is 
described by Fabio Vighi as a tactic to cope with the limitations of writing 
about theory and an attempt to turn the writing process into a revolutionary 
force in its own right; by obsessively repeating himself in his writing, Vighi 
says, Žižek aims ‘at creating the preconditions for the explosion of amassed 
and frustrated energy seeking a point of release.’5 This description of Žižek’s 
quasi-orgasmic writing process not only mirrors Žižek’s own, often 
deliberately crude language, but is also an answer to several of Žižek’s critics, 
such as Sean Homer, who criticise Žižek’s unwillingness to go beyond theory 
and ‘always remain unclear, what Žižek is actually arguing for.’6  
Homer’s criticisms are echoed by the Žižek scholars Matthew Sharpe and 
Geoff Boucher who posit that Žižek’s ‘analysis of post-politics is acute and his 
criticisms of radical academia’s alternatives are incisive. But [that] Žižek 
himself sometimes seems uncertain as to what the alternative actually is.’7 
Sharpe and Boucher have similar concerns to those of Ernesto Laclau’s 
criticism of Žižek, contained in the collaborative book written by the political 
theorists Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Žižek Contingency, 
Hegemony, Universality published in 2000. Laclau labels Žižek’s critique of 
capitalism as ‘leeres Gerede’, empty talk without practical value.8 He 
                                                            
5 Fabio Vighi, On Žižek’s Dialectics (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2010) p.145. 
6 Sean Homer, ‘Psychoanalysis, representation, politics: on the (im) possibility of a psychoanalytic 
theory of ideology?’ The Letter: Lacanian Perspectives on Psychoanalysis 7 (1996) pp.97–
109. 
7 Matthew Sharpe and Geoff Boucher, Žižek and Politics: A Critical Introduction (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2010) p.193. 
8 see: Reinhard Heil, Zur Aktualität von Slavoj Žižek: Einleitung in Sein Werk, 1st edn 




formulates Žižek’s idea as a non-criticism, already opposing what he himself 
considers ‘anti-capitalist’:  
But perhaps Žižek has something more reasonable in mind: for instance, 
the overcoming of the prevalent neoliberal economic model and the 
introduction of state regulation and democratic control of the economy, 
so that the worst effects of globalisation are avoided. If that is what he 
means by anti-capitalism, I would certainly agree with him, but so would 
most of the ‘postmodernists’ against whom his polemic is addressed.9 
Žižek’s answer to Laclau is that Laclau’s so-called anti-capitalism is no  
such thing, as it still accepts and operates within the hegemony of liberal 
capitalism:  
In short, Laclau’s claim about my anti-capitalism also holds for what he 
calls the “democratic control of the economy”, and, more generally, for 
the entire project of “radical democracy”: either it means palliative 
damage-control measures within the global capitalist framework, or it 
means absolutely nothing.10 
Where Žižek speaks of a possibility that lies outside the given horizon of 
liberal democracy, Laclau’s politics are no alternative to capitalism at all but, 
as Žižek calls it, merely ‘capitalism with a human face.’11 Vighi describes how 
it is part of Žižek’s theory that ideas alone cannot change reality, but they 
constitute the initial step in challenging the conditions that make up reality, 
and it is in this capacity that Žižek sees his job as a philosopher – as a 
magician who ‘has got the hat, but not the rabbit’,12 i.e. he has the theory but 
cannot deliver a practical result. Yet, the hat is the precondition for a rabbit to 
emerge. Vighi writes about Žižek’s application of theory, ‘thought as such 
cannot reach directly the imperial other, but instead can ‘only’ posit its own 
inherent otherness as coincidental with the radical contingency of external 
                                                            
9 Ernesto Laclau, ‘Structure, History and the political’, in: Butler, Judith, Laclau, Ernesto, and 
Slavoj Žižek, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left 
(London: Verso Books, 2000) p.206. 
10 ibid p.321. 
11 Žižek, 1999a, p.12. 




reality’13 – meaning that the job of critical thinking is to be critical about 
reality as it is, rather than coming up with ultimate solutions. What Vighi is 
referring to is, indirectly, Marx’s eighth thesis on Feuerbach, in which Marx 
insists that it is not theory that brings about empirical change, but critical 
human beings, ‘All social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead 
theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the 
comprehension of this practice.’14 What Žižek offers for theory is a rethinking 
of radical politics in the post-political, what he identifies as the current status 
quo of world politics.  
Matthew Flisfeder writes in his book The Symbolic, the Sublime, and 
Slavoj Žižek’s Theory of Film, ‘What mostly attracts readers to Žižek’s work is 
his ability to engage and expand on some of the most difficult questions facing 
theorists today, such as how to engage a critical theory of ideology at a time 
when we are said to be living in a “post-ideological era”.’15 Žižek’s uses post-
ideological and post-political interchangeably, while implying that enthusiasts 
of today’s post-political ideology often proudly claim that they are ‘post-
ideological’, whereas Žižek himself would rather dismissively call the state of 
affairs post-political saying, ‘do we not convey the same message when we 
claim that we are entering a ‘post-ideological’ pragmatic era, which is another 
way of claiming that we are entering a post-political order in which the only 
legitimate conflicts are ethnic/cultural conflicts?’16  
Žižek is one of a few contemporary critical thinkers who attempt a 
philosophical approach to rethinking the possibilities of universal humanism 
in a time of broadly post-political status quo. He fuses the anti-humanism of 
                                                            
13 ibid. p.145. 
14 Karl Marx, ‘Theses On Feuerbach’, in: Marx/Engels Selected Works, Volume One, progress 
publishers, Moscow, USSR, 1969, pp.13 – 15. <https: 
//www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm> [last access 4 
September 2014] 
15 Matthew Flisfeder, The Symbolic, the Sublime, and Slavoj Žižek’s Theory of Film (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) p.3. 
16 Slavoj Žižek, The Fragile Absolute: Or, Why Is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For? 




Lacanian psychoanalysis, Althussarian concepts of people’s interpellation into 
ideology, and the humanist philosophies of Hegel and Marx.  
However, it is his understanding of the idea of an active human subject, 
made possible by the virtue of universalist principles, which prevail, and 
which make his theories a valuable method for this analysis. Žižek’s describes 
how the post-political sees itself as having ‘extricate(d) the core of subject’s 
being, its universal essence.’17 He describes that, in the post-political, ideas of 
the private and the public individual have become blurred. He draws here on 
Kant’s differentiation of the private and the public use of reason, where the 
private subject is exercising reason in the limited framework of his/her role in 
society, whereas the public individual has to be totally free and unlimited in 
voicing his opinion in order to advance reason for all. Here, Žižek’s says, the 
subject ‘asserts the dimension of emancipatory universality OUTSIDE the 
confines of one’s social identity.’18 The difficulty of becoming a private 
individual, a political subject in the post-political, is expressed by several films 
in the following analysis.  
This thesis understands contemporary readings of terrorism as fantasies 
of the post-political. Fantasy in a Lacanian sense forms ‘reality by offering an 
imaginary meaning in response to the Real of trauma or antagonism.’19 The 
core of this idea is that fantasy is actually what we understand as unfiltered 
reality, as reality appears to us, constructed in cultural narratives to give 
meaning based on people’s understanding of how they see themselves in this 
world. In this sense, ideology is a fantasy. This is not to deny that these 
fantasies are shaped and conditioned by material realities. Žižek would argue 
that people are not trapped by how ideology shapes them, in contrast to 
Althusser. Althusser’s subject, as James Heartfield points out, is ‘one of 
                                                            
17 Slavoj Žižek, ‘Tolerance as an ideological category’, Critical Inquiry 34.4 (2008d) pp.660–682. 
online version <http: //www.lacan.com/Žižek-inquiry.html> [last access 4 September 
2014] 
18 ibid. emphasis in original. 




repression, not liberation’, and the terms of interpellation ‘are an imposition 
from outside, that impose a given identity rather than liberating the Subject.’20 
Žižek’s subject, on the other hand, emerges out of the contradictions he 
undergoes him/herself, shaped by and at the same time shaping the world 
he/she inhabits. As formulated by Kelsey Wood, ‘the subject as such, however, 
is beyond ideological interpellation.’21 It emerges through the transcendental 
act of a transgression of the symbolic, which in turn is enabled by the subject’s 
ability to actively embark on this transgression. 
Contemporary terrorist acts, in turn, can be categorised as symptoms of 
the post-political. Generally speaking a symptom is some negative effect that 
points towards an underlying problem. For Žižek, the symptom is the 
symptom of capitalist ideology, the ‘irrational’ element of the existing 
society.’22 In short, the symptom is an element of society that can be 
investigated to reveal the inner workings of its ideology. Todd McGowan 
distils the function of the symptom in Žižek’s theory of ideology critique, in 
how the Žižekian symptom ‘expresses the truth of the system that confronts 
the system in an external form. The symptom is excluded, and yet this 
exclusion reveals what the system cannot admit about itself.’23 Here the 
difference between a symptom according to Althusser and Žižek needs to be 
highlighted.  
When there is talk about a symptomatic reading it is usually considered 
in an Althussarian sense. This is how he understood a text, especially Marx, 
should be read. His aim was to show how Marx’s earlier writings were 
‘ideological’, meaning full of subtext that was influenced by other thinkers 
(most of all Hegel), rather than Marx’s own. This, Althusser concluded, only 
emerged in his later writing. He claimed that Marx’s early writing showed 
                                                            
20 James Heartfield, The ‘Death of the Subject’ Explained (Leicester: Perpetuity Press, 2002) p.40, 
emphasis in original. 
21 Kelsey Wood, Žižek: A Reader’s Guide (Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012). p.22. 
22 Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso Books, 1989) p.23. 
23 Todd McGowan, ‘Symptom’, Butler, Rex, (ed.), The Žižek Dictionary (Durham: Acumen 




‘symptoms’, contradictions in thinking, and ideas that showed how the text 
was not his, but informed by a penetrating ideology. Althusser’s method of 
reading Marx is problematic in several ways. Firstly, Althusser understood this 
method to be only available to trained intellectuals who would then ‘translate’ 
the correct reading of the text for the masses, in his view that ordinary people 
were blinded by ideology and could not understand their own limitations.24 
Secondly, such a method of interpretation lends itself to a potentially more or 
less arbitrary reading of a text, motivated not by the purpose of the text itself 
but by the reader’s own ideological prejudices. Žižek’s looking for the 
symptom is therefore not a symptomatic reading, but rather an investigation 
of the symptoms that sustain the text but that are also outside from it. The 
symptom, as discussed later, is the thing that presents and represents the 
contradictions of its own ideology.  
This thesis is not a symptomatic reading in an Althussarian sense; it does 
not aim to expose hidden ideological subtexts within and behind filmic texts. 
Nor does it look to identify, in a Žižekian way, the symptoms themselves; it 
does not discuss elements of the films as expressions of the ideological 
conditions that allow them to happen. This exercise, in itself, is unhelpful as 
Warren Buckland and Tim Dean have pointed out. However, their criticism is 
that, ‘The aim of unmasking ideology to create political change … is no longer 
a sufficient political strategy.’25 Their take is that recent ideology does not 
require a comparison with an alternative, not because the conditions for an 
alternative to capitalism are foreclosed in the post-political, but because there 
is no need to change the fundamental ideological structure. Rather, in their 
thinking, Buckland and Dean are not too far removed from Flisfeder’s idea of 
how to employ Žižek’s work, that is as a means to ‘map’ oneself in the 
coordinates of ideology via film. 
                                                            
24 Oliver Davis, Jacques Rancière (London: Polity Press, 2013). p.13–14. 
25 Warren Buckland, ‘Symptomatic reading in Althusser, Cahiers du cinéma, and Žižek’, Jump 
Cut: A Review of Contemporary Media; Fall (2013), Issue 55 <http: 





Flisfeder makes a case that Žižek should be regarded not as a cultural 
critic but as a film theorist in his own right, who moves away from the 
understood notion of what film theory is, that is a theory of film, saying 
‘Žižek’s film theory involves not theorising about film as such.’26 Instead, 
Flisfeder says that Žižek’s film theory consists of ideology critique. He 
describes how Žižek’s use of film in his writings on ideology makes him a film 
theorist whose idea of cinema allows us to perceive the ‘very co-ordinates of 
ideology today.’27  
According to Flisfeder, ‘Rather than theorising film … film theory must 
focus on theorising ideology by way of film criticism,’28 thus directly 
translating Žižek’s philosophy to film studies; doing what Žižek does himself 
– using film to explain ideology. 
However, even though Flisfeder’s aims for Žižekian film theory to bring 
about an ‘emancipatory cognitive mapping’ of ideology,29 follows Žižek’s own 
methods of investigating, or mapping, how the self in psychoanalysis finds 
his/her coordinates within the symbolic order,30 it is problematic to regard the 
act of ‘mapping oneself’ as truly emancipatory. Instead a case has to be made 
for human agency that lies beyond a ‘cognitive mapping’, the mere situating of 
oneself in ideology. Malik argues that a reliance on human agency is a 
necessity, most of all because it is only through agency that change and 
betterment for all can be achieved, ‘once we accept that human agency – and 
human reason – are forces for destruction rather than betterment, then we 
                                                            
26 In his copious written works as well as in the documentaries The Pervert’s Guide To Cinema 
(2009) and The Pervert’s Guide to Ideology (2012) in which he subjects the works of 
directors such as Alfred Hitchcock and David Lynch to his analytical scrutiny, Žižek uses 
films to illustrate his philosophy. ⁠ For example, in Pervert's Guide To Cinema, Žižek 
describes how the remarkable dynamic of the Marx Brothers is in fact a filmic fantasy of 
Freud’s structural model of the human psyche. Groucho is the superego, the figure of 
authority, Chico is the ego, the mediator between id and reality, and Harpo represents the 
id, the anarchic element that always acts upon its drives. 
27 Flisfeder, 2012, p.2. 
28 ibid. p.5. 
29 Flisfeder, Matthew, and Louis-Paul Willis, Žižek and Media Studies: A Reader (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) p.10. 




lose the only means we possess for human advancement, whether social, 
moral or technological.’31 Human agency is to be understood as the means to 
achieve what Žižek calls the ‘impossible’, that what stands beyond the power 
of the limits of the collective imagination.  
This thesis agrees with Buckland and Dean that a symptomatic reading of 
film is in itself unsatisfactory, as this single-minded approach does not do 
justice to the merits of film in its own right. This is why this work utilises the 
ideological symptoms and fantasies of the post-political – the 
conceptualisation of terrorism – to analyse how films artistically 
conceptualise the experience of the post-political. Rather than utilising film to 
illustrate ideology, Žižek’s methods are used to demonstrate the ideology in 
film itself. In this case the object of study is how the post-political translates 
itself into film form through the motif of terrorism. Ultimately, this thesis 
demonstrates that it is not enough to instrumentalise film for the purpose of 
critical theory. Films can be successfully used as ideology critique, as Flisfeder 
demonstrates. But also, ideology is a valid way of looking at film. Trotsky 
identified the paradox between the demands of artistic criticism and 
ideological criticism in his writings on art; ‘Art must make its own way and by 
its own means. The Marxian methods are not the same as the artistic.’32 The 
way the films in this analysis are shown to contextualise the post-political 
speaks of how the post-political shapes artistic expression, a field of study not 
articulated by Žižek in these terms. The post-political not only informs film 
but also, as Trotsky said about poetry, film in and of itself ‘feels the world in a 
new way.’33 This new way can be described as post-political vision, expressed 
in film, that speaks for the duality of film in the post-political and the post-
political in film.  
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By establishing terrorism as the ideological fantasy and symptom of the 
post-political from the start, this thesis aims to illustrate how the ideological 
foreclosure of political change is affecting the cultural and artistic outputs of 
this society, as evidenced in particular in national cinemas.  
Post-political terrorism is played out with different weights in national 
cinemas, yet the fundamental theme is a constant: each national cinema and 
its relation to the symptom and fantasy of terrorism expresses a fundamental 
desire to narrate its own history at a time when the possibility of human 
agency in the making of history is called into question. This thesis looks into 
how this desire to narrate is expressed in Germany, the USA and in the UK. 
The different national relationships to terrorism influence their respective 
treatment of the subject through cinema. The analysis considers this 
respective treatment through three different perspectives: In the USA the 
impact of the US led ‘war on terror’ is what creates a post-political overcoming 
and processing of national history as cinema. The aspect of terrorism in UK 
cinema that is most noticeable is a desire to narrate the possibly of acting 
politically in post-political British society, as seen in the light of the change in 
nature of homegrown terrorism. In Germany, a re-imagining of the past 
terrorism of the RAF (Red Army Faction), understood as a nation-defining idea 
that is summed up in the concept of RAF mythos, is utilised to express the 
preoccupations of Germany in the post-political. 
 
Terms, methods, context 
This introductory chapter will establish the context under which the thesis 
understands the idea that terrorism and terrorists have taken on a new role in 
the post-political, and how film has become a major way of contextualising the 
post-political through depictions of terrorism.  
In order to set up a critical model for this thesis, this chapter begins with 
a closer exploration of the emergence of the post-political to then answer the 
question of why the less antagonistic life of post-ideology is not a positive 




old ideological disputes is also a vision and the inspiration that the world 
could be created and re-created differently.  
The philosophical approaches of Žižek are helpful here, as he begins to 
unravel how these ‘post-ideological’ times are in fact nothing but ideological. 
By establishing a philosophical emphasis on the importance of the Cartesian 
subject, he provides a philosophical frame within which the post-political can 
be placed and analysed as an ideology by not only naming and defining the 
current political climate but also by revealing how the contradictions of the 
post-political work.  
Žižek’s ideas will be supplemented with the sociological understanding of 
terrorism in the post-political as put forward by Furedi. Taken together, their 
analyses show that terrorism today is a construct that serves as a means of 
mapping oneself in the post-political. Furedi describes how the emphasis of 
personal over universal politics creates a fear of the unknown – and terrorism 
becomes an expression of this unknown. The chapter goes on to describe how 
both Žižek and Furedi establish that the reigning societal motivator is a 
politics of fear, that results in the terrorist becoming an ‘enemy of the state’, as 
described by Schmitt34 – a construct supported by the ruling regime that 
defines the nation state against an imagined Other. An idea that will be looked 
at in more detail. The chapter continues to explain how this projection of the 
fear of the unknown into a thing, in this case the thing being the meaning of 
terrorism, is what Žižek calls an ideological fantasy, with terrorists and their 
acts as such working as the symptoms of post-political ideology. The 
ideological fantasy is expressed by what has been coined ‘New Terrorism’, a 
development that has been criticised as ‘new terrorism theory’ as discussed 
later in the chapter. The conclusion of this introductory chapter describes how 
the new ideological fantasy of terrorism has become narrated predominantly 
through fiction in film and television, forgoing the possibility of it being 
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analysed in its own terms as ideological fantasy and, ultimately, being situated 
as symptom of the post-political. 
 
The emergence of post-polit ics 
Recent political and social relations have been shaped in great part by 
postmodern ideas that emerged most clearly in the later half of the twentieth 
century. These ideas can be summed up as the overall rejection of meta-
narratives, as described by Jean-François Lyotard.35 Or, in Žižek’s words, in 
postmodernism ‘the Hegelian totality of Reason is perceived as the ultimate 
totalitarian edifice in philosophy.’36 The consequence of this outright rejection 
of totality is that the post-political is a historical moment in which ‘the Left 
has accepted the basic co-ordinates of liberal democracy’ on the grounds that 
anything else would by default turn totalitarian in nature.37 The achievements 
of the Enlightenment, at its centre the idea of the Cartesian human subject, are 
problematised, on the grounds that the subject’s claim to universal goals, be it 
in the name of freedom and democracy or fascism, are the same. These ideas 
‘directly or not come(s) back to this metaphysics of Subjectivity’,38 as it is 
spelled out in Derrida’s deconstructive critique of the human subject, in which 
he highlights the difference of things especially subjects, instead of their 
sameness.39 Here totality and totalitarian are seen as the one and the same. 
Terry Eagleton writes how Derrida, together with Levinas, think of fascism 
when they think of solidarity, ‘not the resistance movements which fought to 
overcome it.’40 Both wrote at a time after the Second World War, when 
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‘human communality has been damaged almost beyond repair, both by its 
advocates and by its antagonists.’41 Heartfield, describing Derrida’s dismissal 
of subjectivity, adds that Philipe Lacoue-Labarthe takes Derrida’s attack on 
humanist thinking even further. ‘Humanism’, says Heartfield in reference to 
Lacoue-Labarthe, ‘is [seen as] a fascism, because humanism puts man at the 
centre, makes man’s activity the substance of history.’42 In short, collective 
human enterprise, because it cancels out difference, is seen as inherently 
corruptive and oppressive.  
The main consequence of the postmodern default position is that radical 
politics are rendered difficult to pursue – emancipatory theories that aim at a 
‘total’ liberation, such as Marxism, are dismissed outright. The political aims 
of the left, the once oppositional force to capitalism, have changed, in that 
they broadly accept capitalist state systems as default. The broad tendency of 
the left is that capitalism has to be managed more fairly, by controlling the 
excesses of capitalism (by taxing the rich, protecting the environment, etc.). 
The main strand of leftist politics of the 1990s, as exemplified by Bill Clinton’s 
and Tony Blair’s third way politics, Gerhard Schroeder’s Neue Mitte (new 
middle), were in a sense logical extensions of Margaret Thatcher’s slogan 
‘there is no alternative’ to economic liberalism. In Europe, where leftist politics 
has a different, historically charged meaning than inthe USA, this change was 
felt in a more profound way. As the traditionally leftist parties implemented 
the political programme of their conservative opponents, this changed the 
nature of the role of the state.  
The new direction taken by New Labour, is the subject of a study by Tony 
Cutler and Barbara Waine, which looks into reforms in the NHS and the 
education sector. Their study shows that the New Labour government not only 
‘embraced’ the already installed managerialism of the previous government, 
but also implemented this managerialism in the style of a ‘political project’ 
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that stands in contrast to the ‘criticisms which Labour made of the public 
sector reforms of the 1980s.’43 
Žižek suggests that, through their ruthless implementing of post-politics, 
the left has managed to become better at capitalism than the conservatives. 
In the UK, the Thatcher revolution was, at the time, chaotic and 
impulsive, marked by unpredictable contingencies. It was Tony Blair 
who was able to institutionalise it, or, in Hegel’s terms, to raise (what 
first appeared as) a contingency, a historical accident, into a necessity. 
Thatcher wasn’t a Thatcherite, she was merely herself; it was Blair (more 
than Major) who truly gave form to Thatcherism.44 
In a fairly spontaneous and unplanned fashion, the nature of the state 
changed, becoming weighted toward the administration of peoples’ personal 
lives. Any power it now has lies for the most part in its role of playing on and 
protecting people from their fears. And, as will be discussed later on, in the 
age of post-politics, fear has become a willingly employed instrument of 
governments trying to find a political cause. 
 
Ž ižek’s approach to post-polit ics 
Žižek describes the idea of post-politics (understood as the established modus 
operandi in Western nations and, by extension, the politics of globalisation) 
extensively in his book The Ticklish Subject, and a detailed look into his 
definition of the concept is necessary when regarding this definition as a basis 
throughout the thesis. He writes: 
Today (…) we are dealing with another form of the degeneration of the 
political, postmodern post-politics, which no longer merely “represses” 
the political, trying to contain it and pacify the “returns of the 
repressed”, but much more effectively “forecloses” it, so that the 
postmodern forms of ethnic violence, with their “irrational” excessive 
character, are no longer simple “returns of the repressed” but, rather, 
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represent a case of the foreclosed (the symbolic) which, as we know 
from Lacan, returns in the real. In post-politics, the conflict of global 
ideological visions embodied in different parties which compete for 
power is replaced by the collaboration of enlightened technocrats 
(economists, public opinion specialists … ) and liberal multiculturalists; 
via the process of negotiation of interests, a compromise is reached in 
the guise of a more or less universal consensus. Post-politics thus 
emphasises the need to leave old ideological divisions behind and 
confront new issues, armed with the necessary expert knowledge and 
free deliberation that takes people’s concrete needs and demands into 
account.45 
In Žižek’s epigrammatic sketch of the elements that define the post-political 
the main points are: 
1. The notion of a foreclosure, the absolute ruling out of the political 
antagonism of liberal capitalism. The post-political not simply 
represses radical politics, but excludes it from consideration and 
thought.  
2. Politics has changed in practice. Instead of making policies based on 
political principles, the governing bodies make decisions based on 
‘expert knowledge.’ People are managed to the best possible degree 
with politics reduced to how this management happens and is 
enforced. 
At first glance, the term post-political is an unfortunate choice of phrase, as it 
seems to imply an impasse within political thinking. If the world is post-
political, where do we go from here? However, the term post-political is to be 
understood as a criticism of exactly this understanding of society as being post 
politics. Žižek describes it thus,  
When I say we live in a post-political world, I refer to a wrong 
ideological impression. We don’t really live in such a world, but the 
existing universe presents itself as post-political in the sense that there is 
some kind of a basic social pact that elementary social decisions are no 
longer discussed as political decisions. They are turned into simple 
decisions of gesture and of administration. And the remaining conflicts 
                                                            




are mostly conflicts about different cultures. We have the present form 
of global capitalism plus some kind of tolerant democracy as the 
ultimate form of that idea.46 
What the term post-political embodies is a general lack of belief in alternative 
social models – despite the fact that the post-political world is still determined 
by the contradictions of capitalism. Or put simply, the idea that the world is 
no longer determined by class politics is a self-imposed illusion. For some, 
such as the author of the book Žižek’s Politics, Jodi Dean, the term post-
political, although correct in its observations, is applied wrongly, ‘Weirdly … 
the very claim for post-politics erases its own standpoint of enunciation: why 
say post-politics unless you mean it politically?’47 For Dean the concept of 
post-politics not only overlooks ‘the reality of politics on the ground, but it 
cedes in advance key terrains of activism and struggle.’48 Instead she says that, 
‘our enemy has adopted our language, our ideals, we now lack an ability to say 
what we want. Instead, our present values become horrific realisations of their 
opposites, entrapping us in psychotic politics.’49 
Dean’s criticism deliberately dismisses the intended cynicism of the term 
which in fact highlights the inherent absurdity, the idea of a worldwide 
consensus, of the post-political. The problematic aspect of Dean’s argument 
rests on of her understanding of contemporary power relations, and the 
antagonisms these bring about, through the notion of a rightwing 
appropriation of leftist ideas. However, to an extent it is the left, by 
abandoning traditional leftist ideals of historical thinking, that played a factor 
in the collapse not only of the concept of an oppositional left but also of the 
conservative right in the post-political.  
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The possibility of traditional leftist ideas, and at the same time, 
conservative politics, is exactly what is abandoned in post-politics. The 
necessary agents of the traditional leftist struggle do not exist in this function 
anymore; the coherent organised body of people whose aims, in the words of 
Žižek, function as  
… a metaphoric condensation of the global opposition against Them, 
those in power, so that the protest is no longer just about that demand, 
but about the universal dimension that resonates in that particular 
demand … What post-politics tends to prevent is precisely this 
metaphoric universalisation of particular demands.50  
Even if there was such body, (the Occupy movement or the Spanish protest 
movement los Indignados are sometimes brought forwards as examples for a 
functioning leftist activism), what is missing are the theories, the leftist ideas 
to animate them. Žižek and Furedi’s descriptions overlap in their 
understanding of the lived reality as post-historical. History is no longer 
experienced as human-made but in how it makes humans – and it is this 
narrative, to which both the left and the right subscribe, that has dissolved the 
dialectal antagonisms of left and right politics. Furedi argues that the 
conventional distinctions between a cultural left and a conservative right have 
little relevance today as both sides have lost their historically determined 
antagonism, saying that it was through the ‘adoption of anti-historical 
thinking by the left that has proved so decisive in the shaping of the new 
intellectual climate. There is no longer a debate between left and right about 
substantive issues to do with history. The discussion is over what kind of 
history what kind of identity.’51 The concept of the post-political is thus, for 
both Furedi and Žižek, a closing down of the possibility of historical thinking. 
The left’s accommodation to conservative historicism, in which history 
becomes the determinant of people, was instrumental in the emergence of the 
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post-political climate in which ‘the universal dimension that resonates in that 
particular’ is foreclosed. 
What Žižek aims to encapsulate with the idea of the post-political is not 
the concept of utopia, in which a ‘perfectly unitary and homogenous collective 
will render pointless the moment of politics’, as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
Mouffe point out.52 Instead, what he describes, with his emphasis on a post-
political world view, is that when imagining new ways to think, it should not 
be pretended that this is an era beyond politics (where capitalism has won and 
any alternative has lost by default). Žižek’s call is to resist this world view of 
post-politics, or which Furedi calls the ‘closure of the historical mind’,53 and 
instead create new critical ways for a new voice of opposition that takes into 
consideration this new historical moment. 
 
Ž ižek establishes the acting subject as the  
fundamental condition for societal  change  
Žižek is interested in the constant tension between human beings and their 
surroundings, between their drives (as described by psychoanalysis) and the 
demands placed on them by society. His philosophical starting point seems an 
unmistakably anti-humanist one, in that he identifies himself as Lacanian, 
basing his thoughts on Lacan’s structuralist psychoanalysis. It is therefore 
critical to follow his way of thinking to see how he arrives at the resurrection 
of the active subject. Even though Žižek’s revival of the subject is not a 
straight acknowledgement of the subject as a ‘self-transparent thinking 
subject’,54 (Rather, Žižek finds the subject’s agency in his/her ability to 
recognise, under specific circumstances described below, the real (or the 
universal truth) of materialist political economy) his theoretical observations 
are such that his concepts of ideology critique as well as the possibility to act 
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upon them are a good starting point to make a case for the necessity of human 
subjectivity in and of itself. Žižek argues that the human subject is not as a 
subject fully at the mercy of his/her interpellation, as formulated by 
Althusser.55 Instead he follows the idea that the subject is a place of 
antagonism between the conditions of his/her life circumstances and the 
negations that make up the contradictions of these circumstances. Still, the 
point of departure for Žižek is Lacan’s psychoanalytical theory of how the 
subject is constituted.  
The symbolic together with the register of the imaginary, and the real, are 
Lacan’s three fundamental dimensions of subjectivity. With ‘symbolic order’ 
Lacan describes the subconscious set of rules we live by, ‘the objective order 
(…) of language, law, morality, religion, and all social existence, which is held 
to constitute the identity of any human subject who enters it.’56 Or as Žižek 
describes it ‘society’s unwritten constitution.’57 These subconscious rules are in 
turn, however, created in a material world; the symbolic could be, for example, 
the patriarchal family or the state. More often, the symbolic order can be 
substituted for the concept of ideology. Žižek often compares the 
subjectivisation with the concept of interpellation, the subordination of the 
self to a greater constellation such as ideology. 
But Žižek wants to make a case for human subjectivity as the necessary 
condition to bring about political change based on collective interests. Žižek 
refers to a Marxist humanism when he pastiches, in The Ticklish Subject, 
Marx and Engels’ Manifesto of the Communist Party, ‘A spectre is haunting 
Western academia, the spectre of the Cartesian subject. All academic powers 
have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this spectre.’58 In his work Žižek 
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wants to reconcile the loss of the subject, the view of humans as free willing, 
rationally autonomous beings, from the aims of postmodern theory to 
abandon the notion of human agency. This question is now, how does Žižek 
reconcile the humanism of Marx and the anti-humanism of Lacan in his 
philosophy? In their article, Vighi and Feldner ask this important question, 
‘Based on the psychoanalytic axiom of the split subject at the mercy of 
unconscious knowledge, Slavoj Žižek’s lesson could be seen as a sobering one: 
since our desires are never our own but always the other’s in as much as they 
are articulated by the big Other in advance, how can we think freedom and 
agency?’59 They articulate the urgent question in Žižek’s thinking of how a 
subject, if it can never know itself as well as his/her unconscious desires, is 
supposed to experience freedom?  
Žižek sees the possibility of change for the subject not in an inherent 
rationality, but in the active process of reconstituting the self from the social 
conditions he/she lives in. Vighi describes this mechanism thus, ‘Žižek argues 
that the self must embrace its own absolute otherness (negativity) to become 
subject, thus endorsing Hegel’s view that ‘tarrying with the negative’ is ‘the 
magical power’ through which the subject comes into being.’60 For the subject 
to change their circumstances in reality, they have to change the conditions 
that make up his/her self as a subject within this reality. This does not mean 
they have to change their outlook on life in a therapeutical way, rather that the 
conditions of how life structures the subject have to be discarded by the 
subject, and new conditions constituted out of this. With his conceptualisation 
of the subject, Žižek unites Hegel and Lacan, in what Vighi and Feldner call a 
‘dialectics of the subject.’61 The subject, instead of being a fully formed organic 
whole ‘forever prevented from truly connecting’ is inherently connected to the 
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world by the very fact that it is split into the conscious (which knows itself) 
and the unconscious (which does not know itself).62 The negativity, or 
alienation, that is experienced by the self (not knowing one’s own 
unconscious) and the alienation of the self from society are parallel. Only by 
experiencing alienation is the subject able to contextualise the conditions for 
this alienation, and in turn emerge as a new subject, hence a ‘dialectics of the 
subject.’63 
In Lacanian psychoanalysis and Hegelian dialectics any knowledge or 
discourse hinges upon a mechanism for closure. This mechanism is the 
unacknowledged truth that drives this very same mechanism. For Hegelian 
dialectics this is to be found in the negation that contradicts a thesis. By 
means of negativity of thought by the subject the assumed conditions are 
discarded or dissolved, and he gains a drive to strive towards a new 
‘wholeness’ in a spiral of dialectics or helical change. For Lacanian 
psychoanalysis this mechanism is to be found in the idea of castration – the 
traumatic imposition which then leads to the repression of this trauma by 
trying to compensate for the apparent lack. Like the Hegelian dialectic, the 
Lacanian subject already carries within its own unreason. The trauma 
represents the subject itself in its own negation. 
 
The impossible 
The ability of the subject to evoke change lies in the possibility provided by 
the negation, that what is not considered possible, but which at the same time 
is constitutive of the situation the subject is in. In other words, the possibility 
lies in the impossibility. In Lacan the real, that which contradicts and disrupts 
the symbolic order, symbolises the ‘impossible’.64 Žižek insists that it is the 
very negativity of the impossible where the potential of the real lies. For him, 
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the real offers the dialectical negation of what is considered society, including 
its limitations. 
According to Žižek, the post-political world, shaped by post-modern 
politics, is responsible for the dismantling of the symbolic order.65 The 
negation of capitalist ideology (once the possibility for communism) is 
understood as impossible; instead capitalist ideology has become a non-
negotiable state. The great authority of the other, the representative of the 
symbolic, is replaced with the complexity and plurality of different readings, 
where all interpretations are of equal value.  
The dimension of the ‘impossible’, that what is simply not doable, for 
Žižek is the dimension of a negation of liberal capitalism, is denied in post-
politics and this bears real consequences. That which used to be the 
constitutive other, politics of universal principles (the impossible dimension) 
has been replaced by another that favours the institutionalisation of individual 
identity politics. Žižek writes, 
One can also put it (post-politics) in terms of the well-known definition 
of politics as the ‘art of the possible’: authentic politics is, rather, the 
exact opposite, that is, the art of the impossible – it changes the very 
parameters of what is considered ‘possible’ in the existing 
constellation.’66 […] Instead of the political subject ‘working class’ 
demanding its universal rights, we get, on the other hand, the 
multiplicity of particular social strata or groups, each with its problems 
(the dwindling need for manual workers, etc.) and, on the other, the 
immigrant, ever more prevented from politicising his predicament of 
exclusion.67 
The post-political denies the acting political person, the subject, access to 
methods of changing his/her situation in a politically meaningful way (a 
fundamental change of the conditions of society which requires universal 
principles), and it is this situation that unites the thinking of Žižek, and others 
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such as Rancière and Badiou, with other leftist thinkers such as Mouffe.68 
However, Žižek’s views are more radical than Mouffe’s et al. Žižek’s 
understanding of the social as within a post-political condition also includes 
his ideas of how to overcome this stagnant moment within politics. He not 
only makes a case to return to the active human subject, by the way of a 
political act, which will be looked at in detail in the chapter on the act in 
Hunger. But he also reintroduces the validity of a universal truth of common 
human interests, that is expressed through partisanship – ‘the gesture of 
taking sides.’69 This truth has to be articulated from a distinctly partisan 
position otherwise it cannot be defended as a political gesture. Žižek is blunt, 
‘If one does not specify the criteria of the different, alternate narrativisation, 
then this endeavour courts the danger of endorsing, in the politically correct 
mood, ridiculous narratives like those about the supremacy of some aboriginal 
holistic wisdom, or those that dismiss science as just another narrative on par 
with premodern superstitions.’70 
 
A (post)-polit ics of fear 
In the post-political, people are considered fluid identities in the context of 
globalisation, where the defining of one’s self depends on the audiences that 
are addressed at any particular moment – however; they ultimately remain 
linked by capital. One of the more problematic features of the post-political is 
the posing of social problems as individual ones, affecting people’s identities. 
What were once considered the realms of the political, such as the realisation 
of liberty or the production and consumption of material things, have become 
confined to and defined by the realms of the personal. Often political decisions 
are more or less implicitly formed in terms of identity politics or personal 
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responsibility, and the individual is encouraged to experience life in an 
individualised way. 
Political action is cast in the role of administration and management of 
people’s individual lives. This is why Žižek often calls post-politics ‘post-
political bio-politics,’ where the ‘focus on expert management and 
administration [is] “bio-politics” [which] designates the regulation of the 
security and welfare of human lives as its primal goal.’71 Bio-politics is a term 
Žižek borrows from Foucault to describe how in the post-political, people are 
not seen as subjects but as ‘individuals reduced to bare life’, and governments 
understand their role in administering policies that have direct bearing on 
people’s individual biology.72 (For example, anti-smoking bans, food 
recommendations such as five-a-day, injuctions to be active, but also to wear 
helmets when doing so.) Politics is reduced to the actions of individual 
behaviour and only requires a state apparatus which functions as manager of 
these ideas. German philosopher Jürgen Habermas called this experience of a 
depoliticised public reality, ‘civil privatism’,73 in which administrative 
decisions are made largely independent of citizen participation. By reducing 
politics to individual experiences, Žižek says how, the only way people can be 
mobilised to act politically in the post-political is by having their individual 
life situation threatened,  
When politics is reduced to the “private” domain, it takes the form of the 
politics of FEAR – fear of losing one’s particular identity, of being 
overwhelmed. … once one renounces big ideological causes, what 
remains is only the efficient administration of life … almost only that. 
That is to say, with the depoliticised, socially objective, expert 
administration and coordination of interests as the zero-level of politics, 
                                                            
71 Slavoj Žižek, ‘Censorship today: violence, or ecology as a new opium for the masses’ Lacan. 
com 18 (2008a): 42–43, online version <http: //www.lacan.com/zizecology1.htm> [last 
access 4 September 2014] 
72 Slavoj Žižek, Violence, 1st edn (London: Profile Books, 2008g) p.34. 




the only way to introduce passion into this field, to actively mobilise 
people, is through fear, a basic constituent of today’s subjectivity.74  
Žižek lists the most common fears as:  
The fear of immigrants, the fear of crime, the fear of godless sexual 
depravity, the fear of the excessive state (with its burden of high taxation 
and control), the fear of ecological catastrophe, as well as the fear of 
harassment (political correctness is the exemplary liberal form of the 
politics of fear).75  
To this have to be added new fears that concern the self in an environment 
that is perceived as unknowable and uncontrollable, from obsessions around 
food production and consumption, to how human interactions and 
relationships are more and more perceived as potentially damaging.76 The 
latter example an indicator that shows that human activity is perceived 
through a ‘narrative that is selfish, destructive and toxic.’77 This politics of fear 
is thematised by Furedi as a defyning feature of the post-political. Often 
formulated through ‘apocalyptic thinking about the environment’,78 (an aspect 
which will be analysed in more detail in the chapter on Die Kommenden 
Tage), the politics of fear are experienced as a ‘culture of fear’ in which 
irrational fears are reproduced by society, and nurtured by the loci of power in 
order to provide a platform of personal identification. For Žižek it is the 
politics of fear of the post-political wherein, ‘resides the true line of separation 
between radical emancipatory politics and the politics of the status quo: it is 
not the difference between two different positive visions, sets of axioms, but, 
rather, the difference between the politics based on a set of universal axioms 
and the politics which renounces the very constitutive dimension of the 
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political, since it resorts to fear as its ultimate mobilising principle’79 In both 
Žižek and Furedi’s cases, peoples’ existential fears have become the self-
defining narrative in times when ‘the decline of old conventions creates a 
situation in which individuals feel that they have less control over their 
lives.’80 In the post-political fear itself is the object of post-political policies 
(fear of the other), and so becomes the mobilising principle for politics. 
 
Terrorism and its legislation 
In a culture that defines itself through fear of people’s impact on one another 
as well as the environment, terrorism has to be considered a major part of how 
post-political society constitutes itself. It is defined generally as ‘The 
intentional use of violence, particularly in order to sow widespread fear, for 
political ends.’81 A more precise definition would be that terrorism is a form of 
asymmetric warfare, often directed against civilians directly or with the 
disregard for the safety of non-combatants. It is understood that the aim of 
terrorism is to evoke fear, ergo the effectiveness of terror is always conditioned 
by how much the threat is defined as threatening.  
In order to act against the perceived crime of terrorism, it is in the interest 
of nations to define somehow, on an international level, what terrorism is. This 
problem is being dealt with piecemeal, gradually, in multilateral treaties.82 In 
these treaties, the member states of the UN agree over individual aspects of 
                                                            
79 Slavoj Žižek, ‘Robespierre or the "Divine Violence" of Terror’, Maximilien Robespierre and 
Slavoj Žižek, Virtue and Terror: Maximilien Robespierre, (London: Verso Books, 2007b) 
pp.vi-xiii, p.xxvi. 
80 Frank Furedi, Culture of Fear Revisited: Risk-Taking and the Morality of Low Expectation, 4th 
edn (London: Continuum International PublishingGroup, 2006) p.76. 
81 Simon Blackburn, "terrorism", The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008) Oxford Reference. 2008. Date Accessed 18 Jul. 2014 <http: 
//www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199541430.001.0001/acref-
9780199541430-e-3067> [last access 4 September 2014]. 
82 Such agreements have been developed by the UN General Assembly, the International Civil 
Aviation Organisation (ICAO), the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and the 




terrorism in order to provide basic legal tools to combat international 
terrorism in its many forms.83 
Through the introduction of special legislation to deal with terrorist acts, 
states make choices about their respective interpretations of what constitutes 
terrorism and, in consequence, which criminal becomes an enemy of the state 
(and the people it claims to represent). This construction of the terrorist as 
enemy of the state is an important step by governments to manifest their 
individual agendas. Carl Schmitt posits in The Concept of the Political that 
real-politics is based on the distinction between friend and enemy. He 
describes how the construction of an enemy by the state is the implementation 
of the other as an entity that is a ‘public enemy’ (‘Feind ist nur der öffentliche 
Feind’).84 This means that an enemy is first and foremost a construct, a 
‘Gestaltung’, a formulation, of a possibility for the state to act politically.85 
Schmitt makes a compelling argument for the idea that what and who is 
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regarded as an enemy of the state is to be understood as a symbolic construct, 
made up of the interests of the ruling elements. He presupposes the concept of 
the politics of fear, in which an imagined other is introduced that threatens the 
individual in order to mobilise him/her to political action against said other. 
 
Terrorism as ideological fantasy  
and symptom of the post-polit ical 
Žižek describes how ‘our pluralistic and tolerant liberal democracies remain 
deeply Schmittean: they continue to rely on political Einbildungskraft (power 
of imagination) to provide them with the appropriate figure to render visible 
the invisible Enemy.’86 This constituted enemy of the state is what Žižek 
would call an ideological fantasy. Fantasy is not non-reality but fantasy 
structures the social reality itself, by providing a narrative that explains the 
contradictions of the symbolic in terms of the subjects’ desire. Ideology is thus 
something that is practiced rather than imposed on subjects. One of Žižek’s 
main works is the book titled The Sublime Object of Ideology, in which he 
explains how ideology functions as a place that is constituted by, while at the 
same time constituting subjects, by their striving for this sublime object.  
According to Žižek, ideology works by positing the objects of enjoyment 
for its subjects, points of identification, and providing a freedom to enjoy 
them. These objects of enjoyment are what Žižek calls sublime objects. 
Immanuel Kant defined in The Critique of Judgment the sublime (das 
Erhabene) as a mixed experience that subjects have of something that makes 
then feel exalted, fearful and joyous all at the same time. When encountering 
the sublime, subjects experience a harmony of reason and imagination – the 
sublime is what evokes passion. The subject assumes that he/she shares this 
experience of this object with all other subjects.  
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Žižek adds to this idea the Lacanian concept of enjoyment and the 
Freudian concept of the drives, which both aim at making up for the lack of 
castration, the experience of alienation in the symbolic. The impulse to seek 
enjoyment, the pleasure principle, is one of the powerful drives that shape our 
behaviour – all the time looking for a thing, a sublime object, which Lacan 
calls object a. Since people are never able to fill the gap of castration, they 
create a narrative that explains to them why this is not happening – a fantasy 
that explains the gaps in the symbolic structure that shapes their lives. 
However, Žižek says that ‘when we enjoy we never do it spontaneously, we 
always follow a certain injunction’,87 the super ego.  
For Žižek the same principle applies to regimes who provide the laws that 
provide the limitations of enjoyment. However, Žižek argues that, in order to 
be effective, a regime’s explicit laws must also harbour and conceal a way in 
which people can still enjoy. This is done, as described by Matthew Sharpe, by 
implicating ‘subjects in a guilty enjoyment in repression itself, which Žižek 
likens to the “pleasureinpain” associated with the experience of Kant’s 
sublime.’88 Žižek also uses the term jouissance, the French term for a 
particular excessive sense of enjoyment and pleasure, to describe this idea. 
The written and unwritten laws of a society, which act as super ego, organise 
people’s enjoyment (and, if they experience too much enjoyment, reign in 
their jouissance) through ideological fantasies that address the subjects’ fears 
of having their enjoyment taken away by an imagined other.  
The political climate of post-politics is such that the state, reduced to a 
technocratic machine requiring fuel to keep it running, needs constant 
legitimisation. It achieves this by giving the impression of ‘doing something’ to 
address the immediate subjective lack expressed by individuals, their 
individual fears from the unknown that is expressed through a heightened fear 
from harm from the other. Without an underlying political structure, the post-
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political state needs – according to Žižek – ‘constant “spontaneous” 
ideological supplement(s) to post-political administration, as its “pseudo-
concretization”, its translation into a form that can appeal to individuals’ 
immediate experience.’89 This spontaneous ideological supplement is the way 
terrorism has been defined for the post political – as an ideological fantasy in 
the form of the concept of ‘new’ terrorism.  
 Terrorism has changed qualitatively in the past twenty years. What 
were once regarded by governments as the main terrorist groups that 
dominated past national conflicts such as the Red Army Faction (RAF), the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
have abandoned violence; in 1993 the PLO recognised Israel and renounced 
the use of terrorism. In 1994 the IRA called a permanent ceasefire. And in 
April 1998, the RAF declared its campaign to be over, announcing that ‘the 
urban guerrilla in the form of the RAF is now history.’90 The main reason why 
these groups gave up organising themselves according to their aim was that 
with the end of the Cold War, the political framework that ‘had largely 
organised world affairs (and shaped identities) – both internationally and 
domestically’,91 including the national interests of these terrorists groups, 
ended.  
With the decline of political frames of reference for many terrorists 
groups came a decline in terrorist acts.92 However, terrorism itself did not 
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disappear but at the same time could also not be situated conveniently in a 
political framework. Instead, the terrorist acts of the 1990s and after, such as 
the Oklahoma City bombing and the Tokyo subway sarin attack, both in 1995, 
as well as the attacks on the Twin Towers in 1993 and 2001, were interpreted 
as having been, as Matthew Morgan writes, ‘dominated by religious 
overtones.’93 (Also the politics of Hamas, which filled the political vacuum left 
by the politically irrelevant PLO, legitimises itself on the grounds of 
traditionalist, religious values.) 
Morgan continues, ‘Today’s terrorists increasingly look at their acts of 
death and destruction as sacramental or transcendental on a spiritual or 
eschatological level.’94 For many, such as Morgan and terrorism researcher 
Walter Laqueur,95 this is a sign that a new breed of terrorists have emerged 
who seem to have different agendas and means than previous generations.  
Furedi, Poynting and Whyte describe a movement to redefine terrorism 
within world politics that attempts to accommodate so-called ‘New’ terrorism. 
This attempt at redefinition is built around what they term the ‘new terrorism 
thesis’.96 What is stated in this thesis is that the nature of terrorism has 
changed fundamentally. For example, Iain McLean and Alistair McMillan 
clearly differentiate between ‘New’ and ‘Old’ terrorism;97 In opposition to ‘Old’ 
terrorism’,98 ‘New’ terrorists are described as ‘nihilistic, inspired by fanatical 
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beliefs and … They rarely set out aims that appear remotely attainable, they 
give no warnings, they do not engage in bargaining, they find compromise 
solutions to problems unappealing; they are willing and even eager to carry 
out the mass slaughter of non-combatants; and they frequently do not even 
claim responsibility for their deeds.’99 The impression left by the accounts of 
‘New’ terrorism is that it is unknowable and thus unpredictable, altogether 
more dangerous than ‘Old’ terrorism. These are two important new 
dimensions to the new terrorism thesis.  
In contrast to ‘Old’ terrorism, new terrorism brings with it an 
understanding of an enemy that is not only more apocalyptic and dangerous, 
but also less susceptible to traditional forms of control. ‘This particular 
conceptualisation of new terrorist ‘groups’ as ideologically (as opposed to 
politically) driven organisations is supplemented with an assumption that they 
are beyond the boundaries of negotiation or reasoning.’100 There is a bias 
towards the supposedly inherent non-negotiability of ‘New’ terrorism that 
goes hand in hand with the idea that it is essentially unknowable. The 
combination of non-negotiability and unknowability emerges as the most 
fundamental of the characteristics of the ‘New’ terrorism. Poynting and Whyte 
describe how the ‘new terrorism thesis’ has its ‘origins in the counter-terror 
strategies in Latin America in the late 1980s/ early 1990s, supported by a 
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number of key academic experts who are embedded in the US and British 
military establishment.’101  
The way in which contemporary terrorism is experienced, derives its 
terrorising quality from a feeling of unpredictability. It is experienced as 
having no recognisable political patterns, combined with an assumption of 
knowledge on the side of the terrorist of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) (such as nuclear and chemical devices), apparently making it more 
dangerous than previous forms of terrorism. This trend can be seen in 
headlines that treat terrorists’ fantasies as a legitimate threat; such as the 
headline about Canadian terror suspect Ahmed Abassi, whose 
megalomaniacal idea it was to ‘contaminate the air or water with bacteria in 
order to kill up to 100,000 people.’102  
The collapse of the old political framework has created a shift in the 
collective ability to interpret what terrorism means. The perceived change that 
apparently informs today’s terrorists’ agenda is understood as unintelligible as 
well as unpredictable. This is expressed by a public fear of how young men are 
subjected to radicalisation by an outside force.  
The ‘war on terror’ in particular, as an official statement directed at the 
enemy, indicates a shift in the understanding of terrorism and the state’s 
relation to its citizens. Through creating a pre-emptive worldwide war on a 
contested concept, terrorism has become treated as a crime of conspiracy 
rather than deed, where the crime lies with the incitement of the self to acts of 
terrorism, rather than the radicalisation and recruitment of others. One token 
of this re-conceptualisation of terrorism as a corruption of the self is the idea 
of self-radicalisation; the notion that people can be corrupted by watching 
online terrorist propaganda and are seduced into becoming ‘lone-wolf 
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terrorists’ known by the FBI as HGVEs: homegrown violent extremists.103 
(Examples range from Timothy McVeigh and Anders Breivik to Dzhokhar and 
Tamerlan Tsarnaev.) These terrorists are regarded as impressionable 
individuals threatened by what can be seen as ‘a kind of psychological virus 
that can afflict the vulnerable and those suffering from psychological 
deficits.’104 The terror of the ‘lone-wolf’ has come to stand for the fear of the 
unknown/other generated within society which has lost the provisions to bind 
its subjects together in a meaningful way. 
Furedi describes how the idea of radicalisation, as a process that comes 
from the outside, imposing itself on the impressionable minds of young men is 
misguided. Rather it is young peoples’ disillusionment with post-modern 
society, combined with the limitations of the post-political that limits subjects 
to define themselves solely through cultural narratives, that seems to fuel their 
turn to the radicalism of the internet. As Furedi sums up,  
Many young people, who find it difficult to gain meaning from their 
experience in Western society, react by rejecting Western society. Their 
Muslim peers sometimes go a step further and express their alienation 
through the medium of a jihadist outlook. The attraction of this outlook 
is that it provides a coherent and edgy identity. It offers the cultural 
resources for the constitution of an Islamic youth subculture.105  
The 2005 London bombers, says Bill Durodié, provide a good example of  
how a coherent explanation for their horrific actions eluded the public 
imagination.106 Attempts to explain this act through political or psychological 
frameworks did not hold up to close analysis. The bombers had no proven 
links to a terrorist network, nor were they an openly persecuted minority. They 
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did not attack a governmental institution or politicians – instead they chose to 
kill indiscriminately 52 civilians. As Malik writes, ‘The London bombers – like 
those in Madrid, Bali, and New York before them – issued no warnings, made 
no demands, left no list of grievances.’107 (The alleged leader of the London 
bombings Mohammad Sidique Khan, proclaims in his martyrdom video a 
vague and confused stance towards an enemy he is unable to articulate.)108 
Durodié writes how as explanations, the bombers’ presumed influences, 
from foreign mullahs to supposed social backgrounds, always fall short under 
closer scrutiny.109 These models fail to address the overall destabilisation in 
the post-political of the traditional social network. Rather, these quasi-
explanations contributed to the public conceptualisation of contemporary 
terrorism as coming from outside society. Instead, the terrorist should be 
regarded as what Žižek describes as a symptom of the post-political.  
Žižek’s concept of the symptom is not the same as the post-Marxist 
Althussarian understanding of ‘symptomatic’ that sees the symptom as that 
which is unsaid by the text, a deterministic hidden depth.110 Žižek follows 
Lacan’s understanding of the symptom as one closer to Marx’s ideas. For 
Žižek, Marx exposed the symptom of capitalist ideology, as he saw ideology 
not as an imposed mechanism that deliberately hides the true goings on, but is 
itself conditioned through the material interchanges between subjects.111 The 
symptom is then a contradiction within ideology itself.112 In The Sublime 
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Object of Ideology, Žižek demonstrates how Lacan himself insisted that it was 
Marx who invented the symptom, but it was Žižek’s accomplishment to 
superimpose Marx’s concept of surplus value and Lacan’s concept of surplus 
enjoyment i.e. Jouissance, ‘The ultimate lesson of psychoanalysis is that 
human life is never ‘just life’: humans are not simply alive, they are possessed 
by the strange drive to enjoy life in excess, passionately attached to a surplus 
which sticks out and derails the ordinary run of things’.113 The enjoyment that 
the subject derives from searching for the thing (the unobtainable object of 
desire that is believed to fill the gap) constantly produces an enjoyment 
surplus – jouissance.114  
The excessive pleasure of jouissance that is experienced is then organised 
in the symbolic, with the help of fantasy, into a new kind of signifier. This new 
signifier is then called a symptom – a signpost of the real within the 
symbolic.115 
On the one hand, the symptom is the source of one’s jouissance, and is 
constitutive of the subject within the symbolic. On the other hand, the 
symptom is something from which one suffers, something that prevents one 
from attaining real satisfaction. In The Sublime Object of Ideology, Slavoj 
Žižek gives an example of such a symptom in the form of the Alien in Ridley 
Scott’s film Alien (1979), ‘it threatens them (the crew of the Nostromo)  
and at the same time constitutes them as a closed group.’116  
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Considering the symptom as the element that embodies the 
contradictions of ideology, in Durodié’s analysis the London bombers can  
be interpreted as symptom of the post-political; their acts were a means to 
subjectivise themselves in a society that was unable to provide a strong 
symbolic framework. He describes how the terrorists’ acts should be regarded 
as a senseless acting out: 
The real truth, then, about the London bombings may be that they were 
largely pointless and meaningless. This would suggest a problem entirely 
opposed to that presented by politicians and officials, media and other 
commentators alike. The bombers were fantasists – want-to-be 
terrorists – searching for an identity and a meaning to their lives. They 
hoped to find it in a global cause that was not their own, but that 
appeared to give expression to their nihilistic sense of grievance. Islam 
was their motif, not their motive.117 
Durodié’s reading of the terrorists’ motives as a product of a society that fails 
to provide its subjects with a common meaning, is paralleled by Žižek’s 
argument that, in the post-political, the search for identity within a universal 
framework, especially for those who are already considered other, is 
foreclosed.118 
Durodié’s argument is that terrorism has become a shortcut for people 
who feel excluded from society yet are unable to define themselves outside it. 
Rather than a means that tries to achieve concrete political change, terrorism 
has become the crassest form of acting out, against the hegemony of the post-
political. As described by Žižek as early as 1994,119 ‘the true target of ‘terrorist’ 
acting’s out is the implicit violence that sustains the very neutral, non-violent 
frame.’120 Acting out is a term used by Lacan which he takes from the German 
word agieren, from agens meaning a propelling force. Agieren was first used by 
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Freud in a psychoanalytical context to mean ‘the enactment rather than 
recollection of past events.’121 In Lacan’s definition acting out describes the 
same phenomenon of a discharge by means of action rather than 
verbalisation, but also includes the dimension that this acting out is a failure 
of a subjectivisation. This is more closely looked at in the chapter on Four 
Lions. Acting out is a frustrated way of addressing the Other who has become 
‘deaf’ to the subject’s ‘words’.122 The thrust of Durodié’s as well as Žižek’s 
arguments can thus be expressed thus: Terrorism in the post-political can be 
understood, not as a political gesture but, more generally as a symptom of a 
failure for people to become political subjects.  
This idea is also expressed by Furedi, who claims that the only thing new 
about ‘New’ terrorism is the perception that it’s any more sophisticated or 
effective than it used to be.123 Rather, the notion of a ‘New’ terrorism becomes 
‘a self-fulfilling prophecy’. He says, ‘The existence of a physical threat of 
terrorism cannot be denied, but the idea that terrorism represents an 
existential threat is the product of society’s inability to give meaning to human 
experience. It is a symptom of a society that has lost its way and lacks the 
intellectual and moral resources to deal with the routine threats that it 
faces.’124 
Instead of a shift in the quality of terrorism there is a shift in the 
perception of terrorism – this new perception of terrorism becomes the 
expression of the post-political. It is a shift that finds its expression, more 
often than not, on the cinema screen. 
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The post-polit ical  uses f i lm to contextualise itsel f 
This reinvention of terrorism in the post-political has led to culturally specific 
re-imaginings of terrorism in different national cinemas. Filmmakers have 
given on-screen artistic form to the new paradigms of the post-political not 
merely through technical methods, such as narrative, mise-en-scène and 
characterisation, but also through a sense that terrorism speaks of our time in 
a profound way.  
 Depictions of terrorism in cinema as an area of research has grown 
enormously in the last ten years. For the most part this new research 
specialises in looking at the role of terrorism within certain national cinemas. 
Apart from many contributions to the role of the terrorist in Hollywood films, 
there are new studies of terrorism in Asian especially Indian films,125 Middle 
Eastern cinemas126 and an ongoing interest in terrorism in diverse European 
cinemas.127 This is hardly surprising, since the history of terrorism is often 
defined by national or cultural movements (e.g. the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, 
the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain and France). Moreover, many 
national cinemas have turned the depiction of their perspective on national 
terrorism into a way of exploring national identity and cultural history. The 
fascination with terrorism has long been the source for political drama of 
many national cinemas, including the UK and Germany, who see their own 
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political and ideological dilemmas summed up and played out in the terrorist’s 
struggle.  
This thesis examines how the representation of terrorism can be 
understood as post-political vision, as expressed in film, that speaks of the 
duality of film in the post-political and the post-political in film. The 
aesthetics of the post-political, the way the post-political is put on screen, is 
determined by way national cinemas approach the symptoms of the post-
political, especially the symptom of terrorism. Film as such, in its artistic 
translation, is an experience of the post-political, rather than an index of it. 
The aim is to illustrate how the post-political generates its own aesthetics and 
ways of seeing, and that these qualities, in their contradictions and limitations, 
point to artistic and social possibilities outside post-politics.  
  The cinemas of Germany, the USA and the UK are chosen as 
representative of Western nations in which the post-political has become the 
default of societal operations, and where this mindset is constantly translated 
into local specific histories of terrorism. This thesis investigates specific films 
from these countries that demonstrate a discernible and engaging filmic 
narrativisation of the post-political in their depiction of terrorism. To highlight 
the importance of how the post-political focuses on its own narrativisation, in 
the following analysis, one of the two films from each national cinema 
investigated is set before the age of post-politics, under the conditions of so 
called ‘Old’ terrorism. The re-imagining of past terrorism (terrorism seen as a 
historic event that shaped each nation’s history) through the lens of post-
politics gives a necessary insight into the need for a narrativisation of the post-
political through a re-narrativisation of history. 
In order to identify the richest, most potentially meaningful film texts, a 
great number were viewed and considered as potential candidates for this case 
study. Each country provided an extensive range of films dealing with 
terrorism. 
Many of these films are referred to throughout the thesis as examples. 




providing the most startling insight into the workings of the post-political in 
national cinemas. The films chosen as representative for each country are 
Munich and Zero Dark Thirty for Hollywood cinema, Hunger and Four Lions 
for British cinema and The Baader Meinhof Complex and Die Kommenden 
Tage for German Cinema. 
 
Chapter outline 
This analysis starts with an investigation of post-politics in Hollywood 
cinema. Chapter 1.1. looks at how, in Munich, the concept of empathy is used 
by director Steven Spielberg to create an understanding for his characters. The 
idea of empathy as a post-political device, not only in film but also as a 
fundamental aspect of post-political morality, is established. The film’s 
narrative, as a metaphor for the ‘war on terror,’ is investigated in terms of 
Spielberg’s reliance on empathy as a cinematic device and moral guideline. 
Through the creation of spectatorial alignment with the protagonist Spielberg 
heightens the empathy for the characters’ loss of home.  
Chapter 1.2., as part of an investigation of how post-politics is presented 
in Hollywood cinema, analyses the film Zero Dark Thirty. From one 
perspective the film is indicative of a broader political sentiment and attempt 
at meaning making, and is bound up with the US elites’ attempt to 
manufacture direction and legitimacy after a period of considerable upheaval. 
After investigating how the film can be read in the context of its objectives 
(that is to produce a verisimilitudinous account of the events) the chapter 
describes how Žižek and Shaviro read Zero Dark Thirty in terms of the post-
political. Both are concerned with the film’s relationship to reality, not in and 
of itself but as a framing of contemporary post-politics. For Žižek the film 
constitutes the post-political whereas for Shaviro, it maps it. The two readings 
approach the film as ideology first and cinema second. This chapter 
undertakes another reading of the film that reveals the absurdity and camp 
within ‘the war on terror’, through engaging with it as a film in the first 




camp exposes its aesthetic as an aesthetic with failings bound to the 
ideological failings of the ‘war on terror’. In particular, it is the camp 
characteristic of a failed seriousness that makes the film a marker of the post-
political.  
The second part of the analysis examines how in two examples of British 
cinema, the post-political is represented in terms of a political act. Chapter 2.1. 
argues that the film Hunger which re-imagines the IRA hunger strike at the H-
Blocks prison in Ireland, in particular that of the Irish republican Bobby 
Sands, visualises the possibility of a true act as described by Žižek. The 
chapter starts with a description of Žižek’s concept of the true act in order to 
illustrate why the radicalism of Hunger, goes further than just a re-imagining 
of the protests at the Maze prison. The chapter is an analysis of how the act is 
reproduced in the narrative of Hunger and how it is possible for the film to 
create a sympathetic context for the terrorist mindset by evoking an artistic 
experience of a political act. This makes the content of the film relevant 
beyond the historical limits of a defused conflict. 
Chapter 2.2. proposes that the act has become impossible in the post-
political. This chapter analyses how the film Four Lions shows its characters 
trapped in a social landscape, shaped by policies informed by a top down idea 
of multiculturalism, and are compelled to act out their alienation. The chapter 
starts by investigating how director Chris Morris creates a comedy that shows 
up the metaphysical gaps in the post-political by creating access to a shared 
humanity with the characters. 
The third part of the analysis investigates the ways in which post-politics 
has shaped German cinema, especially how the concept of the RAF mythos, 
the particularly German idea of the terrorism of the 70s and 80s contextualised 
in the cultural landscape, plays a major part in its post-political landscape.  
Chapter 3.1. looks at the film The Baader Meinhof Complex, and its 
stated aim to demystify the different aspects of the RAF mythos. The chapter 
will explore the context of the RAF mythos and the role it plays in German 




of a feature film, the film demonstrates a particular narrative process, which 
Žižek would describe as a postmodern filling in of the gaps. The gap in 
question is between subjective experience and material reality, which is crucial 
for Žižek’s concept of ‘touching the real’ (the moment when the symbolic 
dysfunctions itself through its own negation.) This way, the film’s formal 
aspects fill the gaps that lie between familiar, established images and concepts 
of the RAF mythos, with a subjectivised experience of the historical events, 
achieved through the film’s aesthetic. In this way, the film recreates the RAF 
mythos in terms of the post-political. The final chapter 3.2. analyses how the 
film Die Kommenden Tage forgoes re-mythologizing of the RAF mythos and 
instead takes it at face value, incorporating it more or less straightforwardly 
into its narrative. Žižek’s description, of how in postmodern narratives myth is 
normalised into reality, is explored in order to investigate in the following part 
how different aspects of the RAF mythos, especially its antiauthoritarian 
notions, are taken into the narrative of the film. Finally the film’s sci-fi 
aesthetic is analysed in order to illustrate how the mythos of impending 
economical and environmental apocalypse, perpetuated by a politics of fear, 





Post-politics in Hollywood cinema 
 
This first part of the analysis investigates how Hollywood films show the ‘war 
on terror’ in terms of the post-political, showing how in the films Munich and 
Zero Dark Thirty their attempt at narrativising the events results in specific 
film forms. 
 Furedi describes how contemporary society lacks an intellectual 
framework for confronting the fear of terrorism. Especially ‘Western political 
elites lack a web of meaning through which they can make sense of the threat 
of terrorism.’128 As Durodié writes, ‘Those fears are in large measure an 
expression of social isolation and mistrust, combined with an absence of 
direction and a crisis of confidence amongst the elite.’129 The failure to 
conceptualise the issues at stake is demonstrated by the absence of consensus 
around even the words to be used in order to describe the meaning of the 
present conflict and enemy. This is evident, as Furedi point out, when it comes 
to describing who the enemy is, e.g. the Homeland Security Council (HSC) 
tries to construct the terrorist as enemy through the term of Universal 
Adversary (UA),130 a term so pliable that it allows for any interpretation.  
What can be seen as failure of conceptualisation by Furedi (the forming of 
the idea), Jack Holland describes as a failure of narration (the expression of 
this idea). He describes how after 9/11 ‘Politicians, practitioners and media 
commentators initially struggled to place frameworks of intelligibility over the 
events. … Americans lacked a language to describe and regulate the meaning 
of terrorism at home.’131 The terrorism of the post-political becomes an 
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expression of the loss of the political dimension not only in terms of 
understanding this very loss but also in expressing it.  
Considering this impasse in mapping terrorism in the post-political 
through traditional means, it seems to almost suggest itself that the inability 
to describe contemporary terrorism (especially after 9/11) through the 
traditional frameworks of terrorism, created a platform for a way of 
understanding that lies in the realm of the imaginative. Furedi points to how 
Thomas Friedman in the New York Times talks about the way terrorism and 
counterterrorism is understood in terms of ‘imagining evil’ and dreaming up 
nightmare scenarios, thus ‘encouraging a turn toward speculation and 
fantasy.’132 He also describes how directly after 9/11 the White House turned to 
Hollywood in order to ‘share with the entertainment community the themes 
that are being communicated here and abroad: tolerance, courage, 
patriotism.’133 The Hollywood dream machine became a way of articulating 
every fantastic scenario imaginable in the same way that the UA became the 
blank canvas on which to project every enemy imaginable. The ‘war on terror’ 
especially is imagined through fear of the figure of the irrational, often 
religious or ideological (if not both) fanatic. 
Even before 9/11 the impact of the emergence of terrorism in Hollywood 
cinema, as an expression of the worldwide downfall of the communist regimes, 
is evident on screen. From the late 1980s through to the 1990s, Hollywood 
produced eleven action movies that were constructed around the theme of 
international terrorism which were also in their annual top 50 at the box office, 
most notably the Die Hard franchise.134 The depiction of international 
terrorism in these films would follow a classic Hollywood narrative of a hero 
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fighting a stereotyped villain and would serve as an exploration and 
exploitation of the real life conflicts of the political vacuum the downfall of the 
Soviet Bloc had created. For example, the Gruber brothers in the 1st and 3rd 
instalment of the Die Hard films are a former West German left wing 
terrorist/East-German soldier respectively, who are trying to make a life for 
themselves in a time when their old ideology has lost its meaning.  
By committing coordinated suicide attacks, reminiscent of a Hollywood 
movie, nineteen young Muslims changed the way that America would 
construct terrorism in the cinema. Many saw in the 9/11 attacks a stunning 
recreation of life intimating art – the late director Robert Altman spoke of a 
direct link between Hollywood being directly responsible for the attacks by 
creating the fantasy in the first place, ‘The movies set the pattern, and the 
people have copied the movies […]. Nobody would have thought to commit an 
atrocity like that [the attack on the World Trade Center] unless they’d seen it 
in a movie … I just believe we created this atmosphere and taught them how to 
do it.’135 
The profound impact of the real attacks on the cultural narrative of 
terrorism showed itself in the aftermath as it seems to render any previous 
showings of terrorism in Hollywood obsolete. The collective shock 
experienced in America lead to an eerie code of silence when it came to 
depicting terrorism in the movies. Footage of the Twin Towers became a 
subject of cultural sensitivity and at least forty-five films that were in 
production in 2001 were either cancelled, postponed or heavily edited,136 
among them Collateral Damage (2002) and later box office hits such as 
Zoolander (2001) and Spider-Man (2002). It took five years until Hollywood 
tackled the attacks on the World Trade Centre head on with Paul Greengrass’s 
film United 93 and Oliver Stone’s World Trade Center, both released in 2006. 
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By then, the cinematic landscape had changed in terms of depicting not only 
the terrorist enemy but also the Western role in world politics – it now 
reflected an America that is entangled in an identity crisis in which, according 
to Philip Hammond, the ‘most common overall theme in Hollywood’s version 
of contemporary war is that we are all victims.’137 
In the following chapter this failure to narrate is explicit in Munich and 
Zero Dark Thirty, and the films’ respective artistic expression of this failure is 
described. In Munich the terrorism is experienced and expressed through the 
notion of empathy as a moral imperative of intersubjectivity that is found in 
the post-political. In Zero Dark Thirty the terrorism is experienced and 
expressed thorough a camp aesthetic that speaks of how ideology in the film is 
enjoyed and stylised to excess. 
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Munich: empathy as a cultural expression  
of the post-political 
 
Introduction 
This chapter draws out the preoccupation with empathy that underpins 
Spielberg’s Munich’s post-political interpretation of terrorism.  
Jodi Dean describes how American democracy today is shaped by what 
she calls the ‘fantasy of politics without politics’ where ‘everyone and 
everything is included, respected, valued, entitled; no one is made to feel 
uncomfortable; everyone is heard and seen and recognised and has a place at 
the table.’1 She mentions how Barack Obama’s frequent referrals to empathy 
as a central part of his value system, is consistent with this, ‘“politics” of unity, 
empathy, and understanding.’2 Obama insists that empathy is, ‘at the heart of 
[his] moral code,3 and his aim is to talk less about the ‘federal deficit’… ‘But,’ 
he explains, ‘I think we should talk more about our empathy deficit’.4 Some 
writers go even further, such as psychologist Douglas LaBier, for whom the 
American nation suffers from a pathological disorder which he has called 
‘Lack you Empathy Deficit Disorder, or EDD.’5 ‘We are on the cusp of an epic 
shift,’ writes Jeremy Rifkin in his 2010 book The Empathic Civilisation, ‘the 
Age of Reason is being eclipsed by the Age of Empathy.’6 Rifkin’s study puts 
forward the idea that empathy is a biological (‘homo empathicus’) as well as a 
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cultural achievement of the twenty-first century, and is in fact the ‘invisible 
hand’7 that binds and reproduces society (rather than material forces such as 
the market). Empathy, it would seem, has become to some degree the moral 
impulse for people to instigate change, either in themselves or others. 
The importance of empathy as a post-political imperative in the USA is 
especially evident in Spielberg’s work as his films express his personal ethics 
of empathy. These in turn have been shaped by his own post-political 
appropriation of his Jewish identity. For example, Spielberg describes how his 
film Schindler’s List (1993) shows ‘that profound change can occur when even 
one person makes a positive choice.’8 He says this choice is the result of 
empathy. He continues, ‘The very idea that the best way to teach empathy is 
with examples of it, so that maybe someday, kindness will be a natural reflex 
and not just a random act.’9 For Spielberg, empathy is the instrument through 
which one must approach another in order to generate a world of goodwill and 
consideration. What is interesting is how Spielberg approaches the American 
response to terrorism, i.e. ‘the war terror’, through the lens of empathy, in what 
look like the coming together of two expressions, or even symptoms, of the 
post-political – terrorism and empathy – in the medium of film. 
 This first part will first explore the concept of empathy through the idea 
of how empathy, as an aesthetic tool as well as a concept, has become a 
central object of study in film theory. The second part describes how empathy 
is never an empty tool but has to be contextualised in the historical 
development of ideas in the twentieth century, especially that of the post-
political. 
Even though empathy is a central concept in many branches of critical 
theory, including phenomenology and cognitivism, specific historically-
conditioned instances of empathy have not been the subject of much critical 
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analysis in regard to film theory. Therefore a great amount of this first half of 
the chapter is dedicated to establishing a critical framework for the concept of 
empathy.  
The third part describes Spielberg’s own approach to empathy and how it 
has been shaped by his own Jewish identity in combination with post-politics. 
This is done by investigating the moral imperatives, as voiced by Hannah 
Arendt about Adolf Eichmann, that were the result of Jewish persecution 
during the Third Reich.  
The final part will look at how Munich exemplifies this Spielbergian take 
on empathy and how it is exemplary for the role of empathy as a moral guide 
of how to express oneself ethically and aesthetically in the post-political. 
 
Empathy – a theoretical  tool 
Cinema is often regarded as a medium for creating and experiencing empathy; 
engaging with another through empathy sounds like a natural process, 
especially when watching a film where becoming emotionally engaged with 
the characters in the story often is part of the experience. Yet the idea of 
empathy as a cognitive state, and the term empathy itself, are only about as 
old as cinema itself. 
The term empathy was invented as recently as 1909, by the psychologist 
Edward B. Titchener, in an attempt to translate the German word Einfühlung 
(Einfühlungsvermögen).10 (Translated: to feel into.)11 The idea itself originated 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth century in Germany as a constituent of the 
epistemology of the Enlightenment that considered the dimensions of human 
understanding; one can only feel one self into something if there is a concept 
of self. The concept of Einfühlung became an important tool in the late 
nineteenth century in the field of aesthetics by Robert Vischer and Theodor 
Lipps, who used the term to conceptualise the relationship between spectator 
                                                            
10 Titchener, Edward Bradford, Lectures on the Experimental Psychology of the Thought-
Processes (New York: Arno Press, 1973) p.21. 





and object as an active process of the imagination. The spectator experiences 
the work of art through his/her ability to ‘feel himself into’ the object.12 The 
experience of the object of the filmic image is also often thought of in terms of 
empathy.  
The argument put forward in this chapter is that empathy, as a human 
quality, is conditioned by the very idea of what is a human quality – or, what 
makes us human? This is a highly contested idea in post-politics, reflected by 
the different debates around the function of empathy in film theory. Are 
humans just biological beings with innate structures of how we construct 
behaviour? Or are human beings themselves structuring their behaviour, and 
if so to what degree? In short, the concept of empathy is to be understood in 
terms of human agency.  
People have the ability to identify with another object or, in the case of 
empathy, another subject. (What stands to debate is the matter of degree and 
what this means.) This quality however, is shaped as much by human history 
as it is by biology. The duality of human beings, as simultaneously being 
subject and objects in nature, is the obvious defining feature of human 
exceptionalism. Humans are at the same time biological beings, subject to the 
laws of physics, but also, as Malik writes observantly, ‘reflexive, rational, 
social beings, who can design ways of breaking the constraints of biological 
and physical laws.’13  
The human ability to surmise the content of other minds is such a 
construct; it is achieved in the duality of, on the one hand biological, and on 
the other social and psychological factors, that cannot been seen in isolation 
from one another. Moreover, as this first part will investigate, this duality 
cannot be understood as outside its historicity, its particular meaning in time 
and space – what Hegel called Weltgeist, and which Marx understood as the 
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concept of Menschheit14 (humankind), emphathising the materialist 
conditions under which people make this history. The concept of imagining 
the other has taken on several understandings throughout history, (the idea of 
imaging the other being in itself a historically specific formulation of this), and 
each time this human quality is associated with the specific meaning of its 
time. The emergence of empathy, as an expression of intersubjectivity, as will 
be discussed in this part, can be positioned at a particular moment in time.  
The concept of empathy entered the language at a time when the idea of 
intersubjectivity over subjectivity was regarded as the more preferable option. 
Empathy, can be seen as a theoretical concept that assumes that there is a 
way of accessing an object, by projecting one’s self, and one’s own human 
experience, into the object. It is an aesthetic tool through which, ‘a spectator 
was said to appreciate a work of art empathically, by projecting his personality 
into it.’15 With little other contextual information about an object people can 
still create a somewhat personal relationship with it. Film, by its nature as a 
visual object, shows its subject matter, and can thus only provide limited 
information about it (unlike, for instance, a novel where the character’s 
innermost thoughts are available to the reader). Often filmic, visual 
information is carefully selected through editing, sound, mise-en-scène, 
framing etc, and what the audience is permitted to know is chosen to achieve 
certain emotional affects. (Affect is to be understood as a something that is or 
is being carried out for emotional gratification. ‘In film studies, feeling 
responses to cinema and films, whether prompted by performances of 
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characters’ emotional states and/or evoked by cinematic elements such as 
closeups, music, and mise-en-scene.’)16  
Empathy has been addressed in the context of film since the beginning  
of the twentieth century. In Soviet Russia, Sergei Eisenstein created montage 
effects that were intended deliberately to manipulate the audience’s empathic 
engagement in order to create ecstasy, or as he called it ‘pathos’.17 In 
Eisenstein’s formulation, ‘the spectator is lifted outside of himself (…)  
to an intense intellectual and emotional identity’.18 Eisenstein wished for  
the spectator ‘to experience deep emotions and enthusiasm … a maximum 
emotional upsurge to send him into ecstasy, and for this he created a ‘formula’ 
which will eventually excite the desirable emotions in him (the spectator).’19 
Eisenstein’s idea of pathos has more in common with Brecht’s idea of 
Verfremdung or estrangement rather than empathy. For both artists the 
aesthetic processes that their art enabled was based on an emotional 
identification of the spectator with a material reality outside the artistic object, 
the play or the film, itself. The audience thus becomes part of a dialectic that 
involves them being confronted through art with an antithesis, which is always 
the contradiction of capitalism, that makes the audience gain new insights and 
personal spiritual enrichment. This process is however dependent that the 
spectator is outside a totally immersing identification with the object. What is 
evoked is not as much an Einfühlen in the object as a means of personal 
catharsis, but an emotional recognition of the gaps in the real, the 
contradictions of capitalist ideology, that are provided through the artistic 
object.  
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Around the same time in Germany, Béla Balázs wrote, in his essay The 
Visible Man that film enables the viewer to feel himself into the object in a 
new way – by joining the moving image. ‘Movement in reality is seen only as 
a moment, a cross-section of motion. In film, however, we accompany a 
runner and drive alongside the fastest car.’20 For Balázs this experience of 
movement ‘can be the highest expression of an emotional or vital rhythm.’21 
This statement is, according to Adriano D’Aloia, the first description of 
empathy in regard to film.22 Balázs describes an Einfühlen by the spectator 
into the events on screen, which to describe as phenomenological would not 
be precise enough, as Balázs understands the purpose of film as something 
that transcends the subjective experience of empathy with an object, be it 
physical or emotional.  
In both descriptions – Eisenstein and Balázs’ – empathy has to be seen 
in the context of the possibility of the subject becoming richer and fuller 
through identification with something greater, outside itself. For both, film 
provides for the spectator an emotional understanding of human possibility. 
Emotional identification becomes one of several artistic means intended not 
for mere emotional manipulation of the spectator for its own sake, the impulse 
for a personal catharsis. Eisenstein and Balázs understand the purpose of film 
as for the viewer to become a new kind of subject: for Eisenstein it is the 
creation of a revolutionary subject, and for Balázs cinema is an instrument to 
put human beings centre stage. The empathy evoked by film in the 
descriptions of Eisenstein and Balázs serves as a means to achieve a synthesis 
towards a greater truth about the condition of humanity. 
However, the idea of Einfühlung and emotional identification with what 
is experienced on screen has changed dramatically since Eisenstein and 
                                                            
20 Béla Baláz and Rodney Livingstone, Béla Baláz’s Early Film Theory: Visible Man and The 
Spirit of Film, (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2010) p.64. 
21 ibid. 
22 Adriano D’Aloia, ‘Cinematic Empathy: Spectator Involvement in the Film Experience’, in: Dee 
Reynolds and Matthew Reason, Kinesthetic Empathy in Creative and Cultural Practices 




Balázs, as their ideal of a universally shared vision of humanity has today 
become a foreclosed possibility. 
Contemporary theories on empathy and film are more or less arguments 
between cognitivists (empathy as active brain work), neurobiologists 
(empathy as a biological function) and phenomenologists (film as an aesthetic 
experience of otherness through empathy).23 In these understandings empathy 
is seen as an intrinsic human trait that can be studied scientifically.  
Recent film theory is also heavily invested in the notion of empathy. 
Thomas Elsaesser and Malte Hagener suggest that empathy theory could be 
‘picking up where apparatus theory left off.’24 They emphasise especially 
discoveries that have been made within the field of neurobiology, where so 
called ‘mirror neurons’ are activated in the brain and compel humans to mimic 
the actions they observe.25 Similarly, the work of Margrethe Bruun Vaage26 
uses the recent work of neurobiology to argue that people are hard-wired to 
empathise as a way of mirroring other people. However, the idea of empathy 
as a result of biological processes is questionable on at least two levels. Firstly, 
in terms of biology: In the field of neurobiology mirror neurons have been 
discovered only in a certain type of monkey and there are reasonable doubts 
both about their function (if the neuron cluster identified has the purpose of 
‘mirroring’) and, moreover, their actual existence in human beings.27 Secondly, 
in the field of philosophy: The idea of ‘mirror neurons’ is in itself a human 
concept, conditioned through a particular understanding of the world. Patricia 
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Churchland describes how neurons are in themselves not intelligent and 
therefore cannot be driven by a mindful purpose, let alone a complex one such 
as ‘mirroring’ another.28 
Other academics interested in notions of empathy are cognitive theorists 
such as Noël Carroll,29 Susan Feagin30 and Murray Smith,31 who describe how 
mental schemata, especially those of empathy, determine people’s way of 
understanding and reading film. Empathy here is an internal understanding of 
the other’s emotional make up. The work of Berys Gaut also sees empathy as a 
cognitive process, which he describes as ‘imaginative identification.’32 These 
cognitive approaches to empathy are often helpful in describing the way 
empathy is artistically evoked on screen, by providing a descriptive tool to 
analyse film. For example, by adopting Edward Branigan’s theory of 
‘subjective narration’,33 cognitive theorists (e.g. Carroll, Smith) put forward, 
that by adopting a character’s narrational point-of-view, we are likely to 
emulate the character’s affective state, where the point-of-view (p.o.v.) shot 
becomes one of the artistic tools to achieve this aim. Where cognitive theories 
are less fruitful is in their understanding of human action as based on the idea 
schemata, or the inner logic of common sense. This understanding of human 
behaviour neglects to investigate certain forms of empathy on screen because 
these theories are not interested in exploring the reasons for empathy as a part 
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of a greater social construct that has to be understood in its own terms. For 
example, Smith’s model of empathy is based on the concept of ‘allegiance’ in 
terms of a moral identification. He says that, ‘to become allied with a 
character, the spectator must evaluate the character as representing a morally 
desirable (or at least preferable) set of traits, in relation to other characters 
within the fiction. On the basis of this evaluation, the spectator adopts an 
attitude of sympathy… toward the character.’34  
This approach however fails to explain, on the one hand, how films still 
manage to evoke empathy with morally repugnant people e.g. Hitler and his 
henchmen in Downfall (2004). On the other hand, because this approach 
understands cinema as ‘purely objective’, as Flisfeder points out, the 
cognitivist’s emphasis on empathy fails to conceptualise how empathy is 
historically conditioned.35 A failure to understand empathy as a product of its 
time has a similarly detrimental effect on the reliability of phenomenological 
approaches to film to engage with discussions around the meaning of the 
empathic effect in its own terms. 
 
Intersubjectivity 
Phenomenological approaches are another field in film studies that are highly 
dependent on the concept of empathy. The phenomenological experience, as 
described by the one of the first thinkers of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, 
relies on empathy as the method of intersubjectivity – an appreciation of the 
other through one’s own ‘lived body.’36 Intersubjectivity describes the 
relationship between the subject and the other. This other is seen as relatable 
to in the way its otherness is present within the subject’s own ego and it can 
be accessed through an identification with the other on a physical level, by 
putting oneself metaphorically ‘in the shoes of the other’. The subject’s body 
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becomes the place where one encounters the other, or the object, by 
translating the feeling of the object directly into the subject’s own body, rather 
than through a conceptualisation of the other/object mediated through an 
abstract universal idea of being. As the name suggests, intersubjectivity 
implies an in-between state in the process of becoming a self-conscious 
subject. The process of becoming a self-conscious subject is most famously 
described by Hegel’s dialectical allegory of master and servant. The 
intersubjective state is the moment of recognition between the two subjects, 
where both parties become one subject-object. Becoming a self-conscious 
subject is seen as a process of individual becoming, so recognition happens 
when the individual subject encounters another thing. Robert Williams 
describes how in the intersubjective state, the old ‘subjectivity is transformed 
(aufgehoben), expanded, and elevated into intersubjectivity.’37  
How the contemporary phenomenological understanding of 
intersubjectivity differs from the dialectical process in Hegel’s 
phenomenology, underlines the evolvement of the contemporary 
understanding of empathy as an end in itself rather than as a means to an end. 
In Hegel’s philosophy the process of recognition is based on the subject 
exerting the metaphysical concept of what he called ‘spirit of the world’38 
(Weltgeist), the collective reason of humanity (not people’s individual reason) 
which forms itself through the process of history. The Weltgeist is then a 
distinct moment in time in which the collective truth is reality.  
In Hegel’s process of subjectivisation, the other is first recognised through 
this universal system of meaning, and the subject then continues through the 
intersubjective state to become a self-conscious subject. In the end, one of the 
subjectivities is always incorporated into the other to form a single project or 
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system (of ‘needs and labour’) – in short, one subjectivity is subordinated into 
the venture of the other, more powerful, subjectivity.39  
Today, the implication of Hegel’s’ dialectic towards becoming a self-
conscious subject is problematised as it relies on contested ideas which are: 1. 
A universal meta-narrative as assumed by the subject, and 2. That this meta 
narrative overrides the other’s subjectivity, i.e. it concludes with one 
subjectivity dominating the other.  
With the general rejection of meta-narratives in the postmodern, it is 
more common to understand the state of intersubjectivity as both the start 
and end point of interaction with the other. This state allows for both subjects 
(or subject and other/thing) to exist on the same level of recognition without 
having to succumb to, or be mediated into, a greater/outside body of meaning. 
Today Hegel’s idealistic intersubjectivity, in which the subject emerges from 
the dialectical encounter with another, is replaced by the idea of empathy as a 
safe method, or as a tool, of recognising the other, without imposing on the 
other one’s own subjectivity, by promoting the state of intersubjectivity as the 
place of recognition as a state of compromise between the self and the other.  
Translated to film studies, today’s understanding of phenomenology 
identifies people’s experience of what they see on screen as an almost entirely 
empathetic process. Often, phenomenological theories describe the empathic 
relationship with the body on screen, most fully in the work of Vivian 
Sobchack.40 Also Jennifer Barker describes how experiencing film is a literal 
Einfühlen, in which one’s own body recognises what the body on screen 
experiences: ‘Our emotional sympathy for [film characters] derives from our 
muscular empathy with them.’41 Similarly, Julian Hanich swoons over his 
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ability to Einfühl himself into the on-screen muscular strength of Arnold 
Schwarzenegger through ‘pleasurable somatic empathy.’42 
Žižek describes intersubjectivity, as promoted by phenomenological 
discourses, as the contemporary ideal of a moral being, the ‘fragile symbolic 
status of a human subject, caught in the abyss of decentered symbolic 
representation, and whose very identity hinges on an external, inconsistent 
network’.43 This state of ‘precarious (inter)subjectivity’, he continues, creates 
today’s ‘ethical subject’. It is an ethics of little value, he says as the in-between 
state of a ‘meeting of minds’, that is assumed in the concept of 
intersubjectivity, forecloses what Žižek calls the ‘immortal Truth’ of man.44 
What Žižek is describing is the universal principle, as posited by Hegel – that 
which the individual assumes for all mankind. The universal principle is the 
necessary element in Hegel’s idea of the transitional process from subject to 
self-conscious subject (or to translate it to the meeting of subjects: the 
transformation from other to fellow human being). Hegel describes the 
universal (das Allgemeine) as spirit (Weltgeist) which is brought into being by 
thought; ‘Spirit as simply the ‘nature of human beings en masse,’ a product of 
history rather than its presupposition’.45 For Marx (following Hegel) the 
universal was the prerequisite for history itself – human beings are the 
producers, and at the same time products, of the historical progress of human 
culture (now referred to as historical materialism). Žižek’s main concern is 
that, the necessity for a universal absolute, that speaks all individual 
narratives, is called for in order to evoke progress and with it – change.  
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In rejecting a universal truth for the other, out of the absolute dismissal of 
the idea of one subjectivity dominating over the other the possibility of 
possessing and transcending current realities is foreclosed. The post-political 
is the rejection of political change in favour of a simple ‘recognition’ of the 
other. Žižek asks: ‘is it then the case that the Neighbour is the ultimate 
horizon of our ethico-political activity? Is the highest norm the injunction to 
respect the neighbour’s Otherness?’46 
Empathy as way of experiencing film is, for many theorists, a central idea 
of film studies. Often, these theories are concerned with how the spectator 
relates to the character on screen by feeling a character’s physicality, including 
their emotions be it through the mechanisms of cognitive identification with 
the characters or the phenomenological Erfahren (experiencing) of the other 
through the state of intersubjectivity; the fundamental tenet being is that there 
is an alignment (a word also used by Murray Smith in his theory of emphatic 
identification)47 by the spectator with the character through an empathic 
evaluation. Where differences between theoretical takes on cinematic empathy 
occur, they are in a matter of degree. Accounts range from an abstracted 
empathy that requires awareness of the fiction of the film (e.g. Eisenstein, 
Carroll), over being able to position oneself in the character’s situation (e.g. 
Smith, Gaut) to a copying of the physical experience of what the character 
experiences (e.g. Balázs, Barker).  
For the earlier modernists such as Eisenstein and Balázs, empathy is only 
one step in the dialectics of creating meaning. For them, film had a 
universalising potential, in which empathy was only a means to an end in 
producing a subject that was part of a greater human project. Without a 
common ideal, the human connection that empathy creates with the work of 
art is not the shared social experience they envisioned. Empathy on its own 
allows for only an interpretation of the other’s desire on a personal level as it 
does not access a greater social narrative. It is telling that the discourse on 
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empathy within film studies is between areas that tend to neglect or ignore the 
social that exists outside individual experience. 
 
Empathy as a master signi fier of the postmodern  
and moral guideline of the post-polit ical 
It could be said that contemporary theories on the relationship between film 
and empathy often do not take into consideration that empathy itself, and its 
acclaimed properties to provide insight into the other, are an expression of a 
preference for individual experiences over universal/social ones. The concept 
of empathy describes a distinct form of human interaction that (by insisting 
on a state of intersubjectivity) seems to resolve the gap between individual 
and universal experience. This is why Žižek’s emphasis on ideology critique is 
important, as it makes it possible to grasp the current emphasis on empathy in 
the context of its own construction. It becomes necessary to define the 
conditions that produce, and rely on, the empathic affect, and the reasons for 
why empathy, the intersubjective state, and the construction of victimhood are 
the interconnected signifiers of the post-political age. The following section 
investigates the conditions that created the new emphasis on empathy and 
victimhood in the post-political. 
The post-political is an age that makes a virtue out of the ability to 
empathise. What has changed is that empathy has become a self-serving 
moral imperative; it is not a transgressive state towards becoming a self-
conscious subject, but empathy is regarded as the be all and end all of human 
understanding of another. At the same time the role of victim as a conduit for 
empathy has changed in that the position of victim is no longer a lamentable 
one. Instead there is a case to say that victimhood has become a defining 
feature of social identity. 
The understanding of political change as a cultural matter results in 
emancipatory politics turning into a cultural exercise in finding and/or 
identifying with that which is other. This is where the new emphasis on 




dominant culture, the other is automatically considered ‘oppressed’ and in 
need of recognition. Through empathy, people can achieve a recognition of the 
other that does not impose on another’s subjectivity, and the self, shaped by 
identity, is the acceptable platform for political ideas. The self is considered 
safe enough as a space for change that does not impede the Other’s/others’ 
identity narratives, and (for the greater good) it is only individual human 
behaviour that is changeable. Žižek describes how ethical behaviour today 
revolves around the performance of intersubjectivity as the guarantor for non-
oppression. ‘The ultimate goal of ethics (today) is to guarantee the neutral 
space in which this multitude of narratives can peacefully coexist.’48  
(And, it could be added, the ultimate goal of post-political practice is a 
static pluralism with regard to ‘the intersectionality of oppressions’49 – a 
personal politics of liberation of identities instead of liberating people from 
identity itself. The political act is reduced to gaining a status of being an 
‘other’.50 And the other is the oppressed, the victim, the one who suffers. This 
works vice versa and therefore those who are suffering, the victims, are the 
other – the ideological proof of their oppressed status.)  
Žižek sees the philosophical ideas on ethical behaviour by Richard Rorty 
and Peter Singer, which centre around empathy and suffering, as the logical 
realisation of post-political activism. In their philosophy, which is based on 
any creature’s ability too suffer, they demonstrate that the cultural logic of 
post-modern thinking is that animals should have rights simply because they 
experience suffering. Žižek concludes, ‘This, then, is the ultimate truth of 
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Singer: our universe of human right is the universe of animal rights.’ ⁠51 In a 
society where all narratives are valid, the lowest common denominator of 
suffering is equally valid. The logical conclusion of identity politics for Žižek is 
demonstrated by Singer’s anti-humanism, where the oppressed are defined by 
their ability to suffer.52  
Today, empathy as a basis for human interaction rests on the idea that a 
mutual recognition of pain would resolve conflict. Right and wrong would 
cease to exist or only exist in a new moral absolute; the person who has not 
empathised must be wrong. It could be argued that empathy has become what 
Žižek would call a master-signifier, a denotation of its own system of meaning 
that stands for itself, ‘a signifier which structures an entire field of meaning’.53 
(The master-signifier is also often called by its French name, point de capiton) 
His use of Lacan’s idea of master-signifier is more political than Lacan 
originally intended; as for Žižek it is the ability of the master signifier to 
obfuscate the real relations of things behind an unquestionable truth that 
stands for itself. This is what makes the master-signifier an ideal device for 
ideology critique. Rex Butler gives a useful interpretation of Žižek’s use of 
master-signifier as that which is ‘always a tautological, performative, and self-
referential element in ideology, and that the identification of such a master-
signifier is ‘crucial in any analysis of ideology’.54 Empathy, then, has become a 
self-evident truth in the post-political: something that can be measured, 
articulated and scientifically proven.  
It has to be noted that this is not a critique of the non-existence of the 
notion of empathy. It obviously does exist, as the ability of people to imagine 
and understand the feelings, perspectives, and ideas of fellow human beings. 
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And it is a concept that everyone can identify with as part of what makes us a 
functioning human being (this is evident in that today ‘lack of empathy’ is a 
symptom of pathological behaviour such as Narcissistic Personality Disorder 
(NPD).)55  
The surge in the popularity in the idea of empathy today, also has to be 
regarded as an indicator of how in the post-political people are expected to 
engage with one another – that is, people are expected to understand the 
other in terms of intersubjectivity.  
The rise in the appeal of empathy today is best understood in its 
ideological function as a ‘safe’ way to understand others (without risking to 
impose another subjectivity onto them), where the self is the risk-free space of 
intersubjectivity. And it is here where Spielberg’s moral values sync with the 
post-political; Spielberg sees empathy as the only morally acceptable way of 
encountering the other, and it could be argued that Spielberg’s own Jewish 
identity served as a template for the development of his moral code. 
 
Spielberg and empathy 
This part looks at how empathy plays a role in Munich as a concept that is 
shaped by post-politics, in particular in how Spielberg’s understanding of 
empathy as his guiding the moral principle was shaped by his Jewish identity.  
Spielberg’s movies are noted for their classical narrative structure and the 
recurring themes of childhood and absent fathers,56 childlike wonder57 and 
male angst,58 but they also deal with deeper ethical questions around the 
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consequences of human behaviour. More often than not Spielberg addresses 
the present, and contemporary politics, through analogies created in historical 
films and science fiction blockbusters; subjects centre around history, identity 
and collective memory e.g., Lincoln (2012) Amistad (1997), Saving Private 
Ryan (1998), The Color Purple (1985), Schindler’s List (1993) War Horse 
(2011), as well as uncanny encounters with the other e.g. Close Encounters of 
the Third Kind (1977), Jaws (1975), Jurassic Park (1993), Minority Report 
(2002), A.I. Artificial Intelligence (2001). Buckland observes that, as diverse as 
Spielberg’s films are in subject matter, they all carry the hallmark of his 
artistic, and production, principles. In the words of Jon Lewis, a Spielberg film 
is a ‘signature product’, and Spielberg can be titled as auteur, as author of his 
films.59 
The events of 9/11 had an obvious impact on Spielberg’s cinematic work. 
In 2005 he released two films; a highly successful adaptation of H. G. Wells’ 
The War of the Worlds, and Munich, also based on a preexisting book. These 
two films could not have been more different in subject matter; the first is 
science fiction, the second is a story ‘inspired by real events’, as stated in the 
opening titles. Nonetheless, both films fit comfortably within the Spielberg 
canon of movies: both deal with common Spielbergian tropes such as the 
absent father, the upheaval of the family and encounters with the other.  
Moreover, both films can be seen as Spielberg’s engagement with the 
events of 9/11, their impact on the American psyche, and the consequent self-
analysis by America of its role in the world. Both films deal with a violent alien 
invasion by those whose motives are outside understanding, and how this 
invasion creates a state of uncertainty and ambivalence in society. In both 
films the superstructure of society fails to provide a sufficient fabric of 
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meaning for these encounters with the real, the Lacanian dimension of that 
which cannot be imagined, and thus a general sense of being ‘unsafe’. In the 
epilogue of Wells’ novel it says that, ‘We have learned now that we cannot 
regard this planet as being fenced in and a secure abiding place for Man; we 
can never anticipate the unseen good or evil that may come upon us suddenly 
out of space’.60 This statement coincides with the American experience of 9/11. 
Spielberg, when asked if he would have made his adaptation of War of the 
Worlds if 9/11 hadn’t happened answered, ‘Probably not, our adaptation is 
again at a time when Americans feel extremely vulnerable.’61 These two films 
tackle the effects of 9/11 in different ways; where War of the Worlds 
reimagines the shock of the impact of the attack by the invasive element, 
Munich conceives the reaction to such an event. 
According to Daniel Levine, Spielberg, in his method of ‘dramatic 
exposition’ … ‘through fictionalised retellings of real-world events … stands at 
the head of a remarkable series of initiatives intended to develop and 
disseminate moral, ethical and political consensus around some of the most 
important issues of our times’.62 Key to Spielberg’s success, both commercially 
and artistically, is his ability to fictionalise the political consensus of 
contemporary American liberalism, that can be found through what Buckland 
refers to as an ‘organic unity’63 of three elements of film directing that are: 
cinematic visualisation, blocking and filming. For Buckland, Spielberg’s 
cinematic work, by being well crafted, ‘magically’ evokes something elusive, 
akin to a stage magician who ‘constitutes a fictional domain where what is 
seen is not what is there’.64 Buckland not only talks about Spielberg as a 
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magician but also describes the accomplishment of Spielberg’s craft (brought 
about by Spielberg’s ‘competence, sensibility or intuition’)65 as ‘poetics’.66  
Other Spielberg scholars are more specific when it comes to Spielbergian 
‘magic’. In Nigel Morris’ intertextual analysis of Spielberg’s work, what links 
Spielberg’s films is his ability to create emotional empathy within the 
spectators.67 Others have also pointed out that Spielberg’s dramatic and 
cinematic formula is designed to create empathy as method of evoking a 
reaction from the audience.68 Bringing these approaches together, it seems 
that what Buckland calls Spielberg’s ‘poetics’ is what creates the empathy that 
other critics consider the cardinal point of Spielbergian meaning making – or, 
to put it another way, it is Spielberg’s skill as a director, working in 
combination with his personal philosophy of empathy, that brings about a 
Spielberg film.  
These analyses of Spielberg’s methodology are in accordance with 
Spielberg’s own conception of his filmmaking. Referring to his film Munich, 
and the difficulty of filmically approaching ideologically motivated characters, 
he claims that the only way ‘to understand this as filmmakers is through 
empathy because that’s what you do – you extend empathy in every single 
direction because you can’t understand the human motivation without 
empathy.’69 For Spielberg, empathy is the primary means of understanding 
people. When others do not feel as he does, this is due to their lack of 
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empathy: ‘Sometimes it seems as if there are still people immune to the notion 
of empathy, of compassion,’70 Spielberg said at a news conference in Pasadena.  
Spielberg’s enthusiasm for empathy can be seen in parallel with Roger 
Ebert’s exclamation that ‘Movies are the most powerful empathy machine in 
all the arts.’71 Ebert describes that movies are what enable him to ‘live 
somebody else’s life for a while.’72 He continues that, feeling what ‘it feels like 
to be a member of a different gender, a different race, a different economic 
class, to live in a different time, to have a different belief’ has a liberalising 
influence on him.73  
For Spielberg and Ebert empathy, as generated by the cinematic 
experience, allows for an understanding of the other that is experienced as 
somewhat authentic. This feeling of authentic experience of another is for 
them not one of total subjectivisation. Their understanding of the purpose of 
empathy is congruent with the postmodern understanding of the subject that 
can never be/assume another, but can experience the other in a 
phenomenological way, in the state of intersubjectivity. In Spielberg’s opinion 
this tactic is also a way of tackling greater political issues.  
Spielberg applies the method of empathy to highlight the complex 
political decisions of America’s defence policies in order to understand them; 
he describes his motivation for Munich as ‘an attempt to look at policies Israel 
shares with the rest of the world and to understand why a country feels its best 
defence against certain kinds of violence is counter violence.’74 Spielberg’s 
seeming intention is to draw parallels between the American policies after 9/11 
through Israel’s experience of Munich, and by showing the consequences of 
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Israel’s policy of vengeance on the moral wellbeing of its protagonist, in order 
to question the moral outcomes of the ‘war on terror’. The idea of empathy is 
not just a cinematic tool for Spielberg, but also as the moral guideline for 
understanding people as a whole. Munich in particular demonstrates how 
Spielberg evokes empathy cinematically (in order to elicit understanding for 
his characters).  
It can be argued that his personal moral code around empathy was 
shaped in a great part by his greater identification with his Jewish identity. 
The Jewish experience of the Holocaust created debates around a new moral 
imperative to empathise, which could be seen as a highlighted version of the 
general postmodern turn towards empathy. It is worth investigating how 
Spielberg evokes in Munich this particular combination of empathy; empathy 
as the logical moral exigent of not only of the post-political but also the 
Holocaust. 
 
Jewish identity in the context of Einfühlung  
Spielberg often refers to his own Jewish identity as a basis for his interest in 
history, morality and humanity. He describes how his Jewish background has 
informed his world view: 
From the day I started thinking politically and developed my moral 
system, so from my earliest youth onward, I have been a vehement 
defender of Israel. As a Jew, I know that the existence of Israel is 
important for the survival of all of us. And because I am proud to be 
Jewish, I am very worried about the rise of anti-Semitism and anti-
Zionism in the world.75 
 Spielberg said himself that he rediscovered his Jewish roots when studying 
the Holocaust in close detail for his film Schindler’s List.76  
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To some extent Munich demonstrates how the legacy of the Holocaust 
has created a problematic situation for Jewish post-war identity, as one caught 
in its own tautology. 
The defining feature of the Holocaust was the victimisation of a single 
people. Any event in which Jews are victimised has the capacity to evoke the 
horrors of the Holocaust. In his critical essay on Munich and victim identity, 
titled Identification with Victimhood in Recent Cinema, Roy Brand describes 
how the actual Munich attack triggered what he describes as ‘the old victim 
complex.’77 He mentions how, in the film, Spielberg lets the charismatic 
character of Golda Meir, express how the ‘old victim complex’ affects her 
reaction to the Munich attacks on the Olympic village. At the beginning of 
Munich, Meir evinces her anguish and the horror over the fate that has 
befallen Jews thirty years after the Holocaust, she says:  
Ambushed and slaughtered again …  
while the rest of the world is playing games, 
Olympic torches …  
And brass bands and dead Jews in Germany. 
And the world couldn’t care less. 
Brand explains that the Munich attack had such a great impact on Jewish 
sensibilities because of the unique relationship between Jewish identity and 
victimhood. He starts by illustrating how the clear and unquestionable 
distinction between the victims and the perpetrators of the Holocaust – the 
unambiguous distinction of good and evil – was also problematic for Jewish 
identity, in that the moral absolute of the Holocaust helped to essentialise the 
equation of Jewish = victim in the context of the twentieth century.  
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The anti-semitism of the Nazis was not simply a chance manifestation of 
fascism but was the core of fascist ideology and the planning of the final 
solution (the total extermination of the Jewish population in Europe) at the 
Wannsee conference in 1942. Its execution in extermination camps, was its 
logical and horrific conclusion. The fascistic racist understanding of the Jew 
was that of an ‘incorrigible mistake’; their Jewishness was essential to them, 
they cannot be re-educated, baptised or cured (in the sense of: the Jew is a 
mistake because he is a Jew). This fascist tautology of the Jew is described by 
Žižek (who often refers to the ‘Jew’ as an example for the idea of a master-
signifier of fascist ideology),78 ‘for the Nazis, the guilt of the Jews is a direct 
fact of their very biological constitution; one does not have to prove that they 
are guilty, they are guilty solely by being Jews.’79 The essentialist concept of 
the Jew was in fact the essence of fascist ideology itself. 
The Holocaust, Brand says, turned victim and perpetrator ‘gradually into 
all inclusive (and not always exclusive) categories resulting in the claim that 
every Jew is a survivor by dint of having been a potential victim, and every 
non-Jew is a perpetrator by virtue of not being a victim, or not as much a 
victim as the Jews.’80 In short, the inconceivable scale of the Holocaust 
produced a unique tautology of victimhood for the Jewish people: The 
reasoning of this understanding is that, because the victims of the Holocaust 
were all Jews (the aim of the Nazis was to exterminate the whole Jewish 
people), all Jews are victims.  
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The main feature of post-war Jewish identity, as victim by default, 
contained contradictions. On the one hand, there was a political expediency in 
adopting this identity in order to claim the state of Israel. On the other hand, 
the question was, if Jews integrated this truism into their identity, is this 
adopting the same essentialist principles as fascism? This state of affairs was 
best exemplified by Hannah Arendt’s assessment of Adolf Eichmann’s trial in 
Jerusalem in 1961.  
Arendt describes how the hearing was used as a show trial designed not 
to investigate Eichmann’s individual guilt, but to showcase what the Jews had 
suffered through the Holocaust. She maintained that this was done in order to 
further the political cause of then prime minister David Ben-Gurion by 
teaching a ‘lesson to Jews and Gentiles, Israelis and Arabs, in short, the whole 
world.’81 That lesson was that the Jewish State was the only solution to the 
anti-Semitism in the world and the moral wrongness of the Holocaust (as 
represented by Eichmann) legitimised the then very young and uncertain 
Jewish State as morally right – it was a political move to demonstrate to the 
world that Israel must exist so that Jews could exist. 
Arendt described how ‘the most potent ideological factor in the Zionist 
movement since the Dreyfus Affair’ (the Holocaust) was ‘their (the Zionists) 
conviction of the eternal and ubiquitous nature of anti-Semitism.’82 For many 
political thinkers, such as Arendt, the idea of Zionism, as the only rational 
response to anti-semitism was as anti-semitic as anti-Semitism itself, they 
were seen as two sides of the same coin. What Arendt criticised was how the 
Holocaust was misused by Israel as a moral absolute in order to legitimise its 
existence. For Arendt, a morality that is based on an inherent victimhood of 
the Jewish people ‘was ill advised.’83 She saw the weakness in such a 
legitimisation of Israel as a reminder of fascist ideology itself,84 in so far as the 
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tautology that emerged out of the horrors of the Holocaust, ‘the Jew’ is a 
victim because he is a Jew,’ finds its counterpart in the fascists’ racist 
understanding of ‘the Jew’ as an incorrigible mistake. The criticism Arendt 
makes is that both understandings of Jewish people essentialise their identity, 
either biologically or culturally, and by doing so ahistorical, general statements 
such as ‘the Jew’ can be made. The reduction of the Jewish people to their 
cultural identity enables the fascist ideology and inhibits Jewish people to 
transcend the Jewish experience.  
Arendt’s account of Eichmann, The Banality of Evil, concluded that he 
was not an evil monster who hated Jews, but a pathetic creature who lacked 
the ability to think.85 Her description was, ‘The longer one listened to him, the 
more obvious it became that his inability to speak was closely connected with 
an inability to think, namely, to think from the standpoint of somebody else.’86 
Arendt concluded that the monstrosity Eichmann committed, he could only 
have done because he was intellectually incapable of moral reflection; a 
condition for which she blames the efficiency of the totalitarian Nazi State 
apparatus that, for her, relieved people of their duty to think. This conclusion 
is premised on Arendt’s own phenomenological philosophy. She sees the 
failure of Eichmann in his incapacity of Einfühlung, to feel himself into the 
other. Ultimately, Arendt’s assessment was problematic, as it diminished the 
reality that Eichmann was a rational being, a self-conscious subject, fully 
responsible for his deeds.87  
However, Arendt’s conclusion can be understood in the context as part of 
the greater rejection of Hegelian self-awareness in the postmodern. Arendt’s 
criticism of Eichmann as a failure of Einfühlung is consistent with her own 
philosophy in which she aims to understand the nature of politics through 
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phenomenological approaches that are about abstract contemplation instead 
of worldly engagements with political reality. 
In spite of her critical stance towards its policies, Arendt was a defender 
of Israel, especially at the time of the 1967 war. However, she was always 
aware of the role the Holocaust played in the political self-image of Israel. 
Amos Elon writes in the preface to the 2006 edition of Arendt’s book, that ‘it 
would have been interesting to hear what she might have said later when, 
under the governments of Golda Meir and Menachem Begin (the time of the 
Munich attacks), the Holocaust was mystified into the heart of a new civil 
religion and at the same time exploited to justify Israel’s refusal to withdraw 
from occupied territory.’88 What Elon describes is that Arendt’s original 
criticism, the mystification of the Holocaust, continued establishing itself into 
the national identity of Israel – a theme that becomes a point of identification 
in Munich. 
 
Jewish identity,  morals and Munich 
Munich is a fictionalised account of a real counter terrorist operation, ‘Wrath 
of God’. This was Israel’s retaliation to the attack by the Palestinian terrorist 
organisation Black September on the Olympic games in Munich in 1972, in 
which the terrorists killed eleven Israeli athletes and one German police 
officer.  
Munich tells the story of Avner (Eric Bana), an Israeli born Mossad 
agent, who is recruited by Israel’s Prime Minister Golda Meir (Lynn Cohen) 
personally to lead a unit of five volunteers on a mission to assassinate several 
Palestinian officials. Over the course of the film the assassinations become 
increasingly difficult. Not only do the hits become less well executed but the 
assassins are forced to face the realities and consequences of their mission. 
They discover that attrition does not work, merely producing new targets once 
the old ones are eliminated. The functionaries they kill, who had a more or less 
                                                            




direct relation to the attack in Munich, are replaced by other members of the 
PLO who are further and further removed from the actual event. The realities 
of politics come in to conflict with their idea of punishing the instigators of the 
terrorist attack, and the assassins are confronted with the possibility of losing 
faith through their actions of vengeance. 
Munich is most often scrutinised for its ethics:89 from Spielberg’s 
treatment of revenge,90 to positive readings of the film as redemptive, letting 
‘the assassins (…) question their mission’,91 to descriptions of Munich leaving 
‘essentialist view(s) of Israeli Jewish ethics unchallenged.’92 The focus on 
ethics is unsurprising, as it is the ethics of vengeance and the loss of moral 
framework that inform the narrative of the film. Munich couples ideas of 
victimhood, empathy and the post political, showing how empathy – 
understood as ‘the ability to understand and share the feelings of another,’93 – 
is the preferred method of social connection. The film thematises, through 
empathy, the contradictions in post-war Jewish identity, and applies them to 
the moral dilemma of America’s decision to embark on the ‘war on terror’. 
Munich is about understanding a contemporary conflict through the 
experience of another, one that happened thirty years earlier. For Spielberg 
empathy is the key to unlock the film’s cinematic allegory. Empathy in 
Munich works on two levels: firstly within the narrative itself, where the 
characters’ moral imperative to empathise is compromised. Secondly, the 
audience is connected to the emotional turmoil of the characters through what 
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Spielberg calls an ‘empathic pathway’ where the viewer becomes emotionally 
attached to the character.94  
This first section examines how in Munich this particular moral code of 
Jewish identity is utilised in order to posit a greater question on the politics of 
vengeance in the context of 9/11. Spielberg translates the moral choices the 
characters have to make as Jews to those America has to make as a nation. 
Munich shows the morally complex dilemma of the question of how a nation 
should behave when it is attacked by terrorists, how should it defend itself, by 
imagining the moral dilemmas of the Jewish characters and the consequences 
of their behaviour.  
The characters in Munich are shaped by the opposing notions of post-war 
Jewish identity: On the one hand, that of an identity based on an essential 
Jewish victimhood that demands the safety of a nation state, represented by 
the characters Hans and Steve. Steve says, ‘the only blood that matters to me 
is Jewish blood.’ This exclamation by Steve is shocking as it reveals that his 
racist essentialism (notably he is from South Africa) is evocative of a fascist 
ideology that describes the other as a target because he is not us (and 
ultimately a lack of empathy with the other). On the other hand, the notion of 
identity with a duty to moral righteousness as the essential marker of 
Jewishness (which demands that Jews in particular have the moral obligation 
to ‘not be evil’ in terms of Arendt), as represented by the characters Carl and 
Robert. Robert realises that, ‘All this blood will come back to us’ when he tells 
Avner that he will leave the group. He continues, ‘We’re Jews, Avner. Jews 
don’t do wrong because our enemies do wrong.’ … ‘I don’t know if we ever 
were that decent. Suffering thousands of years of hatred doesn’t make you 
decent. But we’re supposed to be righteous. That’s a beautiful thing. That’s 
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Jewish. That’s what I knew, that’s what I was taught and I’m losing it. I lose 
that and that’s everything. That’s my soul.’  
Confronted with the real of their mission (the discrepancy between a 
moral worldview as espoused by Robert, and the realpolititk of the violence of 
war) Avner has no choice but to cling to and assert the moral code practiced 
by Hans and Steve – otherwise he would have to question the whole purpose 
of the mission and his identification with Israel.  
The consequence of this is that they become ever more inhumane and 
cruel, culminating in their macabre execution and humiliation of a freelance 
female assassin. In the end the agents in turn have become targets themselves, 
embroiled in the tit for tat of international politics. Carl and Hans are 
assassinated and Robert is killed while making a bomb. The film ends with 
Avner quitting Mossad and exiling himself to Brooklyn, by then he is in a 
poor mental state, suffering from persecution complex and psychological 
traumas. 
 Reading the film in terms of the post-political, Spielberg establishes a 
relationship between Jewish identity and post 9/11 American identity through 
the prism of a loss of innocence. For Spielberg the terror attack on Munich can 
be used as an allegory of the events of 9/11, and the mission ‘Wrath of God’ as 
an allegory on the ‘war on terror’. The allegory is complete when the final shot 
of the film connects these two events visually and thematically. Avner walks 
alone, in the distance the Twin Towers loom over the directionless, homeless 
Jew. 
The ethical message of Munich, that the ‘war on terror’ was a 
questionable reaction to 9/11, is delivered by showing the collapse of the moral 
guidelines of empathy. And the ensuing metaphorical homelessness is 
particularly striking as it is the Jew, Avner, who becomes homeless once again. 
Spielberg’s insistence on the value of a moral code of empathy can be 
seen as an answer to the understanding of evil as described by Arendt: If the 




think from the standpoint of somebody else,’95 a moral code based on 
guaranteeing this phenomenon, empathy, is a suitable rejoinder. 
 
Empathic pathways in  Munich 
The following examples show how empathy, as enjoyment, is organised in 
Munich is through points of identification. 
Todd McGowan describes how for Žižek, ideology is captured by the 
cinema in the way that, ‘film organises the spectator’s enjoyment.’96 What 
McGowan refers to, is the particular kind of enjoyment that in psychoanalysis 
understands how people are experiencing the other. Enjoyment here means 
that, if so inclined, one can enjoy a film in an atypical way, by not liking it, but 
by still being engaged in the narrative and the characters. When watching a 
film, enjoyment or jouissance, is generated through watching the on-screen, 
ritualised performance of ideology, ‘that this ideology justifies.’97 In the case of 
the post-political, the emphasis on empathy can be read as an example of this 
kind of ritual. The enjoyment that is experienced by the viewer is achieved by 
‘witnessing the characters’ relationship to their own enjoyment.’98 What this 
means is that the characters, in what Žižek calls interpassivity, take on the 
task of experiencing the spectator’s jouissance, ‘so that it is the object itself 
which "enjoys the show" instead of me, relieving me of the superego duty to 
enjoy myself.’99 By encountering one’s jouissance through the characters in 
the film, the spectator identifies with the character and, in turn, the 
relationship the spectator has with the film depends on how the character 
experiences this jouissance. By looking at how Munich organises the master-
signifier empathy, which can be understood as a master-signifier of the post-
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political, we can see how post-political ideology organises people’s enjoyment 
through film.  
It is useful to turn to Nigel Morris’ description of how this process of 
identification works in the canon of Spielberg’s films and how Spielberg, 
through this, creates empathy. Morris understands empathy as a primordial 
reaction which Spielberg is able to create through his films, by facilitating 
identification though a favouring of subjective shots and thus, ‘aligning 
spectatorial vision with protagonists,’ which, he says, ‘may be an important 
factor in the films’ emotional power.’ 100 This technique that evokes emotional 
identification, he says, triggers a process of analysis and reflection, in which a 
‘postural echo’, a similarity or mirroring of body positions’, is performed by 
the spectator.101 Here he combines psychology with psychoanalysis, by linking 
this postural echo with the spectator’s transferring of his/her own enjoyment 
onto the characters in the act of interpassivity. Morris refers to Spielberg’s film 
E.T. saying, ‘Elliott’s mutual empathy with the alien (‘He feels his feelings’) 
echoes the spectator’s empathy with the screen image.’102 The first example of 
how empathy is generated in Munich, is an analysis of how the film creates an 
emotional identification with the experience of a terrorist attack as a mediated 
event.  
Morris describes how Spielberg generated empathy in E.T. through 
evoking an echoing within the spectator of the mutual empathy between 
Elliott and the alien. This effect is created in Munich in the way the spectator 
is invited to identify with the protagonist as the spectator of the terrorist 
attack as a mediated event. The spectatorial enjoyment is organised in the 
form of a change of the gaze, from an objective ‘witnessing’ of the event as 
mediated spectacle to a cinematic identification with the protagonist.  
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The empathic engagement with the film starts directly at the beginning of 
the story. Spielberg establishes an emotional connection between the events of 
the film and the real experience of 9/11 by showing the Munich attack as a 
mediated event, in which the audience can partake through empathy. Before 
the documentary recording of the Al Qaida attacks on New York, the hostage 
situation carried out by the Palestinian terrorists was the most spectacular 
terrorist media event to date,103 and Spielberg utilises this historical parallel.  
 The film starts by showing a group of men entering the Olympic village 
in Munich. They take guns out of their carrier bags and storm the quarters of 
the Israeli athletes. This first part is designed in the way one expects from a 
Hollywood film; editing and camera angles, music and lighting is arranged is 
this dramatic sequence are arranged to evoke, what Bordwell calls, a ‘classical 
omnipresence’ where the camera becomes an invisible observer, not restricted 
by the contingencies of space and time.104 Here the spectator is not directly 
invited to invest in the characters’ enjoyment, but neither is it made 
impossible. This objective narration though, changes subtly and slowly over 
the next sequence in which several spectatorial alignments take place.  
At the height of the action during the hostage scene, the film cuts to the 
televised news, the camera shows the seventies style tv screen, the announcer 
talking about the breaking news of the attack on the Olympic village in 
Munich. Through this cut the audience’s perspective is switched from 
objective to subjective; they are being addressed directly, also they are 
addressed as tv watchers in the seventies. What follows are several scenes of 
groups of people watching the live news coverage of the dramatic unfolding of 
the hostage scenario. The footage on the screens is the original news coverage 
from 1972. The first group watching the footage are people in a Palestinian 
cafe, where several of them shout rallying cries when hearing the news of the 
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siege. Then Golda Meir, is shown in silhouette, watching the television screen. 
The next shot is of the media centre in Munich from where the live coverage 
takes place. The impression is that this is a global, highly mediated event. We 
also see the terrorists watching the live coverage of their leader negotiating 
with the police. In these scenes the camera cuts between showing the group of 
people, or the person, watching the news and their respective tv screen, 
creating a link between spectator and characters through a switching between 
objective and subjective spectatorship, that is joined by the mutual witnessing 
of the event. The camera shows families together in their living rooms 
watching the news as the hostage situation deteriorates. Palestinian as well as 
Israeli families watch with incredulity, wide eyed, crying. Through the whole 
sequence an ‘echoing’, in the way Morris describes, seems to take place.  
The spectator watches the screen, watching the characters doing the same 
thing – every one involved watches the same footage, creating the effect of the 
spectator being connected with the witnesses of the terror attack. 
This is followed by a sequence that picks up the emotional investment by 
the spectator from the previous one and creates an even more concrete 
empathic effect. Like the previous characters, the film’s protagonist Avner 
watches the coverage of the dead athletes being transported back to Israel. 
Although several days must have passed (from the end of the attack to the 
bodies being flown back) the cut suggests that it is a continuous event. This 
sequence creates the emergence of a deeper emotional connection and 
eventually a sense of empathy in two ways. The first is that, at this moment, 
fragmented news of the Munich attack – shown in the film on tv screens – 
merge into a complete narrative of the event itself – the story of the Munich 
attacks, as told by media reports. The impression is that the connected images 
tell the story of the event, in the same way the coverage of 9/11 and the days 
that followed created a constant loop of news and images that became their 
own interpretation of the events. Patricia Mellencamp wrote of televised 




source and solution.’105 The coverage of 9/11 failed to offer such a solution. The 
immediate question after 9/11 was the now famous phrase ‘Why do they hate 
us?’106 This confusion about an unknown enemy is expressed in Munich by 
Golda Meir’s address to the secret service early on in the film. She describes 
how these new terrorists make no sense to her: 
But I don’t know who these maniacs are …  
And where they come from. 
Palestinians? 
They’re not recognisable. 
You tell me what law protects people like these. 
Spielberg manages to establish his allegory of Munich to 9/11 at the beginning 
of the film, by re-creating the empathic engagement with 9/11  
as a mediated event. The film also recreates the feeling of the failure of the 
repeated images to understand what motivated the attacks. The witnessing of 
the televised attack of 9/11 is ‘echoed’ by the film, not only linking the film 
historically to today, but also creating an emotional link between the 
experiences of Munich and 9/11.  
The second way this sequence furthers empathic identification is again 
through spectatorial identification, but in a more subtle way. This empathetic 
investment begins with the first encounter with Avner. He is introduced 
watching the television screen, the low angle camera framing his shoulder and 
the back of his head in the foreground on the right hand side of the frame. His 
gaze is directed towards the television in the living room which is in the back, 
on the left side of the frame. It is the tv that is in focus, not Avner. This 
atmospheric over-the-shoulder shot establishes a spectatorial alignment with 
Avner experiencing the mediated event by drawing on the audiences’ own 
learned narrative of experiencing 9/11 as a mediated event. Note, it is not a 
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p.o.v.shot that would invite the spectator to take on the role Avner (as would a 
cut showing his p.o.v.). Instead it establishes more of an alignment with a 
character by the audience, which could be called a being-with-Avner, rather 
than a becoming the character. Derek Bousfield and Dan McIntyre describe 
that the importance of the over-the-shoulder shot ‘to the creation of empathic 
emotion in the viewing audience lies in the fact that they generate a sense of 
being involved in the fictional world.’107 They cite Peter Stockwell’s text based 
analyses of how a reader becomes empathetically engaged in the fictional 
world through the text forging a close identification between the fictional 
world and a real life counterpart.108 As mentioned earlier, Morris describes 
that Spielberg’s favouring of subjective shots, and consequential spectatorial 
alignment, ‘may be an important factor in the films’ emotional power.’109 The 
identification with the real life counterpart is what Žižek encapsulates with the 
idea of enjoyment through the other via interpassivity. This seems to be the 
case when the shot connects the viewers’ real life experience with the 
mediated event of 9/11 to a being-with-Avner watching the tv footage of 
Munich.  
By this point it is not clear within the narrative what the viewers’ 
relationship with the character is supposed to be. This could be another in the 
sequence of scenes showing people watch the events in Munich. But then the 
camera moves around Avner, along the side of his face, ending with a close up 
of him staring at the screen. Buckland states that this cinematic introduction 
to the main character (he talks about the same camera movement in Minority 
Report) is a way to create ‘sympathy for the character,’ calling on Steven D. 
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Katz’s description of the ‘sympathetic motion’ of the camera, and this camera 
move repeated several times in the film.110  
In this short sequence, the spectatorial alignment changes from sharing 
the gaze with Avner to a gradual stepping out of this position into turning 
Avner into the object of the gaze. This is not done abruptly, by means of a cut 
to a reaction shot that looks at the object of the audience’s gaze. Rather the 
spectator is gradually, in one coherent move, put in the position of being both; 
their alignment is at the same time a subjective being-with-Avner whilst also 
being allowed to gaze upon the character as an object. This complex 
spectatorial alignment evokes the notion of intersubjectivity, the 
phenomenological condition for empathy; the object of the gaze, Avner, is not 
totally subjectivised, as would have been more the case in a direct p.o.v., 
instead of the over shoulder shot, and a cut between over the shoulder and the 
close up of his face, where the spectator would totally emerge in his 
subjectivity. Instead the film invites the spectator to first identify with the 
environment and the emotional state Avner is in. After the audience got to 
know him on a subjective level the film can start to tell the story of Avner 
from a position that is based in empathy. Spielberg’s cinematic vocabulary 
establishes that Avner is the focus of empathic investment for the film, that 
the audience should empathise with his experience of the mediated event. 
It is worth noting that Avner’s aloof informant Louis (Mathieu Amalric) is 
introduced in the opposite way. The camera movement starts with Louis in 
close up, the Eiffel Tower half seen in the background. Then the camera 
moves back quickly revealing Louies’ upper body. Here the camera creates the 
reverse effect of emotional alignment. The camera perspective is purely 
objective, a spectatorial investigation of the object. But, instead of the camera 
taking the spectator to Louis, it withdraws from him, as if having looked too 
close and then being repulsed by the object.  
                                                            




Another way Spielberg creates empathy in Munich is through points of 
identification that can be understood as a spectatorial echoing of how the 
characters’ relate to their shared experiences of home.  
At the centre of Munich is the motif of home, and its loss. The film’s 
theme is Avner’s relationship with his motherland Israel as the provider of 
home, how a nation can be simultaneously a family and provider in as much 
as real family can, and what happens if this family does not provide the 
fundamental needs of home anymore. Home in this instance is something 
greater than a living place or homeland, it is the particular place that gives 
context and purpose to life. The stress of its meaning lies in its use as a 
counterpoint to social alienation.111 In Spielberg’s films, home is fundamental 
to the character’s experience of reality, it provides and protects meaning and 
moral purpose – it is the seat of identity. Spielberg uses home, a fundamental 
component of human life, as the main source of empathy in Munich. This 
conception of home is spelled out thematically by the character of the PLO 
agent Ali, who tells Avner that their dispute with Israel over land is because 
‘Home is everything,’ (insinuating that this life purpose of home and its 
pursuit is fundamentally true for all people). The characters in Munich 
encounter one another via the notion of home and find their commonality 
through these encounters. The spectator is invited, through their fundamental 
alignment with Avner, to echo Avner’s empathy that he develops through 
sharing the commonalities of domesticity. And when the characters become 
alienated from home through their actions of vengeance, the audience is able 
to emotionally access this feeling of loss. In making the concept of home, and 
the related aspects of food, sex, family, and encountering the other (that which 
is not home), central to his characters’ identities, Spielberg understands the 
characters’ experiences as relatable through an empathic engagement with 
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their humanity. By inverting the wholesomeness of the home, Spielberg makes 
his moral point – the character’s lack of empathy leads to the destruction of 
home, in the literal as well as metaphorical sense. By echoing the experience 
of the loss of empathy the spectator is invited to share through their own 
empathy the greater loss of humanity, through the loss of home, that the 
characters feel.  
For example, Spielberg utilises the motif of food as a shared experience of 
home and one another, when he shows it being used in horrendous ways in 
Munich. Avner is a good cook, who brings his team members together by 
cooking big meals for them. However, the further along their ill-fated mission, 
the more they lose their appetite literally and metaphorically, and the many 
dishes on the meal table, that looked so inviting at the beginning, begin to 
look monstrous and indigestible. Another moment when food turns awry is 
every time Avner meets his case manager Ephraim (Geoffrey Rush), who briefs 
Avner and at the same time tries to give him some sweet baklava (‘from the 
Arabs in Jaffa’), literally sweetening the deal. The most grotesque devaluation 
of food happens when Avner settles the problem over who is going to have to 
carry out the first assassination. His method is breaking breadsticks into 
different lengths and making the team draw lots. It is Robert who draws the 
short end of the (bread)stick – Bread is used symbolically (to the point of 
cliché) as the symbol of life which becomes the harbinger of death and 
murder. The killing of Wael Zwaiter (Makram J. Khoury), in the hallway of his 
house is also shown as a perversion of food. Zwaiter is shot whilst carrying his 
grocery shopping in which there is milk and marinara sauce. Avner and Robert 
shoot him through the brown paper bag with the food which Zwaiter carries in 
his arms. He dies in a pool of a hideous mixture of blood and milk, the 
wholesome puddle of milk being symbolically encroached on by slowly 
seeping blood.  
Through the characters’ relating to one another by means of food, the 




well as the trauma the characters experience through the slowly emerging lack 
of empathy that they develop.  
In the film, the commonly shared notions of food, family and sex also 
become the point of empathic identification with the group’s first three 
victims. After Zwaiter is shot through his grocery bag, Robert gains access to 
the house of the second target, the Parisian PLO representative Mahmoud 
Hamshari (Igal Naor) in preparation for a bomb attack. In the flat he meets his 
wife and daughter – the marked victim is not a single entity but part of greater 
family that will be affected by the violence. Avner meets the third target, 
Hussein Abad al-Chir (Mostefa Djadjam) on the balcony of their adjoining 
rooms in a hotel in Cyprus. They start talking to one another and find a 
connection when watching a young couple fooling around on another balcony 
further down. They both look at each other knowingly, prompting Abad al-
Chir to say, ‘Don’t plan to sleep. They keep at it all night. There, for hours.’ 
Avner’s and Hussein’s shared moment over their common benevolent 
understanding about what goes on in the bedroom next door, also lets the 
audience into their shared moment of mutual understanding. Munich presents 
the targets to Avner and his group through the shared experience of home. 
The spectator discovers the other through empathising with Avner’s and 
Robert’s own empathy for the other – an enjoyment of the other through 
interpassivity. 
 
‘The l ie of Spielberg’  – Ž ižek 
In Munich, Spielberg approaches all characters, not just the other (in the form 
of the PLO), through empathy. This results in the characters only being 
understood in the state of recognition of commonalities, of intersubjectivity – 
Munich plays on the lowest common denominators of human interaction, 
readily accessible images of domesticity. This emotional engagement however, 
leaves no space for an objective evaluation of conflict outside of the personal. 
To approach a complex political subject such as ‘the war on terror’ through 




Žižek emphasises how the humanisation of characters in contemporary 
war films through empathy does not encourage an impersonal evaluation of 
the politics of the film. Žižek describes the portrayal of soldiers as people like 
‘you and me’ in the films The Hurt Locker (2008), Waltz With Bashir (2008) 
and Lebanon (2009) and how, ‘such a ‘humanisation’ thus serves to obfuscate 
the key point: the need for a ruthless analysis of what we are doing in our 
political-military activity and what is at stake. … It is easy to discern the falsity 
of such a gesture of empathy: The notion that, in spite of political differences, 
we are all human beings with the same loves and worries, neutralises the 
impact of what the soldier is effectively doing at that moment.’112 
Žižek points out that by relying on empathy as a method of an analysis of 
war, there is danger of losing sight of the actual political dynamics of the 
conflict. Moreover, according to Žižek, the moral ambivalence of victimhood 
more often than not fails to expose the political motives that created the 
violence in the first place. Žižek accuses Spielberg of this in this passage;  
Therein resides the lie of Spielberg’s ‘Munich’: it wants to be ‘objective,’ 
presenting moral complexity and ambiguity, psychological doubts, the 
problematic nature of revenge, of the Israeli perspective, but what its 
‘realism’ (the aim of an empathetic approach to the character’s motives) 
does is redeem the Mossad agents still further: ‘look, they are not just 
cold killers, but human beings with their doubts-they have doubts, 
whereas the Palestinian terrorists …’. One cannot but sympathise with 
the hostility with which the surviving Mossad agents who really carried 
out the revenge killings reacted to the film (‘there were no psychological 
doubts, we just did what we had to do’) for there is much more honesty 
in their stance.113  
By assuming an ahistorical, post-political morality for the agents, the film 
belies the questionable yet political nature of the historic events.  
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By presenting the Mossad agents experiencing not only doubt in their 
mission and a questioning of their belief system, but also the emotional 
turmoil through which the audience is made to empathise with the 
protagonist, Žižek argues, the film falsifies the political certainties with which 
the conflict was fought. This sentiment is shared by the author of the book 
Vengeance: The True Story of an Israeli Counter-Terrorist Team, published in 
1984 by the Canadian Journalist George Jonas, on which the film is based. 
Jonas writes about Spielberg’s adaptation of his book that, ‘My ‘Avner’ may 
have questioned the utility of his mission toward the end … but he never 
questioned the morality of what his country had asked him to do. He had no 
pangs of guilt.’114 At the time, the Mossad agents of ‘Wrath of God’ had no 
doubt in the rightfulness of their work. By representing Mossad as reflective 
moral agents, as Žižek points out, Munich historicises the Israeli Palestine 
conflict through modern sensitivities in which both sides are equally tragic 
victims of history. For Žižek, the film ignores the complicated colonial history 
of Palestine in which narratives of identity and homeland have obfuscated the 
political power struggles within Israel itself, the repressive actions against 
Palestinians and, most of all, the West’s own politics of interventionism. 
 
Conclusion  
Ultimately, Munich embodies the idea that everyone is a victim of a greater 
failure, a lack of empathy. The emphasis on empathy expressed by Spielberg, 
which translates into his film, describes (as was pointed out by Levine earlier) 
‘a moral, ethical and political consensus … of our times’, in short – an 
imperative to feel – to understand the other through our own emotions rather 
than our reason. It could be said that Spielberg’s films deliberately enable the 
audience to enter the state of intersubjectivity – and the deadlock of 
possibility of action and analysis that comes with this. Munich shows clearly 
the ways in which empathy has become a moral scaffold integral to the post-
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political, not only in facing terrorism but also one another. The highest proof 
of principle for societal and political endeavours has, it would seem, become ‘I 
have empathised,’ shifting the burden from reason to emotion. In the post-
political, the most valid form of self is that which is placed in an emotional 
intersubjective position produced by empathy. Spielberg’s work reflects the 
way in which empathy has become a largely uncontested and culturally fixed 
policy at formal and informal levels.
 102 
Chapter 1.2 
Zero Dark Thirty – the ‘war on terror’ and  
the camp absurdity of the post-political 
 
Introduction  
This chapter has two aims. First, to describe how the film Zero Dark Thirty 
(2012) helped frame ideological discussion at the same time as exemplifying 
ideology at first hand. Second, to explore how the characteristics of camp, as 
described by Susan Sontag, can be read as a symptom of the post-political, 
and how this is evident in Zero Dark Thirty.  
Zero Dark Thirty was a rush job. In April 2011, journalist Mark Boal and 
director Kathryn Bigelow were already working on a screenplay about the hunt 
for Osama bin Laden, set around the Battle of Tora Bora.1 Boal and Bigelow 
had been working together for several years, with Boal having written the 
screenplay for The Hurt Locker (2008), which was also directed and produced 
by Bigelow. On 2 May 2011, Osama bin Laden was killed by the US military in 
Abbottabad in north-eastern Pakistan. This quickly became public knowledge 
and the pair started rewriting their screenplay. Eighteen months later, on 19 
December 2012, Zero Dark Thirty was released in the USA. 
The plot is unconventional for a Hollywood film; it does not follow a 
classical three act structure but is instead a series of instances or episodes 
assembled in chronological order. Running for two hours and thirty-seven 
minutes, it tells the story of CIA agent Maya (Jessica Chastain) and her role in 
the gathering of the intelligence that leads to the killing of bin Laden.  
The film was nominated for an Oscar for best picture but lost to Argo 
(2012), a film that also dealt with real events in America’s geopolitical history. 
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At the time, journalistic opinion was that Zero Dark Thirty was snubbed 
because of the controversial public debates it caused.2 Press agency Reuters 
wrote ‘Zero Dark Thirty fails at Oscars amid political fallout.’3 The film 
addressed a sensitive subject soon after the event and, even before the film 
was released, gave rise to a debate in the media amongst critics and politicians 
concerning the authenticity of the film and the film’s relationship to reality, 
especially around the subject of torture. The film’s opening on-screen 
disclaimer ‘based on first-hand accounts of actual events’ followed by 
fragments of sound taken from the despairing phone calls made by people 
trapped in the World Trade Center on 9/11 ensured that criticism of the film’s 
facticity was limited.  
By presenting the hunt for bin Laden as an artistic Hollywood film, Zero 
Dark Thirty was considered to sum up, contextualise and give meaning to 
recent American history, in particular the ‘war on terror’. It was labelled ‘A 
Film To Define A Decade’ by Mark Hughes in Forbes Magazine, ‘It resonates 
with us because it represents that narrative [the hunt for bin Laden] of the last 
decade’.4 Hughes suggested that Americans expected closure with the capture 
of bin Laden, and that his death would be the end of a particular chapter of 
history. ‘All of that tension and aggression,’ he wrote, ‘all of that killing and 
warfare, all of those revelations about the United States engaging in torture 
and secret prisons and rejection of international law and Geneva Conventions, 
it was all supposed to be building to this moment. Bin Laden’s death was 
supposed to be worth all of it, the justification for what had come before, and 
in his death the nation had expected some resolution and fulfilment.’5  
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The first part of this chapter examines debates around the film’s 
relationship to reality. Following Furedi, Hammond et al, the second part 
proposes that Zero Dark Thirty reflects a more general failure of creating 
meaning in the post-political, and that this void of meaning is filled by tropes 
and narratives that are found in Hollywood cinema. The third part introduces 
the post-political readings of the film by Shaviro and Žižek. The final part 
consists of an analysis of the aesthetics of the film, looking for elements of 
camp within the film’s audio/visual aesthetics, its characters, and its 
dramaturgy. 
 
‘Reality effects’  in Zero Dark Thirty  
In order to look at the film’s claims to show actual events, it is useful to 
contextualise these ideas in relation to Kathryn Bigelow as a filmmaker, her 
films, and the roles atmosphere and aesthetics play in her work. 
Bigelow graduated from the film program at Columbia University in 1979, 
where one of her professors was Susan Sontag. Her reputation as an auteur 
who is proficient in the action genre stems from making atmospheric and 
action-packed films, notably Near Dark (1987), Blue Steel (1989), Point Break 
(1991), K-19: The Widowmaker (2002) and The Hurt Locker. Bigelow is part of 
a generation of filmmakers, including her ex-husband James Cameron, that 
established a new genre of action films in the 1980s. These films signalled a 
shift in emphasis toward action as ‘spectacular movement’; a tendency for 
action sequences to become an end in themselves, rather than a means to a 
narrative end.6 Bigelow became known for her skill as an action film director, a 
genre associated with male bodies and machismo (however these roles were 
and still are filled by women as well as men).7 
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Because of her affiliation with a genre that often seems to be defined by 
maleness,8 Bigelow invites scrutiny in terms of gender. For example, she is 
repeatedly described as a female action director.9 Ann Kaplan says that, 
‘Bigelow’s films, …, do not show easy evidence of her presence or even a clear 
feminist voice.’10 According to Kaplan, Bigelow lacks a feminist voice because 
she is part of the Hollywood mainstream.11 Christina Lane cites Acker and 
Denby’s critique of Bigelow as lacking ‘any new insights into gender politics’, 
for being part of the same old patriarchal filmmaking of Hollywood action 
films.12 Lane’s own opinion is that Bigelow takes on ‘male genres’ such as film 
noir and action films are subverted by her reframing of those genres in terms 
of traditional gender roles. Lane proposes that Bigelow performs the role as 
‘good director-for-hire’ for the Hollywood film industry ‘being someone who 
‘knows’ genre and produces marketable product, but she also engages in a 
heavy narrational style (…) as she capitalises on genre tensions by revealing 
the ideological excesses.’13 While readings of Bigelow’s work informed by 
gender are common, alternative readings are less frequent and this lack invites 
investigation.  
Her films have a particular atmosphere, integral to the action, that verges 
on the scopophilic, the intense love of looking or observing. A good example 
can be found in the opening sequence of Blue Steel, a thriller in which a rookie 
cop (Jamie Lee Curtis) loses her gun, which then becomes the murder weapon 
of a sociopath. The sequence begins with the camera moving around a gun in 
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extreme close up. The shallow depth of field, requiring delicate focus pulling, 
produces the effect of the camera lovingly caressing the gun. 
Another example of the way in which Bigelow emphasises atmosphere 
over narrative can be found in the film Near Dark, a vampire film set in 
cowboy country. In the film, the score by Tangerine Dream supplements the 
images. The distinctive Krautrock sound is a mix of psychedelic noise and 
progrock; the clash of genre expectations between American and European 
sensibilities destabilises the film’s images and engenders an uncanny 
atmosphere.  
Bigelow’s commitment to working on her own projects, establishing new 
styles and working methods, together with her relatively unusual position as a 
successful female director of action films, have earned her the reputation of a 
serious art house filmmaker.14 
Bigelow’s prime directorial principle for Zero Dark Thirty was to keep the 
film’s aesthetic ‘rigorous in terms of the journalistic imperative.’ In an 
interview with American Cinematographer she says, ‘I’m drawn to material 
that tends to be journalistic, (…) but in this instance, we also had the weight of 
reality imposed upon us. So, (cinematographer) Greig (Fraser) and I and 
(production designer) Jeremy Hindle worked closely to find or create 
environments that were correct and respectful to story, reality and 
authenticity. To service the story and still maintain a kind of aesthetic 
coherence was a pretty tall order.’15 
The way in which the film was shot was also dictated by Bigelow’s 
‘mandate of verisimilitude.’16 The film was shot on digital cameras, which were 
able to accommodate the physical restrictions of often inflexible, real-world 
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locations and natural, low light. Bigelow ‘wanted a handheld, guerrilla-
filmmaking feel to the production’, says Greig Fraser.17 These handheld 
cameras were often used up to six at once, to produce more coverage and 
allow for a greater scope during the editing process. This process, according to 
Fraser, gave a ‘guerrilla-filmmaking style’ to the production, often utilising a 
‘run-and-gun method’18 (moving while shooting, with an implied sense of 
urgency). 
The filmmaker’s claims of authenticity were also grounded in its source 
material of first hand accounts and CIA information. Records made available 
through the FOIA (Freedom of Information Act), Birkhold writes, detail the 
CIA’s considerable cooperation with the filmmakers of Zero Dark Thirty. ‘The 
records indicate that Boal obtained permission to visit the CIA at least six 
times over the course of two months in the summer of 2011 and that Bigelow 
visited Langley at least once.’19 The information given by the CIA was tailored 
to the need of the filmmakers in order to provide not only accurate records of 
the mission but also a believable degree of accuracy which derives from ‘the 
trustworthiness of a record as a record.’20 The film thus looks truthful in the 
sense that the correct helicopters are used in the raid of the compound, people 
wear the right outfits, and even the banter used by the agents and the soldiers 
sounds correct. The truth claims of the film, then, are derived largely from 
extra-textual discourse that viewers bring to the film.  
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Matthew Birkhold states that. ‘[t]he CIA has a longstanding policy of 
promoting the accuracy of television shows and films that portray (the) 
agency. Langley’s collaboration with Bigelow and screenwriter Mark Boal in 
the creation of Zero Dark Thirty is not the exception, but the rule.’21 Birkhold 
agrees with Tricia Jenkins, in that the CIA would only agree to collaborate 
with filmmakers in order to ‘project a favourable image of itself in order to 
boost both its congressional and public support.’22 In exchange for this 
positive spin filmmakers gain credibility for their projects. ‘The CIA brings a 
high degree of verisimilitude to Hollywood films. By associating their films 
with the CIA, filmmakers are empowered to market their projects as 
“authentic,” “accurate,” and a “rare insider’s look” at the Agency.’23  
Birkhold’s analysis, of how the CIA supports Bigelow’s aim of creating a 
sense of verisimilitude in her film through proving her access to their recode 
and expertise, indicates that the filmmakers themselves understand the CIA as 
authority on this subject matter. Rather than aiming at an interpretation, the 
filmmakers translated CIA data point blank into cinema narrative. This 
preference by the filmmakers, for taking on facts as issued by the government, 
combined with the CIA’s own interest in promoting their agency, has added to 
the debates around the film in terms of its relationship to reality, and the 
possible ideological biases that informed the film. 
 
Zero Dark Thirty at the centre of public debate 
Zero Dark Thirty was promoted heavily on the American Late Night talk show 
circuit, as it is customary with big Hollywood productions. However, the ways 
in which the film was understood by the shows’ hosts was particular. On the 
Late Show with David Letterman, the host interviewed actor Chris Pratt 
(Justin – DEVGRU) on 2 January 2013, the actress Jessica Chastain (Maya) on 
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7 January 2013 and director Kathryn Bigelow on 9 January 2013. The first 
question Letterman asked each of his guests was about the accuracy of the 
movie: ‘Is it an accurate historical document?’24 This repetition of the same 
question, aimed at the filmmaker and actors, is significant in that in the USA 
in particular, late night talk shows often feed or tap into political discourse.25  
Debates about the accuracy of the film went from the technicalities of 
historical accuracy in the depiction of the raid of the compound; from details 
such as comments about the direction the helicopters were facing,26 the 
correct breed of dog,27 to criticism of the tendency within the film to portray 
CIA work as the work of one single female analyst rather than that of a team.28 
As we have seen above, debates such as these were reflected by Bigelow’s 
mandate of verisimilitude, her filmic techniques as well as the film’s 
translation of CIA information.  
The main focus of the debate about accuracy is centred on the film’s 
portrayal of torture. The New York Times wrote that the film’s depiction of an 
array of so-called ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ became a ‘national 
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Rorschach test’ on the divisive subject of torture.29 The main contention was 
the question: did the film’s portrayal of abusive interrogation show that torture 
had been necessary to find bin Laden? Did the depiction of these events 
constitute an implicit criticism of them or fulfil the role of a neutral 
documentation of them?  
On the one hand, the liberal left claimed that the film promoted the 
effectiveness of torture by showing that torture more or less led to the killing 
of bin Laden. A report by the Senate Intelligence Committee professing that 
the brutal interrogation of prisoners was not ‘a central component’ in finding 
bin Laden challenged this view.30 Left-liberal critics also criticised the film for 
conflating complex, disparate events (for example the interrogation of 
prisoners, different terrorist attacks, such as the London bombings and The 
Islamabad Marriott Hotel bombing) into one joined up, orderly narrative, 
‘thereby bringing a purifying coherence to the chaos and contingency of past 
events.’31 On the other, on the conservative right, Republican congressman 
Pete King accused the Obama administration of bias towards certain 
filmmakers by giving them access to secret information, and by doing so 
‘crafting a pro-administration movie timed for release a month before the 
election.’32  
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The left-liberal critique is supported by Birkhold’s claim that, according 
to recently realised disclosed FOIA33 records, the CIA worked closely with the 
filmmakers. His argument is that the CIA have always been keen to present 
themselves in a positive light.34 So, his argument goes, why would they 
support a film that makes them look bad? Birkhold writes that Marie Harf 
(State Department spokeswoman) ‘extolled Zero Dark Thirty in an OPA e-
mail, emphasising, “[w]e really do have a sense that this is going to be the 
movie on the UBL operation – and we all want [the] CIA to be as well-
represented in it as possible”.’35 But the film’s adherence to verisimilitude, its 
insistence of telling the authentic story of the hunt for bin Laden, was 
ultimately the very element that made it open for critique, Birkhold argues, 
‘The drive to document the film’s inaccuracies derived, in part, from the 
conviction that audiences were accepting the film as an authentic record.’36 
In the long run, the criticism directed at Zero Dark Thirty from the liberal 
left, in its fixation with verisimilitude, could only lead to frustration. By posing 
the analysis in terms of the relationship between real life and authenticity, the 
opportunity to discuss the need for verisimilitude itself was overlooked. 
 
The Hunt for bin Laden – giving meaning to the ‘war on terror’  
In order to make sense of the relationship between Zero Dark Thirty and the 
post-political it is necessary to pose the analysis of this film in terms of Žižek’s 
understanding of ideological fantasy. The hunt for bin Laden can then be 
interpreted as a narrative fantasy of the post-political.  
As already noted, in Žižek’s reading of Lacan, fantasy is not the opposite 
of reality but is the very thing that constructs reality, ‘As Lacan puts it, 
"Reality" is always framed by a fantasy, i.e. for something real to be 
experienced as part of "reality," it must fit the preordained coordinates of our 
                                                            
33 Freedom of Information Act 2000 
34 Birkhold, 2014, p.29. 
35 ibid. 




fantasy-space.’37 Fantasy brings about reality by giving it a fictional coherence 
and consistency, it makes reality function. Following Althusser’s definition 
that ideology is the ‘imaginary relationship of individuals to their real 
conditions of existence’,38 Žižek argues that fantasy functions as the dynamic 
which makes ideology efficient and workable, noting ‘the fundamental level of 
ideology (…) is not that of an illusion masking the real state of things but that 
of an (unconscious) fantasy structuring our social reality itself.’39 In other 
words, for Žižek, fantasy both helps to make and is in itself ideology by 
providing the framework within which the contradictions and antagonisms of 
reality are consolidated and rationalised, where they are given meaning.  
It can be argued that the hunt for bin Laden has a quasi-mythological 
narrative attached to it, produced to corroborate the fantasy, in a Žižekian 
sense, that is the ‘war on terror’. To put it another way, the hunt for bin Laden 
is a fantasy in a Žižekian sense, a narrative that reproduces the established 
conventions of Hollywood narrative in order to structure US politics and 
policies. 
Making meaning of the ‘war on terror’ through ideological fantasy in this 
way can only be conditioned by post-political ideology. As described 
elsewhere in this thesis, by Žižek’s definition, the post-political is a politics of 
consensus of liberal democracy that forecloses the possibility of emancipatory 
politics. Emancipatory politics relies on universal principles that provide the 
parameters of meaning. By ruling out these principles, the post-political brings 
about a situation where society cannot contextualise events in a meaningful 
way.40 Zaki Laïdi writes that this is what happened in the post-political. He 
describes how the end of the Cold War, and the collapse of political ideologies, 
                                                            
37 Slavoj Žižek,Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel and the Critique of Ideology (Durham, 
North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1993) p.43. 
38 Louis Althusser, ‘Ideology and ideological state apparatuses (notes towards an investigation)’, 
Sharma, Aradhana, and Akhil Gupta, (ed.) The Anthropology of the State: A Reader 
(Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell (an imprint of John Wiley & Sons, 2005) pp.86–111, p.100–101. 
39 Žižek, 1989a, p.33. 




created a ‘world without meaning,’41 resulting in a desperate search for 
meaning and identity in contemporary society. As Hammond describes, the 
post-political has created a situation where ‘war and intervention since the 
Cold War have been driven by attempts on the part of Western leaders to 
recapture a sense of purpose and meaning, both for themselves and for their 
societies.’42 Furedi argues that wars have often fulfilled the purpose of giving 
at least a temporary sense of meaning, a cause to rally behind, but that the 
Anglo/American policies post 9/11 have failed to ‘make sense’ of the global 
conflict.43 Ultimately, the fantasy of the ‘war on terror’ failed to function in a 
Žižekian sense to pull reality into an acceptably orderly and satisfying 
narrative. As Furedi puts it, ‘Western political elites lack a web of meaning 
through which they can make sense of the threat of terrorism.’44 The failure of 
the ‘elite to narrate’, to contextualise the ‘war on terror’ and terrorism in a way 
that was recognisable and logical, ‘created a ‘void in meaning’ that 
exacerbated the disorienting impact of the disaster’.45  
As I describe below, Zero Dark Thirty is the expression of the fantasy of 
the ‘war on terror.’ It gives a cultural expression to how the reactions of the US 
government to the understandable shock experienced on 9/11 was to frame it 
in terms of vulnerability and new unknowns. A new politics of fear was 
established in America that was fuelled by uncertainty which saw the nation 
as vulnerable and under threat.46 ‘The war on terror was less a focused 
campaign than an expression of generalised and diffused fearfulness.’47 
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Stuart Croft writes that the major shift in foreign policy after 9/11 was 
constructed by a republican-led, coherent ‘meta-narrative’ which rapidly 
emerged as ‘the hegemonic common sense’ that would inform society’s 
responses to the ‘war terror.’48 Croft describes how this meta-narrative is 
composed of four key elements, with the number one element being the 
construction of an ‘absolute enemy’ who is out to end civilisation as we know 
it.49 He refers to Bush’s address to a joint session of Congress on 20 September 
2001 in which he definedAl Qaida and the Taliban regime for this purpose as 
evil doers who are, in essence, set in direct opposition to US values of freedom 
and democracy, ‘They hate our freedoms: our freedom of religion, our freedom 
of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.’50 
The enemy is constructed as the binary opposite to American values, binary 
opposition being the trademark of the Hollywood villain. This sentiment, can 
also be found in the film Unbreakable (2000), a drama about the nature of 
superheroes, where the character Elijah Price (Samuel L. Jackson) says that the 
comic book bad guy in American mythology is easily identifiable by being the 
opposite of the hero, ‘It all makes sense, in the comic you know how you can 
tell who the arch villain is going to be? He’s the exact opposite of the hero!’  
Traditionally, the villain of dramatic narrative is the ‘ character who 
energises dramatic action by desiring or performing what the play represents 
as culturally evil. Directly opposed to the hero or protagonist, a villain is 
distinguished from a morally acceptable antagonist only by his or her 
wickedness.’51 In postmodern, self-knowing culture, the source of all bad 
things in a narrative is often simply the Big Bad, popularised by the TV 
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program Buffy the Vampire Slayer (1997-2003), where over the course of a 
whole series one main threat would directly or indirectly be responsible for 
each week’s particular monster but is ultimately defeated at the end of each 
series. The Big Bad’s menace can never be defined simply, it is ominous, far 
reaching and complicated yet always reducible to one person or entity.  
When cultural landmarks were attacked on 9/11, terrorists managed to 
evoke established movie tropes of action cinema such as, what the light-
hearted website TV tropes has coined ‘monumental damage’, where the Big 
Bad by ‘behead(ing) the Statue of Liberty, or blow(ing) up the White House, or 
anything recognisable enough that by destroying it, (…) can show the world 
that you mean business.’52 The language of fiction film already established in 
American culture was employed to fill the gap of meaning in the post-political 
after 9/11. The founder of a relatively small group of terrorists, was cast into 
the cultural narrative as an evil mastermind, straight out of a Hollywood 
movie.  
The image of bin Laden – the tall, skinny, bearded man in home video 
images surrounded by beige rocks and followers that look like postulant clones 
– has become the archetype for the figure of Islamic fundamentalist. This 
mythologizing of bin Laden was also achieved by associating and even 
explaining his character through established figures of US cultural history. The 
way the US state contextualised bin Laden came to light when in the raid on 
his compound in Abbottabad when the operating Navy The SEAL team leader 
radioed after killing bin Laden, ‘For God and country – Geronimo, Geronimo, 
Geronimo,’ followed ‘Geronimo E.K.I.A.’ (enemy killed in action).53 The code 
name of the US military for bin Laden was Geronimo,54 named after the 
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nineteenth Century Apache leader who managed to evade capture by US and 
Mexican troops through his cunning and the army’s incompetence. Although 
it can be assumed the al-Qaida leader has been named Geronimo because the 
name evokes the image of a formidable opponent to many Americans, the 
name nevertheless stands for the notion of antagonist to the US state. Over 
time the portrayal of Geronimo in US culture has changed from the image 
taken from historical accounts in which he was regarded as a ‘hostile,’ … ‘that 
meant that he was treacherous, slippery, and without honour’,55 to portraying 
him as ‘the embodiment of freedom, courageous resistance and principled 
defiance of overwhelming odds.’56 However, what still prevails is one 
characteristic, drawn from the original historical interpretations of Geronimo 
where the name was ‘synonymous with terror’,57 that he is a fighter who is first 
and foremost an enemy to the state. In an interview shown on CNN in 2001, 
Bush called to get bin Laden ‘Dead or Alive’, inspired by the ‘old poster(s) out 
west’,58 directly explaining bin Laden by invoking clichéd tropes of Old West 
justice and cowboy vigilantism. As is pointed out by Dan Moos, ‘Born in 1946, 
Bush likely saw a “Wanted” poster only on a flickering screen in a darkened 
theatre.’59 However, this tactic indicates that the concepts of American 
mythology as created by Hollywood cinema are so well established that Bush 
felt that he could reach people by evoking these platitudinous images.  
Where the figure of bin Laden is understood as a storybook villain of 
post-political America, the Hunt for bin Laden can be read in terms of 
established cinematic dramaturgy. In The Way Hollywood tells It, Bordwell 
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cites screen-writer William Martell’s exhortation, that ‘the most important 
element of the action film is the villain’s plan, and he insists that it be well 
motivated. He (Martell) points out that in the first half the hero is likely to be 
reactive, whereas in the second half the hero seizes the initiative.’60 Seen this 
way, the ‘war on terror’ has become the second act -- where the hero goes after 
the villain -- of American history since the Cold War. The terrorist threat from 
Islamic extremists was not considered a ‘high order threat’ before 9/11, even 
after the attacks on the USS Cole in 2000 and the rise of what the 9/11 
commission report describes as ‘New Terrorism’ in the 1990s.61 This could be 
considered the first act of classic dramatic structure, full of exposition and 
rising intent but in which the hero remains passive until the climax, or crisis 
point at the end of first act, which in this case would be 9/11. The second act 
sees the hero take up action, he goes through trials and tribulations, cause-
effect relationships propel the main characters along, this would be ‘the war on 
terror’. When reaching the final act – the death of bin Laden should have 
brought resolution. However, it seems that rather than the real death of bin 
Laden, the filmic version of Zero Dark Thirty has created more reflective and 
analytical discourse amongst critics about the meaning of the ‘war on terror’ of 
the past ten years.  
The failure to capture bin Laden in the aftermath of 9/11, meant that the 
danger posed by terrorism simply added to the sum of formless fears.  
The figure of bin Laden himself became ‘a constant and iniquitous source of 
menace rather than an identifiable enemy who could engaged and defeated.’62  
When Bigelow and Boal learned of bin Laden’s death during their 
scripting of their idea of the Battle of Tora Bora, they immediately stopped to 
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make a film about the ten year long hunt for bin Laden. Mark Harris 
emphasises that, ‘Before the raid, the filmmakers had planned to make a 
narrowly focused, closed-ended story that would have ended on a note of 
irresolution and futility.’63 What is interesting is that they have opted for the 
second storyline rather than the original one, although the story would still 
have been valid and probably an interesting exploration of the failed mission 
in 2001. Instead Bigelow and Boal opted to tell the story that seemed to fit 
more closely with the version of the ‘war on terror’ that had emerged as a 
traditional American narrative, complete with cowboys and baddies and a 
recognisable dramatic structure. Rather than a film that would have ended in 
‘irresolution’, they chose to express the established fantasy of the hunt for bin 
Laden with the mandate of highest verisimilitude. This ideological paradox, of 
fantasy and verisimilitude, has attracted several readings of the film which 
place it firmly in the post-political. 
 
Post-polit ical  readings of Zero Dark Thirty  – Shaviro and Ž ižek  
The subject matter of Zero Dark Thirty and its political significance attracted 
two post-political readings that were concerned with the ideological impact of 
the film. 
Shaviro and Žižek place the film firmly in the post-political. However, 
they place the film differently. For Shaviro the film exposes the managerial 
reality of neoliberal ideology and practice. For Žižek, Zero Dark Thirty, by 
promoting a normalisation of neoliberalism, functions as an enabler of post-
political ideology.  
Although both writers provide different understandings of how to relate 
to the post-political, they find their commonality in their mutual rejection of 
the ‘anti-realist’ theories that64 dominated the second half of the twentieth 
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century, and in their denunciation of today’s ideal of liberal capitalism these 
theories promoted. Both are contributors to The Speculative Turn: Continental 
Materialism and Realism, a collection of essays published in 2011 that 
acknowledged a shift in philosophical writing starting roughly at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century.65 The critique of contemporary liberal 
capitalism is what unites Shaviro and Žižek. Both advance ways of thinking in 
which the limits and contradictions of contemporary neoliberalism are 
recognised and questioned. Both have made the scrutiny of the political 
consensus of neoliberalism the linchpin of their analysis. As Shaviro puts it, 
‘Neoliberalism has entered into all our preconscious assumptions; it permeates 
our habits of thought and speech (…) We no longer have the language to 
articulate radical demands. We suffer from a failure of imagination. As 
Jameson and Žižek have both suggested, we find it easier today to imagine the 
total extermination of human existence than to imagine a humane alternative 
to global capitalism.’66  
Shaviro and Žižek have both written on Zero Dark Thirty, and agree that 
the film depicts the real of liberal capitalism and by extension, post-politics. 
However, their different evaluations of the film reveal their diverging politics. 
For each, the film functions differently. Shaviro says the film ‘expresses’ this 
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state of affairs, an artistic experience of political managerialism, whereas 
Žižek’s argument is that the film works as an ideological ‘gift to American 
power.’67 
In his work Shaviro aims to ‘develop an account of what it feels like to 
live in the early twenty-first century,’68 by investigating the relationship 
between digital technologies of filmmaking together with neoliberal economic 
relations. He writes, ‘I am interested in the ways that recent film and video 
works are expressive: that is to say, in the ways that they give voice [or better, 
give sounds and images) to a kind of ambient, free-floating sensibility that 
permeates our society today.’69 
One characteristic of the post-political is that politics is reduced to the 
administration and management of individuals; Scott G. Nelson argues that in 
post-politics ‘liberal doctrines are institutionalised to administer the ‘flow of 
things’ now that the ‘big questions’ of international politics have ostensibly 
been answered.’70 This proceduralism is the ‘modus operandi’ of government 
bodies and its administrations, and reveals the ‘institutionalisation of non-
politics, of government by artificial consensus’ – technocratic and seemingly 
ideology-free.71 Shaviro proposes that this proceduralism that permeates the 
polis is responsible for the rise of procedural dramas on screen, noting that ‘we 
live in such an overwhelmingly “procedurals” society that the genre of the 
“procedural” has become so ubiquitous in television and film.’72 
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Shaviro claims that Zero Dark Thirty is the ‘non plus ultra of 
proceduralism, its ultimate expansion and reduction ad absurdum.’73 He 
describes how the film’s depiction of torture at the hands of civil servants is 
just as much a part of the overall sentiment of proceduralism as are the 
correlating images of the painstaking research over years. He emphasises that 
the film is relentless in its focus on showing the ‘war on terror’ as bureaucratic 
procedure, especially in the scene where the compound is raided. He writes 
that this depiction of the American military operation is shown in such ‘a 
manner that is utterly devoid alike of the horror of war and of the glory and 
heroism that are so often invoked to justify it.’74 The goal has been so 
absorbed into procedural routine that the ostensible climax of the film, the 
actual killing of bin Laden, occurs off-screen; and we barely even get a glimpse 
of the corpse, zipped as it is into a body bag, which is to say treated entirely 
(and literally) according to Standard Operating Procedure.’ He continues to 
describe how the film manages to drain the ‘very potentially dramatic action 
in which she (Maya) finds herself (…) of drama, and (the drama is then) 
subsumed within proceduralist routine.’75 
As a declared fan of the work of Bigelow, Shaviro lauds her ability to 
create atmosphere and thus a certain affect.76 Shaviro favours films that 
‘provide indices of complex social processes, which they transcend, condense 
and rearticulate in the form of what can be called, after Deleuze and Guattari, 
‘blocs of affect’.’77  
For Shaviro the experience of certain films can demonstrate what it is like 
to live in the post-political. It is the affect of the well-crafted images that can 
be turned into what he, taking a page from Frederic Jameson’s idea of 
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cognitive mapping, describes as affective maps, ‘which do not just passively 
trace or represent, but actively construct and perform, the social relations, 
flows and feelings that they are ostensibly ‘about.’78 The affect of Zero Dark 
Thirty embodies the truth of liberal proceduralism as an organising principle 
of all governmentality and all social life today.79 But he himself admits that, 
‘Embodying and testifying to a truth in this manner is not the same as offering 
a “critique”.’80 Zero Dark Thirty as affect does not provide a way out of the 
situation, it only helps the viewer to recognise their place in the post-political. 
For Shaviro, the film provides an insight into the lived experience of how state 
institutions such as the CIA have become bureaucratic machines in the post-
political, rather than contestable political institutions where political acts, 
such as war, become an administrative matter.  
For Žižek, on the other hand, film works in a multitude of ways. It not 
only provides him with illustrations that help him explain and express his 
ideas, but also cinema is ‘literally’81 needed, he says, as it has the unique ability 
to frame people’s fantasies and let them experience these in a ‘safe’ way. 
‘Fantasy serves as the screen that protects us from being directly overwhelmed 
by the raw Real’.82 Informed by his Lacanian, psychoanalytic background, he 
says that cinema is crucial in that it illustrates ideology by providing that 
crucial dimension which we are not ready to confront in our reality.’83 It is a 
parallel reality than can articulate what can be described as the abstract reality 
of ideology. By looking at the fantasy of ideology, as done in cinema, can we 
recognise the true extent of ideology.  
Žižek’s criticism of Zero Dark Thirty is that it neutralises the violence 
that is part of the post-political – and thus the post-political itself. He writes 
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that, ‘While liberal capitalism presents itself as anti-utopia embodied, and 
today’s neoliberalism as the sign of the new era of humanity, which left behind 
the utopian projects responsible for the totalitarian horrors of the twentieth 
century, it is now becoming clear that there is a utopian core in the liberal 
project itself – the violence that accompanies the victories of liberal 
capitalism is the price we are paying for this utopia.’84 
For Žižek, that fact that torture, a violent act, has become debatable 
today, discussed in terms of pros and cons, is in itself one of the moral failings 
of the post-political. ‘The normalisation of torture in Zero Dark Thirty is a sign 
of the moral vacuum we are gradually approaching. If there is any doubt about 
this, just try to imagine a major Hollywood film depicting torture in a similar 
way twenty or thirty years ago – it’s unthinkable.’85 
For him the real argument is not about the question of whether or not the 
film is for or against torture, or if torture does or does not work (because even 
if it did work it would still be wrong).86 In fact, for Žižek, the problem its that 
the film puts torture forward as a legitimate topic of debate. He illustrates the 
argument – that it is morally wrong to debate torture in and of itself – by 
comparing it with other concepts that are unquestionably beyond the pale in 
our society, such as rape and the Holocaust.  
Imagine a documentary on the Holocaust depicting it in a cool 
disinterested way as a big industrial-logistic operation, dealing with the 
technical problems (transport, disposal of the bodies, preventing panic 
among the prisoners to be gassed, etc.) – such a film would either 
embody a perverse and deeply immoral fascination with its topic, or it 
would count on the very obscene neutrality of its style to engender 
dismay and horror in spectators.87  
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The film evokes for Žižek a ‘disturbing ambiguity’88 which is most of all 
represented by the character Daniel (Jason Clarke). He is described in the 
script as ‘a big American, late 30s, with a long, anarchical beard snaking down 
to his tattooed neck. He looks like a paramilitary Hipster, a punk rocker with a 
Glock.’89 He holds a PhD and his demeanour is rational and well reasoned. He 
likes animals, keeping a group of monkeys on site which he feeds with ice-
cream. However, it is because Dan is portrayed as a paragon of American 
liberalism which makes the film so disturbing, according to Žižek. He takes 
issue with Dan’s casual transition between jovial torturer in the first half of the 
film, and his hipster liberal politician manner in the second half. For Žižek this 
smooth change has the effect of normalising the torture as something people 
just do. ‘This is normalisation at its purest and most efficient – a little bit of 
uneasiness, more about hurt sensitivity than about ethics, but the job has to be 
done. This awareness of the hurt sensitivity as the (main) human cost of 
torture makes sure that the film is not just cheap right-wing propaganda: the 
psychological complexity is properly depicted, so that well-meaning liberals 
can enjoy the film without feeling guilty.’90 
Žižek’s contention is that the film functions as a fulfilment of post-
political fantasy, by making the inherent violence of the post-political 
acceptable, or normal. What the film is saying, according to Žižek, is that in 
the post-political you can be a torturer, because you ‘have to be’ not because 
you want to be, and still be a normal, liberal member of society.  
Both Žižek’s and Shaviro’s criticisms of Zero Dark Thirty show how the 
film conveys a deadlock central to the ideology of post-political society. Where 
Shaviro poses the film in terms of affect, an impulse for people to map 
themselves in the post political, for Žižek, the film has ‘normalising’ effect, 
where the post-political becomes everyday practice. 
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However, these two readings start with the impact of the ideological, and 
read it into the film. The next chapter ventures another reading of the film that 
reveals the absurdity and camp within ‘the war on terror’, by engaging with 
Zero Dark Thirty firstly as a film. Here Žižek’s thinking is directly applied to 
the reading of the film’s aesthetics. By looking at the film in terms of surplus 
enjoyment, or jouissance, the film’s aesthetic can be scrutinised as an 
expression of the failure of governments to generate meaning in the post-
political. 
 
Zero Dark Thirty as a camp fi lm 
The question of how ideology is stylised and given form is addressed in 
this section by making a connection between the idea of the expression of 
excess that is found in the Žižekian concept of jouissance and in Sontag’s idea 
of camp as an aesthetic sensibility.  
Žižek posits that, because enjoyment sustains the ideological belief in the 
symbolic order, ‘enjoyment is a political factor.’ But what is also controlled 
and sublimated by fantasy, including ideological fantasy, is peoples’ surplus of 
enjoyment – jouissance. Jouissance is the excess of enjoyment, a transgression 
of the generally accepted way of finding meaning in the world through the 
pursuit of sublime objects (the Žižekian idea of the unconscious, unattainable 
fantasy object, that, as formulated by Kant, evokes passion in the subject).91 
Ideology frames jouissance for people, and so ‘bribes the subject into 
accepting repression /renunciation by providing access to a surplus 
enjoyment,’ which however is always experienced as excessive and over the 
top.92 Jouissance always accompanies, but also always undermines peoples’ 
imaginary and symbolic identification. An uncomfortable jouissance or 
indivisible remainder, that cannot be accommodated within any greater 
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meaning, which is, as Žižek describes ‘the “irrationality”, the unaccountable 
“madness” of the very founding gesture of idealisation.’93 The surplus of 
enjoyment is not only a political gesture it is also often an absurd one, 
especially in the post-political that is seen as having no strong symbolic 
order.94  
The Žižekian jouissance, can be compared fruitfully with Susan Sontag’s 
concept of naïve camp. Writing in 1964, Sontag observed that the camp 
aesthetic is recognised as the ‘too much’ in art, an overabundance or surplus of 
meaning that defeats the object’s seriousness.95 Sontag wrote that she was 
equally attracted to and repulsed by it, making camp a succinct expression of 
a person’s experience of jouissance. She writes that ‘camp is art that proposes 
itself seriously, but cannot be taken altogether seriously because it is "too 
much”.’96 This surplus of meaning has nowhere to go, there are no parameters 
‘of traditional seriousness’ or ‘the risks of fully identifying with extreme states 
of feeling.’97 This calls to mind the lack of political parameters of meaning in 
the post-political; like jouissance, camp can only be organised in a ridiculous 
fantasy. A meaningful parallel can be drawn between Žižek’s surplus of 
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enjoyment and the surplus of meaning responsible for the camp aesthetic in 
Sontag. 
Ultimately, camp is ‘the sensibility of failed seriousness, of the 
theatricalization of experience.’98 Today, narrative of excess has replaced 
political analysis indicating the degree to which the lack of political 
seriousness accompanies the post-political.  
The camp aesthetic is always askew, awry to the world it represents. 
Sontag writes, ‘camp is a vision of the world in terms of style -- but a 
particular kind of style. It is the love of the exaggerated, the "off," of things-
being-what-they-are-not.’99 Camp films reveal in their too-muchness their at-
odds status to the world, they show a displacement of ideology. This idea can 
be paralleled with Žižek, who writes that, ‘The easiest way to detect 
ideological surplus-enjoyment in an ideological formation is to read it as a 
dream and analyse the displacement at work in it.’100 The conclusion to be 
made here is that film is this fantasy, the dream of the ideological formation, 
which is scrutinised for the surplus of ideological enjoyment – its campness.  
The following analysis of Zero Dark Thirty aims to demonstrate how the 
film is an expression of the surplus of enjoyment of post-politics, an excessive, 
over the top, absurd remainder, in the cinematic form of camp on screen. It 
aims to show how Zero Dark Thirty embodies a set of elite ideas that are over-
invested in, by considering how the film in itself is marked by a failed 
seriousness – a camp theatricalisation of the ‘war on terror’. The ideology in 
Zero Dark Thirty is enjoyed and stylised to excess, in an aesthetically 
appealing way that speaks of a too-muchness of ideological fantasy that finds 
its aesthetic realisation in camp. 
To consider Zero Dark Thirty as a camp film may at first reading appear 
to be contradictory. Camp is kitschy, flippant, self knowingly garish and corny. 
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How can such an earnest, unglamorous film be camp? Zero Dark Thirty is 
these things but not in an immediately obvious way. 
 Sontag separates Camp from camp to distinguish the word not only from 
the idea of the outdoor activity, but also to establish the concept as a new way 
of think about a particular sensibility. Since Sontag’s concept has very much 
established itself in the cultural landscape and this grammatical distinction 
does not have to be emphasised anymore. Her understanding of camp is that 
of a sensibility, a way of feeling after being affected by an object or person.101 
Her definition of camp is that it is ‘a certain mode of aestheticism. It is one 
way of seeing the world as an aesthetic phenomenon. That way, the way of 
camp, is not in terms of beauty, but in terms of the degree of artifice, of 
stylisation.’102 Camp is always excessive, transgressing the norm, often going 
far beyond what feels familiar and comfortable. Films can be camp in a 
multitude of ways; they can have camp aesthetics, subject matter, 
performances, ambition, etc. Sontag assays that a ‘sensibility is almost, but not 
quite, ineffable’, however it does have a certain amount of consistency.  
Zero Dark Thirty is not camp in the same way as a self-knowingly, 
deliberately⁠103 camp movie, such as Baz Luhrmann’s Moulin Rouge (2001).104 
By deliberately producing a heightened artificiality, the point of a Baz 
Luhrmann film is to be camp; as Sontag states, ‘deliberately camp’ films are a 
‘Camp which knows itself to be Camp.’105 The naïve camp of Zero Dark 
Thirty, on the other hand can be formulated in terms of Sontag’s concept of 
camp as a failed seriousness, failure meaning that it does not conform to the 
logical demands of the film but exceeds them.  
Making a film about the tracking and killing of bin Laden, a ten year long 
terrorist hunt that was unequalled in scope, manpower and cost, could never 
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be less than a hugely ambitious project, in terms of storytelling, on the part of 
the filmmakers. Sontag suggests that campness is about the maker’s ‘spirit of 
extravagance’, their drive to take on something that is bigger than themselves. 
The film’s tagline is ‘the greatest manhunt in US history’, displaying its 
ambition and its eagerness, Bigelow herself proclaiming that making Zero 
Dark Thirty was like an ‘epic puzzle’. ‘Logistics. I know it sounds crazy, [but] I 
do enjoy it.’106 It is the filmmaker’s extravagance, ambition, and passion that 
opens up Zero Dark Thirty to a camp interpretation.  
Zero Dark Thirty is a serious film, proposes David Fresko: ‘advances in 
documentary technique with on-the-ground reporting give (it) the sobering 
imprimatur of serious films for serious audiences.’107 In the film there is no 
intentional comic relief to break the tension of the unflinching brutality of 
prisoner interrogations, or the monomania of the person who found bin Laden. 
The film is finally resolved in an anticlimax for the protagonist. 
The film’s deliberate seriousness is the foundation of Zero Dark Thirty as 
a camp film, it does not set out to be camp. Sontag writes that, ‘the pure 
examples of camp are unintentional; they are dead serious.’108 It is therefore a 
reasonable assumption to make that Zero Dark Thirty can be seen as example 
of unintentional, pure camp. Sontag writes that, ‘camp is either completely 
naïve or else wholly conscious’, and ‘pure camp’ is always the naïve version.109 
Zero Dark Thirty falls into this category, being a mainstream straight film that 
is meant to be taken seriously. However, as Sontag writes, ‘in naïve, or pure, 
camp, the essential element is seriousness, a seriousness that fails.’110 Zero 
Dark Thirty fails, in the sense of Sontag’s concept of fail, in its aim to be 
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serious – it does not stay within the limits of aesthetics that would guarantee a 
serious reading.  
The ways in which it fails, or to be more precise, the way in which it is 
excessive, are not immediately obvious as the film’s campness is found in the 
overall aesthetic of the film – Zero Dark Thirty is, more precisely, a collection 
of minor failings that bring about an overall change in quality, an overall 
failure at the level of seriousness. These failings, or excesses, are found in the 
film’s audio and visual aesthetic, its characters and the film’s dramaturgy. 
Each of these must be investigated. 
 
The campness of the f i lm’s audio and visual aesthetic 
Sontag writes that camp is unnatural due to its affinity with hyperbole and 
over-the-topness, ‘camp is (…) love of the unnatural: of artifice and 
exaggeration.’ While camp focuses on artifice, Zero Dark Thirty is designed 
and produced on the principle of maximising the most possible verisimilitude. 
Yet it is this selfsame verisimilitude that pitches the film into camp. 
The film’s consistent use of hand-held camera is in the tradition of 
cinéma vérité, an observational camera style that aims to give realism (veritas- 
truth) to the narrative. Linda Cahir puts forward that, ‘Recording every 
shimmy and shake of even the most stable human hand that is holding it, the 
hand-held camera can intensify the illusion that what is on the screen 
occurred, just as it was recorded by the cameraman who really was there, 
filming it.’111 Handheld camera shots are imbued with the life, or energy, 
transmitted through movements from the body of the cameraman. In Zero 
Dark Thirty the images are constantly jittering, which does not allow the eye 
to rest, creating a sense of constant alertness. Most of the film is shot using 
standard focal length lenses, avoiding the overt stylisation that comes with the 
use of extreme focal lengths. The lenses were non-anamorphic spherical lenses 
because, says Zero Dark Thirty cinematographer Greig Fraser, anamorphic 
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lenses would have given the film too much of an ‘epic’ feel by providing a 
wider frame.112 
The film’s soundtrack is minimal and is better described as a soundscape 
that is only heard in one third of the film. The only direction (composer) 
Alexandre Desplat got from Bigelow was that the music for the film ‘shouldn’t 
be a score.’113 
One effect that the lack of underscore creates, is a seriousness, an 
evocation of the art-house.114 The score surfaces notably in a few scenes often 
when Maya is by herself, or in a transitional moment from an old to a new 
situation. For example, when Maya drives to the Pakistani embassy for the 
first time or she sits on the floor of her office staring into space after hearing 
the news that Jennifer has been killed. Here, the music score is composed only 
of classical minor notes, mixed with a middle eastern undertone, that create a 
somewhat melancholic sound. The understated score of Zero Dark Thirty fits 
with Bigelow’s general filmic approach of using sound to create atmosphere. 
The long absence of a score means that the non-musical sound is 
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foregrounded in the film, says sound designer Paul Ottosson, ‘it has to have a 
raw and gritty feel, true to the subject at hand.’115 
The same words about the film’s aim for authenticity were used by Zero 
Dark Thirty’s FX supervisor Chris Harvey who said in an interview, ‘Kathryn 
wanted it to feel authentic, very raw, very gritty.’116 
This ‘gritty’ cinematography has become a staple of contemporary 
cinematographic style, mostly associated with political thrillers. It was first 
commented on by David Bordwell and Roger Ebert in regard to the film The 
Bourne Ultimatum (2007), directed by Paul Greengrass.117 Greengrass says that 
with this camera technique ‘Your p.o.v. is limited to the eye of the character, 
instead of the camera being a godlike instrument choreographed to be in the 
right place at the right time.’ Bordwell argues that ‘the run-and-gun look (as he 
described Greengrass’s technique in The Bourne Ultimatum) is ‘one option 
within today’s dominant Hollywood style’, which combines wobbly camera 
work, ramshackle framing (where characters keep falling out of the frame and 
out of focus), with a fast editing technique or ‘intensified continuity.’118 
A new generation of lightweight cameras, most notably the Arricam 
introduced in 2000, has facilitated this new quality, turning the shaky 
sensation of earlier handheld camera effects into more of a wobble or 
vibration, giving the image an ‘alive’ feeling. This is often combined with a 
shutter speed much lower than the standard speed of 180º (To compare; 
Saving Private Ryan (1998) used a 45º shutter technique to give a disoriented 
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feel, simulating being in an ongoing war). However, this effect, often called 
jello- or queasicam, often feels more like a fashionable gimmick of filmmakers, 
which some say has become the ‘new normal’,119 rather than adding a new 
level of realness. As Bordwell points out, ‘the style achieves a visceral impact, 
but at the cost of coherence and spatial orientation.’120 
The shying away from usual steadiness suggests a reluctance to find a 
critical perspective for the narrative, a retreat from certainty.  
Bordwell claims that the impression that a documentary truth is shown, 
through a camera technique that induces ‘visceral disorientation’, is a false 
one. ‘So with run-and-gun, the filmmakers in effect cover the action through a 
troupe of invisible, highly mobile camera operators. That’s to say, another 
brand of artifice.’121 
James Buhler and Alex Newton criticise Bordwell’s assumptions, 
interpreting his review of the ‘run-and-gun technique’ as a ‘fear of 
fragmentation’, of what could be a step toward ‘ontological realism, from the 
Bazinian “window on the world” or the Cavellian “automatic world 
projection”.’122 
However, it can be argued that the idea of an ontological realism as 
Buhler and Newton see it, as fragmented and subjective, is itself a 
contemporary understanding of postmodern society. The stylised rejection of 
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certainty of perspective through a ‘run-and-gun’ style is symptomatic of a 
greater loss of certainty in contemporary post-political society.123 
In the run-and gun style in contemporary film, this evasion of certainty is 
evident in how, as Bordwell points out, this tactic is used to hide the plotholes 
of the movie. ‘By whisking the action past us and forcing us to keep up, the 
film doesn’t allow us to dwell on its holes and thin patches.’124 
Because Zero Dark Thirty is a story mimicking real events, it is difficult to 
accuse it of having plotholes. Real life does not have plotholes. What is 
problematic, in terms of the accessibility of the logic of the plot, is that the 
film has taken on a highly complex content with the idea of reproducing 
complexity rather than explaining it.  
Here, Bordwell’s criticism of contemporary visual tendencies towards a 
fragmented viewing experience, help to illustrate the deliberate incoherence of 
the film. The film’s visual aesthetics add confusion to an already complicated 
narrative. On the one hand, the vérité style aims to give authenticity to the 
experience by hinting at the complexity of the issue. On the other hand, the 
jerky camera aesthetic obscures the complicated history, by creating an 
incoherent, fragment and subjective visual narrative. 
 Sontag writes that camp is the consistently aesthetic experience of the 
world. It incarnates a victory of "style" over "content," "aesthetics" over 
"morality," of irony over tragedy.125 The cumulative effect is that the film shies 
away from certainty, replacing it with fashionable visual aesthetics, privileging 
style over content, bringing camp into being as a consequence.  
Another indicator of the film’s adherence to a fashionable aesthetic, 
rather than an adherence to verisimilitude, is the film’s colouring. In 2010 
filmmaker and blogger Toss Miro described a trend in Hollywood cinema that 
uses Digital Intermediary (short DI, the digitalisation process of images) 
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excessively, heightening complementary colours, in particular those found in 
all flesh tones and their complementary cold tones, in order to make the 
subjects pop from the background. Even in 2008, film blogger Stu Maschwitz 
wrote that, ‘This look will be the hallmark of films of the late 2000s. Whether 
you like it or not, films of only a few years ago do look less polished by 
comparison with their blue tints, gasp, actually having an effect on human 
beings.’ The main effect of this ‘excessive abuse’126 of colour correction 
became informally known as ‘orange and teal’, a combination used heavily in a 
number of contemporary movies. For the most part, this colour scheme was 
associated with ‘hectic’ movies such as the Transformers (2007-14) franchise, 
which consisted of intricate, fast edited images showing the relationship 
between humans (fleshy, orange colours) and robots (cool colours). In Zero 
Dark Thirty, the ‘orange and teal’ creates a heightened contrast within the 
images, a sensation of hyperreality which ‘strives to produce an effect that is 
more real than the real thing being copied’,127 and which counteracts the 
desired ‘authentic’, ‘gritty’ style.128  
 The film’s adherence to a voguish colour palette lays it open to a reading 
of it as camp. Sontag writes that ‘Life is not stylish. Neither is nature.’129 The 
highly stylised ‘orange and teal’ colour palette used in the film gives the 
images an over the top, artificial look, rather than a realistic one.  
The film’s score is conspicuously understated in most of the film, until the 
climactic moment when the Navy SEALS set out to board the helicopters 
which will take them to the compound in Abottabad. The images of the 
soldiers getting ready, checking their guns, walking to the waiting helicopters, 
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is underscored with a mix of diegetic sounds of chopping helicopter blades 
and a musical score of militaristic brass elements and tense strings. Here the 
score is reminiscent of the style of music that is associated with a James Bond 
movie score. The ‘blueprint of what became the James Bond sound’ is an 
orchestral sound with emphasis of brass and strings, a sound came to 
represent the ‘cocky, swaggering, confident, dark and dangerous’ Bond. This 
change in (musical) gear in Zero Dark Thirty also brings about a change in the 
nature of the film. It is hard to separate the scenes of the soldiers entering the 
helicopter, flying to be dropped into Pakistan, from the specific equivalent 
scenes in exemplars of the 1980s genre films Predator (1987) and Aliens 
(1986), where characters are dropped from an aircraft into enemy territory, as 
these scenes are already freighted with genre expectation. The film, rather 
than making fiction sound true, makes true events sound fictional by reverting 
to a conventional action movie score when showing military action. By 
associating the real life event of the deployment of Navy SEALs to kill bin 
Laden with clichéd action film tropes, the film fails in its seriousness as it 
‘theatricalises experience’.130 According to Sontag, this ‘exaggerated’ take on 
real life is a component of the failed seriousness of camp sensibility.131 
 
The campness of the f i lm’s protagonist 
By investigating the character Maya as a camp figure, a connection can be 
made between the way she is portrayed in the film and how this evokes a post-
political character on screen. 
Žižek describes Maya as a new kind of feminist heroine of the post-
political age.132 Rather than a real person she is a symbolic cypher of the 
hidden violence of liberal capitalism. She is ‘the ideal executioner,’ he says: 
‘On the one hand she does the male job even better than the man, she is far 
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more determined. On the other hand she retains her sensitivity.’133 He states 
that she ‘is not Chuck Norris or Clint Eastwood playing Dirty Harry’, meaning 
she is not a testosterone fuelled macho man, acting out of physical strength. 
Instead, he claims that the character Maya is the latent violence of liberal 
capitalism personified, ‘this violence is no longer attributable to concrete 
individuals and their "evil" intentions, but is purely "objective", systemic, 
anonymous.’134 
Paul Joseph Gulino, writing specifically about the character of Maya in 
Zero Dark Thirty, makes a useful generalisation: ‘Theme is often delivered 
through the main character and his or her character arc, or transformation in 
awareness about a universal truth. Here, the storytellers made a choice that 
undermines any chance of using the main character to serve this function.’135 
Like the rest of the characters in the film, Maya’s character does not follow 
what is thought of as a traditional character arc.136 The character does not 
change significantly over the cause of the film, and it is not a change within 
the character that leads to a resolution at the end of the film. The lack of 
character development serves to flag up Maya’s single notable characteristic, 
her doggedness, which has been described as ‘Ahab-like’ by reviewers on 
several occasions.137 (The monomaniacal Ahab in Hermann Melville’s novel, 
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says Michael Davey, ‘defies everyone and everything in his rageful and dogged 
pursuit of Moby Dick.’)138 
The lack of character development makes a reading of Zero Dark Thirty 
as camp especially inviting. ‘What camp taste responds to is "instant 
character”, says Sontag, ‘and, conversely, what it is not stirred by is the sense 
of the development of character. Character is understood as a state of 
continual incandescence – a person being one, very intense thing.’139  
All the characters in Zero Dark Thirty can all be described as ‘one, 
intense thing’. However Maya’s intensity is particular, as it is not her dramatic 
character but also the aesthetic presentation of her character that, in 
combination, give her person an exaggerated presence. 
What is presented of Maya does little to contradict the idea that she is 
‘one, intense thing’. She is recruited into the CIA straight out of high school. 
The hunt for bin Laden is all she knows and all she does. She has no private 
life outside her job. The only hint of personal story is when Maya meets 
Jennifer for a drink. Jennifer asks if Maya has ‘hooked up’ with her colleague 
Jack, to which Maya replies, ‘Hello, I work with him. I’m not that girl that 
fucks.’ Maya does not lose focus of her goal because of personal relationships. 
Rather, she pursues them with a Joan-of-Arc like idealism, even saying in one 
scene to Larry (Édgar Ramírez) ‘A lot of my friends have died trying to do this. 
I believe I was spared so I could finish the job.’ 
Maya’s drive does not stem from any obvious physicality (a ‘Chuck 
Norris’ style machismo, as Žižek says) but from the very lack of this 
physicality. Her campness derives from what she is not rather than what she 
is. Maya is driven by ideals, not testosterone. She is prompted by reason and 
feeling, promoting the impression that her violent actions are a necessary evil, 
not a sadistic pleasure – the very thing that Žižek identifies as the disavowed 
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violence of the post-political.140 This disavowed violence, which makes Maya 
an ideological figure, is supported in the film by the highly artificial visual 
presentation of the character, in particular the character’s androgynous 
qualities.  
Sontag writes, ‘Camp is the triumph of the epicene style. (The 
convertibility of "man" and "woman," "person" and "thing.") But all style, that 
is, artifice, is, ultimately, epicene.’141 The notion of the epicene, the conflation 
of gender characteristics, is closely connected to Bigelow’s own image as well 
as her films. Bigelow’s films ‘loosely correspond to her own persona’, writes 
Pam Cook.142 The characters in her films often share the trademarks of 
Bigelow’s own persona, characteristics such as diligence, being ‘cool and 
reserved’, as well as a distinct epicene style.143 Maya’s epicene persona in Zero 
Dark Thirty is a very close copy of a certain, rather complex kind of 
androgyny that Cook associates with Bigelow herself:  
She (Bigelow) has long hair and wears make-up, at the same time as 
dressing in masculine-style, dark tailored suits with simple white shirt or 
T-shirt. (…) This is an androgynous look, but it is not the androgyny 
associated with cross-dressing or gay and lesbian identity. There is, I 
would suggest, no vocabulary for this particular style, though it may be 
related to the power-dressing phenomenon of the 1980s, when women 
making their way up the corporate ladder to the boardroom adopted 
masculine-style tailored clothing with exaggerated padded shoulders. 
(…) What is interesting about her fashionable designer suits is that, 
unlike cross-dressing and drag, they do not seem to suggest a crisis or 
parody of gender or sexuality. Rather, they project a stylish heterosexual 
woman who is at ease in male clothing.144 
This ‘particular style’ of what could be called ‘power androgyny’ is evident in 
the character of Maya in Zero Dark Thirty and worth dwelling on. Maya also 
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wears mainly expensive looking, dark trouser suits. Women’s trouser suits are 
modelled on the traditional male suit which is regarded as, ‘the standard 
masculine civil costume.’145 The film communicates that the character wants to 
appear serious, non-frivolous: that she is doing a ‘man’s job’. It is noticeable 
that the other female character, and Maya’s initial rival, Jessica, wears skirts 
and dresses more often than trousers.  
One of the effects of wearing a suit is to de-sexualise the wearer. This 
goes equally for men as well as women. The suit, in the words of Rosemary 
Hunter, erases ‘the sexed specificity of the individual (…) body.’146 Rather than 
accentuating each person’s individual figure, the suit literally uniformises an 
abstract masculine power by outlining the wearer’s physique as an anonymous 
male silhouette. The suit imbues the wearer with the symbolic power of a 
masculine environment. In the psychoanalytic language of Žižek this is the 
phallus, an object through which one assumes power|: ‘One has to think of the 
phallus not as the organ that immediately expresses the vital force of my 
being, my virility, … but, precisely, as such an insignia, as a mask that I put on 
in the same way a king or judge puts on his insignia.’147  
Maya’s suit is a phallic symbol. It has the effect of conveying multiple 
meanings. Not only is her character doing serious work in an environment 
delineated by stereotypically male characteristics such as violence and logic, 
but also she is driven by the mind over the body. Her suit is her performance 
as well as her persona. Moreover, as Cook suggests for Bigelow, Maya is 
comfortable in being that person.  
There is an exemption to the trouser suit that bears scrutiny. At one point 
when doing field work in Pakistan, Maya wears jeans and a t-shirt. Even this 
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outfit still conveys the idea, as Hollander suggests, of a woman dressed in male 
regalia, and ‘that sex is not of the issue at the moment.’148 
Maya’s distinctive looks can also be classed as androgynous. Underneath 
the power suits, her body is small-framed and suggests fragility. She shows no 
archetypically female curves but neither is she heavily muscled, in the way of 
Sarah Connor (Linda Hamilton) in The Terminator (1984), or even Ripley 
(Sigourney Weaver) in the Alien franchise. Maya does not wear make up, her 
cheekbones are distinctly masculine, but she also has voluminous red hair, 
porcelain skin and plump lips.  
Maya’s androgyny, however, does not desexualise her. On the contrary, 
her androgyny conveys a sexuality often regarded be accessible only to 
connoisseurs. Sontag writes that ‘camp taste draws on a mostly 
unacknowledged truth of taste: the most refined form of sexual attractiveness 
(as well as the most refined form of sexual pleasure) consists of going against 
the grain of one’s sex. What is most beautiful in virile men is something 
feminine; what is most beautiful in feminine women is something masculine.149  
Maya’s sexual power lies in her androgyny, making her sexuality as overt 
as the sexual powers associated with the excessively obvious sexuality 
identified by Sontag, ‘Allied to the camp taste for the androgynous is 
something that seems quite different but isn’t: a relish for the exaggeration of 
sexual characteristics and personality mannerisms.’150  
Maya’s surface androgyny, her exaggerated epicene sexual characteristics, 
are often referred to in texts on Zero Dark Thirty who describe her appearance 
as pre-Raphaelite (e.g. Andrews, Combs).151 
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The woman depicted in pre-Raphaelite paintings are an example of camp, 
says Sontag, ‘The androgyne is certainly one of the great images of Camp 
sensibility. Examples: the swooning, slim, sinuous figures of pre-Raphaelite 
painting and poetry.’152 John Hunt writes about the Pre-Raphaelites’ preference 
for androgyny, ‘The myth of the ideal union of male and female in one person 
had absorbed the Pre-Raphaelite imagination, no doubt because it provided a 
certain erotic fascination.’153  
Christine Kortsch writes that ‘the ideal Pre-Raphaelite beauty had pale 
skin, green eyes, and red hair.154 This perfectly describes actress Jessica 
Chastain who plays Maya. The casting of Chastain must be taken at face 
value, as a conscious choice, designed to evoke and to elicit particular 
emotions and ideas in particular a certain physicality. Even before her 
appearance in Zero Dark Thirty Jessica Chastain was described by critics as 
pre-Raphaelite.155 This look is part of Chastain’s star persona and is fostered in 
images, for example in photo-shoots for magazines such as Vogue,156 and in 
dresses that accentuate this look, such as the dress she wore on the red carpet 
for the Academy Awards ceremony in 2012.157  
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Bigelow says of her choice of actress for Maya that she wanted a 
relatively unknown actress because, ‘in a piece like this, where you want the 
aesthetic to feel as real as possible, you need the audience to be able to create 
an original relationship with the person onscreen.’158 The choice of Chastain is 
revealing especially as in the first instance the actress Rooney Mara was cast 
but had to drop out due to scheduling conflicts. Mara is similar in type to 
Chastain, both physically and in terms of star persona. She also has a small 
body frame and androgynous features. She was cast as the ‘gender outlaw’ 
(termed by Misty Hook)159 Lisbeth Sander in the remake of The Girl with the 
Dragon Tattoo (2011), and it would seem this androgynous persona has 
stuck.160 Mara too was photographed by Vogue in the style of a pre-Raphaelite 
painting in 2011.161  
The type of androgynous woman of pre-Raphaelite paintings is visually 
adopted in Zero Dark Thirty. This is evident not only in the type of actress 
cast for the film but also in how the film’s colour palette presents the character 
of Maya.  
The pre-Raphaelite quality of Chastain’s features are highly suited to the 
visual style of orange and teal colouring.162 Maya’s red hair and pale features 
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on cool background colours also create a contrast that ‘produces greater 
vibrancy’ and gives the ‘optical illusion of a halo.’ In many scenes Maya looks 
ethereal, standing out from surroundings. Her clothes are almost always a 
shade of blue, a complement to her hair and complexion. This is especially so 
in the scenes when she talks to prisoners. Her hair is always covered by a blue 
scarf, with the effect that her presence appears even more glowing. It is an 
invocation of cerebral power, standing in contrast to the male characters’ 
physicality, both prisoners and colleagues.  
The visual presentation of Maya, her androgynous physique in orange 
and teal, captures a subtle menace that is generated by how her character 
visually seems to transcend her physical environment. This ‘disavowed 
violence’, as Žižek calls it, comes across especially in Maya’s interrogation 
scenes. When interrogating Faraj, for example, Maya does not hit him herself. 
With a slight hand movement she touches a guard on the shoulder who then 
immediately punches Faraj. Maya is the first female action protagonist in 
Bigelow’s films since Blue Steel, prompting Armond White to write in his 
critique of Zero Dark Thirty that Maya ‘gets closer than the all-male The Hurt 
Locker to articulating Bigelow’s trademark interest in the androgynous erotics 
of violence.’163 The claim he makes is that the film, by choosing a female 
protagonist, imbues the film’s violence with a fetishistic eroticism, a sublime 
fantasy, that is not as evident in her treatment of the violence of the ‘war on 
terror’ in The Hurt Locker. This sentiment, that the film’s violence is executed 
through the exaggerated androgynous sexuality of Maya, echoes Žižek’s 
analysis of the film as a portrayal of the inherent violence of late capitalism. 
Žižek describes how Maya’s lack of obvious physical brutality disguises the 
objective, systemic violence that she conducts. Unlike the character of Dan, 
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she does not get her hands dirty torturing the prisoners, she lets prison guards 
do the job while she remains in the background. 
Maya’s dogged determination and androgynous sexuality imbue her with 
a power of persuasion that is ‘objective, systemic, anonymous’,164 helping her 
to convince the men in the film to follow her lead. The Zero Dark Thirty script 
conveys this clearly: ‘The girl is a true believer – as pure as they come. Larry 
looks at her. Her sincerity is persuasive. And just like that, he decides to help 
her.’165 Similarly Dan is so convinced by Maya’s lead that he is willing to be 
the fall guy for the CIA.166  
The high artifice of the character Maya is best seen in her physicality and 
lack of character arc. The character is exaggerated by her aesthetics; making 
Maya a case of camp failed seriousness. That does not mean that this failed 
seriousness is not to be taken seriously: rather, it indicates that a trademark of 
post-politics is an inherent ridiculousness. This can be determined in films 
such as Zero Dark Thirty by the ways in which this absurdity presents itself, 
in this case in the faintly ridiculous camp of a stylised androgyny. 
 
Zero Dark Thirty and camp theatricality 
Sontag writes that, ‘There is seriousness in Camp (seriousness in the degree of 
the artist’s involvement) and, often, pathos.’167 The aim of this analysis is to 
demonstrate that camp can be found in the incoherent dramaturgy of Zero 
Dark Thirty, and that this incoherence is due to an aesthetic in which the 
performances are overburdened with an excess of meaning. 
Dramaturgy, in the traditional sense describes the coherence of a drama 
in terms of space, time and action. This model derives from the rules for 
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drama as formulated by Aristotle that, in turn, informed the fundamentals of 
modern dramaturgy as devised by Lessing for the theatre,168 and again, more 
recently by film critics such as Bordwell, for the purpose of describing a filmic 
dramaturgy. Bordwell uses the term syuzhet to characterise the notion of how 
the story in film is told, ‘The syuzhet, then, is the dramaturgy of the fiction 
film, the organised set of cues prompting us to infer and assemble story 
information.’169  
However, dramaturgy implies a more complex relationship between the 
elements of drama. Dramaturgy gives ‘aesthetic Gestalt’170 to dramatisation, 
Gestalt being more than just form or shape but, a ‘unified structure, shape, or 
form that is greater (i.e. more meaningful) than the sum of its parts, and which 
takes perceptual precedence over these.’171 Dramaturgy is better described as 
‘the dialectics of aesthetics of dramatic presentation and performance.’172 With 
this definition the parameters of dramaturgy have to be extended to go beyond 
the idea of coherence of plot, space and time, and must also include the 
coherence of the dramatic and its aesthetic as well as the dynamics of this 
coherence – in short, dramaturgy is also the coherence of dramatic 
performance.  
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The inconsistencies of the dramaturgy of Zero Dark Thirty, which 
coincide with Sontag’s concept of ‘failure’ in terms of the logical demands of a 
piece in its own terms, are not the result of incoherent space, time and action. 
Rather they are more of a disjunction in the dramatic, between text, aesthetics 
and characters. To be clear, it is not a failure in terms of the craft of acting, it is 
not bad acting in the sense of incompetent or amateurish performance, but in 
the conflict between the internal logic of the drama and the logic of the 
characters. 
There is first of all a disjunction between the film’s premise as a 
procedural drama (the presentation of the work done by the CIA with highest 
possible degree of verisimilitude), and its visual aesthetics (what Bordwell 
would call a cinematography of ‘visceral disorientation’). Procedural dramas 
(such as the CSI series or the film Zodiac (2007) are generally ‘plot driven’.173 
It is the investigation that pushes the narrative forward, rather than the 
character’s inner conflict. In Zero Dark Thirty, instead of a classical three act 
structure and character driven plot, where cause-effect relationships propel the 
main characters, scenes are set up as a sequence of episodes assembled in 
chronological order. ‘It is a very, very different kind of narrative,’ Amy Pascal 
(Sony Co-Chairman) acknowledges, ‘It doesn’t have three acts. It doesn’t tell 
its story conventionally. But we felt that if, at the end, you feel the way you’re 
supposed to feel, that after this epic but also intimate odyssey, the world has 
changed, then it didn’t matter if there was a traditional ‘character arc.’174 In 
procedurals, such as Zero Dark Thirty, drama, or conflict, arises out of the 
hurdles that are put in the path of investigation and which have to be 
overcome by the protagonist; difficult superiors, failing technology, bad luck 
etc. However, often this conflict is decidedly un-dramatic in the film.  
The film’s dramaturgy plays the everyday events of CIA administration 
through a story of constant browbeating where one character tries to persuade 
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the other.175 Yet, these persuasion scenes do not provide recognisable conflict. 
For example, in a series of events Maya persuades her male colleagues to aid 
her in various ways. (She persuades Dan to ask Wolf for CIA money. With the 
money, Dan persuades a Kuwaiti prince to give him a phone number, and 
Maya talks Larry into finding the phone’s signal.) None of these persuasive 
acts are met with resistance, only expository questions, but are presented in an 
aggressive manner. In filmic dramaturgy, such persuasion scenes are usually 
reversal scenes; reversal scenes, according to Aristotle, are scenes in which 
characters change their minds, are persuaded and change their motivation or 
goal because interests clash.176 The persuasions in Zero Dark Thirty fail to 
deliver such reversal. There is no real clash of interest, people do not deliver 
counter arguments and the demands are always met.  
In the film, the work done by CIA analysts, is in itself lacking in 
recognisable dramatic conflict. As Shaviro says, ‘Every potentially dramatic 
action in which she [Maya] finds herself (bombings and armed ambushes 
included) is drained of drama, and subsumed within proceduralist routine. 
Every affect, and every reason for doing what one does, is sucked into a black 
hole.’177 This lack of drama in the film is evident in the way it shows images of 
routine meetings, people doing endless research in front of old computers and 
staring at wall charts bearing the profiles of wanted terrorists.  
However, the film’s representation of the procedural slog of 
administration and business meetings is imbued with a heightened visual 
drama in the style of the ‘visceral disorientation’ placing the aesthetic in the 
genre of spy thrillers such as The Bourne Ultimatum.178 This incoherence in 
the visual meaning and its content is magnified by an incoherence in the 
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dramaturgy of performance in the film. The dramaturgic disjunction can be 
felt in the tension between the aesthetics and the dialogue.  
Like many plot-driven stories, Zero Dark Thirty is thick with expositional 
dialogue. ‘Its dense subject matter lends itself to exposition rather than 
poetics,’ as one review described the film. Sarah Kozloff puts forward that, 
‘Expositional dialogue that seems clumsy fails adequately to cloak the fact that 
this information is for us, not the characters. Generally, there is something 
forced about the amount of specific detail crammed into presumably 
incidental conversation.’179 In Zero Dark Thirty, in order to create drama 
through performance, the exposition heavy dialogue is performed 
dramatically, giving the impression that the information is ‘for the characters’, 
as Kozloff would say. For the actors to act out this information rather than to 
integrate into their character creates an incoherence with the other storytelling 
elements of the film, such as the camera techniques used. Filmic elements that 
also, like the performance and the dialogue, and the performance of dialogue, 
depend on their inner logic to fit the overall narrative.  
Bordwell says this run-and-gun camera technique ‘doesn’t demand that 
you develop an ongoing sense of the figures within a spatial whole … they exist 
in an architectural vacuum.’180 Because the run-and-gun camera takes the 
bodies out of the spatial context, it forgoes an elementary part of the story – a 
subtext that could be found in the relationship between the body and the 
space it is in.181 Bordwell described claims that many films hide plotholes with 
the help of a disorientating visual aesthetic; by relinquishing the visual subtext 
that is provided by clearly situating the body in space and time, these films 
hide the fact that such a meaning does not exist. It can be derived that this 
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visual style not only creates ‘an architectural vacuum’, but in some films, it 
also creates a vacuum of meaning.  
That which other films would try to communicate by visual elements, 
visual subtext, is carried by the actual text in Zero Dark Thirty. The dialogue 
is burdened with exposition, resulting in performances that demonstrate the 
exposition rather than character. This has the effect that that many 
undramatic, procedural everyday events shown, are processed by the 
characters in an unnatural, theatrical manner.  
As a consequence of the drama being created by the performance of the 
text’s exposition (since drama is not available through the film’s form) the 
dramaturgy undermines one of the principal elements of story telling: the 
notion of ‘show, don’t tell’ – the Aristotelian ideal of performance is that the 
diegesis should be visualised rather than expressed.182 Again, this is to be 
understood as a ‘failure’, not in terms of failure to adhere to certain standards, 
but in terms of Sontag’s understanding, as an incoherence within the logical 
demands of a piece in its own terms. By telling the content of the scene, 
instead of showing it, the film produces an unsteady dynamic of how the 
audience receives its information.  
Acting out the character, in the sense of acting the subtext rather than the 
character, is what Lee Strasberg would simply call acting, not being true to the 
‘imaginary reality’.183 He famously said to his actors when they started to act 
out their character: ‘No acting please.’184 As soon as the character would start 
acting (acting out) Strasberg (standing in for the assumed the audience) would 
not suspend his disbelief.185 In Zero Dark Thirty, the characters’ imbuing the 
expositional text with the overt dramatics of acting out their character has a 
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similar effect. There is a suspension of disbelief in the ‘reality’ of the drama. It 
becomes overtly theatrical and consequently acquires a camp aesthetic.  
This theatricality also ensues a lack of suspension of disbelief in the 
seriousness of the drama. Sontag writes that, ‘the theatricalisation of 
experience (is) embodied in the camp sensibility’,186 meaning that in camp 
aesthetics events are heightened to such an extreme that they fail to be taken 
seriously, because they often take themselves too seriously, they become a 
parody of themselves.187 In terms of film this means that in a camp aesthetic 
there is an inherent disbelief in the drama, and the suspension of disbelief is 
not worth while. 
This is most evident in the scenes of daily interaction between the CIA 
agents. One scene depicts the agents being collectively excoriated by their 
senior supervisor George (Mark Strong). He paces among them in the 
conference room; the agents sit, heads down. He slams his fist on the table, 
shouting ‘And what the fuck have we done about it, huh?’ Another scene that 
illustrates the artificiality of performance is Maya’s first meeting with the 
other CIA operatives. The team discusses the latest movements of bin Laden. 
Another agent talks about a possible sighting. The scene’s purpose in terms of 
narrative is to convey the methodological failures of the CIA’s hunt for bin 
Laden at the time, while at the same time revealing the personalities of Maya 
and Jessica. This is done by telling both plot-points through the narrative 
device of establishing a rivalry of work methodology, rank and philosophy 
between Jessica and Maya.  
However, the dramatic performance in the scene does not correspond to 
its un-dramatic context. The difference in CIA strategy the two women 
represent is oddly hostile. This arises out of the circumstance that in the film 
the performances are often doubly loaded, the actors having to perform the 
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subtext of the plot as well as the subtext of the characters’ emotion – what 
happens is an acting out of these subtexts.188  
Maya’s interactions with her colleagues repeatedly represent her stoicism, 
how she stands her ground. In her workplace she has to constantly win over 
colleagues and later government officials. Whenever somebody questions her 
she is prickly and indignant. The performance becomes most theatrical when 
she trying to convince her superiors to act on her intelligence.  
For instance the scene in which she demonstratively writes on the door of 
her senior supervisor the number of days in which nothing is being done to 
action her intelligence. In another scene, she threatens her immediate boss, 
claiming that if he does not provide her with technical support he will fail to 
do his duty. The scene not only conveys what is going on in the story (the CIA 
has to acknowledge that Al Qaida is a global phenomenon rather than a 
distinguishable group) but also Maya’s escalating monomania.  
However, the seriousness of the scene is skewed by an excess of 
performance. The dialogue not only carries the heavy exposition of Maya’s 
plan, but this procedural information is delivered in a dramatic way. The text 
is written with high emotional intensity, and the actor can do nothing but act 
out the emotionality in complex sentences such as, ‘Either give me the team I 
need to follow this lead or the other thing you’re gonna have on your résumé is 
being the first station chief to be called before a Congressional Committee for 
subverting the effort to capture or kill bin Laden.’ There is a clash between the 
emotional intensity and seriousness of the situation, and the demonstrative 
performance of the scene, the intensity of which does not derive from the 
textual content. The critic Jiří Levý suggests that a good dramatist describes 
his characters from within, their language expression is controlled by the 
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character and not vice versa.189 The acting out of emotions as content 
compromises the actor’s ability to act the character in a relatable way, 
resulting in a theatrical performance that is incongruous with the seriousness 
of the story.  
The performers’ acting out their characters’ as well as the plot’s subtext 
displays an incoherence in terms of dramaturgy as one of the minor failings 
that make up the film’s more general quality of a failed seriousness. This 
surplus of meaning within the performance is responsible for the film’s camp 
aesthetic, in the sense of Sontag’s definition, it produces a ‘too much’, an 
exaggerated meaning that, in turn, causes the seriousness of the film to fail. In 
short, the film’s aesthetics make it theatrical, too much, exaggerated and over 
the top – they are camp. 
 
Conclusion 
Sontag’s understanding of failure as the incoherence within the logical 
demands of a film in its own terms, can be confidently applied to Zero Dark 
Thirty, in that the film can be understood as a collection of minor failings that 
are camp. The film is camp in its over-dramatic theatricalisation of the 
procedural workplace, its bordering-on-caricature, incandescent protagonist 
and lack of character development, and visual voguishness.  
By looking at Žižek’s concepts of the surplus of enjoyment, the jouissance 
that stands for the too much of libidinal investment, through the parallels it 
shares with Sontag’s concept of naïve camp, Zero Dark Thirty, can be regarded 
as an aesthetic demonstration of the ideological absurdity of the failed 
seriousness of western elites in the post-political. The filmmakers’ 
goal, through the use of neutral images and characters, was to create a 
verisimilar account of the hunt for bin Laden, with the intent of delivering ‘an 
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honest telling of the story as we know it.’ ⁠190 In the deliberate stepping away 
from taking a position, be it on the subject of torture or the ‘war on terror’ 
itself, the film intentionally disengages with the politics of its narrative. What 
is left is an aesthetic surplus, the naïve camp of Zero Dark Thirty, the 
indivisible reminder of post-political ideology.  
Susan Sontag writes in Notes on Camp, ‘It goes without saying that the 
camp sensibility is disengaged, depoliticised – or at least apolitical.’191 Recent 
attempts to re-politicise camp192 do so in the name of postmodern identity 
politics, in which the idea of what is political is different to that of Sontag. For 
her, the personal is not political. A thoughtful description of her world view is 
told in The Village Voice:  
She once told Dick Cavett, after the first of her struggles with cancer, 
that she didn’t find her own illness interesting. She stipulated that it was 
moving to her, but not interesting. To be interesting, experience has to 
yield a harvest of ideas, which her illness certainly did – but she 
communicated them in a form useful to others in ways a conventional 
memoir couldn’t be. (To be useful, one has to reach others on the level of 
thought, not only feeling – though the two are inseparable.)193  
In her writing she understood how a particular experience resonates in the 
universal, the individual bears witness to the greater events in the world and 
articulates these. 
Sontag’s description of camp as a-political resonates with, how the post-
political is the continuing presentation and performance of politics in 
apolitical terms. ‘Every sensibility is self-serving to the group that promotes 
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it’,194 says Sontag, and Žižek says, post-political ideology identifies itself in 
that it ‘no longer lays claim to truth.’ ⁠195  
Camp can thus be regarded as an unconscious sensibility of the post-
political, through which its a-political and a-historical ways of thinking are 
articulated. Following these sentiments it can be concluded that the post-
political can be recognised by its campness, the camp of failed seriousness, 
where elites have substituted overly-dramatic narratives for politics with the 
purpose of making meaning.
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Part 2  
Post-politics in UK Cinema 
 
The inability to act politically is for Žižek one of the most defining features of 
the post-political. By foreclosing this gesture, the only option for people is not 
to act but to act out. This part looks at terrorism in UK cinema through the 
prism of Žižek’s political act, in order to analyse how this political deadlock is 
translated into film form in the films Hunger and Four Lions. The two films 
represent two artistic translations of the possibility to act. In Hunger the act is 
a political one – here the particular stands for the universal. Four Lions on the 
other hand thematises the foreclosure of this possibility in the post-political. 
The foreclosure to act politically in the UK in the post-political has been 
highlighted by Žižek in his analysis of the London Riots. The riots took place 
from Saturday 6 August to Thursday 11 August 2011, following public unrest 
after the shooting of Mark Duggan by the police. Several buildings were 
burned down, shops were looted and the police arrested about 3,100 people. 
There have been many speculations abut why these riots happened ranging 
from leftist interpretations of social inequality and government spending cuts, 
to conservative ones blaming gang culture.1 A study by the London School of 
Economics (LSE) and The Guardian concluded that the rioters’ motivation was 
a general sense of frustration, fuelled by a strained relationship with the 
police.2 In fact the actings out of the rioters’ frustrations could not be easily 
explained by social economic factors nor by the concept of gang culture. 
Instead, the incident was more often a vehicle for the media and political 
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speakers form both the left and the right to voice their own agendas and 
prejudices. The rioters’ actings out, however, seem to point to a greater 
problem of foreclosure in the post-political. Žižek comments that,  
The fact that the rioters have no programme is therefore itself a fact to 
be interpreted: it tells us a great deal about our ideological-political 
predicament and about the kind of society we inhabit, a society which 
celebrates choice but in which the only available alternative to enforced 
democratic consensus is a blind acting out.3  
 According to Žižek there is something ‘inherently terroristic in every 
authentic act’ in the way it reconstructs ‘the rules of the game’.4 This raises the 
question, are the actions and motivations of many terrorists today truly 
terroristic in a Žižekian sense? Does the ideological landscape allow space for 
such an act? And what happens if this space is denied? The answers can be 
sensed, at least partially in cinema. Žižek uses the psychoanalytic term of 
fantasy to demonstrate how cinema has the ability to display for us, and allow 
us to consume our own desires. He describes how people are often unable to 
articulate desires, either because they are deep in the subconscious or too 
horrible to admit. But these desires can find an outlet in cinematic fantasies. 
Through investigating the cinematic depiction of terrorism – seen in a 
Žižekian way, as a fantasy of a liberating act – this thesis proposes that we can 
see if fantasies are actually fulfillable (by watching how the terrorist characters 
of the film are conducting their terrorist act). The films give form to the 
fantasy of such an act, or the foreclosure of the possibility for such an act. 
The first chapter of this section analyses how the act is possible as a truly 
political act, and investigates how this is turned into an artistic experience in 
Hunger. The second chapter, looking at the film Four Lions, analyses how the 
post-political, in its foreclosing of an act, creates a climate in which people act 
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out. This is done by way of exposing the contradictions of the post-political in 
the comedy of director Chris Morris. 
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Chapter 2.1 
A fantasy of emancipation: 
the cinema of Žižek’s true act and  
Steve McQueen’s Hunger 
 
Introduction 
A man in a rubber protective suit enters a room, looking like he is visiting a 
different planet, hostile to his living conditions. He begins to hose down an 
artistically arranged circle of shit from the wall. The whole room is covered in 
shit and rotten food, spread on the walls. The man proceeds very slowly and 
calmly but with unrelenting force. This scene from the film Hunger is a 
powerful image that brings home how the shit smeared walls of the H-Blocks 
at the Maze prison in Northern Ireland during the protests in the 1970s and 
1980s were an ironic response to the ‘civilising’ sentiment of British imperialist 
politics. Also the scene, showing the implacable attitude of the cleaner/prison 
guard as an instrument of authority, is a reminder of the unswerving 
determination of the British government to pursue their colonialist politics.  
Matthew Brown writes that this visual reminder of the dirty protests 
against the removal of political status for the prisoners is the limit of Hunger’s 
ambition to engage with the radical politics that shaped Northern Irish 
identity. By concentrating on the isolated suffering of Bobby Sands, he writes, 
the film only provides a ‘real or imagined somewhere else’ instead of facing the 
complex social realities of the time.1  
However, what is at the heart of Hunger is a greater desire; not to re-
politicise Irish history, as Brown rightly says, but to show the radical within 
the Republican movement and thus go beyond a mere investigation of the 
intricacies of the struggles. Its effect is not that of a more complex 
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understanding of Irish history but a greater desire to create a possibility of 
liberation from unbearable circumstances. This chapter investigates how 
Hunger represents the fantasy of being able to liberate oneself from a social 
order that has become unbearable. The director Steve McQueen creates with 
Hunger a vision of an emancipatory act – the act described by Žižek in his 
theory of the true act. Although McQueen recreates in his film a non-fictional, 
30 year old event, it evokes a contemporary fantasy for emancipatory change. 
Furthermore, by showing the radical ethos that determines the act, Hunger 
does not deny the terroristic character of the Republican movement.  
This chapter looks at the construction of the act, following Žižek, and 
how it occurs in Hunger. The first part describes Žižek’s concept of the true act 
in order to understand why the radicalism of Hunger, through the idea of the 
true act, goes further than just a re-imagining of the protests at the Maze 
prison. Five aspects of the act will be analysed, including Žižek’s influences, an 
analysis of what does and does not make an act, as well as why Žižek regards 
the act as a political instrument.  
The second part will look more closely at Hunger itself, starting with a 
reminder of why the idea of political status was such an important component 
in the self-concept of the Republican movement. This will be followed by a 
description of how the film fits into a cinema that tries to produce a new 
cultural memory of the struggles by evoking ideas of a ‘stillness of image’ 
according to Brown.2 Hunger is investigated in its artistic presentation, its 
method of framing of the image, and its narrative structure, which will be 
addressed by dividing the film into three dramatic segments: the physical, the 
linguistic and the bodily. 
The final part investigates how the act happens in Hunger and how it is 
possible for the film to create an acceptance of the terrorist mindset within the 
audience – an acceptance which is even more uncanny because it favours a 
radicalism that is relevant beyond the historical limits of a defused conflict. 
                                                            





Ž ižek and the true act  
To explore the way in which Hunger does not shy away from the radical 
element of terrorism it is helpful to explore Žižek’s understanding of the 
importance of cinema as platform for our fantasies, and why he would claim 
them to be important as a reminder of our fantasies of emancipation.  
According to Žižek, cinema can show us our own potential to break with 
the oppressive structures that bind our freedom. For Žižek, to access a glimpse 
into this potential is almost impossible in real life. One needs the dimension of 
fantasy, especially the one created by cinema, to see beyond the ideology that 
determines our lives. In the documentary The Pervert’s Guide to Cinema 
(2006) he says: 
In order to understand today’s world, we need cinema, literally. It’s only 
in cinema that we get that crucial dimension which we are not ready to 
confront in our reality. If you are looking for what is in reality more real 
that reality itself, look into the cinematic fiction.3  
The cinema screen, for Žižek, shows how reality works by giving form to 
peoples’ desires through showing them their fantasies. Cinema works here 
similar to ideology in that, ‘We don’t simply believe or do not believe. We 
always believe in a kind of conditional mode. I know very well it’s a fake but, 
nonetheless, I let myself be emotionally effected.’4 
Accessing this real reality (the Lacanian real) beyond our everyday reality 
(the symbolic) through the cinema screen, brings with it, according to Žižek, 
the possibility of changing the current reality we live in – a reality in which we 
are not as free as we can be. In real life we are often bound by unjust social 
constructs that do not allow for a change on a fundamental level. For Žižek a 
true emancipation of the subject can only be achieved through what he refers 
to as a true act. 
                                                            





Žižek identifies the true act as a violent reconstitution of events at a 
fundamental level. He insists that only such an act can bring about true 
political change. However, Žižek also emphasises that in the world today, 
dominated as it is by capitalist liberal democracy, ‘in politics the space for an 
act is closing viciously.’5 
Although contemporary politics may not provide an arena for the true 
act, it is still recognisable it its fantasies. These fantasies are, for Žižek, 
perfectly represented by cinematic fiction. So it is to cinema that we should 
turn in order to be shown not only the possibilities of a world that is more 
than our reality can give us but also a glimpse into the possibility of true 
emancipation. 
 
The act  
Key to Žižek’s ideas of a fantasy of emancipation within a cinematic narrative 
is the concept of the act. The act is an idea Žižek has takes from the work of 
Lacan and uses as the basis of his emancipatory theory. The act describes how 
a subject interacts with the world outside the parameters of the symbolic in 
such a way that he/she is, traumatically and for a short moment catapulted 
outside the symbolic, changing their relationship to the symbolic in the 
process. Lacan’s concept of the act, as a gesture that reconstitutes the subject 
from nothing, is regarded by Žižek as a way of undoing one’s link to the 
symbolic and its constitutive powers. It must be said that Žižek distinguishes 
clearly between a true or ‘political’6 ‘authentic’7 act and an ‘inauthentic act’8, 
one which takes the form of a violent acting out – a passage à l’acte. Žižek 
poses the passage à l’acte as the opposite of the authentic act. The authentic 
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act is a refusal of the Other by the subject, resulting in the dissolution and 
immediate reconstitution of the subject and his/her relationship to the 
symbolic; the passage à l’acte is directed at the Other. In a passage à l’acte the 
given symbolic order is not essentially challenged or changed; the subject still 
operates within its framework, addressing his/her frustration with it through 
impotent, hysterical violence.  
This chapter, on the film Hunger, will concentrate on the authentic act 
and its political possibilities as a tool of analysis. By contrast the following 
chapter, which looks at Four Lions, deals with the passage à l’acte, in 
particular its relationship to the post-political and impossibility of politics, and 
uses this to elaborate the conception of the true act more fully.  
 
The following passage looks at five particularities of the act. 
 
What are Žižek’s main influences for the concept of the act? 
For Žižek, the ‘free’ subject is the result of a violent process – an idea he finds 
in Marxist dialectics (with its historically conditioned insistence on a 
proletarian revolution) as in Lacanian psychoanalysis (as the end to the 
psychoanalytic cure). 
In the idea of the true act, Žižek brings together two concepts of how man 
(in the sense of human), or a collective can be free from their given 
circumstances. 
The first concept comes from Lacan. In his Seminar on the Psychoanalytic 
Act, he describes how the subject has the ability to break with his own 
subjectivisation by refusing to take part in the symbolic order by the 
performance of an act.9 As described elsewhere in this thesis, the symbolic is 
the linguistic structure where subjectivisation occurs, the non-natural universe 
that people enter at birth which then constitutes their ensuing lives.  
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The Lacanian subject is at first without meaning and finds it in its 
reconstitution in the concept of the symbolic order. For Lacan the subject 
becomes the subject by subjecting him/herself to the order of language which 
is what constitutes the symbolic. The symbolic, is, according to Lacan, ‘the 
pact which links … subjects together in one action. The human action par 
excellence is originally founded on the existence of the world of the symbol, 
namely on laws and contracts.’10  
For Žižek, Lacan’s idea of the symbolic can be seen as an attempt to 
describe the discrepancies between the life promised by the dominant social 
constructs or culture/society and the materialist realities of everyday life: for 
example, the contradiction between the capitalist principle of individual 
freedom and the actual unfreedom it produces in the lack of choices people 
can actually make. This is interesting, as it is parallel to the idea of the state as 
the product of the irreconcilability of class antagonisms.  
Žižek combines Lacan’s theory of the act with the revolutionary element 
of Marxism. He draws on Marx’s appeal to the workers, who, for Žižek, are 
caught in the ‘symbolic order of capitalism’. Marx points to their only way to 
emancipation – to unite in solidarity and violently smash the symbolic chains 
that bind them to the capitalist state. As it says in the Communist Manifesto:  
The Communists … openly declare that their ends can be attained only 
by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling 
classes tremble at a Communistic revolution. The proletarians have 
nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win.11 
The assumption is that there is a possibility of overcoming the dominant 
social order. For Marxists it is revolution, for Lacan it is the act – for Žižek 
they are one and the same. 
To recap, for Žižek, the ‘free’ subject is the result of a violent process – in 
materialist dialectics (revolution) as in Lacanian psychoanalysis (confronting a 
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trauma). The emancipatory true act means the complete overthrow of given 
structures. The act is a violent reconstitution of events at a fundamental level; 
that which was always at the heart of the old symbolic order is irreparably 
gone.  
 
What compels us to do the act? 
The paradox is that, although the act is an active deed, it is also impossible to 
consciously enforce. It is unplanned, the subject cannot subjectivise it, 
meaning he cannot make it a product of his consciousness. He can neither 
plan nor internalise it. The act can only be understood by the subject 
afterwards with hindsight. Žižek describes it thus:  
The decision is purely formal, ultimately a decision to decide, without a 
clear awareness of WHAT the subject decides about; it is non-
psychological act, unemotional, with no motives, desires or fears; it is 
incalculable, not the outcome of strategic argumentation; it is a totally 
free act, although one couldn’t do it otherwise. It is only AFTERWARDS 
that this pure act is ‘subjectivized’, translated into a (rather unpleasant) 
psychological experience.12 
This paradox of an active, yet unconscious deed, is possible because the act is 
governed by the ‘death drive’ – the inherent force that, according to Lacan, 
compels us to seek out pleasure in unjoyful experiences, or jouissance.13 In the 
act this pleasure is gained by experiencing the falling apart of one’s own 
subjective world. The breakdown of false symbolic social structures not only 
means a total annihilation of the self, which was dependent on the symbolic to 
give it meaning, but also means a glimpse into the realm of the non-false 
world, the reality beyond reality, or as Lacan calls it – the real.  
Žižek’s analysis might well give the impression that it is groundless, 
purely spontaneous, and leading to nowhere in particular. This does not stand 
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in contradiction to Žižek’s understanding of the act as a means to specific 
political ends. The agent has the ability to envision the possibility of 
qualitative changes in society to be able to act on this vision in the first place.  
 
How long does a true act take and what comes after? 
It is difficult to determine how long an act will take. The way the act is placed 
between an intact symbolic structure and its dissolution means that it cannot 
be placed within a time span that relates to the surrounding elements. Žižek 
(with the help of Laclau) explains, ‘the irreducible “unaccountability” of an act 
attests to the fact that what defines an act is temporality irreducible to 
space.’14 What this means is that, because the act cannot be subjectivised by 
the subject, the time it takes to happen cannot be measured by the world it is 
happening in. Therefore, an act could take any time from a millisecond to 
several years. The momentum of the act is only over once the subject has been 
reconstituted in a new symbolic structure. The subject has completed his 
transition between ‘false’ social structures that determine his life with the help 
of the act. The structures of the new ‘false’ life bear the possibility of a better 
life by starting again from nothing.  
However, the human constitution needs a social structure to define its 
self. The agent of the act has to enter a new social order which is just as false 
as the old one, in that it is constructed around an ideology. As Butler writes, 
‘This act comes down finally to a choice not whether to enter the symbolic or 
not but between two alternatives already within the symbolic.’15 
This does not mean that nothing is gained. By virtue of being able to start 
from scratch, to reconstitute oneself in a new symbolic order; the chance of 
creating a world which is more suited to one’s needs is the prize (to gain) and 
the price (to be paid) of conducting a true act. 
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Why does Žižek see the agents of the act as heroes? 
As we have seen, the act is only possible as an unplanned event, a point where 
the unconscious makes the decision for the subject. Žižek says; 
The point of Lacan’s criticism is thus that an authentic act does not (…) 
presuppose its agent ‘on the level of the act’ (with his will purified of all 
pathological motivations, etc.) – it is not only possible, even inevitable, 
that the agent is not ‘on the level of its act’, that he him/herself is 
unpleasantly surprised by the ‘crazy thing’ he has just done, and unable 
fully to come to terms with it. This, incidentally, is the usual structure of 
heroic acts: somebody who, for a long time, has led an opportunistic life 
of manoeuvring and compromises, all of a sudden, inexplicably even to 
him/herself, resolves to stand firm, cost it what may.16 
The heroism of the act stems from the subject’s willingness to annihilate the 
self contained within the current ‘false’ or symbolic social order. The hero 
does not operate within the boundaries of the oppressive social structure but 
redefines them through the act. This is why suicide cannot be classed as a true 
act. The performance of suicide tries to appeal to the dominating ideology, 
through a desperate measure – it still operates within the given social 
structures rather than abandoning them altogether.  
Žižek finds several examples of the act in cinema. Ranging from Keanu 
Reeves who shoots his partner in the leg instead of firing at the terrorist in the 
film Speed (1994), to Edward Norton who beats himself up in Fight Club 
(1999) and most shocking of all, the character Keyser Söze, played by Kevin 
Spacey in the film The Usual Suspects (1995) who kills his own family rather 
than giving in to the demands of the criminals who are holding his family 
hostage. All figures are breaking with the unbearable social construct they 
have been placed in. They do not engage with their opponents on their own 
terms but instead redefine the rules of the game itself. These examples of 
extreme behaviour demonstrate how the fantasy of an act is perfectly at home 
within the narrative of cinema. In these kind of films we often get the whole 
                                                            




picture, we are shown the agents’ own subjectivity through the medium of 
film, something that is hard to find and recognise in everyday life.  
 
What is Žižek’s purpose for the act? 
One of the focal points of Slavoj Žižek’s work is emancipatory politics. His 
mission is to show the possibilities of leftist politics in the late capitalist, post-
modern world. He challenges his readers to abandon ideological fantasies and 
to confront the structures of their desires, the unconscious drives that can 
affect their actions without them knowing.  
One crucial difference between Žižek and other contemporary leftist 
writers, such as Ernest Laclau, is that Žižek has abandoned the idea of human 
emancipation through a course of radical democracy. To him, the inherent 
contradictions of contemporary capitalist liberal democracy speak against the 
possibility of a true universalist project of human emancipation.17 In their 
book Žižek and Politics, Matthew Sharpe and Geoff Boucher argue that Žižek 
has changed the emphasis of his theory along with his political standpoint. 
They describe how after 1996 Žižek abandoned the idea of radical democracy 
completely in favour of a ‘revolutionary vanguardist position.’18 They argue 
that Žižek’s exploration of the romantic philosophy of Gottfried Schelling 
encouraged him to switch the focus of his project from staying in the symbolic 
(which would mean changing the system from within through cultural 
critique) to fully embracing a more radical position of ‘leaping into the real’ 
and relying on more than reason to cross the ‘bridge between human nature 
and social freedom.’19 
 In a politics of the true act, Žižek sees a way of achieving real 
emancipation from the social structures that shape the subject’s world. This 
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means that a true act happens when an individual or society breaks with given 
circumstances and /or ruling ideologies. 
 
The act as a political instrument 
In the last ten years, Žižek’s writings have concentrated on his insistence that 
what is required to reshape the contemporary political landscape is a radical 
act. He applies Lacan’s prescription of a psychoanalytic cure through the act 
to global capitalism. For him politics and the ideological fantasies that shape 
it, are to be found in the Lacanian realm of the symbolic and not in the realm 
real, and can therefore only be disturbed on an elementary level through an 
act; the complete break with the symbolic, which creates a state of ex nihilo, a 
creation out of nothing.20 Žižek is clear that he equates the fantasy of the 
individual with the collective identity of an entire people. His idea is that the 
radicalness of the act is the only means by which to counter the hegemony 
that is the stalemate of liberal democracy and its inherent contradictions. This 
act is by nature without compromise and is therefore always revolutionary. 
Marc de Kesel writes, ‘Any political act disrupts the (evolution of) the 
symbolic order and is thus revolutionary.’21  
To illustrate the way in which ‘the act’ works as a revolutionary event on 
a political landscape, Žižek uses the example of Lenin’s decision to seize the 
moment of the start of the Russian revolution of 1917. Lenin decided to break 
‘his’ Bolsheviks from the Mensheviks who together made up the Russian 
Social Democratic Labour Party, with the final split happening in 1912. The 
Bolsheviks believed that the Mensheviks were not radical enough to ensure a 
true revolution of the proletariat, as the Mensheviks relied too much on legal 
processes and trade unions to enable a political programme. Still, both sides 
were shaped by Marxist philosophy. Both sides shared a common 
understanding of Marx’s emphasis on the objective lines of history. Both 
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parties were in no doubt about Marx’s concept that a proletarian revolution 
can only follow a period of stable democracy.  
Lenin, however, fully aware that the revolution which was unfolding 
would be premature, went ahead and seized the opportunity that was 
presented to him in the political turmoil of Russia in 1917. Žižek quotes Lenin’s 
exclamation ‘History will never forgive us if we miss this opportunity’, to 
emphasise this point of forced decision-making as elemental to the 
revolutionary act.22 This moment is what György Lukács called the 
Augenblick. The Augenblick – ‘the moment when briefly, there is an opening 
for an act to intervene in a situation – is the art of seizing the right moment, of 
aggravating the conflict before the system can accommodate itself to our 
demand.’23 Žižek embraces Lukács as the ‘philosopher of Leninism’. He writes 
that Lukács’ Augenblick is close to what Alain Badiou today describes as the 
Event: ‘an intervention that cannot be accounted for in the terms of its pre-
existing “objective conditions”’.24 According to Žižek, historical events happen 
when a political situation is challenged, not within its own terms, but through 
acts that defy these very terms. Lenin went against his theoretic and 
doctrinaire absolutes by using the momentum of 1917 to go ahead with the 
revolution, but in doing so created and allowed for a situation of ex nihilo 
where a situation of fundamental change had been made possible. A 
revolutionary act acknowledges the necessity for contingency in the shaping of 
politics rather than assuming the outcome of political action. 
The unease that is created by the uncertainty and unknowability of the 
outcome of a revolutionary act and, moreover, the readiness to allow for 
violence and terror in order create a state of ex nihilo, have earned Žižek’s 
political position enormous criticism. For example, Laclau is alarmed at 
Žižek’s dismissal of existing liberal democracies and proposes that Žižek’s 
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political strategies will lead to a repetition of totalitarian structures of old, 
structures that societies have taken years to overcome.25 Sharpe and Boucher 
see the problem of Žižek’s ‘ultra extremism’ in the matter that he tries to 
equate the concept of true political change with the overthrow of global 
capitalism itself.26 They write, ‘This is a type of change that can only mean 
equating politics with violent regime change, and ultimately embracing 
dictatorial government.’27 Unimaginable for many, violence is a consequence 
and a method Žižek openly embraces.28  
Žižek’s counterargument to the accusation of promoting violence, and 
consequential suffering, is that the post-political environment of 
contemporary liberal democracies is as violent and intolerant as the maligned 
totalitarian regimes, it is just that the latter are more honest about their 
violence. The idea that modern democracy is the result of peaceful 
development is an illusion. The battles for better working conditions, women’s 
rights and racial equality, and the various liberation struggles of occupied 
countries throughout the world in the last century, have not been advanced 
through mutual tolerance and peaceful protests. Moreover, Žižek points out, 
that within the system of capitalism with the concept of liberal democracy at 
its centre, ‘resides the fundamental systemic violence of capitalism.’29 The 
systemic violence of capitalism is its inherent, tolerated and even promoted 
material inequality as well as the violence concomitant with imperialist 
endeavours.  
Žižek is well aware of the deficiencies of past revolutions and the 
resulting horrors which are far more unequivocal than the violence that has 
been the result of global capitalism. These failures are to be critiqued rather 
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than emulated.30 However, Žižek defends the revolutionary impulse that 
allowed for a change to happen in the first place. Žižek criticises the injustices 
of political violence that were the failures of these revolutions but maintains 
that ‘divine violence’ is a welcome disruption of unwanted hegemony and a 
real representation of the will of the people. (Divine violence is a term Žižek 
takes from Walter Benjamin and is an idea of violence that is not defined by 
the signifiers of the ruling ideologies – the rule of the law. Divine violence ‘is 
just a sign of the injustice of the world, of the world being ethically, ‘out-of-
joint’.’31 And it is often in the form of an act that divine violence is executed.) 
 
Final comments on the act 
Žižek follows a path of modern Marxism in the way that he seems to ask: 
‘Why do the people not rebel?’ Since the failure of the communist movement 
in Europe after World War I, Marxists have searched for an answer to why 
Marxism failed to take hold in the working classes. The philosophers of the 
Frankfurt School blamed it on the capitalist invention of a culture industry as 
a social system that kept the working class from discovering the 
contradictions of capitalism. Žižek seems to come to a similar conclusion 
about postmodern society. Today’s pluralistic discourses give the illusion of 
freedom in the same way the culture industry does. For Žižek, it is the denial 
of a real alternative to capitalism that prevents subjects of breaking away from 
dominant ideology.  
For Žižek, only through a true act can we escape the given circumstances. 
The authority of liberal politics prevents the politics of actual change. By 
dismantling the other, postmodernism has taken away the space to protest, it 
has become difficult to oppose authority itself. It is this assumed 
abandonment of ideology, by aspects of postmodernist distance, that allows 
ideology to work in the social. Only by recognising that the postmodern post-
political age is in itself ideological (through the methods of ideology critique) 
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can we find its own negation within – the antithesis that will bring us in touch 
with the real and from where new forms of desire emerge. 
Žižek is clear that there is such a thing as ʻgood terrorʼ – that which as a 
political act brings about the liberation of the subject. But, as we have seen, for 
Žižek one terrorism is not like another. The terroristic element of the act is in 
its true radicalism to completely dispatch the ruling ideology. A terrorist 
action that does not hazard these consequences is not an act, but a mere 
gesture, still operating within the symbolic order. The agent of an act also 
needs a certain readiness in terms of a conscious awareness of his/her dire 
situation as well as an affinity to fantasise about radical solutions to his 
problems. 
For Žižek film, with its potential to visualise our fantasies, can show the 
dimension that lies beyond symbolic social structures – the reality beyond 
reality. Fantasy as expressed through the medium of film, is the most direct 
way to access the inert potential which may be denied in the symbolic 
structures in which we live. According to Žižek, cinema can show us the 
possibilities of the Lacanian real by tapping into our desires and potentials; for 
Žižek they are often one and the same, as in the case of the true act. 
 
Hunger  and the importance of polit ical  status 
Hunger is the directing debut of the Turner Prize winning artist Steve 
McQueen. It is set in 1981 in H.M. Maze prison (also known as Long Kesh or 
H-Blocks) in Northern Ireland, in which the British government interned 
paramilitary prisoners under arduous conditions. The film deals with the 
accounts of the hunger strike conducted by members of the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA). The first third of the film focuses on the life on the prisoners 
inside. The rest of the film converges on the character of the Irish republican 
Bobby Sands (played by Michael Fassbender) and his decision to lead a 





In the film, the character of Bobby Sands makes a comment that 
addresses the discrepancy between the urgency of the protesters’ demands and 
the needs of the people outside the prison. ‘Some woman bringing up three 
children in West Belfast shouldn’t care about civilian clothing or whatever 
they call these clown outfits,’ referring to the prisoners’ demands to wear their 
own clothes instead of prison uniforms. To understand the significance of the 
protesters demands for political status in the film, it is necessary to have an 
understanding of the real life political importance of gaining political status for 
the prisoners at the time.  
 The blanket and dirty protests were the initial reaction by the 
paramilitary IRA prisoners of the Maze prison to the announcement by the 
British government in 1976 that they had been stripped of their status as 
political prisoners.32 Instead they were classified as common criminals without 
any of the rights that were guaranteed to political prisoners. To the prisoners, 
as well as the IRA members outside, the removal of political status was a clear 
attempt by the British government to not only mark the prisoners as criminals 
but also to attempt to criminalise the Republican project in general.  
From 1978 onwards, out of protest, the prisoners refused to wear the 
uniforms given to them which would mark them as felons, instead going 
naked or making provisional clothes from prison blankets. Due to the violence 
they experienced at the hands of the guards, the prisoners would refuse to 
leave their cells. No alternatives were offered to the prisoners and they 
resorted to demonstrations and protests by refusing to slop out their 
excrement. Instead they smeared their shit and rotten food onto the walls of 
their cells. IRA member Pat McGeown described the conditions inside the 
prison in a 1985 interview, 
There were times when you would vomit. There were times when you 
were so run down that you would lie for days and not do anything with 
the maggots crawling all over you. The rain would be coming in the 
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window and you would be lying there with the maggots all over the 
place.33 
The psychological strain of living in these conditions took its toll on the 
prisoners, and the British government showed no signs of giving in. After two 
years of dirty protest, the prisoners decided to step up their methods and 
resorted to hunger strike. After a hunger strike in 1980 failed to secure the 
prisoners’ demands, the prisoners decided on a second strike in March 1981, 
this one led by Bobby Sands. He was chosen at the end of the 1980s as 
commanding officer by the imprisoned members of the IRA at the Maze 
prison. This time they changed their tactics and would start the strike two 
weeks apart, thus guaranteeing that there was constant pressure on the British 
government. The hunger strike was called off on 3 October 1981; ten strikers 
had died by that day. 
Having their status as political prisoners taken from them and with it 
their political legitimation, the IRA in turn called for an indiscriminate 
assassination policy for members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) 
stating ‘We are prepared to die for political status. Those who try to take it 
away from us must be fully prepared to pay the same price.’34 The IRA were 
very clear; the criminalisation of the prisoners was also a criminalisation of 
Republican politics. Only when understood as a group with a political agenda 
could they fight against the foreign rule of the British Government 
legitimately, on equal terms, as political enemies on opposite sides. 
 
The conceptualisation of Hunger  and the art of Steve McQueen 
Hunger is based on true events that are still in living memory. Matthew Brown 
writes that films such as Hunger and Omagh (2004), still maintain an 
‘awareness’ of their political past. They feed on the symbolic meanings evoked 
by potent images of the struggles. The reproduction and use of these images 
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creates an uncanny sensation. Brown uses Mulvey’s theory of Stillness and the 
Moving Image35 to explain how filmmakers such as McQueen, by using past 
events as subject matter, can address contemporary notions about political 
processes, especially in Northern Ireland. He writes, ‘In the terms set down by 
Mulvey, these films are intentionally uncanny, for they mean to disturb the 
contemporary moment by bringing to life old but familiar memories and to 
raise a series of larger questions about how these memories are politicised, 
memorialised, and positioned within contemporary narratives about political 
‘progress’ in Northern Ireland.’36  
Hunger shows a new way of visualising collective memory in order to 
investigate contemporary attitudes and sensibilities. It is uncanny in the way 
described by Brown. Apart from its minimalist soundtrack, there are three 
main areas in which this uncanniness is experienced; in its artistic method, its 
use of the camera and its unusual structure. The score is often only a single 
piano note, designed to break a silence that would otherwise become too 
emphatic, a facsimile of realism, and this is avoided by the introduction of 
audible reminders of the artificiality of the medium.  
Hunger does not attempt a politically interpretative, historically 
revisionist account of the events at the Maze prison unlike, for example, the 
film H3 (2001). Instead it shows fragmented visions of violence and defiance, 
never actively engaging with the past on an interpretative level – it is not 
interested in historical contexualisation. Yet, the fact that the IRA understood 
itself as entirely political in its actions is what drives the plot in Hunger. In the 
film, McQueen thematises the identification of the individual with his politics, 
in the way that the characters are in themselves politics personified. He 
creates this understanding though his unusual cinematic language. 
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In his art, McQueen relies on the viewers’ capacity to appreciate artistic 
capabilities, their ability to engage with the subject matter on a fundamental 
level by experiencing his art as a reflection on, not a description of, reality. His 
films and installations do not tell but show. The Guardian wrote about his 
Paris installation Pursuit (a dark room designed to disorient), ‘As with Queen 
and Country (his project as official war artist in Iraq: a collection of 
commemorative stamps featuring soldiers who died in the conflict), he makes 
us do the work, provokes us into deciding where we stand. It is a complicated 
business.’37 This statement expresses not only the frustration of the viewer of 
applying him/herself (only to have to come up with his own conclusion in the 
end) but also the liberation felt by many of his admirers, such as the art critic 
T.J. Demos, of experiencing art that embraces difficult and political subjects in 
all their cultural dimensions without trying to explain them. For Demos, 
McQueen’s works are a representation of his interpretation of Deleuze’s idea 
of cinéma vérité, a cinema ‘that has destroyed every model of the true’ and has 
in itself become the creator of truth. Demos writes about McQueen’s work: 
‘The liberating outcome of this disruption of truth, (…), is that the audience is 
activated on an interpretive level, just as the filmed subject is released from its 
representational capture.’38  
In his approach McQueen embodies ideas of representation and identity 
in which the concept of awareness, rather than change, is the limit. However, 
by creating an artistic experience of an overwhelming feeling of alienation, 
McQueen has combined fashionable modes of identity with artistic ingenuity 
that allows for a more profound insight into the human condition in the post-
political. In his narrative films that followed Hunger, Shame (2011) and 12 
Years a Slave (2013), the protagonists also experience a world of unreason. In 
Shame, Brandon (Michael Fassbender) cannot connect with other people in a 
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meaningful way. His life is symptomatic of a world in which people find 
themselves without universal moral absolutes. In 12 Years a Slave, free 
African-American Solomon Northup (Chiwetel Ejiofor) is captured and sold 
into slavery, finding himself in a world that does not recognise his humanity. 
Speaking in Žižekian terms, McQueen’s films are an experience of unreason, 
constantly being pushed towards the real of their symbolic order. 
McQueen developed his strategies in the 1990s with the creation of 
several films and videos that often played with ideas of representation. For 
instance Bear (1993), a black and white film which shows the artist wrestling 
with another man, is an unusual montage of closeups and camera moves 
exploring the two bodies. 
The film evokes questions of black identity, violence and homoerotic 
pleasures. McQueen applies a similar filmic exploration of the body to the 
depiction of the emaciated body, an artistic scrutiny of the issues literally and 
metaphorically contained within the body of Bobby Sands in Hunger. 
McQueen relies on an aesthetic complexity to evoke the complications of 
conflict within society. He demonstrates how the camera frame can be used to 
show the multifaceted intricacies of the social space and the histories that 
shaped it and the people who inhabit it. For example, Carib’s Leap (2002) 
explores issues around the postcolonial history of the Island of Grenada by 
contrasting images of a person free-falling next to images of life on the island 
today. Here McQueen explores the desperation that drove the Caribs to jump 
to their deaths in 1651, rather than surrendering to the French, and how this 
history still shapes today’s understanding of the place and its inhabitants. Like 
Hunger, Carib’s Leap is impelled by the question of what drives people to take 
unbelievably drastic measures in desperate situations, and how these decisions 
reflect on society today. 
McQueen approaches his subjects with a neutrality that opens up the 
possibility of examining the paradoxes that inhabit his chosen subject and to 
‘see’ within the image the complexities of what constitutes reality. Adrian 




films remind you of your own presence, in a particular space, engaging with 
the particularities of what is happening in the here and now of the cinematic 
experience.’39 Searle describes how McQueen can be understood more as an 
artist rather than a traditional Hollywood director, as his films provide an 
engagement with the character’s alienation rather than an identification with 
it. McQueen’s films do not provide an empathic recognition or ‘illusionism’ as 
Martin Walsh calls the self-effacing means of representation in Hollywood 
films.40  
 McQueen’s video art and narrative films work with the use of the camera 
frame as a re-imagination of the artistic frame of a painting or photograph, 
with the difference that in his artistic frame the objects depicted are alive, or 
non-static. He plays with the camera’s ability to break completely with 
conventional forms of narrative by providing the viewer with unusual frames; 
for example, by throwing the camera around in his film Catch (1997), he 
literally throws commonly held assumptions to the wind. He thus creates a 
sensation of a failure of illusion by providing a new way of looking and 
consequently seeing the subject of his art. His installations convey forms of 
experience without providing answers as such.  
McQueen applies to his films the same principles of showing, seeing and 
experiencing that he applies to his art installations. Hunger is never explicit 
about its narrative, nor does it attempt to tell the whole story.  
For example, the film’s second scene opens with a striking picture of 
hands being washed clean of blood, the knuckles bruised from a beating. They 
belong to a warden (Stuart Graham) at the Maze prison. This powerful visual 
metaphor for state violence seems to set the tone for the rest of the film. 
However, it is not as easy as that. The warden is representative of the idea of 
‘Irish prison warden at the time’ – a character created as shorthand to 
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visualise the concept of the quotidian ritualised violence. The warden is shown 
in several small scenes throughout the film; living his life as a Northern Irish 
Unionist prison warden in 1981, no more no less. These events are shown to us 
and are thus experienced as witnessing his (the warden’s) normal daily 
routine; from eating breakfast, checking his car for bombs, bantering with his 
colleagues, visiting his mother in an old people’s home. He is eventually shot 
by the IRA.  
Through its observational approach, by showing and experiencing rather 
than by explaining the situation (either visually or with dialogue) Hunger puts 
its audience in a position where they have to witness and thus in a way 
experience the problematics of British policy in Northern Ireland at the time. 
McQueen says, ‘In Hunger there is no simplistic notion of ‘hero’ or ‘martyr’ or 
‘victim’. My intention is to provoke debate in the audience, to challenge our 
own morality through film.’41 McQueen uses the camera to break with the 
assumptions we have about our social world by breaking our habitual ways of 
watching film. In turn he presents the viewer with a creatively reinvented form 
of viewing. 
Another way Hunger creates a new from of viewing is through the images 
themselves. The camera rarely moves. The frame has the actions unfold within 
it, like a painting with added movement. McQueen says: ‘When you look at a 
Velasquez or a Goya painting, the composition of the image holds your gaze – 
their painting has an attractiveness and questioning. What you are attracted 
to, you can also be repulsed by.’42 And, as in painting, we are made to look at 
the slow paced action for extended amounts of time. This recalls Mulvey’s 
theory of Stillness and the Moving Image, as described above by Brown, 
where the uncanny feeling is created by the still image. In Hunger the stillness 
of the image and the slowness of the camera are experienced not as a ‘halt in 
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time’, as would be in a freeze frame, but the stillness, as Mulvey describes it, 
imbues the image with an uncanniness, it ‘comes to life’, ‘provi(ded) with a 
secret, with a hidden past that might or might not find its way to the surface.’43 
Mulvey describes how the still image works just like a ‘photograph’, in 
allowing for ‘the presence of time to emerge within the image’, the stillness 
thus evokes a sense of time passing.44 McQueen says about his film, ‘It is that 
whole idea of looking at how big an idea could be.’45 Hunger is shot on 2 perf 
35mmd, and has a rather wide aspect ratio of 2:35:1. McQueen says that by 
‘using this ratio there is always something else in the frame which makes a 
narrative.’46 The size of the frame and the slowness of the image makes the 
image a live painting to be studied trough the experience of time passing. One 
scene shows a prison corridor being cleaned with disinfectant. The camera is 
static; we see a guard sweeping the concrete corridor, coming closer and closer 
to the camera. Time moves slowly, the spectator has to endure the pace, 
imprisoned by the frame. The slow pace and the scraping noises of the brush 
are inductive to an uncanny sense of a real prison. Great emphasis is placed on 
the tangibility of the real concrete. 
For the film, an identical replica of the prison was built and used as set. 
This is crucial to the film’s cinematography. The camera’s position and 
manoeuvrability is dictated by the space, resulting in a distressing and 
inescapable nearness to the subjects in the frame. The heavy doors of the 
prison cells, that convey dread and finality when slammed shut, are the actual 
doors of the original Maze prison, salvaged by the set designers. McQueen lets 
the restrictions given by the space dictate the positions of the camera. The 
dimensions of the prison cell, the walls covered with food and faeces, the 
unwashed prisoners living in their own filth and the feeling of being locked in 
are palpable. 
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McQueen’s filmic sensibilities refuse to deliver a moral or political 
positioning. Rather, he wants to create with the camera a mirror of 
contemporary Britain, ‘What we did here was a film about reflection, about 
our choices and our past, how we think of ourselves as a nation and what we 
have done. So I hope the debate following the viewing of the film will be about 
who we are.’47 He believes that, by the virtue of the image (its stillness, its 
aspect ratio and claustrophobic framing of the film) the observer becomes an 
extension of the camera. McQueen deliberately refocuses the viewer’s gaze 
onto the details of individual behaviour, rather than the bigger picture of 
historical complexities, and by doing so addresses the universal principles that 
are determined by the character’s alienation from their immediate material 
reality and the political systems that determine their meaning. 
 
A narrative of three parts 
Hunger is segmented into three sequences, roughly 40 minutes, 23 minutes 
and 22 minutes long. I will term them loosely as: 
 
1. The physical: the prisoners are seen rioting with the guards and by 
engaging in a dirty protest against the oppressive system. It is a physical 
confrontation of the self with the outside world.  
2. The linguistic: This is a scene between Sands and Father Dominic. The 
debate between the two men allows us to hear and consider the arguments for 
and against the dramatic undertaking of a strike. This can be interpreted as an 
intellectual confrontation with the outside world.  
3. The bodily – Sands’ actual starving of himself. Different to the 
physical, here the self has been replaced by the body, and has been by erased 
from the world leaving an undead corpse. Looking at these in detail reveals 
                                                                                                                                                              






more clearly the narrative structure and the cinematic composition of 
McQueen’s artistic idea. 
 
The physical 
An unsettling feature of Hunger is its narrative structure which consists of 
three segments that, although linear in time, are thematically broken up. The 
first of these dramatic parts is mostly a graphic enactment of the ‘dirty’ and 
‘blanket’ protests at the Maze prison as experienced by new arrival Davey 
Gillen (Brian Milligan). McQueen does not hold back when depicting the life 
of the inmates inside the cell blocks. The camera shows, without flinching, shit 
and vomit smeared on the walls, piss flooding the corridor and the brutality of 
the guards dealing with the prisoners. The camera’s framing of the image 
provides a real sense of claustrophobia and danger. The willingness of the 
prisoners to go though unbelievable discomfort when participating and living 
in the ‘dirty’ protest, or when smuggling information and utensils is shown in 
frame after frame, yet the protesters themselves are resilient. They are 
vulnerable but defiant, not doubting their political position. Toward the end of 
the sequence we witness a routine inspection of the prisoners. The RUC are 
called in to enforce the inspection. The prisoners are made to run past the 
officers armed with truncheons, and are using them to bang their shields 
noisily as well as beat the prisoners. The scenes of the lives of the prisoners 
are intercut with scenes from the life of the prison warden as described earlier. 
The first act finishes with the guard being shot in the head whilst visiting his 
apathetic mother in an old people’s home.  
 
The linguistic 
The second part is a scene set in 1981 in which Bobby Sands tells a priest, 
Father Dominic Moran (Liam Cunningham), (whom he calls Dom), of his 
decision to intensify the campaign against criminalisation through embarking 




the priest an incident from his youth, which becomes the metaphorical 
explanation for the act he is about to commit.  
This scene consists almost entirely of a single shot of the two men sitting 
opposite each other in a Maze prison meeting room. The scene is back lit with 
the faces of the characters largely indecipherable. The content is the 
conversation, and it is through the conversation that Sand’s deeds are 
contextualised. This scene is again split into three parts. For the first 8 of the 
23 minute long scene, the men engage in small talk about Dom’s career in the 
church, how he was passed over for a nice countryside parish in favour of his 
brother and how he is now stuck in the middle of the struggles in 
impoverished Belfast. In the second part of the conversation which is 11 
minutes long, Sands informs the priest about his plans to commence with 
another hunger strike on the first of March. Dom asks about what would be 
different about this strike since the ones before have been fruitless acts of 
protest Sands makes it very clear: ‘The last hunger strike was flawed. It 
became emotional.’ He explained that when people were faced with death they 
stopped the protest and then were ‘conned by the Brits’. Father Dominic then 
spells out the main argument: ‘So what makes this protest different is that 
youʼre set to die, Bobby?’ He now knows that this protest will be different as 
the participants are indeed ready to die – yet, as Sands clarifies, they are not 
killing themselves dramatically in a grand gesture of protest. Instead he has 
devised a strategy in which, slowly, one by one ‘the men will start 
consecutively, two weeks apart’. This time it will not be about negotiation but 
making a political stance. Sands declares, ‘We could do that (negotiate), Dom, 
or we could behave like the army we proclaim to be and lay down our lives for 
our comrades.’ By highlighting the reasoning behind Sands’ plan, Hunger 
describes how the prisoners do not go on strike in order to communicate with 




decision to do so is the political act involving a ‘subjective destitution’ and 
accepting the role of, to use Žižek’s fitting words, ‘excremental remainder.’48 
The two men then engage in an argument about the morals of such a 
deed. Dom is adamant that this endeavour in nothing less than irresponsible 
murder, arguing that the British Government ‘can easily live with the deaths of 
what they call terrorists.’ Sands does not stop at blasphemy to make his 
argument ‘Jesus Christ had a backbone, but see them disciples, every disciple 
since, you’re just jumping in and out of the rhetoric and dead-end semantics. 
You need the revolutionary, the political soldier, to give life a pulse, 
direction…’ By the end they cannot come to an agreement; Sands cannot 
convince the priest with his political arguments. The strike is not rational in 
the political struggle, the act is only meaningful in its own right.  
In the last, six-minute sequence of the scene Sands tries to make his point 
clear through a parable by telling Dom about an event that happened when he 
was on a cross country run as a 12 year old boy. Here, significantly, is the first 
time the camera cuts away from the shot of the two men and the rest of the 
scene is cut between close ups of the hands and faces of the two men 
especially Bobby Sands, as he is telling the story. This change of distance to 
the characters follows the change in time and space of events, Sands’ political 
decision is linked to his personal history. He talks about how (during their 
warm up) his running team came across a dying foal which was in mortal pain.  
Whilst the other boys were arguing what was to be done, one of the 
supervising priests saw the group of boys and believed them, an uncouth 
group of rough Belfast boys, to be guilty of the foal’s misfortune. Sands makes 
a decision and drowns the foal. He had nothing to lose, as they were 
considered guilty anyway, and took responsibility for not only ending the 
animal’s suffering but also for his own convictions. The same way he is now 
clear of his own convictions. He says, ‘I’m clear of the reasons, Dom. I’m clear 
of all the repercussions. I will act and I will not stand by and do nothing.’ 
                                                            




Father Dominic has nothing left to say. He now knows that Sands’ ambition is 
genuine. ‘I don’t think I’m going to see you again, Bobby’, doubly meaningful, 
confirming Sands should not assume that God will await him in paradise. 
Sands is now even more certain ‘There’s no need, Dom.’  
Sands had entered this talk with doubts, not about his plans but about his 
soul. He asks: ‘God’s going to punish me?’ To which Dom replies ‘Well, if not 
just for the suicide, then he’d have to punish you for stupidity.’ At the end of 
the talk his doubt has been abandoned, Dom’s attitudes only confirming that 
his political choice will grant him personal freedom. 
Sands says in arguably the most revealing passage in the film: ‘My life 
means everything to me. Freedom means everything. I know you don’t mean 
to mock me, Dom, so I’ll just let all that pass. This is one of these times when 
we’ve come to a pause. It’s a time to keep your beliefs pure. I believe that a 
united Ireland is right and just. Maybe it’s impossible for a man like you to 
understand, but having a respect for my life, a desire for freedom, an 
unyielding love for that belief, means I can see past any doubts I may have. 
Putting my life on the line is not just the only thing I can do, Dom. It’s the 
right thing.’ Sands’ speech is a good reflection of Žižek’s idea of the hero that 
emerges through the act. He ‘resolves to stand firm, cost it what may.’ 
 
The bodily 
The last sequence of the film focuses on Sands’ slow decline by starvation, 
ending with his death. The scene plays out as a 22 minute long wait for Sands 
to die. Little is spoken, everything is shown in a montage of scenes. The 
framing is dictated by Sands’ emaciated body.49 He is covered in sores, too 
weak to stand or even sit and the camera is delicate, communicating the 
fragility of its subject.  
He looks like a living cadaver, too resigned to his fate to communicate 
with the world, which in turn is constantly tempting him back into its social 
                                                            




order by placing meals next to his bed. When his death comes, Sands’ face is 
intercut with images of himself as boy running cross country. The 
conversation with Father Dominic has established this as a formative ideal. 
The tears he sheds by his dying body are overwhelming in their humanity – 
his expression is a complex mix of emotion, ranging from sadness and anger to 
joy. This image seems to confirm that his act was not achieved through his 
suicide, but that it has happened before, his death was a consequence, a means 
to an end rather than an end in itself. 
The three acts of Hunger are paced in a way to allow for a real impact of 
what is shown. The first part is almost without dialogue. This is where the 
outside violence happens either by beatings or quiet imprisonment, and this 
violence is demonstrated visually and audibly in acute clarity. Whereas the 
first part is a collection of scenes, the second part happens in real time. 
McQueen compares the conversation between Sands and Father Dominic to 
the tennis matches between Jimmy Conners and John McEnroe; two 
personalities who were able to hold the audience’s attentions with their sheer 
determination. The third part is a ‘free-fall’ – it is a ‘letting go’ after the areas 
of the physical and the linguistic have been completely exhausted.50 
 Brown’s idea, that Hunger is part of a canon of films that aims at creating 
a new cultural memory of Northern Ireland places the film into a position of 
wanting to literally review history. This assumption has to be put into the 
context that McQueen is not interested in showing the greater political 
framework of the world the characters inhabit. What interests him is how 
people can go to such extremes using their own physicality. He wants to show 
how the conditions that people are put in inspire them to such conviction to 
abuse their own bodies to such a degree that it becomes unliveable. In the 
film’s press release McQueen states ‘What I wanted to convey is something 
you cannot find in books or archives: The ordinary and extraordinary, of life in 
                                                            




this prison. Yet the film is also an abstraction of what it is to die for a cause.’51 
McQueen’s political reading may be limited to a mere recontextualising of the 
life at the Maze prison through a reframing of history. However, the nature of 
art, especially art as skilled as McQueens’, achieves to transcend an artist’s 
own vision and will reveal a much greater political idea. By showing a true act 
in Hunger McQueen inadvertently embraces the terroristic mindset as the 
driving force of his character. 
 
The act in Hunger  
It can be argued that finding the fantasy of a true act within the narrative of 
Hunger shows that the film goes beyond a mere reviewing of past events but 
shows that the film does not see the terroristic mindset as a problem but as a 
necessity for emancipation in a Žižekian sense.  
Intriguingly, at first glance Sands seems to do exactly the opposite of 
what we associate with Žižek’s idea of a true act. In the film, Sands does two 
things of that Žižek explicitly warns are mere gestures that have nothing to do 
with a real act. 1. He commits suicide, which according to Žižek is more often 
than not a demonstrative gesture that by its nature (the wish to appeal) still 
tries to relate to the symbolic order.52 And 2. Sands is clear about his project. 
The hunger strike is a planned and calculated enterprise – it is intentional. 
Žižek clearly states that the act happens almost by accident, as something that 
spontaneously arises without having to be consciously thought up. Yet, one is 
totally accountable for it. ‘The paradox of the act thus lies in the fact that 
although it is not ‘intentional’ in the usual sense of the term of consciously 
willing it, it is nevertheless accepted as something for which its agent is fully 
responsible – ‘I cannot do otherwise, yet I am nonetheless fully free in doing 
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it.’53 If Sands’ suicide cannot in itself be regarded as an act, does the act 
happen at all? 
In Hunger, the prisoners’ protest against the state is by refusal. The 
refusal to part take in the British government’s assaults on the individual 
person as well as on the Irish nation as a whole. These assaults range from the 
general oppression imposed by British policies in Northern Ireland, to 
imprisonment and physical abuse. It is through protest by refusal, that Sands 
and his fellow prisoners want to bring about the condition for real political 
change. The three acts in Hunger can be seen as three different levels of 
refusal. The physical – as the refusal to co-operate with the system, the 
linguistic – as the refusal to compromise, and the bodily – as the refusal of 
the self to participate in the false reality of the symbolic order.  
One would assume that the act would be found in the last part as, as 
established earlier, it is this refusal to take part in the symbolic order, that 
constitutes the Žižekian act. However, I would argue that Sands’ starvation in 
Hunger, how it is shown to us, is simply a technicality. For 22 minutes we see 
Sands in the last stages of the Hunger strike, but he may as well be dead 
already. It is his form that is bathed, salved, being talked to – scrutinised not 
only by the people around him but by the camera, by the spectator. We see 
food presented to him but he is out of focus – Sands is already out of the 
picture. 
The long, meticulous third act, ending in death, demonstrates that Sands 
has not been part of the symbolic order for a long time. He is only a shell. 
However, this opting out of the symbolic order can only be fully appreciated 
after having witnessed his physical state and how he is framed within his 
environment for over twenty minutes. Only then can we realise that an act 
must have happened much earlier. At the beginning of this last part the act 
has already happened. 
                                                            




Could the act have happened in the second part of the film? In the second 
part we see a refusal to compromise. When Sands meets Dom he is already set 
on his plan. The priest uses compelling arguments against – accusing Sands of 
egotism, seeking some kind of iconic martyr status without any real chance of 
winning. ‘So, what’s your statement by dying?’, he says, ‘just highlighting 
British intransigence, so fucking what?’ He accuses him of not being mentally 
stable enough, after the suffering he has endured so far, to make a decision 
like this. This does not contradict Žižek’s idea of an act, since as we know the 
act is not achieved through rational thought. Anyway, Sands has already made 
his decision:  
Sands: ‘The strategy’s in place.’  
Dom: ‘Then stop it. Just say stop.’  
Sands: ‘You don’t understand a thing.’ 
[Sands accepts and even seeks his own death, not as an end in itself or 
an advertisement of his righteousness, but for a constructive purpose.]  
Dom: ‘You’re in no shape to make this call.’  
Sands: ‘It’s done. It won’t be stopped.’  
What becomes clear by the end of their talk is that Sands needs the talk, not 
because he is unsure about his moral and political impact, but because he 
needs to spell out that his decision is a personal one, enforced by the 
unrelenting British government – a decision which he has not been given a 
choice to make. As in his encounter with the dying foal, he has not been given 
the chance for a fair solution. The British government will not grant him the 
political status that he needs for a fight on equal terms. Only by creating a 
situation of ex nihilo, a creation ‘out of nothing’, through an act, can he escape 
the dire situation he is in. In turn his political situation enabled his act.54 As 
Žižek states, ‘The act defines its own conditions.’55 
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In the second part of the film Sands can already articulate his actions and 
his positions, he can subjectivise his new position. At this point then, the act 
has already happened. This leaves only the first part of the film for the act – 
the physical. 
The film starts with a rhythmic banging that is heard over the title 
sequence. Then we see a close up of a bin lid thumping on asphalt, intercut 
with a close up of a woman kneeling on the floor in the background more 
people kneeling and banging lids. They are creating a loud din of cadenced 
beats. The film gives no clue that the banging of bin lids was a favoured form 
of nationalist working-class protest during the troubles in Northern Ireland. It 
is the powerful noise of human determination. Later, when the RUC officers 
are getting ready to conduct the inspection of the prisoners and are prepared 
to make them run the gauntlet, they loudly bang their truncheons on their 
shields to intimidate the prisoners. The noise is an echo of the banging of bin 
lids by the Republican community in the first scene of the film. This banging 
drowns out the words and cries of pain and protest within the scene. It is this 
banging which provides the psychological trigger for Bobby Sands’ Žižekian 
act to happen.  
The true Žižekian act happens only when Sands realises that he cannot 
fight the system on its own terms. He has to opt out of the symbolic order that 
refuses him any real freedom by refusing him any real choice. Only then – free 
of the previous symbolic construct – can he be truly emancipated. An 
argument can be made that McQueen shows this exact moment when the act 
happens. It is what could be termed the moment of absolute clarity – the 
moment when Sands sees the falseness of the reality he lives in, the reality 
beyond reality. Or, to put it in Lacanian terms, the moment when he touches 
the real.  
The act happens at the end of the scene in which the prisoners Gill and 
Campbell are truncheoned by the RUC during the inspection. At the end of 
the scene we see how Sands is dropped into his cell, showing that he has also 




front. This is intercut with a quick image of a young RUC officer who we saw 
had been especially brutal to the prisoners – he is in shock and he is crying. 
All the time we hear the overwhelming sound of the truncheons banging on 
the shields. We are left with this image of Sands lying on the floor for several 
seconds and then Sands turns around to lie on his back and whilst he is 
turning the act happens. When he is fully lying on his back his expression is 
peaceful and clear. In his eyes we can see a calm happiness that was not there 
before. That the act happens in this non-spectacular fashion equates with 
Žižek’s claim that ‘the paradox is thus that, in an authentic act, the highest 
freedom coincides with the utmost passivity, with a reduction to a lifeless 
automaton who blindly performs its gestures.’56 Also, his expression entails a 
sense of relief that he does not seem to comprehend. Just like Žižek’s idea that 
the act is always most surprising to the agent himself. After an authentic act 
the reaction is always, ‘Even I don’t know I was able to do that, it just 
happened [sic].’57 
The drumming noise that had been thundering in the background all the 
time, a sound of intimidation and threat, is turned into a reminder of political 
defiance. In the moment, it impacts on Sands that there is no common ground, 
no room for compromise. Protests that still address the British on their own 
terms (in the symbolic order that is shaped by their politics) is no protest at 
all. And Sands refuses them by refusing himself. His death is only a matter of 
form, a technicality, as Hunger shows in the last part, the bodily.  
A salient feature of the act is that it is not mindless but unforeseeable. 
Sands is clear as to his convictions and his political position. He has an image 
of what Ireland should be like and he is prepared to die for this idea. He 
gained his idea of what freedom would feel like when doing cross country 
running. We understand through the uncanny images of prison life that when 
Sands committed himself to the Republican cause he did not want to end up 
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dead but free. Only a mindset like this, a truly terroristic mindset in a Žižekian 
sense, could be ready to find itself in a true act. 
 
Conclusion  
McQueen says, in an interview added as an extra on the DVD of Hunger, that 
he wanted to explore how it became ordinary for men to turn their bodies into 
sites of protest.58 The historical facts of Bobby Sands and his impact on 
Northern Irish nationalism are no part of Hunger. In this regard, Brown is 
right to claim that Hunger is not interested in interpreting the complicated 
political history of the struggles. However, although the film is not about the 
greater historical political framework of Northern Ireland, it does not mean 
that it is not about it. On the contrary, through the act, the character Sands 
performs in Hunger, the film accidentally embraces a radical mindset that can 
be called truly terroristic in a Žižekian sense. 
McQueen says, that although the film is embedded in a situation that is 
completely political ‘in the end personal decisions have to be made.’59 In a 
reversal of the 1960s motto of the personal is political, here the political is 
personal. The political is shown as a personal act of emancipation – as a true 
Žižekian act. 
All art, including film, often has unexpected consequences, and 
consequences that change with history. These are consequences in the sense 
that art, in its ability to sublimate individual experiences into, if not a 
universal, at least a shared experience. The uncanniness of Hunger, as created 
through its outlook and visual and narrative style, shows how political conflict 
becomes internalised. It is here, at this moment when the internalised political 
frustration inspires the revolutionary moment, in Hunger this coincides with 
Žižek and the act. Sands lets go of the symbolic order which frustrates his 
desires (the British government that does not allow for a conflict on equal 
terms) and creates a space in which he is free from the limitations of 
                                                            





negotiating with this symbolic order (or what Žižek would call the big Other) 
to plan, organise and eventually conduct a hunger strike for the benefit of a 
greater cause. 
The fantasy of a true act, that is within the cinematic narrative of Hunger, 
is the sublimated shared artistic experience that makes Hunger a highly 
political film. It speaks in a way that is not a nostalgia for an ‘understood’ Irish 
history, as desired by Brown, by it is nostalgic for a more general desire for the 
courage of political conviction.
 195 
Chapter 2.2 
Acting out and the post-political in  
Chris Morris’ film Four Lions 
 
Introduction 
This chapter builds on the concepts of the previous one, which described how 
the film Hunger portrayed a true act as defined by Žižek. This chapter puts 
forward the idea that the terrorists in the film Four Lions are barred from such 
a true act. Instead, they are trapped in a society in which no real alternative to 
post-politics is available; the characters in the film act out their frustrations – 
a path that ends up for one of them in what Žižek identifies as a passage à 
l’acte. 
Four Lions is the story of a group of young British Muslims who want to 
become martyrs, styling themselves on the Al Qaida -style terrorism which 
they follow in a fan-boy fashion. In the film the terrorists are not presented as 
religious zealots with alien ideologies. Instead they are the opposite – plan-
less anti-heroes, looking for coherency and meaning in post-politics Britain. 
Their motif is arming themselves in the name of the plight of muslims 
worldwide; their motive however is homegrown. Morris uses the possibilities 
of fiction to explore the reasons why these terrorists act the way they do. They 
lack obvious motives such as material destitution or the overt racism of the 
twentieth century, and have only a symbolic connection to the struggles in the 
Middle East. This echoes what Hammond writes about the character’s real life 
equivalents, ‘In most cases, would be martyrs have little or no first hand 
experience of oppression or discrimination.’1  
The film can be seen as a challenge to contemporary ideas of Al Qaida 
style terrorism as an alien threat and product of a foreign ideology, as 
described by Imed Labidi who says, ‘Four Lions contests the absurd rhetoric 
                                                            




that all terrorists are the product of an imaginary universal Islamic 
radicalism.’2 Hammond takes this reading further: not only does the film not 
portray the terrorists as culturally other, but also, neither is their terrorism a 
political response to oppression. Rather, ‘Four Lions suggests that the 
terrorists are hopelessly muddled and vague in their political motivations, and 
that such views as they do have fall firmly within the political and cultural 
mainstream.’3 In this sense the terrorists’ actions are framed by the post-
political rather than a reaction to it. 
Following Hammond’s argument, that the terrorists’ radicalism does not 
represent a meaningful political reaction against oppression, this chapter 
argues that the film goes beyond satire as it is commonly understood, as 
‘exposing the failings of individuals, institutions, or societies to ridicule and 
scorn.’4 The aim of this chapter is to expand the idea of the terrorists’ 
following of ‘mainstream’ ideas, arguing that Four Lions takes Hammond’s 
argument further, by showing the terrorists as individuals trapped within the 
political dead-end of post-politics, and that their jihad is a way of acting out 
their subjective sense of frustration, in a manner described indirectly by Žižek, 
as a passage à l’acte. 
The comedic effect in Four Lions is not achieved through visual jokes. In 
fact, the only moment of slapstick in the film is a remarkable exception, 
happening when Omar (Riz Ahmed) intends to fire a rocket launcher at an 
overflying drone. Because he holds the launcher the wrong way round, his 
terrorist act literally backfires, killing bin Laden in the process. The film’s few 
sight gags too are not played out but become thematised within film, such as 
the toy gun Waj (Kayvan Novak) uses for his martyrdom video. The film’s 
comedy arises from the subject matter itself and the way Morris understands 
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the characters’ situation – how it is established in the film and how the viewer 
relates to the characters cinematically and thematically. Four Lions works by 
subverting expectations of prevailing cultural beliefs. To understand how 
Morris plays with common assumptions it is necessary to look at his unique 
style of comedy. To do this, this chapter starts by looking at how Four Lions 
arises out of Chris Morris’ body of work, describing how his style of comedy is 
adjacent to a metaphysical approach to humour. 
In order to establish how different variants of the act can be recognised in 
Four Lions, the second part describes the relationship between the act, acting 
out and the passage à l’acte, looking at how Žižek understand the differences 
between these acts and how he relates them to the idea of the post-political. 
The next part investigates how Four Lions pertains to the post-political, by 
looking at how the film thematises not only the perceptions of terrorists, but 
also thematises the post-political and its limitations on subjectivity. The limits 
of Labidi’s reading of the film, as thematising a ‘correct Othering’ of the 
characters is scrutinised, and it is posited that the film questions postmodern 
assumptions of identity altogether. 
Continuing from this, this chapter looks into how Morris, in order to 
create a spectatorial identification with the characters, creates empathy for 
them by referring to Marc Sageman’s ‘bunch of guys’ theory of terrorism, and 
by developing a universalist approach of finding a common sphere of 
ridiculousness. This is followed by a look at how the aesthetics of Four Lions 
creates a sense of participating in the space time of the characters. 
 The final part describes the character’s motives of acting out and their 
relationship to the post-political. This is followed by looking at the story of 
Omar, who is compelled (as a result of his failure to create a new identity after 






Chris Morris,  satirist  
Geoff King writes that the target of satire is always ‘social or political’.5  
This is also true for Morris’ style of comedy. However, Morris’s comedy works 
differently from traditionally understood modes of satire such as Jonathan 
Gray, Jeffrey P. Jones, and Ethan Thompson’s description of satire in their 
article State of Satire, the Satire of State. They propose that satire works by 
revealing an otherwise hidden truth. They claim, ‘Satire lessons often enable 
people to recognise the naked emperor and … begin to see the realities that 
have been obscured … Satire provides a valuable means through which 
citizens can analyse and interrogate power and the realm of politics rather 
than remain simple subjects of it.’6 
Morris, however, does not feel comfortable with the idea of satire as a 
means of exposing the nexus of obfuscation that hides the true power relations 
from people. He says, 
Satire feels to me to be pre-programmed, polemical and utterly 
predictable. Preaching to the converted … I think, that something which 
is a 90-minute strip of satire will miss a great deal of what’s interesting 
about a subject … But I think to get at something in a particular way … 
For example, take the subject of jihadi terrorism, or radical jihadi action. 
The easiest thing in the world is to say, “That’s bad for this reason.” To 
put them at certain safe distance and parade a conveyor belt of jihadi 
activities past the viewer, for 90 minutes, and point at each action, 
saying what’s ridiculous about it. But what the heck would that tell you? 
Since everyone’s predisposed to find anything wrong with all of these 
people and all of these actions all the time – how revealing is that? You 
got to go against the flow, otherwise you might as well just stop and shut 
up.7 
For Morris satire, as it is understood, is not radical in itself. Most political 
satire is directed at the obvious gaps and inconsistencies in particular 
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symbolic structures. Today these are often aimed at the inconsistencies of 
capitalism such as the gap between rich and poor, the hypocrisy of politicians, 
or the shallowness of celebrity culture.  
Morris’ particular approach to satire is highlighted by author and 
biographer Lucian Randall, who writes that, ‘For Morris there seemed to be 
something dismissive in the term satirist, as if it suggested taking the moral 
high ground over being funny and made him safer through explanation.’8 For 
Morris, the principle idea of satire arising out of making fun of those deemed 
inferior or wrong, in one way or another, feels not only conservative but, 
because of this, it is in itself not funny. Morris’ satire does not prescribe to his 
own description of satire being ‘essentially conservative’.9 It avoids the pitfalls 
of conservative comedy by approaching its subjects in a more profound way in 
that it is concerned with a more metaphysical approach. This metaphysical 
approach to jokes is analysed by Marcus Pound, who describes that comedy 
has a transgressive, emancipatory potential, to which, as this chapter argues, 
Morris’ comedy comes close.  
Pound, quoting Hokenson, describes how comedy that subscribes to, the 
Aristotelian superiority theory whereby ‘socio-moral values are posited as 
superior to the butt (of the joke) who comically deviates from them’ is to be 
put on par with the humour of the ‘modern critical reaction … championing 
instead the “underdog” as the comic hero who transgresses the law.’10  
Both approaches remain within the confines of the existing social order, 
‘In the former, one laughs at the comic protagonist, thereby reinforcing 
superior social values; in the latter one identifies with the comic protagonist, 
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as if to satisfy an “insurgent impulse to alter the social order”.’11 By making the 
humour of the joke dependent on the butt of the joke, either by laughing at 
them or laughing with them, this kind of humour often fails to address the butt 
in its own right, as a subject caught in a world of unreason.  
For comedy to be truly transgressive requires ‘a politics of the 
impossible’: By highlighting this world of unreason, rather than condemning it 
outright, humour arises from the experience of this world of unreason.12 For 
this to happen, in Pound’s understanding, transgressive comedy has to 
approach its subject not on a material but on metaphysical level; not point out 
the inconsistencies of concrete claims of truth and expose them to ridicule, but 
to assume their universalist truth and revel in the contradiction between their 
idealist form and materialist execution. Referring to the work on comedy by 
Alenka Zupančič, Pound says, the transgressive comic mode is not found ‘in 
the usual materialist critique of idealism; but the very point at which the ideal 
appears directly as the material, and it is this paradox – this incongruity – 
which generates the truly subversive comic mode of comedy.’13 In short, 
comedy has the ability to tap into the subtle questions of the human condition 
concerned with how it is rather than pointing out the way things are. 
Most of Morris’ comedy works in this fashion, in that his satire does not 
aim at exposing the materialist discrepancies of society, but accepts these 
incongruities and takes them as the basis to ridicule their very existence – 
what the audience is alienated from is not the absurdity of concrete claims but 
the fact that the mundane is also part of this very absurdity. The comedy of 
Morris does not aim at the obvious targets, such as heads state or individual 
politicians – he never attacks directly institutions commonly regarded as 
villainous, such as big business or government. Instead, his comedy alienates 
from the everyday – questioning assumptions on a metaphysical level (how 
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things are) instead of on a material one (the way things are). It could be said 
that Morris’ satire is aimed at what Hegel describes as Gewohnheit, people’s 
habits, their mechanical, unconscious actions that form the basis of their daily 
lives – what Hegel calls the ‘Fürsichsein der Seele’, habit as an unencumbered 
(by thought) expression of the soul.14 Žižek writes how the zombie is the 
perfect habitual creature as all its actions are without conscious reasoning. He 
concludes that, ‘being-a-zombie is a zero-level of humanity, the 
inhuman/mechanical core of humanity.’ He continues, saying that, ‘The shock 
of encountering a zombie is not the shock of encountering a foreign entity, but 
the shock of being confronted by the disavowed foundation of our own 
human-ness.’15 In Morris’ comedy the audience is confronted with how they 
are situated in material and social reality and experience this as a world of 
unreason, a sensation that is as absurd as it is disturbing. According to 
Randall, Morris’ body of work as a comedian and satirist, ‘charges straight 
through the politeness and respect habitually paid to sensitive subjects which 
can be enormously destructive when it means that pain and distress are 
allowed to fester within someone rather than being illuminated and 
understood.’16 In other words, he goes straight for the jugular of accepted 
sensibilities. 
Morris’ satire is more complicated than the version allowed by traditional 
notions. Rather than trying to show what is hidden, his comedy alienates from 
what is in plain sight – the familiar, mainstream ideas that shape the social 
and political as experienced on an everyday basis. Morris’ comedy style sets 
itself apart because it is on a mission, not to explain the world’s power 
relations, but to connect with what is commonly understood and to question 
this in the process. 
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The premiere of Four Lions took place at the Bradford International Film 
Festival on 25 March 2010. A minority of press reviews accused the film of 
delivering flat, stereotypical characters who are merely stupid, and lack 
depth.17 This stereotyping could be explained though the idea of comic 
exaggeration as described by King, where ‘exaggeration serves to establish a 
level of implausibility that removes the events from the world of harsher 
dramatic realism, where the consequences of the destruction unleashed might 
be felt more painfully.18 However, it should be argued, that through 
understanding the characters as complex individuals who share a desperation 
to define themselves as part of society, the film creates a narrative that centres 
and is driven by the characters’ motives and motifs. The terrorists’ motives 
being something, as Durodié points out, that had been impossible to 
determine for the real life London bombers.19 By creating extreme characters, 
rather than simplistic or even exaggerated ones, Morris shows how different 
individuals act or, more precisely act out, under what they consider a world of 
unreason. For the characters this unreason is found in the foreclosure of 
politics in the post-political in which policies of multiculturalism are proposed 
to manage a politics of cultural identity. What becomes clear over the film is 
that the characters’ acting out is not their actual bombing of the London 
marathon but their self-styling as jihadists – they address the Other not by 
bombing or following jihadist motives, but through their motivation by the 
post-political to act out the inconsistencies of the post-political. 
King writes of film comedy that the ‘enjoyment lies, often, in the gap 
opened up between expected norm and disruptive ingredient.’20 That this 
comic gap can be truly transgressive can be seen in the comedy of Morris. He 
opens up the metaphysical gap between the idealist assumptions of ideology 
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and its materialist execution, he does so by subverting the subconscious habits 
that allow people to function on a daily basis and are recognisable in others. 
By confronting people with recognisable habits Morris creates a comedic 
shock which, as Žižek says, is not the shock of encountering a foreign entity, 
but the shock of being confronted by the disavowed foundation of our own 
human-ness.21 ‘To know the habits of a society is to know the meta-rules of 
how to apply its explicit norms’, says Žižek, and Morris uses this knowledge in 
his comedy.22 The principal, unconscious ways of the everyday workings of 
society are highlighted in Morris’ comedy. Thus, rather than revealing the 
incoherencies of the post-political (the metaphysical gap between the idealist 
assumptions of ideology and its materialist execution), he shows them up. The 
post-political is humiliated through a process of making the audience identify 
with the ideology instead of allowing them to laugh at it from an outside 
position. The laughter is not one of ‘derision and mockery’, which Hegel says 
comes from ‘complacent insight’ into one’s own ability to recognise ‘the 
contrasts’ of what is being shown.23 Instead the laughter stems from the 
uncomfortable shock of being confronted with what people recognise of 
themselves in the characters.  
For example, the character of Barry (Nigel Lindsay), whose behaviour is 
as rigorous as it is ridiculous when he shouts, when their car breaks down, 
‘Jews invented spark plugs to control global traffic.’ His belligerent behaviour 
and his need to make up his own logic has little to do with his jihadism or 
cultural identity, but is recognised by almost everyone else as the trademarks 
of an unpleasant choleric. In short, Four Lions shows the characters in all their 
absurdity, but it is not the absurdity of cultural belief but it is the absurdity of 
the post-political itself. The effect – apart from being comic – is that the 
characters’ vulnerability, as it comes in to contact with their social reality, can 
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be recognised and identified with. Morris exposes the spectator to the 
metaphysical gap the characters inhabit, their feeling of being out of sync with 
the world they inhabit. Barry’s unreason is not in itself funny, rather it exposes 
the absurdity of the everyday habits of the post-political one of which is to 
subscribe to conspiracy theories in one way or another, usually involving some 
form of new world order theory. In post-politics, Žižek describes, people suffer 
from ‘political frustration … : they are called to decide, while, at the same time, 
receiving the message that they are in no position effectively to decide, i.e. to 
objectively weigh the pros and cons. The recourse to "conspiracy theories" is a 
desperate way out of this deadlock, an attempt to regain a minimum of what 
Fred Jameson calls ‘cognitive mapping’.’24 Fundamental to conspiratorial belief 
are the ‘unknown knowns’, the ‘disavowed beliefs and suppositions we are not 
even aware of adhering to ourselves.’25 What Morris essentially does, is to tap 
into the spirit of conspiratorial thinking that sustains much of the post-
political, by exposing Barry’s mode of conspiratorial logic. 
 
Who is Chris Morris? 
Morris became widely known for his satirical news show The Day Today 
(1994), the television adaptation of his radio comedy On the Hour, in which he 
and his fellow comedians lampooned the presumptuous conceits of the media. 
On The Hour consisted of twelve episodes and aired from 1991 to 1992. The 
show’s approach to writing was unusually collaborative and improvisational. 
The goal of the programme was to blindside the audience with news stories 
that were completely over the top, yet delivered in such a serious manner as to 
give an illusion of plausibility. The show always begins with Morris delivering 
sensationalist headlines, such as ‘Panic as European average falls below the 
European average’, playing on the ways in which news programmes 
sensationalise everyday events.  
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The TV show The Day Today worked on the same principle as the radio 
show, presenting inane current affairs stories with deadpan gravitas. Morris 
studied the methods, look and mannerisms of news programmes in order to 
recreate them ad absurdum. Both The Day Today and On The Hour question 
the idea of authorship and the way in which news programmes create 
hyperbolic narratives to promote themselves with minimal regard for subject 
matter.  
In 2000, Morris created, directed and starred in the television programme 
Jam which was based on his 1999 radio show Blue Jam. In the show, concepts 
that are typically friendly and familiar – doctors, families, general suburban 
life – were shown as grotesque and defective, playing on people’s habits and 
their unconscious fears of having these habits disturbed. In Brass Eye (1997) 
Morris addressed mainstream sensibilities towards themes such as animal 
rights, drugs, sex, crime and paedophilia. These programmes targeted those 
people in the public eye who lend their name to trendy causes without 
questioning their authenticity.  
In his comedy, Morris identifies the fault lines of what is acceptable and, 
by doing so, manages to push the line further. A good example of this is the 
Brass Eye Peadophilia (2001) special episode, which spoofed the demonisation 
of paedophiles, and caused a storm of media outrage from broadsheet, liberal 
newspapers such as the Guardian, as much as the tabloids.26 However, as the 
Guardian itself had to admit, the backlash only proved what was spoofed in 
the show all along – ‘that liberals’ arguments, when shorn of their caring 
finery, often conceal exactly the same atavistic thoughtless fears as the 
Paulsgrove demonstrators.’27 The main focus of the satire in Brass Eye was the 
idea that moral outrage is mainly a form of self-indulgence. The causes 
celebrated by Morris’ prank victims were no more than a pretext for snobbish 
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self-promotion. The subject matters themselves were exposed as empty 
receptacles that could be filled with any random meaning.  
The postmodern obsession with surface without meaning became the 
subject of Morris’ project about self-serving media types, Nathan Barley 
(2005) a show reminiscent of his treatment of the media’s obsession of form 
over function in The Day Today.28 Nathan Barley, the main character of the 
show, describes himself as a ‘self-facilitating media node’. The show is a 
criticism of the self-satisfaction of people who consider themselves radical but 
are in fact guilelessly promoting mainstream ideologies, a motif that is also 
found in Four Lions. Nathan Barley lampoons the postmodern figure that 
emerged in the late 1990s, more recently termed Hipster. Hipsters are deluded, 
youthful poseurs that, according to Mark Greif, assume moral superiority by 
declaring their anti-establishment credentials through elitist consumer 
behaviour. ‘What is meaningful about the hipster moment, 1999 and after, is 
that it seems to be an effort to live a life that retains the coolness in believing 
that you belong to a counter-culture, where the substance of the rebellion has 
become pro-commerce.’29 Where the wannabe jihadists in Four Lions consider 
themselves opposed to capitalist commercialism, Nathan Barley also sees 
himself outside the commercial mainstream. Both parties think they are more 
enlightened than those whom they consider the duped masses.  
Before turning his attention to the motives of terrorists, Morris already 
satirised the ‘war on terror’ and the nature of the politics that supported it. On 
Sunday 17 March 2002, Morris and Armando Iannucci published a special 
section in the Observer newspaper titled ‘Six Months That Changed a Year’, 
an ‘Absolute Atrocity Special.’ In this pull-out section Morris and Iannucci 
ambitiously satirised the response to 9/11 only six months after the event. 
Most of the spoof was a calendar chronicling the events after 9/11, each entry 
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an absurd realisation of the real-life aftermath of the ‘war on terror. Their 
particular interest was to question the ubiquitously portrayed assumption that 
9/11 ‘somehow changed everything’,30 setting out to highlight the hysteria 
surrounding these attacks and how the government seized this political 
climate to push draconian agendas that approved of the suspension of 
personal liberties. 
Four Lions is Morris’ first full-length feature film. He wrote it with 
established comedy writers Sam Bain and Jesse Armstrong, the creators of the 
television comedy Peep Show (2003–2013). In Four Lions, it is through the 
careful construction of character that Morris describes the world they inhabit. 
This chapter reads the film in terms of post-politics and considers this world 
to be informed by the mindsets and policies of post-political thinking. And it 
is through post-politics by which people are compelled to identify with the 
categories made available to them. However, this dilemma affects each 
character in different ways, and it is revealed through they way they act. By 
humanising the terrorists, Morris allows for an insight into the motivations of 
the individual terrorists and this by extension, provides a way of determining 
their acts as variations of an acting out as identified by Žižek. In order to 
contextualise Four Lions in terms of the post-political, the next part describes 
the relationship between Žižek’s understanding of the act and its variations, 
and its relationship to the post-political. 
 
Ž ižek on the act and its variations 
 
The political act 
As described previously, Žižek considers the revolutionary act as the only 
authentic deed that can lead to true emancipation. By destroying one’s own 
relationship to the symbolic, and entering a new relationship from a position 
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of ex nihilo, the subject is able to start negotiations about the conditions of a 
new symbolic order. The destructive element of the act affects not only the 
link to the symbolic but also destroys the subject itself because it is a foreign 
element to both. As Žižek comments in A Perverts Guide to Cinema when 
talking about Fight Club (1999): ‘I think this is what liberation means: in order 
to attack the enemy, you first have to beat the shit out of yourself, to get rid in 
yourself [of] that which in yourself attaches you to the leader, to the 
conditions of slavery and so on…’31  
An authentic act always leads to the subject’s self-erasure. In Hunger, 
even though Sands dies as a result of his act it does not diminish or question 
the political impact of his deed. His freedom, and with it the political 
dimension of his act, is not achieved by death but by his extraction from the 
symbolic, and his own demolition and reconstruction of his subjectivity.  
What is important is that, for Žižek, terrorism rarely constitutes a 
revolutionary act, yet every true act is always terroristic. Most terrorism is to 
be seen not as a ‘true act’ but as an inauthentic act, or as acting out.32  
 
 Acting out and passage à l’acte 
Broadly speaking, Žižek’s idea of what constitutes an act remains within 
Lacan’s distinction between the act that leads to a breakthrough in the 
psychoanalytic treatment of a patient (and what for Žižek would constitute an 
act of a true political emancipation), and two other forms of reacting towards 




Acting out is the English term for what Freud calls agieren, with which he 
described the patient’s recourse to transfer his/her anxiety into an active deed. 
In Freud’s case study Dora (1905) he describes how the patient breaks off her 
                                                            
31 The Pervert’s Guide To Cinema, [London]: p.Guide, ©2006. 




treatment with him after she feels misunderstood by him. Freud interprets 
Dora’s action as a transferred punishment. Instead of facing the real issue (in 
this case Freud believes that she has issues confronting her desires for a man 
called Herr K.) Dora acts out by heedlessly dismissing Freud’s treatment. For 
Freud, if a traumatic memory is not remembered (with the help of the talking 
cure) the patient is compelled to act out the trauma physically.33  
Acting out, according to Lacan, can be seen as a form of communication 
between patient and analyst indicating that something is amiss in the analytic 
process. The analyst here becomes representative of the Other – the big Other 
is the symbolic, as a constitutive alterity, as it presents itself for each subject. 
[In Seminar VIII, Lacan describes acting out as ‘this type of action through 
which at one or other moment of the treatment … the subject requires a more 
exact response’.]34 Acting out does not describe a failure of interaction, rather 
it is still part of the communication between the analyst and his subject. It is 
‘essentially something in the behaviour of the subject that shows itself. The 
demonstrative aspect, the orientation towards the Other of every acting out, is 
something that ought to be highlighted.’35  
Acting out is to be understood as the dramatic implementation of the felt 
anxiety and thus as a method of communication, after the failure of dialogue. 
Žižek describes Lacan’s concept of acting out as: 
An attempt to break through a symbolic deadlock (an impossibility of 
symbolisation, of putting into words) by means of an act, even though 
this act still functions as the bearer of some ciphered message. Through 
this act we attempt (in a ‘crazy’ way, true) to honour a certain debt, to 
wipe out a certain guilt, to embody a certain reproach to the Other, etc.36 
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For Žižek’s adoption of Lacan’s concept, acting out entails that the subject in 
his/her protest addresses the Other, he stays within the realm of the symbolic 
and his /her act is not directed against the Other but is instead a 
communication by other means. He says, ‘We could say that by acting out we 
identify ourselves with the symptom … as a ciphered message addressed to the 
Other.’37 Acting out is a method of overcoming a breakdown in 
communication within the symbolic through the method of acting it out.  
The most important aspect in Žižek’s description is that a big change 
happens to the concept of acting out in terms of scale and ideas. The change is 
from the private to public, from the psychological to the social – the Other is 
no longer the analyst but the adressed Other is now society and, by 
association, ideology. This acting out can take the form of terrorist acts. This 
violent acting out of perceived injustices is to be seen as a response within a 
still existing dialogue with the Other.  
The other inauthentic act Žižek describes is the passage à l’acte, or the 
passage to the act, in which the subject does not address the Other anymore 
but instead resigns in his attempts to make himself/herself heard. 
 
Passage à l’acte 
The passage à l’acte, or passage to the act, is what Lacan describes when a 
subject identifies with the object of his desire, the Kantian sublime object, 
(Object a) in a self–destructive act. The difference between acting out and the 
passage à l’acte is in the way the subject addresses the Other. Both acts can be 
regarded as extreme resorts against anxieties, but where acting out directly 
speaks to the Other, in the passage à l’acte the subject takes himself out of this 
dialogue, he leaves the symbolic network that contains the Other.  
The method of taking oneself out of the constraints of the symbolic 
chimes with the characteristics of what constitutes the authentic act – both 
                                                            
37 Slavoj Žižek, 'The Undergrowth of Enjoyment: how popular culture can serve as an 




acts contain a refusal to engage with the Other. However, in the passage à 
l’acte the subject is still identifying with Object a, that what is desired from 
the Other, but can never be attained. In filmic terms the idea of a McGuffin, 
the narrative device that has no textual logic but being the goal of the story 
told, is a Lacanian Object a. 
Žižeks himself gives an example for such an Object a in the dragon scroll 
from the film Kung Fu Panda (2008).38 This legendary scroll is said to contain 
the secret to limitless power only accessible to the dragon warrior. When the 
hero of the film, the fat and unlikely warrior panda Po, unravels the scroll, he 
finds that the scroll is a metal sheet in which he can only see his own 
reflection: the real secret of the power of Kung Fu is to believe in yourself. 
There is no secret as such, no actual Object a, just the subject’ s (Po’s) desire 
for it that sustains its power. Even though the subject knows that his ideology 
is false he/she nevertheless cannot bring himself to break with it. Instead he 
arranges himself with the Other, his fantasy of Object a sustains the symbolic. 
In a passage à l’acte the fantasies that are produced to sustain the 
symbolic cannot be attained by the subject and he/she resigns to the situation 
and leaves, bows out altogether. However, their desires are still addressed to 
the Other and their belief in/ identification with Object a is still there. In 
contrast, in a true act however, the subject severs all connections to the 
symbolic. Although the subject refuses to communicate with the Other in both 
the true act and the passage à l’acte, it is in his/her abandonment of belief in 
the Other where the fundamental difference between both acts lies. 
Roberto Harari writes that ‘a typical passage à l’acte is suicide’,39 an ‘exit 
from the scene, where the subject completely identifies with objet a’40 rather 
than staying on the stage and acting out.  
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Žižek’s gives several example of the passage à l’acte in his book The 
Parallax View, including Travis Bickle’s final outburst in Taxi Driver (1976). 
For Žižek the passages a l’acte seen in Hollywood films describe the 
underlying failure of the American ideology to reconcile the character’s 
fantasies that sustain the American dream with the lived reality. Travis 
Bickle’s dream of ridding the world of ‘the scum, the cunts, the dogs, the filth, 
the shit’ is ultimately directed against himself since he strongly identifies with 
what society constitutes as scum.  
 
Criticism 
Critical of Žižek’s defence of political terrorism, Geoff Boucher41 imputes  
that Žižek, in his 1991 book Looking Awry,42 fails to see the difference between 
the act and the passage à l’acte. Boucher ascribes Žižek’s provocative flirtation 
with unpopular images of red and Jacobean terror to his misunderstanding of 
the ‘psychotic’ and ‘suicidal’ dimensions of the passage à l’acte as part of the 
revolutionary act. It is true that Žižek often is careless in his use of the 
terminology. Recently he wrote in his book Living in the End Times,  
Recall the psychoanalytic distinction between acting out and passage à 
l’acte: acting out is a spectacle addressing a figure of big Other, leaving 
the big Other undisturbed at its place, while passage à l’acte is a violent 
explosion destroying the very symbolic link.43 
One criticism one could put forward here is that by leaving out the discussion 
about the true act, readers could misunderstand the different meanings of the 
act. However, that the two modalities of acting out and the passage à l’acte, do 
not constitute a true act is made clear by Žižek in several writings before the 
publication of Boucher’s article, e.g. in his book On Belief: 
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The act proper is thus to be opposed to other modalities of the act: the 
hysterical acting out, the psychotic passage à l’acte, the symbolic act. In 
the hysterical acting out, the subject stages, in a kind of theatrical 
performance, the compromise solution of the trauma she is unable to 
cope with. In the psychotic passage à l’acte the deadlock is so 
debilitating that the subject cannot even imagine a way out – the only 
thing he can do is to strike blindly in the real, to release his frustration in 
the meaningless outburst of destructive energy. The symbolic act is best 
conceived of as the purely formal, self-referential, gesture of the self-
assertion of one’s subjective position.44  
Though Žižek is often unclear, here he is unambiguous about the fundamental 
differences between the three modes of an act and the special role of a true 
act. Both acting out and the passage à l’acte are displacement acts, that ‘can 
only be properly grasped as reaction to some disavowed trauma that they 
displace, disavow or repress,’45 whereas the true act tackles the very conditions 
that are responsible for a trauma to happen. 
 
The act,  the post-polit ical ,  multiculturalism 
The above concepts are important because they are pertinent to a reading  
of Four Lions, in particular its relationship to and portrayal of 
multiculturalism. According to Žižek, the way the political sphere is arranged 
today makes the constitution of a revolutionary act – one that would 
fundamentally change the way society is organised – difficult.46 The logic of 
the post-political forecloses the possibilities of a political and societal 
paradigm shift by renouncing the big ideological causes that previously 
shaped the understanding of the ruling powers and its antithesis as radical 
antagonisms. The shift from politics to administrative management brought 
with it new social movements that have shifted towards forms of identity 
politics. Post-politics promotes ‘the all encompassing nature of the post-
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political Concrete Universality which accounts for everybody at the level of 
symbolic inclusion.’47  
Žižek’s analysis of multiculturalism in terms of post-politics requires 
detailed analyses, as it is the role of identity, the foreclosing of an active 
subject, that becomes the ideological fantasy in the post-political.  
Žižek argues that the multiculturalist vision of unity in difference requires 
that the Other is not constructed out of the real antagonisms that create the 
symbolic, but as an elusive construct, defined by the concept of identity, 
which can never be fully understood but only tolerated. Post-Politics has 
changed the parameters of possibility for the subject to constitute his/her own 
subjectivity, through its emphasis on its multiple forms of subjectivity.48 This 
does not mean that the contradictions of capitalism are solved, merely 
displaced. 
Žižek refers to Wendy Brown’s States of Injury, and her argument against 
identity politics, when he says,  
As postmodern politics (post-politics) involves a ‘theoretical retreat from 
the problem of domination within capitalism’, it is here, in this silent 
suspension of class analysis, that we are dealing with an exemplary case 
of the mechanism of ideological displacement when class antagonism is 
disavowed, when its key structuring role is suspended, ‘other markers of 
social difference may come to bear an inordinate weight; indeed, they 
may bear all the weight of the sufferings produced by capitalism in 
addition to that attributable to the explicitly politicised marking’. In 
other words, this displacement accounts for the somewhat ‘excessive’ 
way the discourse of postmodern identity politics insists on the horrors 
of sexism, racism, and so on this ‘excess’ comes from the fact that these 
other ‘–isms’ have to bear the surplus–investment from the class 
struggle whose extent is not acknowledged.49 
The way the subject is constituted through identity is key to a post-political 
reading of Four Lions. In the absence of anything else, the subject identifies 
with the categories available to them through the postmodern notion of 
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identity politics which are often given form in the idea of multiculturalism. 
This process gives rise to anxiety as people struggle to define and fulfil the 
role they have created within their symbolic network. The anxieties evoked by 
these plights find their expressions in what can be regarded as displacement 
activities. Here the aforementioned example of the London riots of 2011, helps 
to illustrate this point, together with Žižek’s comments that the rioters’ ‘only 
available alternative to enforced democratic consensus is a blind acting out.’50  
 These displacement acts take the form of either an acting out, or they 
find their expression in the passage à l’acte. These inauthentic acts reveal a 
misunderstood radicalism which is not radical at all, but nihilistic by nature in 
the way they are an expression of delusion within the symbolic.51 Both are a 
venting of powerlessness and an admission of impotence. The point is that 
they each can be clearly read and understood in Four Lions. 
 
Four Lions’  portrayal of a misdirected radicalism 
In Four Lions, Morris unpicks contemporary imaginings of Al Qaida style 
terrorism in Europe and the USA. Rather than locating radicalism ‘within 
imagined strange ideologies in far away lands,’52 the film questions the idea 
that the agendas of Islamist terrorist are created outside Western ideas. The 
film reveals that this terrorism stems from an obsession from within rather 
than a threat from outside.  
Morris started research for the film before the London bombings in 2005, 
in which four homegrown terrorists detonated bombs at four different 
locations on the London transport system. This event did not change the way 
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he saw contemporary terrorism, instead the lives of the four bombers affirmed 
his viewpoint about his interest in the subject of terrorism. Morris says,  
It was an attempt to figure it out, to ask, ‘What’s going on with this?’ 
This [the ‘war on terror’] is something that’s commanding so much of 
our lives, shaping so much of our culture, turning this massive political 
wheel. I was wondering what this new game was all about. But then 7/7 
hit that with a fairly large impact, in that we were suddenly seeing all 
these guys with a Hovis accent. Suddenly you’re not dealing with an 
amorphous Arab world so much as with British people who have been 
here quite a long time and who make curry and are a part of the 
landscape. So you’ve got a double excavation going on.53  
 
A desire to assay the terrorists themselves rather than concentrating on the 
absurdities of the ‘war on terror’ from a western perspective, as was done on 
Team America: World Police (2004) or in Armando Iannucci’s film In the Loop 
(2009), made Morris concentrate on the way terrorist are commonly 
understood. 
Labidi in his essay on Terrorism, Violence, and the Collision of 
Masculinities in ‘Four Lions’ says, ‘In not so subtle ways, the film critiques 
constructed and invisible sources of fear that haunts Western imagination 
[sic].’54 Labidi’s conclusion is that this fear of foreign terrorism is the 
consequence of the failings of the hegemony of ‘white masculinity’, and that 
the films show characters’ who ‘fail to perform’ according to ‘scripts of 
masculinity’ dominating western ideology, which then leads to their 
radicalisation.55  
This reading sees the characters’ identities compromised by having their 
masculinity not recognised in their cultural otherness because of dominant 
mainstream ideals of ‘white masculinity’. Labidi’s analysis implies that the film 
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manages to distinguish between a “correct” othering (recognising the plurality 
of masculine identities described as ‘alternative masculinities (minorities, 
underclass males, homosexuals, foreigners, others).’)56 and an “incorrect 
othering” (seeing the terrorists as strange, unrecognisable unknowns). 
Central to Labidi’s line of argument is that of a “correct” othering, the 
creating of a plurality of different concepts of cultural identities (in this case 
masculinity and Asian culture). Labidi’s argument is in line with the 
preoccupation with identity politics that Žižek sees as instrumental in the 
working of post-politics, saying ‘today’s capitalism thrives on differences.’57 
Žižek says that, in the post-political, capitalism is not enabled by the 
‘traditional fixed patriarchal subject’ but by the very dynamic of compelling 
‘subject(s) constantly reinventing himself.’58 Instead of identifying with a 
universal goal, the subject of post-politics is seen as a self-regarding investor 
in their own human capital, constantly encouraged to analyse themselves in 
regard to how well they are adjusted to society often done through exploring 
one’s ‘intolerance towards the Other.’59 The upshot of identity politics and 
multiculturalism is that what ‘this kind of politically correct struggling for 
tolerance and so on advocates is basically not only not in conflict with the 
modern tendencies of global capitalism, but it fits perfectly.’60 The link 
between multiculturalism and its instrumentalisation in the post-political is 
succinctly put together by Malik. Malik makes a clear distinction between 
multiculturalism as a ‘lived experience of diversity’, and multiculturalism ‘as a 
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political process, the aim of which is to manage that diversity.’61 It is the latter 
idea, the rise of multiculturalism as a political tool within post-politics, that is 
to be criticised. Multiculturalism in this sense is a concept not demanded by 
communities, but largely imposed onto them from without. From the 1980s, he 
says, fuelled by a collusion between the state and opportunist religious and 
cultural organisations in minority communities, there was a rise in ethnic 
identity politics. The multicultural policies brought in by the government, 
which were designed to deal with race relations and regarded as an 
appropriate framework for dealing with cultural difference, created a new 
necessity for immigrants to define themselves through their religion. ‘Once the 
mosques became the voice of the community, then Muslim became the 
identity stamped upon every individual within that community. People began 
to accept that identity as their own, because it was the way to relate to the 
outside world.’62 What Malik illustrates is how identity becomes determined 
by politics through the instrumentalisation of mosques and other religious and 
cultural centres as the point of interaction between the government and British 
Asians. 
When New Labour came to power in 1997 these trends became 
intensified in a new struggle for identity.63 Malik writes, ‘At the heart of the 
strategy was a redefinition of racism. Racism now meant not simply the denial 
of equal rights but the denial of the right to be different. Different peoples 
should have the right to express their specific identities, explore their own 
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histories, formulate their own values, pursue their own lifestyles.’64 What 
Malik described is how the emancipatory struggle for racial equality was 
exchanged through government policy to a state managed culture of personal 
expression of identity, foregoing the universal principles that lie outside 
identity. The lived experience of many Muslims in Britain was an imposed 
otherness which became the only ‘valid currency’ around which to shape their 
identity. The normative framework of multiculturalist policies effectively 
became an extension of identity politics, in which the subject was defined 
through the limitations of cultural identity.  
Identity politics creates scenarios in which the subject no longer defines 
itself but is instead defined through a small group of prisms of identity around 
the categories of sexuality, religion, race and culture. (A categorisation 
reflected in Labidi’s alternative masculinities (minorities, underclass males, 
homosexuals, foreigners, others).65  
This narrow approach to human subjectivity compels people to identify 
with certain ‘life-scripts’66 that have been laid out for them. Malik refers to the 
philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah who suggests, ‘Demanding respect for 
people as blacks and gays can go along with notably rigid strictures as to how 
one is to be an African American or a person with same-sex desires. There will 
be ‘proper modes of being black and gay: there will be demands that are made; 
expectations to be met; battle lines to be drawn’.’67 
Four Lions is an astute articulation of this phenomenon. It pitches the real 
life of the characters against their culturally determined ‘life-scripts’. Their 
failure to perform according to these ‘life-scripts’ creates much of the humour 
of the film. For example, when the characters leave for London to blow 
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themselves up in the London Marathon they are very motivated, starting their 
journey listening to a patriotic mujahideen song, indicating a common and 
earnest goal of jihad. They look at one another, bobbing their heads to the 
music, conscious of the magnitude of the situation. This scene cuts to some 
time later when they are entering the city. Now they euphorically sing along to 
the song Dancing in the Moonlight by the band Toploader, a song that is 
associated in British culture with the ‘outpouring(s) of middle-class smug-o-
wank surrounding (tv chef Jamie Oliver’s) School Dinners series’, as Morris 
collaborator Charlie Brooker remarks.68 The characters’ habits trump their 
idealism – their Fürsichsein der Seele’, their unencumbered expression of the 
soul.69 This has, on the one hand a heart-warming effect, evoked by an 
identification with their ‘zero-level of humanity.’70 On the other hand the 
spectator is exposed to their own habits of living in a world where he/she71 can 
identify with the Toploader song on a habitual level, terrorists and non-
terrorists alike. To be confronted with such a commonality is to experience the 
metaphysical gap of transgressive comedy. The humour arises not from the 
fact that the characters listen to Toploader but that they listen to Toploader 
just like us, unbound by cultural determinants – something that is not taken 
for granted in the post-political and therefore properly transgressive.  
Reading Four Lions as a film that promotes a politically correct othering, 
as Labidi suggest, is to deny the film’s transgressive potential. Instead of 
prompting a correct othering, the film’s satirising of the very idea of othering 
in fact highlights the absurdities of the failings of pluralism and 
multiculturalism, as constituted by the post-political.  
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The film questions the idea of terrorism as the arcane Other, or the 
‘unknown unknowns’, in the words of Donald Rumsfeld.72 But instead of 
describing the failings of an ideology which ignores the pluralist recognition of 
identity, the film describes how the characters’ struggle to overcome the 
limitations of identity politics leads to their frustration with the symbolic 
order, and their consequent acting out. 
Hammond says, ‘In rejecting the conventional view of ‘fundamentalist’ 
Islamist terrorism, Four Lions recognises that would-be suicide bombers are 
much closer to the mainstream of British society.’73 This idea is reflected in a 
study by forensic psychologist and former CIA. Official Marc Sageman called 
Understanding Terror Networks (2004). Sageman states that 84% of all Al 
Qaida members joined whilst living in the diaspora, and 87% of these joined 
when living in western countries.74 For example, the homegrown terrorists of 
the London bombings ‘were young Britons who had led apparently ordinary 
lives,’ their assumed leader ‘a highly Westernised young man.’75 The official 
picture of the religiously crazed zealot did not fit the terrorists’ profiles.  
With the film, Morris addresses the same issue, ‘It doesn’t conform to 
type, does it?’, he says. ‘These (real life terrorists) aren’t cold, reptilian killers. 
They’re dicking about with a hat; they’re pissing themselves laughing. What’s 
interesting is to look at this footage and think, ‘But they still did it.’ They acted 
like this, and then they still went and did it.’76 Morris seeks the answers for 
their actions in the society they find themselves in.  
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In the film, the characters’ encounter with non-Muslims is always polite 
and friendly. From the official side they are even met with a manner that is 
almost too cautious. In one scene, which takes place around a public 
discussion about Islam, the MP Malcolm Storge (Alex MacQueen) comes 
across as slippery and inept, trying desperately not to offend anyone. His 
behaviour a distillation of the multiculturalist polices that determine today’s 
political landscape. 
Morris’ focus on the bombers’ motives discloses a social and political 
sphere in which people find themselves unable to formulate their grievances. 
The characters experience that their potential for subjectivity is foreclosed. 
One of the revealing moments of Four Lions is when the police negotiator 
(Benedict Cumberbatch) asks, ‘Waj, what are your demands?’ He replies, ‘I 
don’t have any.’ Waj is a terrorist by default, his acting out as a jihadi is acting 
out by expediency. He has no personal agenda against society. He just wants 
more than what has been offered to him. 
Žižek describes how, in the post-political, the inequalities produced by 
capitalism are displaced by the construction of the subject around the limited 
scope of identity. The unresolved anxieties of the subject, trapped in the 
pluralist narratives of the post-political, compel people to find displacement 
activities, from of acting out to a passage à l’acte. The next part analyses how 
Four Lions describes, in the way the characters act out, the displacement of 
anxieties created by the post-political. 
 
Sharing space time with a ‘bunch of guys’  
Morris’ method of creating readily identifiable characters is achieved by 
approaching them, not as terrorists but as a ‘bunch of guys.’ In approaching 
his characters as a group of normal guys, Morris turned to Sageman’s ‘the 
bunch-of-guys theory’ of terrorism, which he came across whilst researching 




crucial factors in the radicalisation process.77 Sageman’s research showed that 
over 80% of jihadists joined Al Qaida because of friendship/kinship to a 
person sympathising with the group. This approach is often regarded as a 
theoretical breakthrough in understanding the mindset of terrorist martyrs.78 
However, for Morris this approach to human behaviour is only logical, ‘You’re 
much more likely to get people hanging together for positive reasons than 
negative reasons,’ Morris says, ‘and those reasons have to do with 
companionship and common views.’79 He does not understand his 
protagonists as other, but instead sees the jihadists of his film as: ‘The 
Universal Male!’80  
Well, they’re a bunch of blokes but they’re not just a bunch of blokes. 
You have to understand something that seems, paradoxically, not to fit 
into a universal experience until you look at it this way. … But it’s true 
you’re using the universal in something like this – which you find when 
you go to court trials or you read these anecdotes about terrorist pilots. I 
had a press card and watched the Bluewater trial and got to hear a lot of 
MI5 surveillance tapes of the suspects, and you start to realise these 
people are klutziness [sic] around in a very average way – like men at 
stag parties or five-a-side football. Everyone reporting on it knew it was 
like The Keystone Cops. The police thought it was funny and would 
sometimes surreptitiously play the funniest bits of their material to the 
journalists. There were loads of surveillance tapes that cruelly exposed 
very average conversation.81 
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Morris says, ‘Terrorist cells have the same group dynamics as stag parties and 
five a side football teams. There is conflict, friendship, misunderstanding and 
rivalry. Terrorism is about ideology, but it’s also about berks.’82 
Through finding the universal experience of the guys in their humanity, 
Morris achieves his comedy by exposing the gap between the characters’ 
humanity and their alienating plan to blow themselves and others up. One of 
the ways this paradox between identifying with their friendship whilst at the 
same time being confronted with their acting out is achieved through a 
cinematography that assumes the position of witness, in the form of a critical 
witness, rather than passive spectator. The handheld camera frequently frames 
what is going on in a fashion that puts the spectator in the position of spy or 
observer. The idea of an ‘onlooker’ as described by Doane, in that the ‘time 
and space of the image coincide with the time and space of the referent’, is 
being utilised to create an involvement with the ‘guys’ without sharing their 
perspective.83 Here Bordwell’s account of the camera as an ‘ imaginary 
witness’ is realised in a way that presents the spectator with a field of vision 
that mimics a presence in the space the characters inhabit.84 The film is shot in 
a standard 1.85:1 aspect ratio and the image is bright and sharp, yet the picture 
quality is flat, looking more like a video recording throughout. The characters 
are often framed through doorways, curtains, beaded curtains, window frames 
and the like, with a shallow depth of field, with the focus on the characters, 
and the framing element more or less unsharp. This technique creates the 
effect of being in the same space-time as the characters but at a degree 
removed, spatially. The camera / spectator is present as a witness but not as a 
participant. This framing goes against the common assumption of Hollywood 
cinema that witnessing events consist of a ‘passive’ giving oneself up to the 
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image that has taken over the field of vision’, promoted by the loss of 
conscious framing through formats like Cinema Scope, as cinematographer 
Leon Shamroy said, ‘with the lack of consciousness of a framework 
imprisoning the action, you feel as if you were actually witnessing an event, 
rather than watching a picture of it.’85 
In Four Lions there is, rather than a Hollywood style cathartic witnessing, 
but a critical witnessing. The witnessing effect of the framing is added to by 
establishing shots done by the use of creeping zooms, images of surveillance 
cameras, night vision and the suggested action of consecutive images of still 
photography. These cinematographic devices suggest that the characters are 
being watched, although it is never revealed by whom. It is not the police, who 
are shown as incompetent, repeatedly arresting and shooting innocent people. 
Rather, this watching of the characters suggests on the one hand a critical 
distance between the spectator and the terrorists, and on the other hand the 
critical witnessing of their lives, suggests that their acting out is witnessed as 
something that is happening to friends. 
In locating the characters in the same visual and temporal space as the 
spectator, the personal habits of the characters in Four Lions provide an 
insight into the atomised society that has led these young people to find their 
place in a type of Islam that bears no relation to that of their parents, or, 
indeed, any traditional Islam at all. On the contrary, we can see that their 
outlook is an incoherent mishmash of conspiracy theories, second-hand ‘hurts’ 
against Muslims, and mainstream criticisms of consumerism and moral 
behaviour.  
Looking at the characters’ radicalisation and desire to become 
mujahideen as a form of acting out, shows how the group functions as a nexus 
of meaning for each character’s distinctive situation. In line with Žižek’s 
description of acting out as the method of communication with the Other in a 
failed dialogue, acting out in Four Lions becomes the characters’ way of 
                                                            




creating meaning for their own condition through ‘an attempt to break 
through a symbolic deadlock (an impossibility of symbolisation, of putting 
into words) by means of an act.’86 The group is the place where each character 
finds coherence for their personal reasons for acting out. The characters’ 
individual frustrations find a collective home in their different levels of 
identification with the plight of Muslims globally – each character has a 
personal interpretation of what jihad is to them. They embrace the elements of 
Otherness that make sense to them, and take them to their extreme 
conclusions. 
 
Acting out – Moti f  not motive 
What makes the home-grown jihadists funny, in the eye of Morris, is their 
ordinariness, their human failings with which they approach their terrorism. 
Take, for example, the two real life British wannabe jihadists Yusuf Sarwar and 
Mohammed Ahmed who were arrested in 2014. It was revealed that they 
bought a copy of Koran for Dummies and Islam for Dummies on Amazon in 
preparation to join IS in Syria.87 It is almost as if life imitated art, as this 
demonstration in the religious seriousness in jihad is precedented in Four 
Lions. In the film the character Waj has a Teddy bear that helps him with his 
prayers and he receives his religious education from a children’s book called 
‘The camel that went to mosque’. 
This understating of religion as ‘motif not motive’, as put by Durodié, is 
reflected in several studies, including Sageman’s and Scott Atran’s, that 
describe that most jihadists are not motivated by religion, but rather because 
they are ‘bored, underemployed, overqualified and underwhelmed by hopes 
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for the future’, and see ‘jihad as [sic] an egalitarian, equal-opportunity 
employer that is thrilling, glorious and cool.’88  
In Four Lions, the characters are formed through specific individual 
contexts and methods of performance that reflect these recognisable traits of 
young people around the world today. Omar claims to be the groups’ leader, 
he is disillusioned with the treatment of Muslims around the world, personally 
outraged on behalf of Muslims in other countries. With him are: his friend 
Waj who does not have the brainpower to come up with any ideas of his own, 
trusting Omar’s guidance in all matters; Feisal (Adeel Akthar), a shy, quiet 
character – yet the one who has been gathering bomb-making material for 
some time; Barry, a monomaniacal British convert to Islam, who competes for 
leadership with Omar; and Hassan, a rich kid and media student with an 
enthusiasm for rap music.  
In the film Omar and his mates and are rather uninterested in Muslim 
beliefs or practices and continuously mock Feisal’s attempts to avoid being 
filmed by putting a box over his head. Feisal’s literal, materialist, translation of 
the religious ideal that taking a photo of a being with a soul is haram (sinful) is 
a good example of the comedic gap between idealist imagination and its 
materialist execution. The humour that seems at first to be directed at the 
expense of Feisal and his failure to recognise this gap, is subverted by the 
film’s touching portrayal of his character’s tragic story. Faisal finds a home in 
the group away from his mentally ill father who eats newspaper. The idea of 
martyrdom however is not altogether convincing for him, so he trains 
explosive laden crows to fly into ‘sex shops, a US embassy or some other such 
slag utility’ because he does not want to martyr himself. Whilst carrying the 
explosives to a different hiding place, Feisal trips and is killed, taking out a 
sheep that he landed on whilst falling over. His farcical death is a visual shock 
that sums up Faisal’s tragedy – a person who joined a suicide group for 
companionship and compassion. The idea of friendship, the habitual mundane 
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traits the spectator encounters through the group, becomes perverted and 
Feisal’s death not only confronts the characters with the reality of their 
situation, but also the spectator is shocked into the realness of their politics.  
In contrast to Omar, it his peace-loving brother Ahmed (Wasim Zakir) 
who is devout Muslim. He dresses head to toe in traditional clothing and, to 
the annoyance of Omar, finds all solutions to life in Islamic rulings which he 
has spent all day memorising. The final images of the film underscore the 
tragic irony of a bias that understands the terrorists’ beliefs being motivated 
by religion in that it is Ahmed, prosecuted by the police, who ends up in an 
interrogation.  
 Ahmed is not without faults, as he refuses to be in the same room as his 
sister-in-law and locks his female relatives away in a small cupboard that used 
to be a toilet. Morris shows the two brothers as two different sides of the same 
post-political coin. The imposed limits of their cultural scripts has one brother 
turn to religion and the other turn to a more western style anti-capitalism in 
the form of jihad. Omar’s acting out against society is a reaction to what his 
brother represents – a limited idea of the Muslim faith and, moreover, a 
limited idea of him as a person. His life is far more interesting, complicated 
and rich than what is provided by a cut-out identity. He rejects the provided 
frameworks of identity even in the absence of anything else to identify with. 
Omar’s yearning for meaning is met with forms of protest that fall within the 
accepted frame of the symbolic he inhabits and his protest reveals a mindset 
that is not dissimilar to very mainstream liberal prejudices. On the rare 
occasion he expresses his opinion he says that they are ‘to bring havoc to this 
bullshit, consumerist, godless, Paki-bashing, Gordon Ramsay ‘Taste the 
Difference’ speciality cheddar, torture-endorsing, massacre-sponsoring, ‘Look-
at-me-dancing-pissed with-my-nob-out ‘, Sky1 Uncovered, ‘Who-gives-a-fuck 
about-dead-Afghanis?’ Disneyland.’ By letting Omar espouse these pitiful 
polemics against capitalism, Morris shows up the gap between the idealist 
dimension and the materialist reality of contemporary anti-consumerism. In 




himself – a fulfilled life, the fast track to paradise. For Waj he puts it in terms 
he understands – the thrilling Rubber Dinghy Rapids ride at the Disneyesque 
amusement park Alton Towers. Morris undermines Omar’s anti-consumerist 
rant by showing how much the characters enjoy the concepts of Disneyland. 
Omar identifies himself with Simba the main character from the Disney film 
The Lion King, telling his son about Simba’s jihad in which he replaces 
himself with the cartoon character. As with Waj’s equating Rubber Dinghy 
Rapids with the paradise awaiting him after his martyrdom, in Omar’s fantasy, 
Disney becomes a metaphor for jihad itself. In the film the character’s 
grievances are expressed in the same way as those of the western anti-
capitalist movement in the post-political, a campaign directed against the 
excesses of capitalism that ‘emerged in the wake of the Battle of Seattle in 
1999’, which are regarded, as anti-neoliberalism journalist Semis Milne says, 
as ‘both economically and ecologically unsustainable’.89 Hammond picks up 
on how the antipathy of radical Islamists to the West was not the expression 
of an Other but that they were, drawing on Sageman’s study, ‘mostly upper 
middle class’, and ‘global citizens’. He continues, saying that, ‘the Islamists’ 
condemnation of Western decadence is not so much a foreign ideology 
confronting the West from without … but rather a violent manifestation of the 
West’s own self-loathing.’90 In the film, the characters act out through their 
mundane, rejection of what they regard as the excesses of capitalism. For 
example, Waj’s critique of consumerism (apart for his preference for Chicken 
Cottage) is ‘Fuck Mini Babybels.’ One ritual of the post-political is that the 
idea of consumption, that used to be the outcome of ritual (to be able to 
consume without the burden of belief), has become inverted says Žižek, 
‘Instead of enabling free consumption without sacrifice, the modern "total 
economy" which wants to dispense with this "superfluous" ritualised sacrifice 
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generates the paradoxes of thrift – there is NO generous consumption, 
consumption is allowed only insofar as it functions as the form of appearance 
of its opposite.’91 The only consumption that is allowed is an expressive non-
consumption and the anti-capitalist protests in the post-political can be 
regarded not as much as an acting out in the post-political but rather as a form 
of ideological ritual of the post-political. Their off-the-shelf ideology is not the 
characters’ acting out – it is their motif not their motive. What they act out 
against are the cultural scripts of political multiculturalism they are presented 
within in the post-political, effectively foreclosing them from assuming a 
political role outside the narratives of identity. 
Similarly media student Hassan (Arsher Ali) acts out in a way that is 
recognisable by the audience as a common motive. In the film he seeks 
meaning outside the institutions that treat him like a child, and his acting out 
is in return a childish one. One scene, in which he prances in the living room, 
talking to himself, and doing a bad Travis Bickle impression, he reveals his 
motives, ‘Whats that, Mrs. Thistle? No, I don’t want to resit my media studies. 
Stupid Mrs. Thistle, I don’t want to retake it. You know why? Cos I’ve found a 
new purpose in life. And here it is. Eat that shit! Eat that. Eat that. You fuck …’ 
Apart from creating a relevant reminder of Žižek’s example of Taxi Driver for 
an acting out (before Bickle goes on a rampage), this scene shows Hassan 
alone for the first time. This is how he sees himself when others are not there. 
Hassan’s acting out is more recognisable as a ritual of the post-political. What 
Morris confronts the audience with, are the symbolic ideological rituals people 
perform on an everyday basis. These are, as Žižek says, ‘compulsive rituals of 
sacrifice – in order to disavow their (peoples’) jouissance in the eyes of the 
Other.’92 What he means is that, in order to cover the gaps in the symbolic 
people have to transfer their jouissance onto ersatz acts that take on the 
function of believing in the symbolic for them – much like the ‘the ritual of 
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Santa Claus’, where parents assume their belief, and children pretend to 
believe so as not to disappoint their parents.93 These substitute actions are 
ideologically sanctioned, in the post-political, as Žižek says, the ‘performance 
of the ritual destined to keep illicit temptation at bay becomes the source of 
libidinal satisfaction.’94 Hassan’s acting out therefore is better understood in 
terms of a juvenile rebellion. For Hassan joining the group is nothing more 
than a cool thing to do. Here he can demonstrate his anger with the world 
within the frame of reference that he thinks is regarded as Other by the 
institutions that he makes responsible for not recognising his talents. His 
insincere and faddish commitment to the cause make him the only one to 
bottle out in the end. Morris presents Hassan’s acting out as resulting from the 
paradoxes of post-politics where the symbolic institutions foreclose the 
antagonisms necessary for politics. In the film, Morris manages to address the 
gap between the idealist concept of multiculturalism and its practical 
translation as a politics of foreclosure, where Hassan becomes a point of 
identification.  
Hassan’s acting out, in the manner of a typical teen rebellion, is as 
ridiculous as it is tragic. When he approaches the police officer with his pleas 
of trying to give himself up his upside-down-clown-costume emphasises his 
dilemma; in the costume he is literally ‘talking out of his arse’ – the police 
officer finds it hard to believe him until the moment Barry blows him up. Even 
in death he is not taken seriously. 
Hassan’s behaviour can be recognised to be a juvenile acting out fuelled 
by an adolescent attitude of rebellion. His rap, in which he compares himself 
to the late singer Tupac Shakur, is reminiscent of how, as Bakari Kitwana 
describes, black culture has been appropriated by middle class white kids 
looking for a rebellious thrill.95 Even though Hassan is Asian he is from a 
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middle class background performing the ideologically sanctioned libidinal 
rituals of youth. 
 
Omar’s passage a l ’acte 
At the end of the film Omar’s circumstances change in ways that directly 
affect the nature of his acting out. These changes are only recognisable by 
understanding how his desire, his belief in his jihadi ideology which sustains 
him in the symbolic order, has been made unrelatable for him. Omar sees his 
purpose as becoming a martyr who ‘dies smiling’, restoring his own 
equilibrium with the world – an inherently satisfying experience he also 
wishes for Waj. Omar is supported in his redeeming version of jihad by his 
son and his wife, who tells him when he is forlorn after having left the group: 
‘You were much more fun when you were gonna blow yourself up, love.’ It is 
their shared version of jihad which is the foundation of his family unit. In a 
tender moment this is expressed in his appropriation of the story of Simba the 
lion. Omar’s belief in his version of jihad is what compels him to act the way 
he does. To not become a martyr would be devastating to Omar as it is the 
object of his desire – Object a. The belief that sustains him as a subject in the 
symbolic order.  
Near the climax of the film, the ‘Four Lions’ are strapped up with bombs, 
ready to blow up the London Marathon. With the title Four Lions Omar 
includes the members of the group in his version of noble jihad. When Waj 
shows doubts about the rightness of what they are about to do, Omar performs 
his usual procedure with Waj – he tells him what to think. And Waj is happy 
to proceed. At this point Omar is still convinced by his mission. But soon 
afterward Barry blows up Hassan who is trying to give himself up.  
The ensuing row between Omar and Barry brings Omar to the realisation 
that he has misled Waj into a mission that was not his but Omar’s. Unlike 
Omar, Waj is not able to make a choice about this.  
Waj, who is holed up in a Kebab shop with the server as hostage, is 




goal. Omar tries to talk Waj out of martyring himself, but because he does not 
employ his usual method of making Waj follow his example (since Omar still 
intends to go through with it) he only confuses Waj. Omar then hears over the 
phone that Waj’s bomb has gone off – he is dead.  
The dynamic of Omar’s act changes. Instead of carrying out his jihadi 
plan, Omar realises that he has killed his friend. His dream of jihad was not 
the universal panacea that he could bestow upon others, especially not his 
best friend who trusted him to have his best interests in mind. Disillusioned, 
Omar kills himself in a pharmacy, a scenario that assumes the look of an 
acting out but the film shows that this deed is in fact a tragic passage à l’acte.  
In the film, Omar’s profound change in the way he acts is evident in is his 
face. After the call to Waj on the phone he borrowed from his colleague Matt 
(Craig Parkinson), he is distraught but this is closely followed by a sobering 
realisation of what is going on. Omar tells Matt that he should say that he, 
Omar, was smiling when asked by the police, he then tries to smile for Matt 
but fails. On the way into the pharmacy he is definitely not smiling.  
The dialogue between Matt and Omar is framed in a tight close-up where 
the handheld camera is shakier than in the rest of the film. What happens in 
this sequence is a change in focal length in the framing of Omar. It starts by 
showing his face, intercut with shots of encroaching policemen from his p.o.v. 
Then Omar walks away from Matt, who is in the background shouting ‘where 
are you going?’, the camera is still with Omar. Then the p.o.v. is that of Matt 
who watches Omar from the back in a long shot walk towards the pharmacy, 
the intimacy of the conversation has finished, and so has the spectatorial 
identification with Omar. After cutting back to a close up of Matt, the long 
shot from his p.o.v. is back on the pharmacy into which Omar just entered. 
Now the image is again framed by the mise-en-scene, in this case green street 
posts. The witnessing effect of the camera in this scene ultimately positions 
the spectator with Matt, Omar’s friend, including the spectator within the 
friendship circle of the Four Lions – creating the visual conditions to create 




Omar’s jihad is his petit a, and like the Kung Fu warrior Po in Kung Fu 
Panda, Omar discovers that his object a, his dream of finding universal 
equilibrium as a soldier for god, is only a construct that sustains his ideology. 
The tragedy of the passage à l’acte for Omar lies in the matter that he still 
identifies with what sustains this dream (as described by Žižek, in the passage 
à l’acte the subject identifies with his object of desire in a destructive act.) – 
his role within his family as a father who defined himself through his belief in 
a noble jihad. 
By telling Matt that he should say that he was smiling, Omar saved his 
son from knowing that did not give up, because, as he told him ‘Simba would 
never give up.’ But he is no longer the old Simba who bravely fights for a just 
cause, instead he has nothing else that would sustain his identity as a father, 
as a friend, as a Muslim and as a human being. 
This double bind between a life with an identity based on a belief that has 
been tainted or a life of no identity whatsoever compels Omar to embark on a 
passage à l’acte. He takes himself out of the dialogue with the symbolic order 
by going into the pharmacy where he blows himself up. That he chooses a 
pharmacy, a target he earlier in the film deemed unworthy for a true jihadi, 
confirms that he has seen through the inconsistencies of his belief.  
Omar’s passage à l’acte is the tragic realisation of his misguided acting 
out. He realises that his idea of jihad was an illusion however he still has to go 
through with it. The only way to do this is to find the last bit of meaning in his 
action – his death. 
The limitations imposed on Omar’s subjectivity in the post-political 
landscape find their expression in his passage à l’acte. Despite realising that 
his jihadi dream is his own subjective fantasy the absence of a possibility to 
change his circumstances in a meaningful way, compels him to act according 








In Four Lions, the character’s acting out happens in their jihadi group – an 
idea that would commonly be assumed to be alien to most people. Yet Four 
Lions presents the terrorists as universal characters because their situation is 
borne out of an environment that is recognisable. For each character’s acting 
out to make sense, Morris understands them to be part of a common universe 
and a common social environment. He understands them as a ‘group of 
blokes.’  
Morris tackles the accepted framework around which contemporary 
morality is debated and shaped. Using Žižek’s understanding of excessive 
pleasure pain, one could say that Morris as an artist of pure jouissance, who 
makes it his mission to dig his finger into the wounds, the symptoms, of 
society. In turn, the symptoms exposed by Morris reflect Žižek’s vision of the 
post-political – the political and societal limitations of the subject and his 
frustration that lead to different kinds of acting out. 
By creating a universal experience Morris manages not only to make the 
audience sympathise with his protagonists, but also he makes a case for a 
more general universalism that lays claims to a universal humanity. Coming 
back to the words of Chris Morris, talking about Four Lions reveals an 
approach to humanity as a universal ideal, ‘They’re a bunch of blokes but 
they’re not just a bunch of blokes. You have to understand something that 
seems, paradoxically, not to fit into a universal experience until you look at it 
this way.’96 
With Four Lions, Morris creates empathy for what should be alienating – 
jihadi-style terrorism. Morris humanises that which should not be humanised, 
while maintaining the methods of his other comedy – alienation, absurdity 
and a desire to find the extreme beneath the surface of things.  
In this method he sees a way to access some truth behind the moral panic 
and media sensationalism around the subject. He says,  
                                                            




It’s making them seem like you or me, I suppose. … That goes back to 
the observation I picked up time and again that these people are 
abundantly, goofily frail. It doesn’t alter the fact that they’re terrorists. 
But I think it improves your understanding of what’s going on. Or it at 
least gives you the opportunity to do that.97 
Morris humanises them by looking at them as fellow subjects from the same 
social universe as himself where a passage à l’acte is a consequence in a world 
of unreason. He makes it possible to experience a passage à l’acte of a kind 
especially loaded with meaning in contemporary ideology: ideological 
frustration and the inability to become subject taken to its illogical bitter 
conclusion.
                                                            




Germany: the RAF mythos in  
post-political German cinema  
 
This part of the thesis analyses how, in Germany the cinematic narrativisation  
of the post-political is expressed through the concept of the RAF mythos. The 
German organisation RAF (Rote Arme Fraktion), established itself in 1970, saw 
itself as an anti-imperialist urban guerrilla group, opposing what they saw as 
the West German state apparatus harbouring fascistic tendencies. And it is 
through the history of the RAF that radicalism is frequently contextualised in 
Germany. By appropriating the RAF for the post-political, contemporary 
preoccupations with national identity and loss of political parameters are 
given cinematic form.  
The two major ways in which the RAF has shaped German history are, on 
the one hand their criminal deeds and their consequences and, on the other 
hand, the mythology that has been created around the RAF and which still 
informs much of the nation’s relationship to radical politics. The RAF 
indirectly helped change the relationship between the German state and its 
citizens. The German terror’s main historical legacy was a change in politics 
that provoked changes of un-freedom in a manner of the Überwachungsstaat, 
the surveillance state, and loss of civil liberties in the form of the controversial 
Radikalerlass in 1972. These decrees included vast powers of investigation for 
the state such as the Rasterfahndung, the dragnet investigation whereby huge 
databases of all citizens are created, and can be checked against specific data 
of a wanted person or persons.1  
                                                            
1 In 1976 an addition was made to Paragraph (article) §129 of the StGB ⁠1 that dealt with the 
membership of a criminal organisation. This paragraph deals with the criminalisation of 
groups that belong to a terrorist organisation in order to clearly differentiate and 
criminalise crimes that were motivated by political goals. The new paragraph makes it 
illegal to found or be a member of a terrorist organisation, and it became the centre of 
German state security laws. Bundesministerium der Justiz (http: //www.gesetze – im – 




Also, the RAF became a prominent and defining subject in German 
culture, contextualised in the so called ‘RAF mythos’. In one sense, the RAF 
mythos can be understood, as Chris Homewood does, as the RAF as codified 
in the sum of images and narratives of ‘cultural memory’, as described by Jan 
Assman.2 While the concept of ‘cultural memory’ is problematic, resting as it 
does on the concept of a definable and discrete culture, and locating the 
proceeds of memory outside human agency, it nevertheless points in the 
direction of a necessary frame of reference. The term cultural landscape will be 
used as it describes the concept of accumulated cultural products in a  
way better suited to this study. The RAF mythos is a specifically German 
construct, interwoven in the context of German history and various 
interpretations of the RAF. The way it is constructed and contested will be 
analysed in detail in the next chapter on the Baader Meinhof Complex.  
A few notes to the concept of myth have to made in order to contextualise the 
notion of myth not only within the following chapter, but also for the chapter 
on Die Kommenden Tage in which the RAF myth is also a fundamental idea.  
In the German language, the word mythos expresses several ideas.3 In 
English two words exist; mythos, meaning a body of myths, and the word 
myth itself.4 The word myth in English is more closely associated with the 
idea of a lie, whereas the concept of mythos is considered more in terms of 
traditional narrative or mythology. That this distinction is not made in 
German has to be considered when looking at research on the concept of RAF 
myth/mythos, not only by German but also English investigators. The 
meaning of the RAF mythos is thus not only subtle, in the sense of being a 
                                                            
2 Christopher James Homewood, ‘From Baader to Prada The Representation of Urban Terrorism 
in German-Language Film’ [electronic resource] (University of Leeds, 2008) <http: 
//etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/id/eprint/665> [last access 4 September 2014] p.74. 
3 A good analysis of the concept of mythos and its Bedeutungsfacetten (nuances of meaning) is by 
Peter Tepe, referring to over 70, in this study alone. Peter Tepe, Mythos & Literatur: 
Aufbau Einer Literaturwissenschaftlichen Mythosforschung (Würzburg: Königshausen & 
Neumann Verlag, 2001) 
4 Jennifer Speake and Mark LaFlaur, ‘mythos’, The Oxford Essential Dictionary of Foreign Terms 
in English (Oxford University Press, 1999) < http: 
//www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199891573.001.0001/acref-




founding myth while at the same time implying that it is a lie, but also pliable, 
in the sense of ‘whose myth?’ and ‘what constitutes this myth?’ What is 
thematised, in the part exploring the RAF mythos, is how the concept of 
mythos works out ideologically in the post-political and how this is expressed 
on the cinema screen. The central thesis is that there is a preoccupation in the 
post-political with the concept of mythologisation as way of explaining 
contemporary phenomena.  
In the following chapter on The Baader Meinhof Complex the meaning of 
the RAF mythos will explored as part of the overall argument around the 
greater concept of the post-political. This chapter approaches the concept of 
myth through the filters of Barthes and Žižek. The chapter on Die 
Kommenden Tage will contextualise the role of the RAF mythos as it assumes 
the form of images of a politics of fear which according to Žižek, is a mode of 
function of the post-political.
 240 
Chapter 3.1 
Filling in the gaps of history: 
the RAF mythos and The Baader Meinhof Complex  
 
Introduction 
The RAF disbanded in 1998. In their final letter they state that their existence 
is futile in a world where ‘the threat to peoples’ lives’ arises from the new 
hegemony of the ‘neoliberal world order’1. It is no accident that the end of the 
RAF, group that saw itself as fighting for an internationalist emancipatory 
cause, came about not long after the emergence of post-politics. With the 
foreclosure of radical change per se, the RAF’s own concept of protest had lost 
its ideological foundation also.  
However, in a sense the RAF has not disappeared, but remains ubiquitous 
in German culture, in art, film and lifestyle products,2 as well as in politics in 
the form of a Vergangenheitsbewältigung, a specific term to describe the 
processes of coming to terms with the past, in particular the Holocaust. The 
idea of a RAF mythos is often present in discourse around the RAF. The RAF 
mythos is the idea of a constitutive lie that has shaped the imagining of the 
RAF in Germany. The role that the concept RAF mythos plays in the 
construction of an ideological fantasy is a foundational idea for this chapter.  
 According to Thomas Elsaesser, the RAF is a zombie, dead and yet 
alive in its presence in German culture.3 This raises the questions of why the 
                                                            
1 ‘RAF-Auflösungserklärung’, Rafinfo.de (Hrsg.) <http: //www.rafinfo.de/archiv/raf/raf-20-4-
98.php> [last access 4 September 2014] 
2 Such as clothes inspired by the RAF e.g. by the label Maegde&Knechte, or t-shirts carrying their 
portraits. e.g. ElternHaus <http: 
//www.elternhaus.com/product_info.php?products_id=121> [last access 4 September 
2014], bags with Meinhof quotes e.g. Roter Shop<http: //www.roter-
shop.de/taschen/tragetaschen/2354/tragetasche-ulrike-meinhof> [last access 4 September 
2014] 
3 Thomas Elsaesser, German Cinema – Terror and Trauma: Cultural Memory Since 1945 




spectre of the RAF is haunting present day Germany? And what are the 
mechanisms of this bringing the past into the present? Elsaesser writes that,  
… cinema especially plays an ambivalent role in this (retelling the RAF’s 
past for the present) because it is here where reality turns into affect, and 
that what was is constantly made present again. Authenticity and 
mythos become one on a new chronological level in the moving image, 
they have a special relationship to history and memory… . 4  
The reconstruction of the past in cinema, Elsaesser says in as many words, is 
in itself an act of myth making, through cinematic affect. By the blending of 
fact and belief through the cinema mill, history becomes part of a mythos that 
reproduces itself.  
This chapter investigates the ways in which The Baader Meinhof 
Complex is an example of how the merging of authenticity and mythos in a 
cinematic image, creates a new understanding, in this case of the RAF. The 
central line of the analysis is that the film does so by using a film-form that 
enables a cinematic post-political experience of the RAF. 
The cinematic realisation of The Baader Meinhof Complex can be seen as 
a demonstration of the need of the postmodern to ‘fill in the gaps’, in a way 
described by Žižek. The gaps in this sense are the missing pieces of 
information in a narrative that one fills with one’s own understanding and 
desires. The gaps are subjective spaces that the subject fills with meaning, the 
gaps that suture the subject to the narrative. When stories are told in the 
postmodern, these gaps in the narrative are filled by the narrator. Žižek writes, 
‘an archetypal post-modern procedure it is this: that is to say, it is filling in the 
gaps of some classical work, rewriting it, sequel, prequels, retelling the story 
from a different perspective5 … .’  
This chapter describes how The Baader Meinhof Complex creates a filling 
of the gaps between authenticity and myth – between historical facts and the 
RAF mythos – with a visual interpretation that reflects content of the post-
                                                            




political as evidenced in contemporary Germany. This content is the desire to 
‘demythify’, in the sense of Barthes; demythify, as in re-mythologise with a 
more enlightened myth, ‘not to reveal the (latent) meaning of a statement, of a 
feature, of a narrative, but to fissure the very representation of meaning; not to 
change or to purify symbols, but to contest the symbolic itself.’6 The Baader 
Meinhof Complex represents an attempt to demythify what is considered to 
be an ideological problem. The problem that people identify with, and by 
extension tacitly endorse the radicalism associated with the RAF. 
The first part of this chapter considers Žižek’s understanding of myth and 
how the idea of demystifying myth plays a major part in his concept of filling 
in the gaps. This is followed by an investigation of the concept of the RAF 
mythos and its relation to, and its role in, the notion of 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung in Germany. The next part will look at the 
filmmaker’s vision for The Baader Meinhof Complex, and describe it in 
context of other RAF films, as well as the criticism it received.  
The final part will look at how The Baader Meinhof Complex fills in the 
gaps of the RAF and its mythologisation. This is done through an examination 
of how the film portrays three founding myths of the RAF. 
 
Ž ižek and myth 
In order to conceptualise the cultural necessity in Germany of demystifying 
the past, it is helpful to understand how the concept of de-mythologising is 
situated in the post-political. By first looking at how the role of myth is seen in 
the postmodern in the writings of Roland Barthes, this chapter then describes 
how Žižek relates the concept of myth in the postmodern to the practice of 
filling in the gaps.  
The concept of myth is frequently associated with the idea of a 
constitutional lie, often in terms of collective belief. For example, myth is seen 
                                                                                                                                                              
5 Slavoj Žižek, ‘The Body Politic’, Lacanian ink 16– Spring (The Drawing Center, April, 2000a) 
<http: //www.lacan.com/issue16.php> [last access 4 September 2014] 





as a pathway to the ‘collective unconscious’ in the psychoanalysis of Carl 
Jung,7 or considered as a constitutive language by the anthropologist Claude 
Levi-Strauss.8 The imprecise nature of myth as either a narrated history, a 
collective story, or even a constitutive collective story, has made the concept 
of myth an ideological matter for structuralist thinkers such as Roland Barthes.  
Myth, according to Barthes, is an ideological apparatus, much in the 
same way that Althusser presents ideology, which deforms reality in 
compliance with the ruling ideology. Myth, for Barthes, is inherently 
problematic, due to its tendency to do away with historical conditions, and 
with them the political and social agendas that shaped the myth in the first 
place. For Barthes, myth is the carrier of bourgeois ideology, and the goal is to 
‘demystify’ and ‘account in detail for the mystification which transforms petit-
bourgeois culture into a universal nature.’9  
However, Barthes insists that demystification does not work in a straight 
forward way, but must be done by an ‘estranged’ ‘myth-reader’ or 
‘mythologist’.10 These are (supposedly) the critical thinkers, who ‘decipher(s) 
the myth, […] [and] understand(s) a distortion.’11 Rather than explaining myth, 
Barthes says, ‘the best weapon against myth is perhaps to mythify it in its 
turn, and to produce an artificial myth: and this reconstituted myth will in fact 
be a mythology. Since myth robs language of something, why not rob myth?’12 
The plan is to reveal myth by displacing ideas that have been taken for 
granted and retelling them in a new light. De-mythologising becomes a sort of 
re-mythlogising of the old myth but with a more ‘responsible idea of 
                                                            
7 Carl Jung, G., Gerhard Adler, and R. F. C. Hull, The Collected Works of C.G. Jung: V. 9, Pt. 1: 
Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, 2nd edn (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1981) p.5. 
8 Lévi-Strauss, Claude. ‘The structural study of myth’, Journal of American folklore (1955) 
pp.428–444. 
9 Barthes, Roland, Mythologies (New York City: Hill & Wang, 1972) p.8. 
10 ibid. p.158, p.11, p.129. 
11 ibid. p.127. 




language’13. Myths, according to this logic, can only be demythified by 
retelling them in a more ‘responsible’ way, in that it ensures a different 
narrative which considers the voice of ‘the oppressed.’14 For Barthes, ‘left-wing 
myth is always an artificial myth, a reconstituted myth,’15 but that is a myth of 
the left. This notion of re-constituting myth to fit with what are felt to be more 
acceptable sensibilities is a constituting factor in the making of The Baader 
Meinhof Complex. 
Whereas Barthes laments the inherent properties of myth as obfuscating 
the workings of the dominant bourgeois ideology, Žižek sees postmodernism’s 
rewriting of myth as problematic. For Žižek, unlike Barthes, the mythological 
form is not a beginning, but the end of a convoluted process of transposing old 
meanings and condensing complex correlations. ‘Myth’, says Žižek, ‘by 
definition, emerges as a memory, as the retroactive reconstitution of 
something, which, when it ‘actually took place’, was simply a common vulgar 
play of passions?’16  
What Barthes sees as the problem of myth, that there is no demystifying 
myth in terms of an absolute truth of the thing-itself – Žižek finds helpful. In 
the hands of ‘modernist’ (as opposed to post-modern) thinking myth becomes, 
‘the interpretative frame of reference for its contemporary narrative’, by 
asserting ‘the metaphysical potential of the most common and vulgar bits of 
our daily experience.’17 The modernist mindset, Žižek describes, shaped by the 
principles of the Enlightenment, ‘always already ‘contaminates’ the mythical 
naive immediacy. Enlightenment itself is mythical, i.e. its own grounding 
gesture repeats the mythical operation.’18 What Žižek means by this is that the 
modernist subject (working on universal principles), although enlightened and 
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Notion (London: Verso Books, 2002) p.36. 
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aware of the function of myth and their own subjectivisation, can still use it as 
a useful device to help describe areas outside subjectivity, where pure reason 
may fail to do so.  
Barthes insists that myth obfuscates ideology and must be undone 
through creating a new mythology, as myth cannot be understood in terms of 
absolute truth outside subjectivity. Žižek understands myth as a tool, created 
by self aware subjects, through which subjects can access a greater truth 
outside subjectivity.  
Žižek suggests that the desire to demythify through more acceptable 
myths stems from the limits placed on subjectivity by postmodernism. He 
says, ‘Postmodernism directly rewrites myth itself by filling in the gaps.’19 It is 
a gap that addresses a universal concept that lies outside the restrictions of the 
symbolic order that is, outside the limitations of the realm of structured 
society of politics and culture. However this realm can be accessed by 
everyone as individual subjects.  
The postmodern condition is that, instead of leaving a possibility for a 
void, for a ‘not being there’ of answers, postmodernism fills the gaps with 
privileged terms or texts that are held to be unassailable such as race, gender 
or pathology. In Žižek’s understanding, the gaps are gaps in the narrative of 
the symbolic itself, tears in the fabric of ideology. People can either fill those 
gaps with convenient narratives, or ideological fantasies, or they can leave 
them open and experience the void – not knowing in what way this will 
change them. The experiencing of gaps, as provided by myth are, for Žižek, 
full of potential.  
Considering Žižek’s understanding that demythification (or re-
mythification with privileged ideas) is the default mode of the postmodern 
mindset, which finds its political form in post-politics,20 The Baader Meinhof 
Complex can be understood as a contextualisation of the RAF myth in terms of 
the post-political. The next part will look closer at the conceptualisation of the 
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myths that constitute the RAF mythos, its relation to German history and its 
relation to The Baader Meinhof Complex. 
 
What is the RAF Mythos? 
The RAF in the context of Vergangenheitsbewältigung  
The ‘RAF mythos’ is what is known in German as a Schlagwort; a buzzword or 
catchphrase, an emotionally charged term often with propagandistic 
undertones. In a linguistic study on the origins of the term ‘RAF mythos’, Silke 
Reinicke describes how since the late 80s the RAF has been associated with the 
term mythos, or myth.21 To explain the complex idea of the meaning of RAF 
mythos, not only in its own terms but also as a concept of the post-political, is 
the aim of this section.  
Wolfgang Kraushaar, in his work on the RAF mythology, describes how 
the RAF mythos has been perpetuated from the moment the RAF existed.22 He 
differentiates five different sources and outputs that he holds responsible for 
the emergence of the RAF mythos:  
 
1) The way the RAF produced its own myth of heroism.  
(This self-mythologising of the RAF is divided into three main myths 
perpetuated by the RAF; a) the myth of ‘armed struggle’. Kraushaar describes 
that the RAF employed this term too late in their terror spree to mean anything 
but a retroactive persuasion for sympathisers. b) the myth of isolation torture, 
claims of the damaging psychological effects suffered from being kept 
imprisoned from others. According to Kraushaar this was a tactic employed by 
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populistischer Bedrohungsphantasie’, Wolfgang Kraushaar (ed.) Die RAF und der linke 




the RAF to attract sympathisers. And, c) the myth that the first generation RAF 
were murdered in prison by the state.) 
 
2) The way the state helped to produce the RAF myth by demonising the 
terrorists. 
3) The way the mass media produced a dramatisation of events. 
4) How the audience of the mediated events were victims of an 
atmosphere of fear generated by either the terrorists or the state. 
5) The discourse around the RAF; How it became a projection space for 
others to voice their own agendas, interpretations and understandings of the 
RAF.23  
Kraushaar’s categorisation of the RAF myth describes it as a meshing of 
different myth producers and myth distributors, all profiting from the RAF; the 
media, the state, the audience and most of all the RAF itself. 
Thomas Elsaesser also sees the RAF mythos as a product of an interplay 
between different parties. For him, these were the providers of the images of 
‘terror made in Germany’; the RAF itself, the yellow press and television.24 
This pool of images and narratives then created ‘a forest of symbols, a 
landscape of ideographs, text fragments and rebuses’ that could be read like a 
looped, never ending film strip.25  
Reinicke’s study concludes that the idea of a RAF mythos has, over the 
years, developed a life of its own and ‘it has become a slogan more and more 
devoid of self explanation.’26 The study shows that, most of all since the 
controversial art exhibition Mythos RAF in Berlin in 2005, today the idea of 
mythologising the RAF has replaced the character of ‘sympathiser’ of the RAF, 
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‘Whomever one accuses to hero worship, to mythify, to romanticise the RAF, 
one also accuses of not facing ‘the facts.’27  
The idea of ‘RAF mythos’ has become shorthand for a myth that 
obfuscates the reality of the RAF. However, what this reality is, is itself 
problematic. The suggestion is that the concept of RAF mythos has been 
propagated by the post-political elite, incorporating the RAF’s failures, human 
and political, in order to discredit radical politics in general. According to 
Reinicke, being called a propagator of the RAF mythos – the RAF mythologiser 
– has turned into a political stigmatisation of people ‘who are associated with 
any kind of leftist ideology.’28 The RAF mythos has on the one hand become a 
polemic with which to defame a political opponent, even though this opponent 
does not have to belong to a particular political group (it includes writers, 
artists, filmmakers etc.). On the other hand those who use the word mythos, 
even in a negative way, perpetuate the concept of a RAF myth and assume the 
existence of such a mythos in the first place.29  
The tendency to assume that there is a mythology around the RAF is what 
drives the interest in contemporary depictions of the RAF, including The 
Baader Meinhof Complex. And the desire to demythify the RAF through a re-
telling of the RAF story in more acceptable terms, can be understood as an 
expression of a specifically German form of post-politics.  
In order to understand why the RAF myth and its unravelling play such a 
big role in German cinema and German history altogether it is important to 
understand the context of The Baader Meinhof Complex in terms of the RAF 
film and the idea of the RAF as collective trauma in German history. 
The desire for a demythifcation of the past can bee seen as an integral  
part of German identity, a circumstance that has its roots in the cultural 
concept of Vergangenheitsbewältigung – not as the name would suggest  
a mere coming to terms with the past, but a method of constant critical 
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evaluation of the past through the lens of the present. Torben Fischer,  
and Matthias N. Lorenz describe in their Dictionary of Vergangenheits-
bewältigung the term as the composite of the ‘multifaceted debates and 
discourses of National-socialism after 1945.’30 
Reinicke’s self-set goal for her study was to investigate if the idea of RAF 
myth has become a linguistic Vergangenheitsbewältigung. The idea of the RAF 
myth as a collective trauma, that defines aspects of the German psyche, is also 
what Elsaesser describes when he talks about how today’s Germany finds its 
identity in the collective coming together around the concept of 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung. He writes, ‘dealing with past has become the 
German way of life.’31  
The roots for this desire to deal with the past lie in the idea of a political 
pedagogy, promoted by the concept of critical theory of Theodor Adorno and 
Max Horkheimer. Adorno writes in the Negative Dialectic that,  
‘Hitler has imposed a new categorical imperative on human beings in 
their state of unfreedom: to arrange their thoughts and actions in such a way 
that Auschwitz should never be repeated, that nothing of the sort should ever 
happen again. This imperative is as resistant to explanation as was the given 
nature of Kant’s imperative in its day.’32 
Adorno describes that Germany must follow new guidelines of behaviour 
based on a constant self-awareness and self-analysis. The horrors of the 3rd 
Reich led to a new German intellectual mindset that saw in the ongoing critical 
examination of the past (through terms and sensibilities of the present) a 
guarantee to avoid a resurgence of fascism. Moreover, this constant  
self-analysis would become the defining feature of German identity from then 
on.  
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Martin Leudke describes in Die Zeit Clemens Albrecht’s thesis of the 
‘intellectual founding of the BRD’ on the basis of Vergangenheitsbewäl-tigung: 
‘The Vergangenheitsbewältigung has played a major role in re-nationalising 
Germany after the war. It became the legitimisation, a new consensus what it 
meant to be German – the task of dealing with the country’s fascist past.’33 
The success of Vergangenheitsbewältigung as political strategy was again 
adopted to form a consensus around what it meant to be German after 1989. 
After German reunification, the legacy of the GDR and its impact on the 
German psyche has become known, controversially, as the Doppelte (the 
double) Vergangenheitsbewältigung of Germany.34  
The adoption of psychological terminology (seeing the past as something 
to be dealt with) is picked up by Elsaesser in his concept of how the 
representations of the RAF are dealing with a historical trauma in a uniquely 
German way, what he calls Wiederholungszawng, a compulsion to repeat and 
retell these traumas in a cyclical time frame.35 The trauma of the nation is to 
be treated through a general identification of past events on an individual 
basis. By making each German responsible for the nations 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung the state legitimises its own existence as an 
institution that is dedicated to enable all citizens to partake in the nation’s 
self-therapy and thus prevent a new rise of fascism/communism through 
radical politics.  
The German notion of a collective identity based on seeing the past  
as a traumatic event that needs to be addressed/confronted, is perpetuated by 
the uncertainties of the post-political. Post-politics calls for a legitimisation of 
the state that is ‘beyond ideology’. In the case of Germany the function of the 
state is to enable a collective identification with the past. The cultural 
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expressions of Vergangenheitsbewältigung become what Žižek calls the 
‘spontaneous ideological supplement to the post-political administration, as 
its ‘pseudo-concretisation,’ its translation into a form that can appeal to the 
individuals’ immediate experience.’36 Here the post-political fantasy is 
translated into a form that appeals to the ‘individuals’ immediate experience.’37 
This is were the technocratic character of the post-political succumbs to ‘a 
supplementary "populist" level of self-legitimisation.’38 The concept of 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung should thus be understood as ideological, an 
essential fantasy of post-political Germany. 
 
The History of the RAF fi lm in Germany and  
The Baader Meinhof Complex in this context  
 The Baader Meinhof Complex is part of a strand of German cinema that 
could be termed the RAF film. The RAF has been thematised in various ways 
over thirty years, from film and theatre to literature and art. The filmic 
treatment of the subject started with Volker Schlöndorff’s interpretation of 
Heinrich Böll’s novel The Lost Honour of Katharina Blum (1975) and the 
cinematic reaction to the events of the ‘German Autumn’ in the collective film 
project Germany in Autumn (1978). 
The story of the RAF has to some extent become interchangeable with the 
story of radical politics itself, its beginnings and its failure. The failure of the 
RAF has been interpreted according to the relevant readings of the time: from 
a critical perspective of the German state in the 1970s and 1980s, over a re-
evaluation of leftist politics after the fall of the Berlin Wall, to a nostalgic re-
imagining of a de-politicised RAF in terms of cool, anti-authoritarian chic, and 
then a return to history in the 2000s.  
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Rachel Palfreyman describes how German films about the RAF are shaped 
by the changing history of the country. Her argument is that the reunification 
of Germany in 1989 no longer required an examination of the legitimacy of the 
state, a task that was the main occupation of what she labelled the ‘first 
generation’ of RAF films (a name with which she echoes the way the actual 
RAF was divided into generations of members and their aims and methods).39 
She describes how films about the RAF that were made after the German 
reunification can be seen as a new form of RAF film. After the reunification, 
the goal for filmmakers was no longer to examine the state’s relationship with 
competing ideologies, but, following the end of traditional politics, to create 
visions of how the old ‘Bonn Republic can be understood in the climate of the 
new Berlin Republic.’40  
The historical changes went hand in hand with changes in the aesthetics 
of cinematic imaginings of the RAF. Whereas the RAF films of the ‘first 
generation’, as Palfreyman describes, imbued with the cinematic aesthetics of 
the New German Cinema starting with The Lost Honour of Katharina Blum 
and Germany in Autumn (1978) and ending with the film Stammheim (1986), 
‘appear sober and analytical as if deliberately confronting the potential 
criticism of the mythologising power of the cinema’,41 the RAF films made in 
the 2000s, possess a deliberate ‘subordination of historical material in favour 
of a good story and [their] lack of defamiliarising aesthetics would seem 
precisely to invite the charge of ‘excessive seductiveness’ and mythologising 
tendencies.’42  
From 1998 onward the treatment of the RAF on screen shows how film 
form changed dramatically with the new political landscape. In times when 
radical left politics were still accessible (at least on paper), filmmakers 
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described the discrepancies between the state, politics and the meaning of the 
RAF as a means of addressing the German state. After the German 
reunification, the subtext of films dealing with the RAF was no longer a critical 
examination of the state but the RAF itself. Films like The State I Am In (2000) 
and The Legend of Rita (2000) use the RAF to describe a ‘crisis of identity’ that 
followed after the reunification and loss of grand narratives. In Die Terroristen 
(1992) a terrorist group disbands itself, recognising their anachronism in a 
world that did away with radical politics, whereas films like Baader (2002) and 
Starbuck (2002) concentrate on the star personas of Andreas Baader and 
Holger Meins. Both these films coincided with the reemergence in German 
pop culture of Meinhof, Ensslin and Baader as cyphers of radical/terrorist 
chic. Homewood speaks of a ‘commodification of the RAF at the hands of 
consumer pop culture.’43 The terrorists’ portraits, logos and slogans, the iconic 
images that were already part of German cultural memory, were glamourised 
e.g. in theatre plays (e.g. Ulrike Maria Stuart 2006), comedy shows (e.g. 
Terrorprogramm 2007)44 and fashion lines featured in then new and hip 
lifestyle magazines Tussi Deluxe and Max.45  
The loss of political immediacy after 1989 also brought with it a change in 
film form, designed to give shape to newly emerging interpretations of the 
RAF. Similar to Palfreyman, Sabine Hake describes how in contrast to the 
‘austere treatments of the subject by directors of the New German Cinema, the 
younger film-makers used linear narratives and strong character identification, 
the seductive lure of set and costume design, and the self-reflexive play with 
the respective decade’s musical sounds to work through the myths and 
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mythification of the New Left.’46 Another cinematic style that features heavily 
in the post-unification RAF films is the docudrama, including films like 
Todesspiel – Teil 1 & 2 (1996-97), Black Box BRD (2001), Baader (2002), 
Mogadishu (2008) and Tödliche Schokolade (2010). The hyperreality, the drive 
to produce ‘an effect that is more real than the real thing being copied’, created 
by the juxtaposing of re-contextualised footage, original drama, re-
appropriated mise-en-scène and historically specific music speaks of a desire 
to give verisimilitude to an interpretation of the RAF.47 It is a method that 
creates drama and generates relevant content without running the risk of 
‘taking sides’ as the filmmakers of the first generation of RAF films clearly did. 
This method however, as Homewood describes the film Black Box BRD, 
‘rather than offer any new perspectives it merely went over old ground, 
deriving a thriller potential from the Schleyer kidnapping and consolidating 
the state perspective.’48  
When Baader Meinhof Complex came out in 2008, it looked as if it was 
part of the same canon of films.  
1.Its narrative structure is a spectacular succession of pivotal events 
which the book pinpoints as defining moments of the RAF. These are 
combined with images that have come to define the canon of the RAF in 
Germany’s cultural landscape. The film reenacts these events, combining some 
scenes with news footage of the time, in a form which utilises the dramatic 
methods of docudrama.  
2.The film shows the terrorists in an interesting, sexy, and action packed 
way through its fast cutting, a vintage look colouring, tight framing and use of 
German stars such as Moritz Belibtreu, as Andreas Baader and Johanna 
Wokalek, as Gudrun Ensslin. The aesthetic of The Baader Meinhof Complex 
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gave rise to criticism arguing that the film, by evoking images of terrorist chic, 
glamourises the RAF’s deeds. For example: ‘The Baader Meinhof Complex 
stylised Baader, Ensslin und Meinhof into a glamour-trio of violent excesses’ 
said the Deutschlandradio.49 As Clive James writes, the glamourising effect of 
modern day terrorist films, ‘Almost always (…) will replace the event with a 
glamorous fiction, because there just isn’t room in the frame for the people 
who don’t matter.’50  
From a film theoretical perspective, the effect of the film’s dramaturgy has 
been interpreted in terms of its failure to process the past, as well as the 
mythologisation of the RAF. 
In Lothar Mikos’ assessment, the film’s aesthetic alienates by not 
interpreting history. For those not familiar with the history of the RAF, the 
films provide no access to the story, for it assumes a ‘prefigurative’ knowledge 
of the audience. ‘The Baader Meinhof Complex is stuck in its self-imposed 
contradiction between fictionalised production in its action sequences and its 
historical accuracies in its dialogues, set design and images.’51 This criticism 
sees the film as a semiotic nightmare in which Roger Odin’s cognitive 
pragmatic film theory, of ‘reading’ a film as either fiction or documentary and 
creating an appropriate distance or involvement to the subject matter, is 
overthrown.52  
Chris Homewood follows Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung’s commentator 
Frank Schirrmacher’s conclusion that The Baader Meinhof Complex is 
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‘neither a documentary nor a history film … but has something of a parallel 
universe about it’53 and it is this new thing which has become a ‘second order 
reality’, a second order memory system as described by Robert Burgoyne,54 
that is ‘closer in tone to the parallel universe of the RAF offered across the 
pages of Tussi Deluxe’, but that, ‘more comprehensive filmic reckonings with 
the legacy of the RAF are to be found elsewhere. Whether the perspectives 
they provide can be heard over the mainstream might of Edel’s and Eichinger’s 
text, however, is another question.’55  
This critique is more or less congruent with Fredric Jameson’s argument 
that the ‘postmodern nostalgia film’ represents the commodification of history. 
Postmodernism, he asserts, ‘the cultural dominant’ of late capitalism, is a 
culture of pastiche. ‘Nostalgia film, consistent with postmodernist tendencies 
generally, seeks to generate images and simulacra of the past, thereby – in a 
social situation in which genuine historicity or class traditions have become 
enfeebled – producing something like a pseudo-past for consumption as a 
compensation and a substitute for, but also a displacement of, that different 
kind of past which (along with active visions of the future) has been a 
necessary component for groups of people in other situations in the projection 
of their praxis and the energising of their collective project.’56  
Jameson emphasises that nostalgia films do not attempt to recapture or 
represent the ‘real’ past but are structured around certain myths and 
stereotypes about the past that are purely there for consumption 
commodification. In this way The Baader Meinhof Complex’s treatment of the 
past is the only way the past can be understood in the postmodern age; 
through a commodification of historicity for the mass market of cinema 
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blockbusters. This understanding would explain the film’s emphasis on 
violence and action elements which are usually found in blockbuster action 
films.  
However, Lutz Koepnick makes a claim that ‘heritage filmmaking in post-
wall Germany cannot be understood simply as a symptom of the postmodern. 
It is inextricably linked to the specificities of German national history in the 
twentieth century.’57 From this point of view heritage films are part of Eric 
Rentschler’s concept of a dominant cinema of consensus, in that ‘by reviewing 
the national past, they solicit a new kind of German consensus for the 
emerging Berlin republic.’ Rentschler’s58 criticisms of post-wall, Post-
reunification cinema was that these films failed to address the political and 
historical matters of the time, and instead there was a cultural dominance of ‘a 
formula-bound profusion of romantic comedies, crude farces, road movies, 
action films, and literary adaptations’59  
But as Jamie Fisher and Brad Prager point out, there has been a 
resurgence of political and historical film since 2000 with films such as Sophie 
Scholl – The Final Days, Head-On (2004), The Lives of Others, Downfall, and 
especially the collective film project Germany 09 (2009) which they point out 
is a direct quote of Germany in Autumn and its desire to address the ‘state of 
the nation.’60 Fisher and Prager talk about these new political films as a 
renaissance of critical German filmmaking that stands in direct heritage to 
New German cinema.61 In what they call a Third Wave of German cinema or 
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post-millennial German cinema, they claim one can make out a cinema ‘that is 
substantially different from the era of consensus that precede it.’62  
The new found that the urge to tackle Germany’s past is driven by a 
desire to demythify and lay bare what has been occupied by ideology. This is 
done in post-millennial German cinema by employing forms of realism to 
appeal to a subjective reading that postulates a pluralistic worldview. In this 
spirit, The Baader Meinhof Complex deals with German heritage through a 
desire to create transparency through the murkiness of the RAF mythos.  
The ‘Eichinger method’ (after producer Bernd Eichinger) of a 
representational cinema as a way to approach defining moments in history 
(the talk was of a ‘vereichingern’, an Eichingerisation, of German history)63 
was welcomed by the influential weekly news magazine Spiegel, the 
journalistic home of Aust. Chris Homewood describes how the magazine’s 
writer Dirk Kurbjuweit heralded the film as a revelation; ‘According to 
Kurbjuweit, the film’s relevance and status as a corrective to Mythos RAF was 
rooted in a representational strategy which in recent years has come to define 
the impact of Germany’s most successful producer and writer, Bernd 
Eichinger.’64 Kurbjuweit in the Spiegel proclaimed the films would destroy the 
RAF myth. A claim so significant it made the title page which also included a 
quotation of the last line of dialogue. However, as Homewood points out, the 
great majority of Germany’s press was not of the Spiegel’s opinion. ‘Far from 
seeing The Baader Meinhof Complex as a corrective to entrenched cultural 
myths, in most quarters of the print media the film was considered to serve the 
inverse on the intended function.’65 (Homewood refers in particular to Eckhard 
Furh’s comment in Die Welt and Daniel Koltenschulte’s article in the 
                                                            
62 ibid. p.33. 
63 Andreas Borcholte, ‘Eichingers "Baader-Meinhof-Komplex": Die Terror-Illustrierte’, Der 
Spiegel (September 2008) <http: //www.spiegel.de/kultur/kino/eichingers-baader-
meinhof-komplex-die-terror-illustrierte-a-578786.html> [last access 4 September 2014] 
64 Chris Homewood, ‘From Baader to Prada: Memory and Myth in Uli Edel’s The Baader 
Meinhof Complex (2008)’, in Paul Cooke and Chris Homewood (eds.), New Directions in 
German Cinema (London/NY: I. B. Tauris, 2011) p.133. 




Frankfurter Rundschau, both emphasising the way The Baader Meinhof 
Complex perpetuates the RAF myth). What was also criticised by the press is 
the film’s refusal to critically engage with the past in a cinematic fashion that 
would engage the audience through a traditional narrative where the burden of 
creating meaning lies with the authors of the film.  
Instead we get ‘complete disorientation’, writes Jan Schulz-Ojala in the 
Tagesspiegel, ‘No idea, anywhere. No serious attempt of interpretation or 
analysis of the times…. Everything has to go into the Bilderverwurstungs-
maschine, (the image-sausage-grinder that makes an incomprehensible whole 
out of individual events.)’66  
In short, the film is regarded as having failed as a meaningful exploration 
not only of the RAF itself but also as a thorough demythifcation of the RAF 
mythos, an earnest cinematic showing of their political failures as well as their 
failure as human beings. Instead it regarded as a sort of RAF-myth-sploitation 
film that commodifies German history in favour of entertainment and 
saleability. Considering the importance of the RAF mythos in terms of its 
political role as a concept of rallying behind an unspoken consensus of 
German ideology, the vitriolic reviews of critics are not surprising.  
What is remarkable here is that the film has been almost universally 
received as a failing to deliver a critical analysis of the RAF and its mythos, 
and that it is this failure that is the main concern of the journalistic as well as 
the academic reviews. This preoccupation with the film’s insufficient portrayal 
of, what is perceived to be the correct presentation of the RAF mythos as a 
false friend seems to suggest that the need to demythify is at the forefront of 
dialogue around The Baader Meinhof Complex. The general complaint is that 
the film showed the RAF in a style that was in itself not a desirable way of 
approaching history in Germany, that is through a style that pandered to 
commercial interests instead of providing, if not a clear condemnation of the 
RAF, at least a more nuanced historical perspective. Elsaesser’s criticism of the 
                                                            





film sums up the general dissatisfaction with the Baader Meinhof Complex, 
‘But perhaps the main issue to raise with The Baader Meinhof Complex is that 
it so clearly subscribes to a dramaturgy of heroes and anti-heroes, and treats 
the cycle of returns and the thirtieth anniversary as an obligation to 
“demystify the myths”, which not only end up doing the opposite, but brutally 
simplifies the multi-layered fabric of the myth.’67 In short, it was felt that the 
re-mythologisation of the RAF in The Baader Meinhof Complex had not been 
done correctly. 
 
The Baader Meinhof Complex: 
the past as reflective nostalgia 
The Baader Meinhof Complex is best described as an illustrated history of  
the RAF. Covering ten years of history in 143 minutes, it starts in 1967 by 
showing journalist Ulrike Meinhof, her husband Klaus Rainer Röhl and her 
two daughters holidaying in the bucolic landscape of the island Sylt in the 
North Sea; the playground for the well-off middle class from nearby Hamburg. 
The film jumps between Meinhof reading her article on the Shah of Iran’s visit 
to Berlin, and the protest around the event itself, culminating in the shooting 
of student Benno Ohnesorg by the police.  
Events follow rapidly. The radicalisation of Gudrun Ensslin and Meinhof, 
the student protest of 1968, the assassination attempt of Rudi Dutschke and 
the protesters’ attempt to ‘Stop Springer’, an arson attack on a department-
store, the freeing of Andreas Baader, guerrilla training in Jordan, bank 
robberies, bomb attacks. The main characters are arrested, Holger Mains dies, 
Ulrike Meinhof has a break down and hangs herself.  
It is then 1977: Brigitte Mohnhaupt is freed from prison and meets Peter 
Boock, the second generation reorganise the RAF. The depiction of the 
Stammheim trials is intercut with scenes showing the blackmail campaigns by 
the second generation RAF to free the inmates: This is followed by images of 
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the murders of Siegfried Buback and Jürgen Ponto, the kidnapping of Hanns-
Martin Schleyer and the highjacking of the Landshut. At the end of the film 
there are four bodies. Baader, Ensslin and Raspe are dead in their cells. In the 
final scene, Schleyer is shot. The murderer remains unidentified.  
The film is based on the journalistic accounts of the RAF by Stefan  
Aust. Aust published the first edition of his book The Baader Meinhof 
Complex in 1985 and it became the standard text of the history of the RAF. 
The book uses interviews with witnesses, terrorists and their families, police 
and judicial documents, materials by the RAF and Aust’s own experiences to 
present one of the defining texts on the Baader Meinhof group. According to 
Die Welt, it ‘has dominated the image of the RAF in Germany for the past 20 
years’.68  
The book documents the events, and is also as a personality profile of 
both the terrorists and the agents of the German state. One of the reasons the 
book has become so influential is because Aust emerged from the same scene 
as Meinhof. Their relationship is also re-created in the film. The largely 
favourable reception of the book is grounded in Aust’s journalistic abilities 
and his credibilty derived from the first hand experience of the political milieu 
he emerged from.  
Aust met Meinhof in the 1960s during his work as an editor at the 
magazine Konkret. In 1985 he published The Baader Meinhof Complex, in 
which he described the story of the RAF from its beginnings in the student 
movement of the late sixties to the events of the German Autumn in 1977. The 
German Autumn or Deutscher Herbst is the term for the events at the end of 
1977 which comprise the kidnapping of the German industry representative 
Hanns-Martin Schleyer, the kidnapping of the German Lufthansa flight 
Landshut by the Palestinian terror unit Martyr Halimeh to the suicide of 
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Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin and Carl Raspe at Stammheim prison and 
the protests that followed these events.  
The book’s status as a unique journalistic document of the time, and the 
persons involved, provides not only a coherent narrative of the complexities 
and different historical connections between events but also a history of the 
RAF which positions it in the cultural landscape of post-war Germany. When 
discussing his filmic adaptation of the book with Aust, the film’s writer and 
producer Bernd Eichinger insisted on making a feature film instead of a 
historic docudrama on the grounds that ‘The Baader Meinhof Complex is the 
story of the Täter (the perpetrators).  
In a documentary you can show the effects and consequences of the 
terrorists’ deeds but you cannot show how they are doing them [sic].’69 
Eichinger emphasised that he is not interested in the why but the how of the 
RAF, allowing the deeds to speak for themselves and allowing a multiplicity of 
readings. Eichinger describes his adaptation of the book as 
‘Fetzendramaturgie’. The film’s dramaturgy is a collection of shreds,  
of scenes and images that have to be ‘puzzled together’.70 This strategy, he 
says, was to avoid any kind of moral interpretation on the side of the film 
makers. The same goes for Eichinger’s decision to forgo any dramaturgy that 
would allow identification with any of the characters. His aim was create a 
film that is ‘full of questions but no answers’, ‘after all’, he says, ‘it is called 
The Baader Meinhof Complex not the Baader Meinhof Simplex.’71  
Eichinger aims to create an engaging film without reliance on a traditional 
narrative form or a character driven plot. But neither is it a docudrama, as it 
avoids drawing attention to its artifice and verification by witnesses. Instead, 
The Baader Meinhof Complex is a cinematic dramatisation of events 
influenced by the cinematic style of films such as, ‘Black Hawk Down (2000), 
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Syriana (2005) and Children of Men (2007), films he says, that were driven by 
a great dramaturgic tension, films that did not follow ‘the rules’ (of traditional 
Hollywood) and where the narrative was advanced by using ‘the aesthetic of a 
documentary style realism.’72  
In order to communicate exposition that diverges from the viewpoint of 
the terrorists, Eichinger creates fictionalised scenes in which the president of 
the Federal Criminal Police Office at the time, Horst Herold, talks about the 
terrorists’ deeds, often with the invented figure of an assistant, Dietrich Koch. 
The use of the figures of Herold and Koch to give opportunity for more 
authorial voice ties together several events in the ‘Fetzendramartugie’ that 
would otherwise have had less coherence in the film’s narrative. The use of 
fictional signposts, however, does not destroy the film’s claims to 
verisimilitude. Eichinger states that his aim was a film propelled by the ‘speed 
of the events’ which become a ‘tidal wave’ that would ‘sweep the audience 
along over the cliff where a violent ending is to be expected’.73 It would start 
idyllically on the beach of Sylt and end in a ‘Bloodbath’.74 The narrative 
‘pressure’ needed to create such an atmosphere of urgency in his film, 
Eichinger describes, could not be created by editing alone. The set, characters 
and camera had to be constantly ‘hyped’, never relaxed or complacent: ‘the 
creative heat’ was to be translated onto the screen.75 The score also adds to the 
rush of the films’ narrative through ten years, scurrying strings provide 
escalating anxiety, propulsive tribal drums that relentlessly manipulate the 
heartbeat.  
Eichinger chose Reiner Klausmann as director of photography, having 
already worked with him on Downfall, for his visual style of sober yet 
immersive verisimilitude. Klausmann himself agrees that this style  
is an appropriate way to visualise German history and argues that one ‘has a 
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responsibility towards history’ that demands ‘honesty’ of the images toward 
the subject matter.76  
Archive footage is often introduced into the film, blurring the lines 
between story and history. The film often shows the characters watching 
footage on TV – they are witnessing not only the events but  
their own mediatization. In this way the film thematises what Elsaesser and 
Krausshaar see as a major part of the RAF mythos: the way the media 
perpetuated the images of the RAF and the way the RAF themselves began to 
identify with their own mediatized mages. Klausmann says. ‘The colour 
matching of the film was influenced by what we used, because our movie had 
to fit with the real stuff; we avoided strong reds, blues or greens and we 
desaturated the image in the DI (digital intermediate). Otherwise, it would 
have looked like two different movies, and that’s not good.’77  
The film’s director, Uli Edel, states that Klausmann’s camerawork  
was informed by a news-gathering style in order to ‘complement the 
spontaneous energy of the archival material. The idea was to make the whole 
film in this documentary style so it matched the original footage,’. ‘It was very 
important that we could really follow the action; we did not want to create the 
action through cuts. That’s why there were so many steadicam and handheld 
shots.’78  
Edel was chosen by Eichinger to direct the film. They went to film school 
together and worked together on the films Christiane F. (1982) and Last Exit to 
Brooklyn (1989). In his vision of The Baader Meinhof Complex, Edel 
emphasises the desire to create something ‘authentic’, mirroring Eichinger’s 
notion of creating a realistic representation of the terrorist’s deeds: 
‘Authenticity was key. As in Christiane F. we followed the laws  
                                                            
76 ibid p.44. 
77 Mark Hope-Jones, ‘The Baader Meinhof Complex, shot by Rainer Klausmann, BVK, details the 
rise and fall of a German terrorist group’, American Cinematographer, September 2009 
<http: 
//www.theasc.com/ac_magazine/September2009/TheBaaderMeinhofComplex/page1.php





of cinéma vérité and not those of the fiction film.’79 Whereas the run and gun 
style camera technique in Zero Dark Thirty ultimately draws attention to 
itself, in The Baader Meinhof Complex, the technique is used to merge history 
with story. The effect produced is simultaneously of the past and of today, and 
can be understood with the idea of reflective nostalgia as described by 
Svetlana Boym. Boym says that people ‘engage in the anti-modern myth-
making of history by means of a return to nationalist symbols and myths.’80 
The cinematic affect of the The Baader Meinhof Complex is one of nostalgia, a 
longing for the past through the lens of the present.  
Edel insists that the reason The Baader Meinhof Complex has to be told 
as a chain of events is found, not in the self-intellectualisation of the RAF but 
in the Faustian question ‘Ist es der Sinn, der alles wirkt und schafft?’ (is it 
reason that makes all things happen?).81 He says, ‘The Baader Meinhof 
Complex provides a clear answer to this question. You cannot separate word 
from deed and ultimately it is the deed that makes the man.’82  
In striving for verisimilitude through cinematic techniques of realism 
(natural light and muted filters, handheld camera, real locations, letting the 
actors act unencumbered by the cinematic process) the film relies on the 
intensity of the events depicted to involve its spectators.  
The narrative method of concentrating on representation as a way of 
circumnavigating the interpretation of history, rather than confronting myth, 
can be understood as a strategy of the post-political, as Žižek understands it. 
Žižek’s understanding is that the post-political is not to be understood literally 
but as a ‘predominant form of cynicism.’83 What Žižek points to is that in the 
post-political ideas and findings, or the official narrative, are not open for 
debate but have become indisputable truth.  
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In The Baader Meinhof Complex the ‘obvious truth’, the uncontested 
content, is the one provided by official accounts of the RAF mythos: 
Narrativisation of history has been downplayed in favour of the images and 
myths that shape the understanding of the RAF. Or as the Spiegel writes: 
‘Until now there have been many words about the RAF but not the pictures. 
These are the pictures of the deeds. Bernd Eichinger follows this when he says 
‘it is not why they do it but that they do it’.’84 In The Baader Meinhof Complex 
cinematic action is the method of choice to portray the RAF mythos. 
 
Fil l ing in the gaps in The Baader Meinhof Complex  
The form of The Baader Meinhof Complex is, very deliberately, a combination 
of verisimilitudinous film techniques and the dramaturgy of a fast-paced 
thriller – resulting in a run and gun visual technique not unlike the one used 
in The Bourne Ultimatum as discussed by Bordwell.85 The filmmakers take 
great pains over historical accuracy in the mise-en-scène (in their desire for 
‘authenticity’). Not only are the material details correct – from shooting on 
original locations to meticulously researched props, from Baader’s leather 
jacket to the twenty-seven records in his prison cell – but so too are the 
immaterial ones. The significant moments associated with the RAF are chosen 
carefully. For the purpose of his Fetzendramaturgie, Eichinger picks pieces 
from the German cultural landscape – pictures, concepts and suppositions 
that are an integral part of RAF history and RAF mythology. The effect is one of 
a subjective experience of several events and an identification with the 
terrorists’ motives of the first generation RAF in the first half of the film. 
However, in the second half of the film a reversal of the spectatorial alignment 
takes place, which prompts an understanding of second generation RAF as 
alien and unidentifiable.  
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This chapter will examine three scenes in The Baader Meinhof Complex 
that show how the film fills in the gaps between the Fetzen/fragments using a 
cinematic language that engenders an understanding of the RAF in terms of 
the post-political. These scenes depict three pivotal moments in the history of 
the RAF, which represent 1. the birth of the RAF mythos, 2. the birth of the 
RAF as a group and 3. the formation of the Second Generation RAF: 
 
1) The Shah’s visit to Berlin in 1967 and the death of Benno Ohnesorg. 
During a protest rally on the 2 June 1967 in Berlin, the student Benno 
Ohnesorg was shot by a policeman. Ohnesorg’s death became seen as the 
rallying point for the further radicalisation of the student movement as well as 
the trigger that lead to the formation of the RAF and other extremist groups. 
Aust describes how the events of the 2 June led to the fragmentation of the 
student movement. One of the directions it took was terrorism, in form of 
militant groups such as the first generation of the RAF and the Bewegung 2 
Juni, a militant group who named themselves after the event.86 It s not 
surprising that, in its momentous impact, the death of Ohnesorg has become 
the point of origin for the RAF mythology – the ‘igniting moment’ that turned 
rational protestors into irrational terrorists.  
 
2) Ulrike Meinhof’s ‘jump into illegality’ on the 14 May 1970 during the 
so-called ‘Baader Befreiung’, the freeing of Andreas Baader.  
This is the moment when Meinhof decides not only to support the group 
but to join them, leaving behind her old life and becoming the official 
mouthpiece and main ideologist of the RAF. This event is often regarded as the 
‘birth’ of the RAF,87 because it was then that the three leaders of the RAF 
(Meinhof, Ensslin and Baader) carried out their first campaign together. Even 
though the group was not yet the RAF at this point, and was referred to only as 
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the Baader Meinhof gang by the police, the actual jump from the window has 
come to symbolise the metaphorical birth of the RAF. 
 
3) The release of Brigitte Mohnhaupt (Nadja Uhl) from Stammheim 
prison on the 8 February 1977.  
With instructions from the Stammheim inmates on how to proceed with 
the RAF’s attempts to extort the German state to free Baader, Ensslin and 
Raspe, Mohnhaupt took over the leadership of the second generation RAF and 
organised the Offensive 77 the events that started with the murder of Siegfried 
Buback on the 7 April 1977 and ended with the murder of Hanns Martin 
Schleyer on 18 October 1977. 
 
Fil l ing in the Gaps of the 2 June 1967  
with a subjectivised experience 
Aust posits (in Der Baader Meinhof Komplex) that the murder of Ohnesorg 
was one of the turning points in Germany’s post war history.88 On the 2 June 
1967, the German student organisation APO (external parliamentary 
opposition) organised a demonstration against the visit to Berlin of Reza 
Pahlavi, the Shah of Persia. During these protests the student Benno Ohnesorg 
was shot in the back of the head by the plain-clothes policeman Karl-Heinz 
Kurras. The resulting slogan ‘Der Staat hat auf uns alle geschossen’ (the state 
shot at all of us) was widely heard in the student movement, and for many of 
them the idea (described by Adorno in The Authoritarian Personality) that the 
authoritative state has inherent potential for violence was proved. According 
to Aust’s book it was the events of the 2 June which brought to the surface 
Ensslin’s frustration with the state and her potential for violence. The book 
describes how, on the evening of the 2 June 1967, young Berliners met at the 
headquarters of the Sozialistischen Deutschen Studentenbundes (SDS) to 
discuss the events of the day. Among these youngsters was the 26 year old 
                                                            




Ensslin. It was then that she was supposed to have uttered her subsequently 
famous and often quoted speech, ‘Dieser faschistische Staat ist darauf aus, uns 
alle zu töten. Wir müssen Widerstand organisieren. Gewalt kann nur mit 
Gewalt beantwortet werden. Dies ist die Generation von Auschwitz – mit 
denen kann man nicht argumentieren.’89 (This fascist state means to kill us all. 
We must organise resistance. Violence can only be met with violence. This is 
the Auschwitz generation– you cannot argue with them.)  
The key fragment of the day is an image. It is Jürgen Henschel’s 
photograph of Benno Ohnesorg’s death that has come to be representative of 
the events. Henschel captures the moment when the woman assisting 
Ohnesorg, Friederike Dollinger, turns to the crowd with an expression of utter 
despair. It is a Historienbild, a history painting, which depicts a moment in the 
particular narrative of the German student movement.90 
This is the historical background of the acts depicted at the start of the 
film. The process of fictionalisation, mediatization and narration of the events 
constitutes a ‘filling in of the gaps.’ The contemporary representation of the 
events – photographic images, historical accounts are necessarily 
contextualised by subsequent narrativisation. But any narrativisation is 
purpose motivated; the missing context between the established cultural 
signifiers, the gap, cannot be filled in a neutral manner. In this case, the 
motive for providing context is drawn by the impulse to demystify, but the gap 
can only be filled by a new myth. Moreover, the interstitial, contextual matter 
– the interpretation – is shot for a nostalgia for the source material. However, 
rather than considering the nostalgia of the first two examples as expressions 
of a ‘nostalgia film’ and a commodification of history, these scenes should be 
understood in terms of reflective nostalgia as described by Boym. The 
nostalgia in the first example can be described as an expression of a yearning 
for the political clarity of the 68 movement, in the sense of that it was a brief 
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moment in time that seriously considered the possibility of the impossible. 
These events are seen through a nostalgic prism and a subjective perspective 
that frees these events of their historical specificity.  
The section of the film starts with Meinhof reading out loud her open 
letter to Farah Diba in the new edition of Konkret. The film cuts to the protests 
in front of the Berlin Opera with Meinhof’s speech continuing as a voiceover, 
describing the injustices of the Shah’s regime, creating an ideological link 
between Meinhof and the protests. 
When showing the protestors, the film does not recreate any specific 
contemporary imagery. Instead, the film plays out its reenactment through a 
combination of point of view and over the shoulder shots in a way that puts 
the viewer into the scene. 
With the arrival of the Persian agents the protest escalates. The filmic 
point of view is that of the protesters. The spectator is immersed into the 
action through a fast paced montage of close ups and point of view shots – at 
one point we are looking directly into the muzzle of the firing water cannon– 
and a soundtrack of fast drums that creates an effect of urgency but also 
wildness. (This musical motif is heard in all the scenes that depict one of the 
constitutive RAF myths that are analysed in this chapter.) By compressing 
events that originally took several hours into approximately four minutes, the 
film presents the whole event as a personal, felt experience, in that it 
subjectivises space and time. As Jenny Chamarette observed, this kind of 
subjective ‘phenomenal experience of time is thus radically different to time 
itself’.91 Events are experienced through an ahistoric temporality that presents 
itself as a more real version of the day, as if the most urgent subjective 
accounts of the day have been compressed into one subjective experience, 
mediatized through the film itself. The subjective experience expressed by the 
film becomes a new general mythologisation. Apart from creating a 
subjectivity through a new temporality of events, the film creates an 
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involvement through camera effects that evoke a subjectively experienced 
verisimilitude of the events. 
The effect of the scene as subjective experience is most evident in the 
film’s depiction of the death of Ohnesorg. In the tumult he flees from the 
police and is pushed to the ground by policemen. As he gets up a shot is 
heard. Here the cinéma vérité effects of the handheld camera, the natural light 
and the use of the location of the real Ohnesorg’s death, in the courtyard of 
Krumme Strasse 66, create an experience of witnessing his death as a 
subjective encounter of a real event. The camera angle is in line with a 
viewpoint from someone ducking a possible attack, in this case from the 
police. The sum total is a filmic experience of the constitutive myth of the RAF 
mythos; that is, Ohnesorg being shot, becomes a re/demystification of the 
event as subjective experience, and as before adding to the canon of RAF 
mythos as an ahistorical subjective experience.  
In a medium shot, the lifeless body of Ohnesorg is lifted up by a woman, 
then the action cuts and reveals that this scene is being photographed. It is the 
photographer Henschel creating the famous picture of Ohnesorg. The film 
does not recreate the picture itself, rather the photograph being taken. Here 
the point of view unifies the subjective understanding of the scene of the 
protestors, the onlookers and Henschel into the spectatorial viewpoint. The 
RAF mythos is being re-created and normalised into a witnessing of history. 
The film turns the moment the photograph is taken into a narrative in which 
the audience is part of the ongoing event. The scene ends with an emphasised 
flash gun going off, signalling the mediatized moment that came to stand for 
the events of the 2 June.  
The subjectivised experiences of the events of 2 June 1967 produced by 
the filmmakers, effectively fill the gaps of the fragmented historical facts and 
its old mythologised version. It is necessary to compare this with the logic 
demanded by Vergangenheitsbewältigung. The film, instead of engaging 
critically with the question of guilt of Kurras, a verdict that was only finalised 




thrill. The death of Ohnesorg is not demystified in the way a “responsible”, 
intellectual Vergangenheitsbewältigung would demand. Instead the gaps are 
filled with a subjective experience of the RAF mythos itself, they are filled with 
a nostalgic understanding that denies the historical responsibility of the 68 
movement.  
However, both approaches of the filling of the gaps, either with a 
nostalgic, subjectivised experience as done in the film, as well as the idea that 
these gaps must be filled with a critical distance that promotes 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung of the RAF mythos, should be firmly placed in the 
post-political. Both are ‘compulsions’, as Žižek says, ‘to understand, to 
‘normalise’, and, in this way, to avoid the void that is subjectivity.’92 Moreover, 
the criticism, that the film did not fill the gaps with the correct narrative, and 
instead promotes a commercial exploitation and a lost opportunity for 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung, is an even more direct translation of the post-
political than the subjectivised experience of history as delivered by the film. 
Whereas the film firmly positions the narrative in a subjective, personal 
experience of history, demands for a representation that reflect a consensus of 
the right politics are a direct ideological imperative that consequently brings 
about a greater unfreedom. 
 
Fil l ing in the gaps of Ulrike Meinhof’s ‘ jump into i l legality’   
with the fantasy of an act  
Andreas Baader was captured by the police on the 4 April 1970. Immediately, 
plans were made by the group that had collected around Baader and Ensslin to 
break him free. The plan was to get Ensslin’s acquaintance, Ulrike Meinhof, to 
request a meeting with Baader in the archives of the Dahlem Institute of Social 
Sciences, claiming to require his help with research for a sociological book on 
teenagers.  
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Meinhof agreed and, after careful planning, on 14 May 1977, four 
members of the group attacked the institute, shooting one employee, whilst 
storming the reading room where Meinhof, Baader and two guards were 
sitting. In the confusion, tears gas was fired by the attackers, and in the chaos 
of the brawl and overall disorientation all the perpetrators, together with 
Baader and Meinhof, were able to escape through the window of the institute’s 
reading room. In his carefully researched account of the event, Aust writes 
that it was Baader who was first to jump out of the window, followed by 
Meinhof, ‘the others fired a couple more tear gas bullets and then followed 
suit.’93  
No one knows if Meinhof had planned from the outset to use the 
liberation of Baader to go underground and join the group, or if it was an 
impulse decision. The transition from journalist to outlaw, became manifest 
with her leaving the scene of the crime, thus declaring her status as part of the 
anti-government group.  
Meinhof’s decision to flee with the others through an open window is a 
factual circumstance, which prompted a mythologised reading of the event. 
The image of a jump through an open window into a new life is hard to resist 
as a metaphor. But this would be to read history with hindsight. The concept 
of ‘a jump into illegality’ by Meinhof was already mentioned by Die Zeit in 
1972,94 and Aust writes in his book that ‘with a leap out of the window of the 
Institute for Social Studies, Ulrike Meinhof ended her career as a journalist 
and went underground’.95 The ‘jump into illegality’ has thus established itself 
as an image of the RAF mythos, with the figure of Meinhof herself becoming 
mythologised as a new Antigone.  
Meinhof has become associated with the figure of Antigone as a central 
idea of the RAF mythos, most of all evident in Schlöndorff’s film segment ‘Die 
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verschobene Antigone’ in Germany in Autumn (1978). An intelligent, critical 
person, who gives up her children to join the underground struggle, Meinhof’s 
behaviour has been equated with Antigone. Both women declare that they 
know the law (the laws of the symbolic order, the law of the state/Creon’s law) 
but choose to break from the symbolic through an act, thus expounding upon 
the superiority of ‘divine law’, their beliefs, to that made by man. This reading 
of Meinhof’s decision in terms of a break with the symbolic is described by 
Olga Taxidou, ‘In testing the limits of liberalism and the possibilities of Utopia 
within the same gesture, Antigone acts as an appropriate precursor/model for 
Ulrike Meinhof.’96 Elsaesser even calls Antigone ‘the master-mythology of 
1977’ – a mythologised act that has become the foundation mythos of the 
RAF.97  
Žižek has frequently interpreted Antigone’s decision to bury her brother 
as an authentic act, the moment according to Lacan when a person is 
effectively ‘free’. The fact that Meinhof explicitly rejects leaving the social 
order she detests for the sake of her children makes her decision to join the 
group in their illegality all the more poignant. The scene is played out in a way 
that shows Meinhof making an impulse decision, arising out of the moment. 
Or to put it in Žižek’s terms, when she confronts the real that has come about 
facing the violence of the attack. As Žižek writes:  
 The paradox of the act thus lies in the fact that although it is not 
‘intentional’  
in the usual sense of the term of consciously willing it, it is nevertheless 
accepted as something for which its agent is fully responsible – ‘I cannot 
do otherwise, yet I am none the less fully free in doing it.98  
In the film, Meinhof’s jump is played out as Žižekian act similar to that in 
Hunger, as a moment where the subject is willing to annihilate the self – a self 
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that is contained within the current false or symbolic social order. She not 
only gives up her life in society as a respected columnist but also knows that 
she gives up her children. To illustrate the moment of Meinhof’s act, the film 
again uses an array of point of view shots, creating a spectatorial alignment 
with Meinhof; her decision to act is subjectivised, created as an experience of 
the moment of an act for the spectator. In a ‘subjective realist style of 
narration’ which, as Matthew Campor describes, ‘depicts the imagination of a 
character from a subjective point of view,’ Meinhof’s act (the RAF mythos) fills 
the gaps of subjectivity by being turned into a subjective experience itself.99 
The scene starts with a carefully researched recreation of the sequence of 
events. Baader is first to jump out of the window whilst the others are still 
trying to subdue the guards. He calls out for Ensslin who first hesitates, then 
returns to help her three comrades. They manage to overwhelm the policemen 
and all jump out of the window, Ensslin being the last.  
Meanwhile, the camera shows Meinhof, visibly shocked by the brutality 
she is witnessing, pressed against the wall. Her expression when confronted 
with the reality of the brute force shows that the situation clearly overwhelms 
her expectation. Ensslin’s jump is shown from a point of view shot from 
Meinhof’s perspective, she looks haphazard when the camera cuts back to her. 
Then another point of view shot from Meinhof’s perspective, seeing first the 
guard on the floor, then the camera pans to the left – Meinhof is taking in the 
second guard lying unconscious on the other side of the room. The camera 
now cuts to Meinhof, looking past the camera to the open window. The next 
cut shows the window from Meinhof’s point of view, the still camera frame 
makes the window frames appear peaceful in contrast to the chaotic room. 
The film cuts to show that, slowly people in the institute become aware of 
what is going on.  
The camera cuts to Meinhof’s face, excited but aware. This is a key image, 
in that it reflects the concept of Žižek’s conception of the act as 
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simultaneously an instinctual and a rational decision. Then she moves and, 
what was Meinhof’s point of view, becomes the viewpoint of the audience, 
who see Meinhof taking off from her previous position, witnessing her jump 
out of the window. The camera stays on this image of the open window for a 
few moments after Meinhof has jumped and disappeared. This creates the 
effect of a questioning of the spectator, asking: Is this not inviting? What 
would you like to do? The film effectually posits the spectator into the space 
time of Meinhof, re-creating her subjective act for the audience as a felt 
experience.  
The gap to be filled in this scene is Meinhof’s motive, by showing her 
‘jump into illegality’ as an act that describes how her jump was neither 
planned from the outset nor a headless decision. In short the 
Meinhof/Antigone mythos is re-mythologised as a subjective experience. 
However, the filmmakers pose Meinhof’s dilemma as human rather than 
political. The film’s depiction of her decision to turn her back on not only civil 
society but also her own children inadvertently shows her decision process as 
a potentially Žižekian act. However, whereas in Hunger the act is a political 
one, Sands’s decision is a break with the symbolic order as such, in The 
Baader Meinhof Complex, Meinhof’s forced choice becomes depoliticised in 
that her aim is to stay in direct dialogue with the Other – her act becomes a 
false one. Determining a false act from a genuine one is always done in 
hindsight, as Butler points out, it is ‘only in retrospect that objective reasons 
for the act exist, after the revolution has organised and stabilised itself.’100  
The fantasy of Meinhof’s decision as an act, a choice forced onto her by 
the logic of the symbolic order, imbues the actions of the real life Meinhof 
with relatable motive. Because Meinhof’s act turned out to be a false one, the 
re-mythologisation of the real life Meinhof in the cultural landscape through 
the film, by default understands all acts as political, even false ones. In the 
post-political all acts are seen as political, even though they are not. 
                                                            





Brigitte Mohnhaupt’s release and reorganisation of  
the RAF, f i l led with a gendered content  
In the third example the idea of reflective nostalgia changes into something 
more akin to the nostalgia film, in that here the female terrorist Brigitte 
Mohnhaupt is presented as a non-relatable, uncanny creature. The gaps to be 
filled are less the motives of the terrorists, but rather their motifs, their in 
station of the RAF mythos of the Stammheim suicides and the brutality of their 
deeds. What fills the gaps is a gendered underrating of the concept of female 
terrorist.  
The gaps in question relate to the complexity of the reorganisation of the 
RAF. How much was purposeful and how much expedient? In his book Aust 
describes how, whilst imprisoned together in Stammheim, Ensslin grooms 
Mohnhaupt to become her successor as the leader of the RAF. To stay in 
contact with Mohnhaupt, once she was released from prison and the RAF 
outside, Ensslin creates a secret code using the novel Moby Dick to pass 
messages between the prisoners and their lawyers. Out of prison, 
Mohnhaupt’s ‘task was to organise all individuals already living in illegality to 
start attacks that would bring the German government to its knees.’101 She was 
also instructed to organise the smuggling of weapons into the prison, so that in 
case the attempts to extort the prisoners’ freedom failed, they could take their 
own lives. The plan was to make it look like they were killed by the state, thus 
demonstrating once and for all that the state is a continuation of the fascist 
regime (one of the methods used by Ensslin to implant this idea was that she 
hinted to the prison vicars that she is afraid that something will happen to 
her).102 Peter Boock, with whom Mohnhaupt started an affair soon after her 
release, describes how Mohnhaupt told him, that the creation of the state-
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murder-myth was planned from the start; ‘Whatever happens; the story is, it 
was murder’ and ‘you are not to tell the others.’103  
The filmmakers of The Baader Meinhof Complex compress the events of 
Mohnhaupt’s instruction by Ensslin, her release and hooking up with Boock as 
one whole and, by doing so, fill in the gaps that make up the complexity of the 
reorganisation of the RAF. It is filled with an exploration of one of the RAF 
myth’s most intriguing aspects; the idea that political radicalism takes 
feminism too far, turning women into, as Barbara Creed would say, figurative 
monsters’, ‘non-human animals’ without morals or conscience.104  
Still in the 1980s the Spiegel writes, ‘the most popular explanation for the 
strong position of female terrorists is feminism.’105 And even though attitudes 
towards feminism have changed over the years, the obsession with the 
combination of terrorism and femininity is still apparent. In 2007 the Spiegel 
again wrote about the Offensive 77, the name of the actions committed by the 
RAF in 1977 under the leadership of Mohnhaupt and other ‘female 
protagonists’, and titled their article ‘Das grausame Feminat’ (The cruel female 
power-base). The article confirms a commonly held view of Mohnhaupt as 
‘the worst’ (worse than men) in terms of righteous cruelty.106 The combination 
of cruel femininity, empowered by weapons and not afraid to use them and the 
good looks of the young women fed into the public imagination of the RAF 
mythos.  
The Baader Meinhof Complex shows Mohnhaupt’s grooming and taking 
over the RAF, planting the seeds for the biggest moment in RAF self-
mythologising, as one coherent unit of scenes, and in doing so creates a visual 
connection between historical facts (details of her time of release, clothes 
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Mohnhaupt wore etc.) and reported situations (Mohnhaupt being instructed 
by Ensslin about reorganising the RAF, having an affair with Boock, telling 
him about the inmates’ wish to commit suicide). The film creates a narrative 
around single elements, which have different sources of origin and 
verification, that are put together through the means of Eichinger’s 
Fetzendramaturgie in a new way – time and RAF myths are compressed into a 
fluid storyline that assumes verisimilitude by the virtue of telling a visual truth 
rather than a factual one.  
With the image of Mohnhaupt’s release, the musical theme of tribal 
drums begins and the image shows an imposed headline: ‘Spring 1977’, 
indicating to the audience that this is a new chapter in the story – the 
beginning of the next generation RAF under the leadership of Mohnhaupt in 
1977, the year of the German Autumn. The next scene sees her travelling by 
train to an undisclosed destination. The camera shows her as she would have 
been seen by her fellow travellers, sitting opposite her or seeing her from 
outside the carriage. Mohnhaupt is portrayed as a calm and focused young 
woman.107  
The train stops in a rural setting and Mohnhaupt is greeted by her old 
boyfriend Rolf Heißler. Whilst in Heißler’s arms Mohnhaupt looks over his 
shoulders to eye up Peter Boock. The camera frames this scene in a way that 
looks over Boock’s shoulder, making the spectator the object of Mohnhaupt’s 
sexually charged gaze.  
Žižek describes how the gaze is always on the side of the, in this case, 
filmic object (it is the ‘eye viewing the object (that) is on the side of the 
subject’). ‘When I look at an object, the object is always already gazing at me, 
and from a point at which I cannot see it.’108 Because the object the spectator 
is looking at is not shown from its point of view (the spectator is only allowed 
to look at it from their subjective experience), it creates feeling of anxiety, in 
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the form of Freud’s uncanny.109 Moreover, Mohnhaupt’s gaze into the camera 
addresses the spectator directly, asking them the Žižekian constitutive 
question the subject asks of the symbolic, ‘What do you want from me?’110 
Žižek describes how there is an idea of Woman as an ‘agency of power which 
is pre-symbolic, unbridled by the Law of castration.’111 Woman, in this case is 
an ideological fantasy of an oppressed other, imbued with the imagined ability 
to resist the symbolic, by filling out ‘the vicious cycle of the symbolic order, 
the void of its origins: what the notion of Woman (…) provides is the mythical 
starting point of unbridled fullness whose "primordial repression" constitutes 
the symbolic order.’112 The figure of Mohnhaupt is presented as possessing the 
hysterical attributes, in a psychoanalytical sense, of Woman to resist the law, 
not as a person in her own right but as the mythologised creature of female 
terrorist.  
Mohnhaupt then insists on talking to Boock alone. They walk along the 
tracks while Mohnhaupt tells him the instructions for the group from the 
Stammheim inmates, in whose authority she speaks. They stop, and the pair 
are shown in a long shot standing between the tracks. Boock symbolically 
welcomes her back into life in the underground by giving her a gun. The film 
then cuts to Boock and Mohnhaupt having sex. The quick edits imply a short 
but desperate sexual act. This is emphasised by the next scene in which both 
smoke a post-coital cigarette. In the book The Baader Meinhof Complex, the 
real Boock describes that the dialogue in which Mohnhaupt told him about 
the inmates’ plans to commit suicide happened before they slept together.113 
The reversal of priorities in the film shows that Mohnhaupt’s sexual prowess is 
vital in her role as leader of the RAF and the events result from her base 
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behaviour. By showing Mohnhaupt as a sexual predator, all the time 
emotionless and calculating, the film fills the gaps of the complex history of 
the RAF with the myth of the femme-fatale – ‘she who ruins the lives of men 
and is at the same time victim of her own lust for enjoyment’, as Žižek 
describes her, ‘What bestows on her an aura of mystery is precisely the way 
she cannot be clearly located in the opposition between master and slave. At 
the moment she seems permeated with intense pleasure, it suddenly becomes 
apparent that she suffers immensely; when she seems to be the victim of some 
horrible and unspeakable violence, it suddenly becomes clear that she enjoys 
it. We can never be quite sure if she enjoys or suffers, if she manipulates or is 
herself the victim of manipulation.’114  
Mohnhaupt’s politics, as questionable as they were, are replaced by a 
view that woman’s radical politics are politics gone wrong – worse still, they 
are seen as a metaphorical castration of men . Žižek writes: ‘In short, it is OK 
for a woman to protest the public state power on behalf of the rights of family 
and kinship; but woe to a society in which women endeavour directly to 
influence decisions concerning the affairs of state, manipulating their weak 
male partners, effectively emasculating them.’115 
The gap is filled with gendered content. The certified authentic moments 
in Mohnhaupt’s life are combined with a visual language that aims at showing 
how the second generation RAF generated the powers that led to German 
Autumn. The film’s portrayal of Mohnhaupt suggests that the fascination with 
woman terrorists today is an expression of how the understanding of their 
ability for violence is based around the question of gender rather than an 
exploration of their political motives. As described earlier, Žižek describes that 
postmodernism ‘fills the gaps’ with privileged terms or texts that are held to be 
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unassailable such as race, gender or pathology.116 The Baader Meinhof 
Complex fails to recognise the political dimension of Mohnhaupt’s motives, 
and can only convey the reasons for her behaviour through the prism of a 
crass idea of femininity. 
 
Conclusion 
This need to demythify the past and come to terms with it is played out clearly 
in The Baader Meinhof Complex. In the film, the final sentence spoken by 
Brigitte Mohnhaupt, the transitional figure between the first and the second 
generation RAF, conveniently and unequivocally describes a fascinating 
attempt to deconstruct the RAF mythos though the RAF’s own words: ‘Hört auf 
sie so zu sehen, wie sie nicht waren’ (Stop seeing them as they never were).  
The scene is a cinematic translation of a true event, described in the 
revised edition of the book Der Baader Meinhof Komplex, in which Brigitte 
Mohnhaupt tells the members of the second generation RAF that the 
remaining leaders of the first generation – Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin 
and Jan-Carl Raspe – committed suicide in prison through free choice, and 
were not murdered by the state. It is important that this scene is only to be 
found in the revised edition of the book. This version included material that 
Aust got from interviews with former members of the RAF who had gone into 
hiding in the GDR, and who were subsequently exposed by the fall of the 
Berlin Wall. After the reunification, the former members (who were all keen to 
leave their past behind) cooperated fully with the police and used every 
opportunity to recount their view of events. Aust managed to interview Peter-
Jürgen Boock of the second generation RAF who described the scene with 
Brigitte Mohnhaupt on which the end of the film is based. With the (still 
unverified by others) interview, an important change had happened: A leading 
member of the RAF demystifies one of the main myths surrounding the RAF. 
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Here the demystification is a truly postmodern one in Žižekian terms ; by 
admitting that at the time they deliberately promoted the murder story, Boock 
fills that gap of ideological fantasy that sustained the RAF sympathisers, and 
following official imperative to demystify the RAF mythos. Whether Boock 
was telling the truth is impossible to prove and is irrelevant here.  
The story originally perpetuated by the RAF and their followers was, 
thirty years later, destroyed through letting the RAF expose their own myth-
making. The method of the book, as well as the film The Bader Meinhof 
Complex, is to tell the story through the means of a documentary-style 
succession of events, in order to achieve the same effect – an unravelling of 
the RAF’s own account of itself. 
If RAF mythos was the main reason for the RAF to attract sympathisers, 
why not demythify it once and for all by showing how the Stammheim 
prisoners killed themselves in very historical detail? The main reason why this 
did not happen has as much to do with the film’s dramaturgy as well as the 
intention of the film to demythify the RAF. The decision to reveal the RAF 
myth was not centred around Baader, Ensslin and Raspe but on the self-
unravelling of the RAF through its own members. This was done in the final 
scene through Mohnhaupt’s revealing (and historically documented) words. If 
the filmmakers had shown the suicides, the main aspect, which was that the 
RAF perpetuated this myth themselves as an ideological strategy, would have 
been less clear – Showing the suicides would not have demystified the RAF in 
as a profound way than unveiling these suicides by the RAF itself did.  
The Baader Meinhof Complex is a visual recreation and remythologis-
ation of the RAF mythos as laid out by Aust. By turning the RAF mythos into a 
subjective, felt experience of the first generation RAF, the filmmakers 
addressed a nostalgia, in the form of reflective nostalgia, for the fight against 
authoritarianism of the late 60s. This nostalgic recreation however, speaks less 
of return to the political radicalism of the past, but for a revival of the political 




 Žižek describes that in today’s hegemony of third way post-politics the 
aims of the ‘68 movement have been incorporated, ‘The establishment 
succeeded in undoing all threatening consequences of 1968 by way of 
incorporating the so-called ‘spirit of ‘68 and thereby turning it against the real 
core of the revolt. The demands for new rights (which would have meant a true 
redistribution of power) were granted, but merely in the guise of ‘permissions’ 
– the ‘permissive society’ being precisely one which broadens the scope of 
what subjects are allowed to do without actually giving them any additional 
power.’117 
In The Baader Meinhof Complex, the filmmakers only lament the loss  
of possibility for radicalism as felt by individuals in the post-political,  
by evoking the subjective feeling of the spirit of ‘68 as a safe nostalgic ride. 
They stay away from embracing the reality of terrorism as such by creating an 
experience of the radicalism of the second generation RAF  
as an entartete version, a deformed version of the protests of the late 60s. By 
doing so the film fills the gaps of a subjective reading of the RAF mythos with 
the accepted texts of the post-political hegemony of third way politics where, 
in tune with the cultural imperative Vergangenheitsbewältigung, all opposition 
to the system that favours any more radical notions is equated with the 
terroristic narcissism of the RAF.  
The film still has to be regarded as a cultural product of its time, an 
expression of the post-political need to demythify the past, rather than a mere 
commodification of German history. The filmmakers’ approach to the 
demythifcation of the RAF is less intellectual than the film’s critics expected or 
wished for. Instead of delivering a story that demystified the RAF in a critical 
act of ideological deconstruction, the filmmakers produced a nostalgic 
appropriation of the dynamic of the RAF in Boym’s terms. However, both 
approaches understand that the RAF mythos is a really existing thing that has 
been created to obfuscate the historical RAF. The idea of a deconstruction of 
                                                            




the RAF mythos pre-supposes the existence of a RAF mythos as an entity that 
is without historical context. What is important is to recognise how the 




Die Kommenden Tage  
(The Coming Days) 
 
Introduction 
Die Schwarzen Stürme is the terrorist group in Lars Kraume’s film Die 
Kommenden Tage /The Coming Days. They are a fictional creation designed 
specifically to parallel the Baader-Meinhof group, put in place to fulfil a role  
in a fictional narrative while capitalising on the rich possibilities of the RAF 
mythos. The relationship between the fictional group, the RAF mythos and  
the RAF in reality is complex. The film is built around a particular narrative 
mechanism, mythos as truth, that needs investigation and is the object of 
scrutiny in this chapter.  
In one sense, to experience Die Kommenden Tage is to experience the 
politics of fear. It is a sci-fi film that processes contemporary fears of 
unknowables, delivering an experience of the politics of fear by treating it as 
truth. It does this in two ways; firstly, by narrativising the fictional group die 
Schwarzen Stürme in terms of RAF Mythos, secondly, by cementing fears of 
ecological catastrophe into its images. 
It is worth restating the special definition of mythos in this sense. Mythos 
is not a lie, it is meaning-making that has gained enough traction to become a 
thing in itself and effect material reality. At the same time, the specific 
untruths within mythos can still be recognised without damaging its function 
as a focus of ideological coherence. Žižek suggests that with the abandonment 
of a universalist framework of reference, the social function of mythos has 




occurrence’, a statement that is taken as read, not questioned in its own terms, 
because it has only itself as its frame of reference.1 
Žižek considers the normalisation of mythos into reality to be an 
expression of the postmodern condition that sustains the post-political. Die 
Kommenden Tage carries this out in the introduction into its narrative of two 
myths. The myths are the RAF mythos, the mythologised history of the Red 
Army Faction, and the mythos of impending social collapse.  
The previous chapter on The Baader Meinhof Complex described how 
the idea of the RAF mythos has become intellectual property of the post-
political in Germany, coupled with a desire that the RAF mythos should either 
be demystified, under the compulsion of the societal imperative of 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung or, as the film does, re-mythologised as a 
subjective experience. 
This chapter analyses how Die Kommenden Tage reinvents the RAF 
mythos for the post-political era. In contrast to The Baader Meinhof Complex, 
the film is a symptom of a particular shade of German post-politics in the way 
that it plays on a political narrative built around fear.  
It is again useful to look at how Žižek describes post-politics, in that it 
‘takes the form of the politics of FEAR – fear of losing one’s particular 
identity, of being overwhelmed.’2 When it comes to engaging with its citizens, 
post-politics plays on the natural anxieties of people through the fear of 
unknowables such as terrorism, or economic and ecological catastrophes.  
The film Die Kommenden Tage translates these fears more or less directly 
on to the screen, and in doing so normalises the mythos of the end times in the 
form of a collapse of the particular form of the German state. By extension, it 
accepts and normalises the RAF mythos, in the form of a thinly veiled fictional 
substitute Die Schwarzen Stürme, as the counterposition to the authority of 
the state.  
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The first part of this chapter looks into the role and function of mythos in 
the post-political, and expands on the ideas in the previous chapter on how 
the post-political narratives fill in the gaps of subjectivity. Die Kommenden 
Tage relies on mythos and its normalisation, and it is therefore necessary to 
investigate this process.  
The second part of this chapter illustrates how the film takes elements of 
the RAF mythos and fictionalises them, using them as the basis for the actions 
of an imagined band of future terrorists, by appropriating different aspects of 
it, including ideas of Aktionismus, the ‘Ohnesorg effect’, counterculture and 
images of protest. 
The third part is concerned with the politics of fear and how Die 
Kommenden Tage embodies a culturally specific expression of a greater post-
political phenomenon. It describes the film’s relationship with the politics of 
fear as embodied in ideas of apocalyptic thinking, and how this relates to a 
particularly German form of the politics of fear, German Angst. 
The final part is an analysis of the postmodern narrativisation of mythos 
through the genres of contemporary dystopian science fiction. To illustrate 
how the film’s logic depends on post-political thinking, Die Kommenden Tage 
is compared with the film Children of Men (2006), a film that also shows a 
dystopian future centred on the collapse of the old structures of the world 
economy. This comparison highlights how, unlike Children of Men, Die 
Kommenden Tage is truly postmodern, in the Žižekian sense, in that it does 
away with the fantastic element of fiction. 
 
Die Kommenden Tage 
Die Kommenden Tage is a cinematic rarity: a German science fiction film. It is 
written and directed by Lars Kraume, whose most successful cinema film to 
date is the Dogme style Keine Lieder über Liebe (2005), a relationship drama.  
Die Kommenden Tage’s cinematic release coincided with the re-showing 
of several television dramas in early 2011 (e.g. Aufstand der Alten (2007) and 




visions of the near future were thematically similar, representing the decline of 
the particular form of the German state at the hands of an ever-more-ruthless 
capitalist system. In these dramas, depictions of growing injustices and 
extremes of poverty are shown accompanied by outbursts of new radicalism, 
often in the form of organised terrorism. These themes find their fullest 
expression in Die Kommenden Tage.  
The plot concerns a well-off middle-class family, the Kupers, on their 
journey from today to eight years in the future. During this time the demand 
for the world’s last resources plunges it into the fourth Gulf War. This in turn 
generates an influx of migrants onto the streets of Germany. The fight for 
ecological resources turns into a demise of economic resources for the World’s 
citizens.  
The three adult children of the family follow different paths, discontent 
with the political situation that their parents and parents’ generation have 
created. The family father is a high-standing lawyer, whose company enables 
the destructive exploitation of the final resources by big companies. Eldest 
daughter Cecilia (Johanna Wokalek), is influenced by her radical boyfriend 
Konstantin (August Diehl) to join the terrorist organisation Die Schwarzen 
Stürme. The youngest child Philip joins the Bundeswehr (the German army), 
and middle child Laura (Bernadette Heerwagen) dreams of a peaceful family 
life and sees procreation as the only meaningful option. 
It is worth sketching briefly a comparison between Die Kommenden Tage 
and Thomas Mann’s archetypal German family saga Die Buddenbrooks, 
which detailed the radical changes in German society in the nineteenth 
century. Die Kommenden Tage also connects economic and societal changes 
with the private disfunctionalities and decadence of a bourgeois family. And, 
like Mann, director Lars Kraume sees the bourgeois lifestyle as doomed. 
However, where Mann lamented a decline in the value of artistic 
intellectualism, Kraume sees the decline of the decadent family as symbolic of 




ecological excesses of global capitalism are incompatible with the traditional 
state and lead to its eventual collapse. 
In Die Kommenden Tage, social change is not a slow decline but the 
violent collapse of old certainties and the German political guarantees of 
liberalism, the Grundrechte, (constitutional rights), paired with devastating 
manmade ecological catastrophes. These changes are met with more violence 
in the form of Die Schwarzen Stürme. 
One important aspect of the film for this analysis is its relationship with 
RAF mythos. The film deliberately uses the RAF mythos as a constitutive 
element in its formation, and the relationship and process need unpicking. 
 
Mythos as everyday occurrence in the post-polit ical 
As diverse as the theorists of mythos such as Jung, Lévi -Strauss, Barthes or 
Žižek are, their common interest lies in the analysis of where mythos becomes 
more than a story. When and how, for example, does it become manifest in 
literature, religion, tradition, and eventually gain traction to become an 
operating truth? Žižek considers truth as something that comes from outside 
the subject; it is a truth because a collective has decided that it is truth, in 
partisan judgement. His example for how truth is established is Lenin’s quote,  
‘The theory of Marx is all-powerful, because it is true’. Žižek explains,  
‘Lenin’s wager … is that universal truth and partisanship, the gesture of 
taking sides, are not only not mutually exclusive, but condition each 
other: in a concrete situation, its universal truth can only be articulated 
from a thoroughly partisan position – truth is by definition one-sided.’3  
Truth is thus never subjective, neither can there be pluralist narratives that all 
have to be accepted as ‘different’ truths. The transfer of myth into truth for 
Žižek, is thus an action done by a collective who have come to an agreement 
of what this truth is. 
Because Die Kommenden Tage relies on the process of turning mythos 
into truth, it is helpful to investigate this process, starting with an exploration 
                                                            




of Žižek’s idea of mythos and its ability to become accepted at face value, as a 
truth. Whereas Barthes laments the properties of mythos as problematic, in 
that it has the potential to be exploited by the elite,4 Žižek sees 
postmodernism doing away with mythos as metaphor and reframing it as fact. 
Die Kommenden Tage, does not coincide with Barthes’ reading of mythos, 
with its call for an unmasking and retelling of it through new parameters. 
Rather, it relies on the necessity of taking mythos as beyond contestation. 
For Barthes, mythos is the carrier of bourgeois ideology, and the goal is to 
demystify, or unmask it and in doing so, to expose the bourgeois character 
behind it. Mythos, for Barthes, is inherently problematic, due to its tendency 
to do away with historical conditions, and with them the political and social 
agendas that shaped the mythos. His plan is to reveal mythos by displacing 
ideas that have been taken for granted and retelling them in a new light.  
Žižek describes how, ‘postmodernism directly rewrites myth itself by 
filling in the gaps’ … ‘the move to fill in the gaps thus obeys the compulsion to 
understand, to ‘normalise’, and, in this way, to avoid the void that is 
subjectivity.’5 This void however is necessary, it is where the subject 
experiences the real, that which is outside the symbolic. This for Žižek is at 
the heart of subjectivity, the radical negativity of what the real represents is 
the negation to the symbolic, and in this dialect the subject emerges. Filling in 
the gaps forecloses this possibility. Myth needs to be myth – meaning it needs 
the fantastic element, something that is outside symbolisation, something that 
is not considered truth as established by ideology, in that it is unquestionable 
– to function as an experience of subjectivity.  
Postmodernism, for Žižek, is the rejection of universality, the collapse of 
authority within the symbolic order and the expression of this collapse in 
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culture. From this standpoint, the rewriting of myths has an interesting ‘truth 
effect’ when it comes to narrative:  
The opposition between modernism and postmodernism would be via 
the tension between myth and the ‘narrative of the real story’. The 
paradigmatic modernist gesture is to stage a common everyday event in 
such a way that some mythical narrative resonates in it (…) The 
postmodernist gesture would be the exact opposite: to stage the mythical 
narrative itself as an ordinary occurrence. So – either one recognises 
beneath what purports to be a straight realist narrative, the contours of a 
mythical frame (…), or one reads myth itself  
as a ‘real story.6  
The events in fiction are built around established, fundamental myths – they 
are reinterpretations, not of myths themselves but the universal claim that 
constitutes the myths. For example Pygmalion, in which the sculptor 
Pygmalion falls in love with the statue he creates, resonates in films that play 
on this myth, such as My Fair Lady (1964) and She’s All That (1999), but also 
less directly in films in which a woman is shaped by the fantasy of a man, such 
as Vertigo (1958).  
However in the postmodern, myth is played out as normality, replayed 
without the subjective gaps that make it universal. It is staged as an ordinary 
occurrence, without a fantastic element. That which is told through mythical 
metaphor is made explicit in the postmodern narrative, and by this process 
remodelled into a new myth, read as a new truth. Old myth becomes new 
through the process of filling in the gaps with whichever preoccupations are 
broadly recognised as truth, or beyond contestation. By presenting myth 
directly – not as metaphor, not as a particular that stands in for the universal 
– the subjective gaps of the myth are filled by the unassailable truths of the 
particular ideology, the collective truths agreed by society. In the post-political 
these truths are often concerned with the body (biopolitics) and or/identity.  
For example, the film adaptation of Dorian Gray (2009) shows how the 
young Dorian is repeatedly mistreated by his miserable grandfather leaving 
                                                            




him covered with scars. However, in Wilde’s original book The Picture of 
Dorian Gray, Dorian himself describes his grandfather merely as ‘stern’ and 
‘hateful’. The film’s filling in of Dorian’s backstory, of showing his physical 
abuse as a child, now provides Gray with a psychological motive for his future 
deeds. The new film provides an interpretation for Dorian’s evil behaviour 
derived from an external source, the narrative of childhood trauma. By 
interpreting Dorian Gray’s cruelty as psychologically induced, the film creates 
a mythos about the book itself.  
Where Barthes sees myth as a linguistic prop for the powerful, Žižek 
recognises the problem with mythos as a product of the postmodern. He 
criticises the postmodern for trying to turn myth into truth and proposes a 
return to the transcendental possibilities provided by mythos. He finds 
support for his interpretation from Clayton Crockett in their book Hegel & the 
Infinite. Crockett also sees the mythical as an asset which is rejected in the 
postmodern: ‘In our age of the world-picture (Heidegger’s postmodern 
ontology of the world as a picture, instead of understanding a picture of the 
world), the mythological conditioning of our experience hides itself behind the 
mythology of demythologisation. The world seems to be fully disenchanted; 
we have bypassed traditional societies by giving up values based on authority, 
etc.’7 What Crockett describes as the disenchanted world is a world in which 
myth is regarded as truth because there is no one authority against which 
myth can be held accountable against.  
What both Žižek and Crockett identify is that, with the advent of 
postmodernism, the ability to abstract myth from the circumstances which 
helped create it is often neglected, overlooked and in itself not desired. Die 
Kommenden Tage reflects this normalisation of myth into reality that Žižek 
describes, forgoing the need to question the inconsistencies of the myth itself. 
One instance of this concerns the RAF mythos, in particular, the strands of 
anti-authoritarianism that help constitute it as a body of ideas. 
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RAF mythos as normalised reality 
For its central conceit to function, Die Kommenden Tage assumes as 
uncontestable the tropes of the RAF mythos that are connected with the ‘68 
movement, especially the formal aspects of its anti-authoritarianism. The 
Student movement in Germany was influenced by the works of Horkheimer 
and Adorno and their concepts of the authoritarian personality and the 
authoritarian state. The members of the Frankfurt school used the concept of 
authoritarianism to explain how the Third Reich was possible. Their 
conclusion was that the power structures were already ingrained in the culture 
of the German state apparatus, in its education system and structure of family 
and social life.8 The political ambition of the student movement was to get rid 
of these institutional vestiges. With Aktionen, political actionism, the 
followers of the student movement set out to provoke the German state so it 
would ‘reveal’ its authoritarian, and thus fascistic, nature.9  
In order to evoke the subversive, the film creates an image of terrorism 
that appropriates the mythos but not the content of the past. This is 
intertwined with mythologised manifestations of the 68 movement, such as 
Aktionismus, the ‘Ohnesorg effect’, ideas of counterculture and images of 
protest. 
The positioning of die Schwarzen Stürme In Die Kommenden Tage as a 
new version of the RAF is entirely deliberate. The RAF mythos is relied upon to 
describe how the terrorism ought to be understood. Much of this 
mythologised imagery are Bilder (images), actual pictures but also the 
associated imagery that encapsulate the cultural understanding of the protest 
movements of the 60s and 70s. The film uses as a foundation recurring 
elements of the RAF mythos, such as the murder of Benno Ohnesorg, the 
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antiauthoritarian ideal, the personalities of Andreas Baader and Gudrun 
Ensslin. These will be examined in detail in turn. 
Lars Kraume says that the terrorism portrayed in Die Kommenden Tage is 
‘designed in the same way as would be a fourth generation RAF.’10 The 
participants, he says, ‘are again coming from a middle class milieu, an 
intellectual circle. People that come together who are of the opinion that the 
civilisation, the way our society is developing today, and all that is done in the 
name of our civilisation to the planet, sooner or later will lead to a collapse, 
and that this is why we have to destroy civilisation before it can destroy the 
world.’11  
Kraume implies that the fundamental message of the RAF is ‘destroy what 
is killing you’. Kraume picks up directly on a quote from Ulrike Meinhof, 
herself paraphrasing the anarchist slogan of the sixties ‘Macht kaputt, was 
Euch kaputt macht’ (Break what breaks you).12 This slogan was one of the 
favourite sayings of the counterculture movement, especially in the punk and 
anarchist scene. However, whereas the original slogan was aimed at the 
constraints imposed upon the human potential and individual freedom by the 
chains of capitalism, its reuse in the context of the film gives it a different 
resonance. 
Kraume states that there will be no repetition of the original (first 
generation) RAF ‘because the utopian ideas of the past are not valid 
anymore’.13 What becomes embodied in Die Schwarzen Stürme is the mythos 
of the call for action. This creates a new mythos; filling in the outer shell of Die 
Schwarzen Stürme’s terrorist action with the bias of the Aktionismus of the 
RAF mythos creates a new myth about the original myth itself. It becomes the 
myth that German terrorism is defined by a desire for action coming from the 
yearning to act out. 
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The tagline of Die Kommenden Tage is ‘Die Zukunft gehört denen die um sie 
kämpfen.’ (The future belongs to those who fight for it.) The film’s theme is 
global ecological and sociological breakdown, and it also positions itself as 
agitation, as sending a message – that out of a difficulty something new can 
arise, if we make the effort.  
‘Fight for the future’, was also a defining ideal of the 60s German protest. 
The student movement saw in the Leninist method of Agitprop a useful 
instrument of protest.14 But where for Lenin the final emphasis was on the 
longer propaganda process, the protesters of the 60s usually limited 
themselves to the short-term goal of agitation. The Aktion, the act itself, 
became the goal. Although there were many discussions about the ‘right kind’ 
of action to take, the urge ‘to do something’ more often than not became its 
own justification.  
The deeds of the members of the Kommune 1, the politically-motivated 
commune in Berlin, active in its original form 1967–1969, have become 
examples of the spirit of Aktionismus. Aktionismus means doing things for the 
sake of doing things, and for this reason has a negative connotation – it 
deliberately avoids continuity, working toward a goal. The Aktionismus was 
therefore often associated with a mindless acting out of frustration in a 
childish manner; its participants were called out as ‘naive and pseudo political 
anarchists.’15  
However, the urge to ‘do something’, is seen as the driving factor of 
change in the revolutionary spirit of the 1960s and 1970s. For example, Jürgen 
Habermas wrote in his commemorative article in Die Zeit about the death of 
the most well known spokesperson of the student movement, Rudi Dutschke; 
‘it always came back to one word: active, activism, action. And one slogan 
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took my breath away: No Aufklärung (education/enlightening) without action. 
Dutschke even said Aufklärung and direct action in one breath.’16 
In recent years the Aktionismus has been associated with the terrorism of 
the 70s.17 A direct link is made about how the Aktionismus turned more and 
more violent, ultimately resulting in terrorist acts.  
The film embeds the Aktionismus in the radicalisation of Cecilia and 
Konstantin, their protest initially relatively harmless and playful, turns 
ruthless and violent when their demands are not met and they find purpose in 
the ideology of the Schwarzen Stürme. Here the crypto-fascist name 
Schwarzen Stürme comes into play. The notion of Black Storms has an audible 
‘Nazi’ quality to it; abbreviated it stands as SS, reminiscent of the SS 
(Schutzstaffel) the Nazi paramilitary organisation, and the word storm is 
reminiscent of SA (Sturmabteilung) another Nazi paramilitary organisation. 
This play on words can be no accident, and evokes the contemporary, 
historicised understanding of the radicalism of the 68 movement in Germany 
and will be looked in greater detail in the section on German Angst. An 
understanding that was first formulated by Habermas’s exclamation that the 
politics of the APO were nothing but ‘utopian socialism’ and, ultimately, 
‘Linksfaschismus’ (left fascism), a conclusion many saw verified by the 
terrorism of the RAF and others.18  
The idea of Aktionismus is recreated most directly in the film in its 
translation of the events of 2 June 67 – the way the film utilises these events 
for its narrative are looked at thorough the concepts of ‘Images of protest’ and 
‘The Ohnesorg effect’. 
  
                                                            
16 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Er verband die Kraft zum Visionären mit dem Sinn fürs Konkrete’, Die Zeit 
(4 January 1980) <http: //www.zeit.de/1980/02/ein-wahrhafter-soziali 
17 See e.g. Gerd Koenen, Das Rote Jahrzehnt: Unsere Kleine Deutsche Kulturrevolution, 1967 – 
1977 (Frankfurt am Ma, Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2002). pp.174–82. or Alexander 
Strassner, Sozialrevolutionarer Terrorismus: Theorie, Ideologie, Fallbeispiele, 
Zukunftsszenarien, 1st edn (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag fur Sozialwissenschaften, 2008) p.22. 
18 Jürgen Habermas quoted, Thomas Hecken, Avantgarde Und Terrorismus: Rhetorik Der 
Intensität Und Programme Der Revolte Von Den Futuristen Bis Zur RAF (Bielefeld: 




Images of Protest 
On 2 June 1967, the student organisation APO (external parliamentary 
opposition) organised a demonstration against the visit of Reza Pahlavi, the 
Shah of Persia. They accused him and the German state of collaborating, in 
order to legitimise the Shah’s holding on to power in Iran. The Shah and his 
wife were expected to visit the Berlin Opera. So-called Jubelperser (cheering 
Persians) in essence provocateurs, some of them members of the Iranian secret 
service, were planted in front of the Opera where the Shah was expected to 
attend. They soon started beating up the anti-Shah protesters with the wooden 
planks that held the sloganeering placards. The German police, instead of 
protecting the protesters from the attack, stormed towards the protesting 
students and started to truncheon them in order to disperse the protestors 
with the Leberwursttaktik – a concept devised by Berlin’s then police 
commander Erich Duensing, that envisages to brutally ‘poke into the middle 
so that it breaks at either end’.  
The images of this memorable day have become famous through the tv 
documentary Der Polizeistaatsbesuch – Beobachtungen unter deutschen 
Gastgebern (1967). More recently, this famous event was dramatically 
recreated in The Baader Meinhof Complex, and discussed in the previous 
chapter.  
The first political protest in Die Kommenden Tage is a flash mob action, 
among them Cecilia and Konstantin; protesters provocatively clap at the Saudi 
commercial attaché, who is guilty of selling his country’s oil reserves to the 
West. The protest, planned as an act of intimidation, soon turns violent. The 
protesters chase the dignitary down the street, and they are then beaten up by 
the police and brought into custody.  
The playful protests against the Shah in the late 60s, as well as the one 
against the Saudi dignitary in Die Kommenden Tage, start out as open protests 
that soon turn violent. In Die Kommenden Tage the playful protest is brutally 




dignitary’s bodyguards, who are beating the protesters (together with the 
police), look and act similar to the real life Jubelperser. 
These images are reminiscent of the political demonstration of 1967 as 
depicted in Der Polizeistaatsbesuch. In both scenarios the students are 
protesting against western imperialist politics. The dignitary in Die 
Kommenden Tage could be seen as a quasi Reza Pahlavi, an Arab who sells his 
country to the West. Kraume says about the activism in Die Kommenden 
Tage: ‘In the beginning it is a bit more playful with its Mantra ‘We have to get 
rid of civilisation’, and is done in sympathetic and playful actions.’19 In 1967, 
several students were seen wearing paper-bags on their heads. On the bags 
were caricature of the faces of either the Shah of Persia or his wife, the 
glamorous Farah Diba. This image of a playful protest was recreated in The 
Baader Meinhof Complex.  
In Die Kommenden Tage, the ‘playful protest’ comes in form of a 
flashmob where the protesters who start out clapping at the Arab dignitary, 
chase him down the street and continue by collectively throwing him in the 
air. The playfulness is underlined by the score, a high spirited violin concerto 
that, once the protesters have reached the dignitary, seamlessly blends into the 
dialectic sounds of the oncoming police sirens.  
By recreating the playful energy of the actionism of the 60s as a 
possibility for political action today, the film understands that it is the action 
itself, without greater ideology, that will evoke change. 
 
The ‘Ohnesorg effect ’  
On 2 June 1967 in Berlin, the student Benno Ohnesorg was shot by policeman 
Karl-Heinz Kurras during a protest. As described in the previous chapter, a 
specific image of the death of Ohnesorg has, within the German cultural 
landscape, become seen as a point of origin of RAF mythology. The wider 
                                                            




consequences of his death became known as the Ohnesorg effect, and it is to 
this effect that Die Kommenden Tage makes reference.20  
Once again, the film Die Kommenden Tage plays on the RAF mythos 
around the event. Careful consideration must be paid to the relationship 
between fact and mythos, and the representation of both in fictional form.  
The death of Ohnesorg undoubtedly created a rallying point for the 
student movement and a push towards radicalisation. It is this dynamic that 
has become mythologised in the RAF mythos. It was primarily Henschel’s 
picture of the dead Ohnesorg that, as Carsten Dams explains, ‘stylised 
Ohnesorg as a martyr.’21 Patricia Leavy observes how iconic images are not 
historical but ‘through a cultural process acquire historicity.’22 
Ohnesorg’s was called a martyr as early as 4 June 1962 when the Berliner 
Morgenpost commented that Ohnesorg was no martyr but a victim of the ‘FU-
Chinesen’ (the ‘red’ students from the Freie Universität Berlin). Within the 
student movement the idea of Ohnesorg as a martyr was criticised. At a 
student rally with around 3000 students is was said that he was no martyr but 
a victim of a ‘position (in government) that revealed itself to be 
unreasonable.’23 In 1972, Spiegel journalist Horst Günter Tolmein wrote that 
Ohnesorg was the martyr gave birth to the RAF, while the Spiegel itself made 
critical reportage of the RAF its journalistic mission.24 Many other magazines 
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Lexington Books, 2007) p.3. 
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and articles would describe Ohnesorg in this way, as a ‘martyr of the left 
radical extremists’.25  
Ultimately, the concept of Ohnesorg as a martyr of the left needs to be 
placed into the realm of RAF mythos in its mediatized form, rather than in any 
historically detailed form. Neither the left nor the right saw his death as 
anything other than a condemnation of the other. For the right, the student 
movement that was to blame, for the students it was the authoritarian state.  
It was the picture of Ohnesorg as martyr that became fixed in the cultural 
landscape. In 1990 a statue named Der Tod des Demonstranten (The Death of 
the Demonstrator), already constructed in 1971, was unveiled in front of the 
Deutsche Oper Berlin. And in the same year an official memorial panel was 
installed next to the sidewalk where Ohnesorg was shot. A theatre was named 
in his honour, and his hometown of Hanover named a bridge after him in 
1992. 
The real Ohnesorg was shot by the police, a representative of the state. In 
Die Kommenden Tage it is the terrorists themselves who plan and execute the 
murder of a demonstrator for their own means, in an attempt to engineer a 
tipping point of public indignation.  
In Die Kommenden Tage, Die Schwarzen Stürme plan to manipulate the 
desperate protesters who are demonstrating against the politics of the German 
state. Members of Die Schwarzen Stürme disguise themselves as riot police in 
order to ‘accidentally’ shoot one of the demonstrators. Their aim is to create a 
martyr for the protest movement because, ‘Martyrs move the hearts of the 
masses’. The leader of the terrorist group says, ‘we need a dead person in 
Berlin.’ 
The internal logic of the film’s narrative demands a deliberate 
dehistoricitization of the events of 2 June. The film is a myth of a myth. The 
narrative is structured around a pre-existing interpretation of real historical 
                                                            




events. The depiction on screen of the actions of the fictional terrorists relies 
on this interpretation as being both readily accessible and uncontested.  
The fiction is further complicated by the apparent implicit awareness of 
the fiction by the characters themselves. In the narrative, the characters act in 
a fashion that suggests they are aware of the Ohnesorg effect, without the 
narrative explicitly stating it. In effect, the fictional characters act to engineer 
something that happened in a particular interpretation of a reality external to 
the screen fiction. They attempt to bring the past back to life by force, but it is 
a mythos of factual past, where both the mythos and the factual past are 
external to the frame of reference as an internal reality the characters inhabit. 
In short, the characters work to produce an Ohnesorg effect. This can only 
mean that the narrative assumes the Ohnesorg effect is taken as read. The 
portrayal of Die Schwarzen Stürme actions narrativises a desire for a particular 
kind of certainty, the fait accompli, that can only obscure or weaken the 
connection to the specificities of the factual historical moment. 
The film does not recreate the Henschel picture. Instead, the shooting of 
Linda, a student, by Konstantin is shown. Dressed as riot police, the characters 
Cecilia and Konstantin are attacked by demonstrators including Linda. Whilst 
the camera shows Linda hitting the prone Celia in a long shot, the gunshot 
happens outside the frame. Although the film shows Konstantin’s arm holding 
the gun, the film does not show his face. When he gets up and holsters the 
gun, he is shown from the back, annonymised by riot gear.  
The scene bears a reading in terms of the partial autonomous object, and 
its relationship with ideology. The image of the gun in the cut off arm forms 
what Žižek would call a partial object, an organ without body.26 These partial 
objects described by Žižek evoke unease in the onlooker as the abscence of the 
human element from the physical body. It is something that represents pure 
death drive, not a self-conscious subject. Žižek says, ‘subjectivisation refers to 
the “whole person” as the correlate of the body, whereas the “pure” subject 
                                                            




refers to the partial object alone.’27 The ‘pure subject is ‘a subject of the 
signifier’, totally submitted to the symbolic order and its content, ‘When the 
object starts to speak (in this case a gun shot), what we hear is the voice of the 
monstrous, impersonal, empty-machinic subject that does not yet involve 
subjectivisation.’28 From this perspective Konstantin’s deed is directed by the 
symbolic order he finds himself in, rather than his self-conscious subjectivity. 
The film amplifies the horror of Konstantin’s deed through the use of the 
anxiety-inducing partial object. Before the event, he tells Celia that killing one 
person is only part of the general, systemic killing that is happening in the 
world that they live in.  
Although Kraume consciously reveals the terrorists’ double standards and 
showing their immoral and authoritarian methods, that is, shooting an 
innocent person for their own means, what he regards as the deciding factor in 
a new ‘turning point’ in politics is not who creates the martyr, but that it 
happens at all. The actionism shown by Die Schwarzen Stürme is the deciding 
factor, and their unethical methods succeed in providing the desired 
‘Ohnesorg effect’. Die Kommenden Tage shows a solemn vigil, demanding 
‘justice for Linda’. This is a clear parallel to the great reaction to – the reality 
being invoked – Ohnesorg’s death, which was treated as political murder by 
the student protesters. Laura says to Konstantin, after seeing the rioting in the 
streets that follows the murder of Linda, ‘It is unbelievable how powerful Die 
Schwarzen Stürme have become.’  
Die Schwarzen Stürme not only emulate the ‘Ohnesorg effect’, but the 
film itself presents the radicalism of the near future as a carbon copy of the 
actionism associated with the late 1960s, as well as its terrorist extremes. The 
‘creation mythos’ of the RAF, and the impetus for radicalisation it contains, is 
the point of reference for Kraume’s terrorists. The Schwarzen Stürme’s 
nostalgia for the events and ‘historical turning points’ of the past show that 
they understand the past in its mythologised form. It displays an ahistorical 
                                                            





thinking, as they imagine the events are recreatable at any time. Here, myth is 
no longer metaphor, exactly as Žižek and Crockett lament, but an ahistorical 





The failures of the parent generation 
One of the key myths that feeds into the narrative fabric of Die Kommenden 
Tage is that of the failure of the parent generation. Again, it is a harking back 
to, and remythification of, a real historical precedent, a filling in of the gaps 
with ideological content from a different, more recent historical moment. 
The critique of the parent generation in Die Kommenden Tage resembles 
the critique of the Achtundsechziger29 towards their parents’ generation. The 
Achtundsechziger, or 68ers, and with them the RAF, saw their parents’ 
generation as the creators and supporters of the imperialist politics of Western 
Germany, while simultaneously suppressing the nation’s Nazi past. Die 
Kommenden Tage cinematically relives the idea that, in order to make 
credible politics, one has to be honest with one’s own past as well as the 
present. As Laura tells her parents: ‘You have to draw the consequences. 
Nobody has a future without knowing the past.’  
The blaming of previous generations for today’s problems is an idea that 
has renewed resonance. A dead-end situation brought on by living to the 
excess with no regard for the next generation, is blamed on the ‘guilty ones, 
Germany’s middle class baby boomers, who now strive for the same privileges 
as the aristocracy did once.’30  
This new form of ‘parent bashing’ is not a solely German phenomenon. 
Paul Begala, former advisor to Bill Clinton, wrote an article for Esquire 
magazine called The Worst Generation. He claims it is legitimate to hate the 
baby boomers as a generation driven by selfishness, ‘The orgy of greed, fed by 
a mountain of debt, ran the economy into the ground. The massive, selfish tax 
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cuts produced even more massive deficits and debt, which the Boomers 
passed on to those who followed.’31  
Die Kommenden Tage draws out the parallel between the anti-
authoritarian movement of the 60s and today’s contempt for the parent 
generation. Both generational conflicts blame their elders for the trouble they 
are in and the refusal to own up to their mistakes. Whereas the generational 
conflict of the 60s was geared towards the criticism expressed against the baby 
boomer generation, of which the Kuper parents are an example, and is more a 
hostility towards human ambition in general. Again, Kraume is re-
mythologising the RAF: in this case, by re-appropriating the cultural 
understanding of the anti-authoritarian impulses that drove the student 
movement in the 60s, as a contemporary conflict of generations. 
Fuelled by almost two decades of economic growth, the late 1960s in 
Germany were informed by a movement of unrest and protest. The economic 
boom provided space and possibility for personal freedoms that were in 
contradiction to previous, more authoritarian social structures. The post-war 
generation wanted to escape from what they regarded as the contradictions 
that formed the new Federal Republic, a combination of the 
Wirtschaftswunder (the rapid reconstruction and massive economic growth in 
Germany after the second world war) and an authoritarian political and social 
space. Moreover, this generation felt the need to deal with the country’s Nazi 
past, which had, up to this point, not been come to terms with. As formulated 
by the Frankfurt School in its criticism of the authoritarian state, many 
students saw that it was the authoritarian structures of the older generation 
that allowed the possibility of the Third Reich in the first place.  
Gudrun Ensslin’s alleged outcry of outrage directed at ‘Generation 
Auschwitz’ came to stand for the attitude towards the failures of the parent 
generation. These failures were not only failures to stand up to the Nazi 
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regime but, moreover, to tolerate what was felt to be the same repressive state 
structures in the present. This failure has not only become seen as the main 
catalyst for the student movement, but, as illustrated earlier, has also become 
the explanatory model for the formation of extremist groups such as the RAF. 
The actions of the RAF have, for some commentators, become seen as an 
acting out against the shortcomings of the parent generation. The 
psychoanalyst Hans-Jürgen Wirth sees the members of the RAF as 
‘subconscious delegates who act in the stead of their parents generation’ 
fighting ‘against a pugnacious past.’32 Also Aust, by paraphrasing Andreas 
Baader’s lawyer Horst Mahler, asserts that the motives of the RAF were ‘not 
initially a protest against the Vietnam war, but a rebellion against a generation 
that had tolerated the Nazis and was consequently complicit in the murder of 
millions. The defendants drew the consequences and decided not to 
participate in a society that was founded upon exploitation, injustice and 
oppression.’33 For Aust it is clear that the RAF wanted to ‘provide the 
resistance (to the authoritarian state) that the parent generation failed to do.’34  
These factors are all deliberately mediated through the fiction of Die 
Kommenden Tage. The film makes the deeds of the parent generation directly 
responsible for the ills that have befallen the globalised world, and 
consequently for the violent reaction of the young generation against the old 
political structures. The Kuper family is an upper-middle-class family; the 
father is a lawyer, who represents unscrupulous oil companies that have 
created ecological catastrophe, but knows that what he is doing is not right. 
When it comes to choosing between his children and his chambers he picks 
the politics of his children’s generation against ‘this shitty war’.  
The character of the father fulfils the role of failed parental figure, 
representing the parents’ generation’s complicity in the crisis at hand and their 
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failure to protest against what is happening. They cannot claim to be ignorant 






The characters of Die Kommenden Tage  
The playing with RAF Mythos can be seen in the film’s characters and their 
relationship to the archetypes, and the star personas of the actors chosen to fill 
the roles. The stars already embody a distinct narrative that they bring to the 
narrative of the film. The star thus, as Hayward describes, ‘is the point of 
synthesis between representation and identification. She or he represents or 
re-presents the ‘host culture’ of which she or he is a part and with which the 
spectator identifies’35 In the case of Die Kommenden Tage, the actors are thus 
placed in the role of their star persona, the archetype of the mythos and the 
role of the character itself. 
The fictional terrorist couple, Cecilia and Konstantin, can only be 
modelled after the archetypal relationship of Baader and Ensslin. Konstantin, 
whose charisma convinces his girlfriend Cecilia to join Die Schwarzen Stürme, 
personifies many of the qualities associated with the idea of Andreas Baader – 
his mythologised archetype that is established the cultural landscape. 
In fiction, evidenced in films such as Baader (2002) or The Baader 
Meinhof Complex, Andreas Baader is an id-monster, interested only in 
following his own dark hidden desires. In Christopher Roth’s deliberately 
falsified film Baader, the character is described as ‘Gangster, Autofreak, 
Frauenheld (womaniser). Unberechenbar (erratic), narzisstisch, 
charismatisch.’36 In the tv documentary Andreas Baader – Der Staatsfeind 
(public enemy) (TV 2002) Baader is described as a ‘dandy’ from the outset, as 
well as a weapon fetishist with ‘energy and the power of persuasion.’ The 
programme puts emphasis on Baader’s urge for Aktionismus: ‘He always 
wanted something to happen. He was drawn to the happenings and events of 
the Kommune 1, where he was appreciated because he was always ready for 
action.’ Ex-communard Reiner Langhans talks about Baader’s ‘impish pleasure 
in provocation.’37  
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In fiction, the mythological archetype is filled out and to some extent 
fixed as an entity by the film The Baader Meinhof Complex. Baader is played 
by Moritz Bleibtreu, whose star persona of the eternal man-child, as an 
‘obercooler Typ!’38 fits the film’s idea of Baader as a chaotic pistolero and a 
hard-nosed, thoughtless boor.  
In Die Kommenden Tage, the Baader-cipher Konstantin is only interested 
in living out his own ideas of revolution. He is narcissistic, charming, brutal, 
sly and without compromise. Most of all, he is driven by the need to do 
something. He describes Die Schwarzen Stürme as ‘the organisation that I 
have always longed for.’  
It is hard not to read the casting of Johanna Wokalek as Cecilia as 
anything other than an intentional reference to her role as Gudrun Ensslin in 
The Baader Meinhof Complex. Here, the use of the figure of Ensslin is as a 
reference point is obvious. The character of Cecilia, like the real-life Ensslin, 
comes from a well respected, middle-class family.  
Her relationship with Konstantin proves to be passionate but ultimately 
destructive. Ensslin’s relationship with Andreas Baader was described by her 
close friend Ernst Heinitz, ‘Gudrun was more than she knew, and more than 
her intellect admitted, slavishly dependent on Baader. She was infinitely 
emotionally connected to him.’39 In the same way Cecilia is under Konstantin’s 
influence in Die Kommenden Tage. Hans Koerner describes how, in the 
mediated world of RAF images, ‘the blond pastor’s daughter Ensslin comes 
across as the crass opposite to Baader.’40  
The rich narrative potential of the cool blond and the impulsive rake has 
often led to the conflation of Baader and Ensslin with Bonnie and Clyde. In 
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Die Kommenden Tage, Wokalek’s Cecilia is closely styled after her 
performance as Ensslin in The Baader Meinhof Complex. Her costumes and 
hair are strikingly similar in the two films. In effect, the casting of Wokalek as 
Cecilia evokes the mythologised Ensslin – an effect that leads to an 
understanding of Cecilia as a terrorist whose persona wears the vintage 
clothes of the RAF on the outside but is filled with a contemporary outlook. 
A further reliance on RAF mythos in Die Kommenden Tage can be found 
in the relationship between Cecilia and her sister Laura. The focal point of the 
RAF mythos in this instance is exemplified in Margarethe von Trotta’s film 
Die Bleierne Zeit (or Marianne and Juliane)(1981). The film is a RAF film, 
about the relationship between two sisters, Marianne and Juliane and is based 
on the real life relationship between Christiane and Gudrun Ensslin. Marianne 
becomes part of a violent terrorist group whereas Juliane is a journalist for a 
feminist magazine. In both films the daughters of the house go down different 
paths in an effort to escape the authoritarian structures that confine them. One 
is quiet and gentle, and her protest is verbal; the other is wild and rebellious, 
joins a terrorist organisation, and ends up in prison.  
By repeating the motifs of Die Bleierne Zeit, Die Kommenden Tage draws 
a formal connection with an early example of RAF mythology. In a similar 
fashion to its re-appropriation of the mythologised characters of Baader and 
Ensslin, Die Kommenden Tage uses the cultural reference of the two sisters 
and turns them into spokespersons for contemporary conflicts. 
 
Counterculture 
One aspect of 1960s and 1970s counterculture that Kraume evokes in Die 
Kommenden Tage is the image of the Hippy, the societal dropout who 
withdrew from the authoritarian moral codes of the time to live in remote 
places of the world that catered to their hand to mouth lifestyle such as India, 
Ibiza or Morocco.  
The ides of counterculture and the lure of alternative lifestyles in Die 




is shown wandering around the flat, fascinated and frightened by the 
otherness of the place.  
Laura’s boyfriend Hans (Daniel Brühl), withdraws from society and 
contact with other people to live in a cabin in a remote part of the Alps. There 
he lives on only the bare essentials while pursuing his private passion, bird-
keeping. His only companion is a Man Friday character, a young African 
emigrant whom he has taken in.  
The romanticism inherent within idea of the dropout, is often 
counterposed with accusations of shying away from the problems at hand or 
destroyed by reality catching up with them. In Die Kommenden Tage reality 
catches up with Hans in the form of Konstantin, who has come to the cabin to 
claim back Laura and his son. Konstantin shoots Hans and burns down his 
cabin. By carefully destroying the mythos of the care free abandonment of 
society, Die Kommenden Tage emphasises that no one can escape the collapse 
of a global society.  
Another facet of counterculture utilised in Die Kommenden Tage is the 
politicising of the personal. Konstantin and Cecilia’s relationship changes once 
they meet Vincent (Mehdi Nebbou), the contact that introduces them to die 
Schwarzen Stürme. Vincent moves in with them, into their student house 
which is obviously paid for by Cecilia’s and Laura’s parents. Laura is already 
uncomfortable with the way Konstantin takes for granted the sharing of the 
food and the house; she is surprised, accepting but most of all intrigued by the 
new open-mindedness in Konstantin and Cecilia’s relationship. Once Vincent 
moves in, the image of a 60’s commune comes to mind, especially when Laura 
comes home one day to discover Cecilia, Konstantin and Vincent having sex 
together. The staple of 60s counterculture, in the form of free love, is 
knowingly brought into play by Kraume.  
Inspired by writings such as those of Horkheimer,41 many of the 68ers 
saw the traditional family structure as the root of all authoritarian evil. Their 
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goal was to break away from what they saw as the bourgeois moralities 
imposed by the state. The philosophy was that, before there can be a 
successful revolution, the revolutionaries have to first of all revolutionise 
themselves. The idea of ownership was also questioned in terms of 
interpersonal relationships, and many tried to follow an ideal of an 
emancipated sexuality. Gudrun Ensslin acted in a short film called Das 
Abonnement (1967) which promoted free love and alternative lifestyles.  
Several films about the legacy of the 68ers deal with the inevitable 
jealousies that occurred between people ‘against their better judgement’, and 
which put dampers on the idea of free love. E.g. The films The Baader Meinhof 
Complex and Wer nicht wenn Wir (2011) deal, respectively, with the problems 
Andreas Baader and Gudrun Ensslin have with practising free love. 
In Die Kommenden Tage, the scene in which Laura sees the other three 
characters having sex is a play on understandings of 1960s counterculture and 
its demytstification. This scene also implies that the sex between Konstantin, 
Vincent and Cecilia is motivated not simply by personal preference, but by a 
political agenda that will reveal the real power-structure of Konstantin’s and 
Cecilia’s love and will also spell its inevitable end. 
Die Kommenden Tage uses different aspects of the RAF mythos, and 
general mythologies of the 68 movement to develop ideas of what terrorism in 
Germany may look like in the near future. Kraumes imagines a ‘lifestyle 
terrorism’, an embodiment of the revolutionary sprit of the RAF. He says of 
Die Schwarzen Stürme,  
‘They are similar to the revolutionary cells in the 1970s, of whom very 
few were caught in the end. They (RAF) were also, to say it crudely, 
‘Feierabendterroristen’ (after-work-terrorists). All lived in a bourgeois, 
normal milieu and did their attacks in the evening. And it is the same 
with these terrorists (DSS), they continue living in their middle class 
situation. Konstantin’s official job is as a corporate consultant and 




framework that she does her terrorism by poisoning her guests with 
Salmonella.’42  
Kraume’s description of the RAF as Feierabendterroristen is a crude 
simplification of the historical reality of the RAF but exposes Kraume’s 
understanding of the idea of RAF as a mythical entity. In Die Kommenden 
Tage he transposes this mythos into Die Schwarzen Stürme, and creates a 
terrorism that relies on the forms, but not the content, of old to imagine a 
protest movement for today. The motivations for apocalyptic thinking are not 
thematised but have become part of a new cultural hegemony of the post-
political. 
 
Endzeitdenken :  Living in the End Times 
Die Schwarzen Stürme are motivated by their frustration towards the ideas of 
contemporary capitalism that, in the film have run their ‘logical’ course – new 
imperialist wars for the last resources; mass immigration by economically and 
ecologically displaced people, who in turn create a dismantling of the German 
welfare state; general poverty; wars; new borders.  
However, the science fiction scenario that the film portrays, takes its cues 
from a constitutive myth of the post-political. The fear that capitalism has 
grown out of control, exacerbated by the recent financial crisis, posits 
capitalism as an entity gone bad. The fear of a ‘Turbo-Capitalism’, a term 
created by the conservative Edward Luttwak,43 can be found across the 
political spectrum today, from the right as well as the left. Leftist philosopher 
John McMurtry dramatically calls it ‘The Cancer Stage of Capitalism’;44 writer 
Naomi Klein notably describes it as ‘disaster Capitalism.’45 This new, out of 
control capitalism, it is thought, brings about unchecked global warming, 
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catastrophic climate change and other ecological disasters directly linked to a 
predatory exploitation of the world’s resources. This will, in turn, bring about 
an ever increasing chasm between rich and poor, both within and between 
nations. Impressions of a never-ending military conflict, and massive cultural 
antagonisms in the ‘war on terror’, dominate world politics. For example 
German government spokesman Thomas Steg, ‘applauded the high moral 
aims of the (G8) protesters and their important contribution to pointing out 
the social risks posed by a world economy spinning out of control.’46  
The Endzeitdenken (thinking in terms of the end times) expressed in Die 
Kommenden Tage has, more generally, become symptomatic of the micro-
political discourse in the post-political. Susan Sontag presaged this 
phenomenon in her essay ‘AIDS and Its Metaphors’: 
Much of the well-intentioned public discourse in our time expresses a 
desire to be candid about one or another of the various dangers which 
might be leading to all-out catastrophe. … The taste for worst-case 
scenarios reflects the need to master fear of what is felt to be 
uncontrollable. It also expresses an imaginative complicity with disaster. 
The sense of cultural distress or failure gives rise to the desire for a clean 
sweep, a tabula rasa.47  
Kraume’s film is an expression of the need, as described by Sontag, to feel in 
control of what is perceived to be an uncontrollable world. ‘Change and 
uncertainty have acquired negative connotations in the contemporary 
imagination’, writes Furedi, ‘such sentiments fuel a palpable sense of dread 
towards the unknown and acquire a coherent expression through the 
ascendancy of possibilistic thinking.’48 The crises of the present are envisioned 
as catastrophes of the future, because, as there is a lack of a coherent, popular 
body of thought in the post-political that envisions how the present should be 
shaped. According to Žižek, ‘It is precisely within the domain of ecology that 
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one can draw the line that separates the politics of emancipatory terror from 
the politics of fear at its purest.’49 
The problems of the present are seen outside of society, and the concept 
of nature plays a big part in this imagination. Erik Swyngedouw describes how 
the concept of ‘Nature’, ‘as a predictable and determined set of processes that 
tends towards a (dynamic) equilibrium – but one that is disturbed by our 
human actions and can be ‘rectified’ with proper sustainable practices’, has 
become self evident in the post political.50 Nature, regarded as something that 
is outside subjectivity, is for Žižek, one of the symptoms of the post-political. 
At first glance Žižek’s own outlook seems to subscribe to a post-political, 
environmentalist body of thought. Living in the End Times talks about the 
scenario of constant end times, that the failures of capitalism are bringing 
about an ecological and economical catastrophe. He poses climate change, 
lack of resources and bio engineering as real threats to the lives of people. 
However, Žižek places the understandings and actions taken by 
environmentalists firmly in the post-political body of thought. He insists first 
of all that there is nothing like a balance in nature, ‘Nature does not exist’, 
nature’s excesses are not an ‘answer’ to human behaviour.51 Žižek says that 
people react in three different way to environmental disasters. In the first case, 
events, especially those in nature become normalised into the human 
experience as soon as they happen. ‘Once the catastrophe occurs, it will be 
perceived as part of the normal run of things, as always having been 
possible.’52 A second way of dealing with catastrophes is achieved by those 
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who fail to normalise events (environmentalists). What they do is understand 
the catastrophe on the level of libidinal investment, id driven obsessional 
behaviour.  
The obsessional participates in frenzied activity, he works feverishly all 
the time – why? To avoid some uncommon catastrophe that would take 
place if his activity were to stop; his frenetic activity is based on the 
ultimatum, “If I don’t do this (the compulsive ritual), some unspeakably 
horrible X will take place”.53  
This understanding is to see these events as a moral punishment for 
mistreating nature: ‘The lesson drawn by those who react in this way is that 
we must cease our derailed, perverted way of life and begin to live as part of 
nature, accommodating ourselves to its rhythms, taking root in it.’54 
For Žižek, the last approaches fail to see the event in its proper context. By 
understanding environmental events through the prism of symbolic subject- 
ivisation, their complexity and randomness become foreclosed. For Žižek 
‘apocalypse means revelation, not catastrophe’.55 It is through extreme events 
that modes of thinking can be analysed through ‘the irreducible gap separating 
the real from the modes of its symbolization.’56  
In post-political environmentalist thinking these avenues of reading 
natural catastrophes have become unthinkable. As Swyngedouw exemplifies,  
The popular response to Katrina, the barrage of apocalyptic warnings of 
the pending catastrophes wrecked by climate change and the need to 
take urgent remedial action to engineer a retro-fitted ‘balanced’ climate 
are perfect examples of the tactics and configurations associated with 
the present post-political condition.57  
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Žižek is aware of the anti-humanist strain contained within the 
conservationist idea: 
While we cannot gain full mastery over our biosphere, it is unfortunately 
in our power to derail it, to disturb its balance so that it will run amok, 
swiping us away in the process. This is why, although ecologists are 
constantly demanding that we radically change our way of life, 
underlying this demand is its opposite – a deep distrust of change, of 
development, of progress: every radical change can have the unintended 
consequence of triggering a catastrophe. It is this distrust that makes 
ecology the ideal candidate for hegemonic ideology, since it echoes the 
anti-totalitarian post-political distrust of large collective acts.58 
Fear of ecological catastrophe as a narrative of the post-political works as a 
constitutive fantasy of the post-political. The world is experienced as 
‘unknowable’ and ‘uncontrollable’, as this fear finds fruitful ground in the 
public imagination and with it in Kraume’s film. He transposes this fear into a 
filmic vision of the future. Sci-fi has always served as an artistic outlet for, and 
a critique of, the social fears and political concerns of the time. In the context 
of sociology the conditions for our imagination of the future are described by 
Furedi; ‘The relationship between the present and the future depends on how 
society feels about itself today. Fears about the future are linked to anxieties 
about problems today. And, if the future is feared, then reaction to risk is more 
likely to emphasise the probability of adverse outcomes.’59  
For Kraume, these fears constitute themselves in Die Kommenden Tage 
as an acceptance of the old mythos of the RAF and the contemporary mythos 
of the imminent global collapse. For a German born in 1970, Kraume’s 
expression of these fears is unique to a certain cultural understanding and 
history of the politics of fear described under the umbrella term German 
Angst. 
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Die Kommenden Tage imagines what the terrorism of the future will look like 
and the forms it will take. What it conjures up is Die Schwarzen Stürme. It is 
an organisation that, according to their spokeswoman, wants to use violence 
to tear down civilisation, to bomb into being an ‘empty space’, out of which a 
just society can emerge. The spokeswoman, whose tone of voice is reminiscent 
of RAF member Ulrike Meinhof, says to new recruit Cecilia, ‘In the future, we 
will do the same thing: place explosives so that our society implodes, but 
which spares as much life as possible in its demise. Should we fail, our 
civilisation will soon destroy all life on earth.’ The message is clear, destroy 
the system before it destroys the world.  
The idea expressed by the terrorists in the film (that ‘self defence against 
the system’ is not only legitimate but needed to prevent the excesses of an 
inherently corrupt system) is a self conscious echo of Germany’s recent past. 
The real-life terrorist group RAF made it their mission to lead a struggle 
against the building blocks of the capitalist system. This system they regarded 
as a self-perpetuating, vicious circle of injustice and exploitation that had to 
be eradicated. They write in one of their statements: 
Only through violent struggle – which radically breaks with everything 
that always returns man to the deadly mills of the system; which shows 
that and how it is possible to bring the system to its knees by 
materialising the destruction of consensus and destroying the political 
bases of the rotten system, destroying its last moments of legitimacy and 
attractiveness, – can and will revolutionary politics be implemented.60  
The fictional group Die Schwarzen Stürme seem to reproduce in fiction the 
goals and rhetoric of the politics of the past. However, their agenda very much 
reflects the fears of contemporary Germany, that is, the fear of capitalism’s 
disregard of social and ecological sustainability. This fear is found everywhere, 
but expressed plainly by the newsmagazine Spiegel in its topic page on 
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sustainability: ‘Oil supplies are running out, the planet is warming up, sea 
levels are rising – Humanity has recognised that we cannot go on like this.’61  
Die Schwarzen Stürme in fictional form express the real life desire: a 
radical implementation of sustainability in order to avoid what is seen as the 
inevitable outcome of uncontrolled capitalism – wars, ecological disasters and 
an escalation of misery. 
The idea of sustainability has become something close to an 
unquestionable truism in German culture. The precautionary principle, which 
states that policies that are felt to be harmful to humans or the environment 
are to be rejected outright without the need for scientific proof, has been the 
guiding principle of the German government since the early 1970s. The 
German sociologist Ulrich Beck talks, in his influential book 
Risikogesellschaft, of a ‘risk society,’ where unnecessary and involuntary risks 
are pervading the social fabric of Europe. He insists on the necessity of a world 
wide practise of the precautionary principle as it is (for Beck still not 
sufficiently) practised in Germany.62 The precautionary principle is thoroughly 
ingrained in the self-conception of Germany and a disregard for it (for 
Germans particularly prominent in US policies) is often met with a general 
feeling of incomprehension and emotional outrage. 
Swyngedouw, describes how it has become a dictum of the post-political 
to manage nature through the concept of sustainability.  
The fantasy of ‘sustainability’ imagines the possibility of an originally 
fundamentally harmonious Nature, one that is now out-of-synch but, 
which, if ‘properly’ managed, we can and have to return to by means of a 
series of technological, managerial, and organisational fixes. … 
Disagreement is allowed, but only with respect to the choice of 
technologies, the mix of organisational fixes, the detail of the managerial 
adjustments, and the urgency of their timing and implementation. 
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Nature’s apocalyptic future, if unheeded, symbolises and nurtures the 
solidification of the post-political condition.63  
The dialectic between sustainability and the precautionary principle has 
impregnated the German psyche for longer than most other countries.  
A good example for the specifically German notion of a turning away 
from a universal project, and with it the concept of progress as such is the 
dystopian vision of writer Hans Magnus Enzensberger, a poem titled called 
Untergang der Titanic/The Sinking of the Titanic. This poem represented a 
‘Riß im Rumpf des Fortschritts’ (a rupture to the idea of progress).64 
Enzensberger used the metaphor of the unsinkable Titanic as a metaphor for 
the hubris of Enlightenment thinking in particular the idea of progress, and by 
extension for the modernist project as such. Disillusioned by the failure of the 
60s to produce a meaningful counternarrative to capitalism and resulting in 
the terrorism of the RAF in the 1970s, his understanding that utopias end in 
dystopias is echoed in Habermas’ exclamation of ‘Linksfaschismus.’ 
Enzensberger’s motivations for his poem are formulated by Alasdair 
King’s analysis, saying that for Enzensberger, ‘political action never turns out 
as hoped: one never achieves exactly what one sets out to.’65 King sums up 
Enzensberger’s conclusion to what is to be done to avoid fascism of any kind 
in Germany as, ‘what is needed is clear thinking and modesty.’66  
Enzensberger’s position perfectly describes the post-war attitude in 
Germany that enabled and favoured the emergence of a social, cultural climate 
based on risk avoidance and sustainability.  
                                                            
63 Swyngedouw, 2007. 
64 ‘Riß im Rumpf des Fortschritts Nicolas Born über Enzensberger: "Der Untergang der Titanic”’, 
Der Spiegel (23.10.1978) <http: //www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-40606219.html> [last 
access 4 September 2014] 
65 Alasdair King, ‘Enzensberger’s Titanic: The sinking of the German Left and the aesthetics of 
survival’, Bergfelder, Tim and Sarah Street, eds., The Titanic In Myth And Memory: 






The obsession with environmental catastrophes such as Waldsterben 
(trees dying because of acidic rainfall) and nuclear power have been at the 
heart of Germany’s political consciousness. These causes are so emotionally 
invested that a scientific and/or historical evaluation that does not question 
these ideas is understood in terms of fascist ideology. (The vocabulary of 
‘denier’ – a term reserved for the concept of a fascistically motivated denial of 
the Holocaust has become a way of describing views held to be unassailable 
today, ‘implying not merely wrong but evil’)67 All this has given the impression 
that there is an inherent fear of risk taking in German culture, often described 
as German Angst. Many see this as a ‘fear of impoverishment of competence 
and a fallback into barbarity’68 – i.e. falling back into the barbarity of the 
Third Reich.  
This fear is analysed rigorously by political scientist Hamed Abdel-
Samad, ‘My thesis is: The greatest fear the Germans have is from themselves. 
Many believe that they do not live in a developed democracy which can deal 
with a homogenous society. They think many are able to just follow the next 
fanatic. One looks into the rearview mirror and believes that one looks into the 
future.’69 Bearing in mind this attitude, towards what could be described as a 
fear of too much freedom, it is not surprising that Die Kommenden Tage was 
welcomed by the German press as a film with ‘high plausibility’70 and a ‘close 
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relationship to today’,71 that shows how the world ‘will look like in ten years 
time.’72 Director Lars Kraume has made a film about the future that is regarded 
by some sections of its audience as if it were a documentary. The story has 
been lifted out of the realm of fiction and has become truth; a truth about an 
apocalyptic future met by a terrorism that has the credentials of a radical past. 
Die Kommenden Tage does not try to decontextualise existing 
assumptions, in the way The Baader Meinhof Complex tries to do with the 
RAF mythos. Instead, Die Kommenden Tage presents in its reworking of the 
politics of fear through science fiction scenario assumptions of the past and 
the present and takes them at face value – it assumes an understanding of 
mythos as a normalised, unquestionable truth. The film does not allow a 
mythos to be used as a tool of abstraction and analysis but, by taking it 
literally, demonstrates the politics of fear in its creative imagination.  
In Die Kommenden Tage the normalisation of mythos into reality that 
Žižek describes, forgoes this process, which is the need to question the 
inconsistencies of the RAF mythos itself. The materialist reality is that this is 
still a mythos. The film overcomes this problem by setting the mythos into the 
genre of science fiction, where the possibility for the reality of the events in the 
future is part of the genre’s conventions.  
The film sees no need to interpret the mythos of the past, taken 
collectively as the RAF mythos, and ultimately sees no need to abstract into its 
narrative its own basic assumptions. The visual translation of this idea is in 
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The future is bright and full  of  fear –  
science f iction as a genre device to normalise myth 
Die Kommenden Tage does away with the fantastic element in its sci-fi 
narrative. Through, what Žižek would call, ‘filling in the gaps’ with 
contemporary biases, the film manages to leave the realm of fiction and 
become part of an accepted truth. A good way of examining how this happens 
is by comparing Die Kommenden Tage with another film that, superficially at 
least, has the same agenda – Alfonso Cuarón’s Children of Men.  
Both films rely on the same visual language of a broken society in the 
near future; but where Children of Men stays within the bounds of fiction, Die 
Kommenden Tage does not. 
It is through the images of the future that more often than not the sci-fi 
element is established in sci-fi films. From the monumental Cityscapes of Fritz 
Lang’s Metropolis (1927) to the chaotic street life in Ridley Scott’s Blade 
Runner (1982), the way the future becomes part of the narrative is often to be 
found in the backdrop of the scenes rather than in the foreground of the 
narrative.  
Dystopian futures have always been part of the canon of sci-fi. Sci-fi film 
is a genre that strongly relies on mise-en-scène, for it is here that the new is 
interwoven with the familiar, without being directly involved in the diegesis – 
the vision of the future is inconspicuous. Michael D. Gordin, Helen Tilley, 
Gyan Prakash describe how a ‘dystopian narrative – because it is so much 
more common (than a utopian narrative) – bears the aspect of lived 
experience.’73 
This is no different in Die Kommenden Tage. The collapse of society is 
more clear in the background than in the narrative itself. Žižek describes this 
phenomenon referring to Children of Men, ‘The fate of the individual is the 
prism through which we the see the background more clearly.’ He goes on to 
say, ‘If you look at the thing too directly, the oppressive social dimension, you 
                                                            
73 Michael D. Gordin, Helen Tilley and Gyan Prakash, Utopia/Dystopia: Conditions of Historical 




don’t see it. You see it an oblique way only if it remains in the background.’74 
Here, the background becomes the actual story onto which the characters 
provide a connecting thread.  
Children of Men is based on the PD James novel of the same name, which 
was published in 1992. The film takes place in 2027, and describes a world in 
which two decades of global human infertility have left humanity with less 
than a century to survive. The action takes place in the UK, which is the only 
European country left that has not completely collapsed. Instead a brutal, 
authoritarian police state tries to keep the country going. In the midst of the 
dying society, main character Theo Faron (Clive Owen) is asked by his former 
partner to secretly escort a pregnant refugee to the safety of the Human 
Project.  
The comparisons between Die Kommenden Tage and Children of Men 
are worth making. Both films are created with high verisimilitude in their 
mise-en-scène, with the intention of portraying the collapse of society 
accurately and believably. Like Die Kommenden Tage, Children of Men is set 
in the near future: society has collapsed through migrant influx and the demise 
of a social structure within the state. Terrorism is rife, resources are rare and 
people are increasingly hysterical. The visualisations in both films of society’s 
collapse are uncannily similar. For both films to be effective, the mix of the 
familiar and the futuristic elements has still to be recognisable as ‘our time’ 
(we are familiar with what we see) whilst experiencing an Entrückung, a 
rapture, from this very familiarity.  
In both films, the first signs we are in the future are glimpses of new forms 
of advertising billboards that show moving images. This is a common trope in 
many recent sci-fi films, and the fact that these particular forms of advertising 
are already found in some places indicate how quickly these signifiers of the 
future become normalised once they happen. They fail to have the same 
impact for audiences in 2014, as they did in 2006 and 2010 respectively.  
                                                            




Both films introduce the ‘future’ through garish adverts on the side of 
buses. The next indicator is that technology has advanced in daily life is 
expressed through the characters’ familiarity with a new generation of 
computer screens. Both films image the screens of the future to look like sheer, 
illuminated glass panels.  
In their book Make It So: Interaction Design Lessons from Science 
Fiction, Nathan Shedroff and Christopher Noessel observe that, ‘The most 
prominent visual aspect of speculative technology is that it glows.’75 They try 
to answer the question why this could be,  
Why does sci-fi glow? We suspect it’s because things of power in the 
natural world glow: lightning, the sun, and fire. Other heavenly bodies 
glow as well – stars, planets, and the moon (especially against a black 
background) – and have been long associated with the otherworldly. 
Additionally, living things that glow captivate us: fireflies, glowworms, 
mushrooms, and fish in the deep seas. It’s worth noting that while most 
of real-world technology glows, a lot of it doesn’t, so its ubiquity in sci-fi 
tells us that audiences and sci-fi makers consider it a crucial visual 
aspect.76 
The visual effect of illumination draws the eye onto the futuristic background 
and elements – that which is to come. In Die Kommenden Tage everyday 
objects such as the kitchen shelves are illuminated in the future. But also this 
method draws the eye to what is happening in the future, the most obvious 
example is the image of the terrorists’ headquarters in which an illuminated 
writing on the wall spells out ‘Capitalism kills’. 
This is where the comfortable images of the future stop. What comes next 
is more unsettling. A distortion of familiar landmarks; of London in Children 
of Men and Berlin in Die Kommenden Tage. In both films recognisable 
landmarks have gone wrong. In Die Kommenden Tage, the panoramic view of 
the Reichstag is obstructed by ugly scaffolding; the first letters of the sign of 
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the Staatsbibliothek are broken, symbolically indicating the loss of the state as 
a public institution. 
In Children of Men, tanks and heavily armed policemen guard the 
entrance to the Mall at Admiralty Arch; the view from Trafalgar Square to Big 
Ben is also spoilt by ugly scaffolding. In Die Kommenden Tage we see 
increasing homelessness; empty shelves in the supermarket – images of 
contemporary poverty are used to induce fear of the future.  
Both films create their uncanny re-imaginings of ‘what is to come’ 
through images of what is uncomfortable in the present. An almost circular 
logic that shows the ugliness of poverty by showing how ugly poverty is.  
In Children of Men and Die Kommenden Tage there are images of ever 
increasing rubbish on the street. Shanty towns fill the screen, and homeless 
people are on every corner. Both films use a visual understanding of 
contemporary poverty to describe their future fantasy of what poverty will 
look like. In this context even the technological advancements; the screens, 
the modern cars, the Zeppelins or the fields of solar panels in Die Kommenden 
Tage – the illuminated future – and are not seen as part of a positive 
development. ‘Science-fiction film is caught in a curious paradox: the more the 
advancement of technology lends itself to narratives fed by anti-technological 
anxiety and conspiracy, the more the representational strategy can rely on 
technological development’, says Barbara Mennel, ‘cities are dystopian sites of 
decay based on seeing technological advancement not as utopian fantasy but 
as extreme dystopian fantasy.’77 In Children of Men and Die Kommenden Tage 
progress is not progress at all, but is in itself an indicator of the wrongness of 
the society depicted.  
In both films life in the future is revealed by following the protagonists, 
often in tracking shots, through the streets of the city, revealing the state of 
affairs as the background to the protagonist’s story. What are usually mere 
establishing shots (Where is the scene set? How does character A  
                                                            




get to place B?) are now the most important part of the narrative; by following 
the character is to encounter by association the ruination  
of decent standards of living. The background in the film is also the 
metaphorical background of the protagonists’ circumstance. 
Moreover, the background of both films reveals the misery that is the 
outcome of global capitalism: migration on the scale of a Völkerwanderung, a 
tidal wave of migration, and the mistreatment of migrants and the local 
population as a consequence. 
The films show a future that is a combination of not only what is typically 
thought of as rightwing propaganda – that is the horrendous consequences of 
a drastic influx of immigrants –, but also what has been described as leftist 
apocalyptic theorising – visions of capitalism’s endpoint due to an exhaustion 
of the earth’s capabilities. This vision of the future encapsulates Žižek’s 
criticism of environmentalist thinking as ‘ideal candidate for hegemonic 
ideology’,78 the politics of fear that confronts people with their nightmare 
scenarios in form of their conservative fears. 
 
The truth of Die Kommenden Tage  
Both Children of Men and Die Kommenden Tage depict the failure of global 
capitalism, but there is a qualitative difference between the two in terms of 
internal logic. In Children of Men, the global crisis is brought about because 
procreation has stopped inexplicably. In terms of narrative the loss of fertility 
is symbolic and symbolises the loss of history. 
 In an interview Children of Men director Cuarón says: 
I never cared about infertility from a literal standpoint. For me it’s a 
metaphor for the fading sense of hope and the lack of human historical 
perspective. Meaning that humanity’s living a culture of hedonism in 
which everything is instant gratification. Even our economy is about 
instant gratification, it’s economic growth without any concern about 
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the consequences. In other words there’s a complete disregard for the 
next generation.79  
In other words, for the purposes of narrative, in Children of Men a fantastic 
event is invented to articulate contemporary fears.  
In Die Kommenden Tage, however, the mythos of the impending 
apocalypse is treated as an ‘everyday occurrence’, a self-evident truism that is, 
in itself, a metaphor for the wrongness of contemporary politics. The global 
crisis is not a metaphor, but the expansion within the narrative of the ‘war on 
resources’ that is already felt to be going on in real life. In several newspaper 
reviews, it is felt to be a truth that makes the film relevant. The magazine Der 
Stern writes: 
Now seriously, joking aside, really, truthfully and without bullshit: Why 
are we still shocked when somebody says what is true? Why does it cost 
so much bravery to describe the current world condition? The thirty-
seven year old (Kraume) has managed, with the epic family story Die 
Kommenden Tage, to create a genius translation of the presentiment we 
have all learned to suppress so well. It is a dark vision of the future of 
how the world will look in ten years time if all will not go right.80  
For Der Stern, the fact that Die Kommenden Tage is about a truth that no one 
wants to hear makes the film even more urgent politically. Here is Žižek’s 
‘filling in’ in operation; the unknown future is filled in with the apocalypse and 
thus the film creates its ‘truth effect’.  
By replacing myth for truth the film actively rules out the possibility of a 
metaphorical element in its sci-fi narrative. That which Darko Suvin describes 
as the novum, the fictional ‘novelty or innovation validated by cognitive logic’, 
has been left out of the narrative of the film, and left the film without its inner 
logic.81 According to Suvin, the novum is the distinguishing feature of sci-fi 
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narrative. It is a ‘totalising phenomenon’… ‘a means by which the whole tale 
can be analytically grasped.’82 In Žižek’s terms, this would be the 
transcendental tool in narrative which can bridge the world of the subject and 
the world outside it. Without the novum, Die Kommenden Tage is left without 
a self-contained logic that sutures the narrative to the background images of 
the future. 
In Children of Men, it is the desperation born of hopelessness, the lack of 
a future generation, that gives the background of the film context and a point 
of entry into this vision of the future. The fantastic element, by creating an 
imaginative leap into an alternate reality, renders the unimaginable 
acceptable. The metaphor of global infertility enables the subject to transcend 
into a realm of possibility that would not otherwise be open to him. This is the 
element of sci-fi, the novum which is ‘validated by cognitive logic.’ The 
premise does not have to be believed before the narrative can operate. The 
premise is intentionally fantastic yet logical in its own terms. In Children of 
Men, the background is not only a logical visual extension of the fantastic 
premise, but also the key to accessing the logic of the narrative. 
In contrast, in Die Kommenden Tage the envisaged future is never 
explained in terms of its own fiction. The truth, which is held to be self-
evident, that we are indeed reaching an endpoint of global capitalism due to 
an exhaustion of what nature and politics can deliver, is external to the 
fictional narrative.  
In the film, the causes for the collapse of society rely on what is perceived 
to be true outside the narrative. The novum of the story, that which is ‘other’ 
in the imagined future, is assumed from the outset and not explored by the 
narrative. The internal logic of: ‘no more oil’ to ‘no more everything’ is never 
explained, neither by the images nor by the characters themselves. It is 
assumed that the logic of the narrative is self-explanatory.  
                                                            




In Children of Men, belief in its narrative does not rely on anything 
outside it. In Die Kommenden Tage, the premise is built on a collusion 
between filmmaker and audience, a shared set of assumptions. Without 
investment in these assumptions the narrative cannot operate effectively. 
Die Kommenden Tage understands itself as a cautionary tale about the 
dangers of excess capitalism. But it is a cautionary tale only if accepted as one. 
The dystopian background in Die Kommenden Tage only enhances the 
incoherence of the film; the characters’ actions and motivations are never 
understood in terms of the world they live in. The background is not a mirror 
of the characters’ lives, as in Children of Men. In fact, in Die Kommenden 
Tage the story told through the background has no real relation to what 
happens to the characters. 
Die Kommenden Tage is an attempt to visualise the future, extrapolated 
from what feels like the worst case scenario today. However, instead of 
providing an artistic vision with the help of a mythical metaphor, Die 
Kommenden Tage does not thematise contemporary problems but instead 
embodies a fear of them, in particular a German fear of ‘falling back into 
barbarity’. It is not surprising that Die Kommenden Tage deals with the 
terrorism of the future using the same method of displacing mythos with 
assumed truths. The actions of Die Schwarzen Stürme is also void of this 
narrative suture. Their motivation is predicated on the assumption of the RAF 
mythos as real. 
 
Conclusion 
Jameson said, ‘someone once said that it is easier to imagine the end of the 
world than to imagine the end of capitalism. We can now revise that and 
witness the attempt to imagine capitalism by way of imagining the end of the 
world.’83 This is what has been done in Die Kommenden Tage. 
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Ultimately what Die Kommenden Tage represents is the post-political 
loss of faith in human agency and progress. This is shown by the methods of 
realising the RAF mythos and the mythos of imminent social and ecological 
catastrophe. Inspired by the imperative, that is felt more in Germany than 
elsewhere due to its history, of an imperative to avoid all kind of extremism 
and this is done by risk avoidance altogether.  
Kraume utilises the assumptions around imminent global collapse, as well 
as assumptions around the emergence of terrorist behaviour in Germany’s 
past, to ‘fill in the gaps’ provided by the real fear of the new unknowns. Die 
Kommenden Tage takes the ecological catastrophe and the RAF Mythos out of 
the realm of mythos and presents them as a straight  
realist narrative, what is described by Žižek as reading mythos itself  
as a ‘real story’.’84  
This sci-fi of Die Kommenden Tage reflects real life world fears of an 
unknowable future and presents the mythologised concept of worst case 
scenario as indubitable. Kraume ‘fills the gaps’ of uncertainty with the worst 
case scenario, thus articulating in fiction the prophesied ‘falling back into 
barbarity.’ One could say that the film is an experience of the precautionary 
principle in filmic form, and it is this that makes Die Kommenden Tage a very 
German encounter.  
Another particularly German aspect of Die Kommenden Tage, is in its 
treatment of terrorism of the past, and its acceptance of the RAF mythos as a 
coherent historical entity. What started out as a demystification mission in 
The Baader Meinhof Complex is taken to its logical conclusion in Die 
Kommenden Tage. Where The Baader Meinhof Complex saw  
itself as providing the film with a new mythological framework that was 
supposed to reveal the gritty truth of the RAF, Die Kommenden Tage is not 
interested in the artistic exploration of its mythos but takes them as truths 
from the outset. 
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This thesis set out to explore the post-political through the prism of how 
terrorism – contextualised as a symptom, as described by Žižek – is put on 
screen in Hollywood, British and German cinema. By using a theoretical 
framework based on the work of Žižek, and his concept of the post-political in 
particular, the argument concentrated on how the foreclosure of the universal 
element and the consequential impossibility of true emancipation – the 
freeing from social and political constraints – is translated to the cinema 
screen in a duality of the post-political in film and film in the post-political. 
However, any discussion around emancipation requires a discussion around 
what freedom means.  
Again Žižek is helpful here. For him the question of freedom is answered 
through an evocation of Lenin’s, ‘Freedom yes, but for WHOM? To do 
WHAT?’1 What this points to is a vital distinction of the concepts of formal 
and actual freedom or, the context and terms in which freedom takes place. 
Formal freedom is guaranteed by the symbolic order, whereas actual freedom 
means, so to speak, to change the rules of the game – freedom on one’s own 
terms. However, the heavily qualified, constrained freedom in the name of 
universalist thinking in the post-political, goes hand in hand with the erosion 
of individual freedoms experienced.2 In short, freedom means the possibility of 
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accessing the dimension of transcending and ultimately transforming one’s 
own circumstances. If, in the post-political, the universal is foreclosed, and 
transcending it impossible, the question is, to quote Žižek, ‘How, then, do 
things stand with freedom?’3  
Historically, the concept of freedom has always been intimately bound up 
with the idea of the subject. In order to implant actual freedom it is vital to 
have a subject that is able to make this transcendence away from the 
symbolic, to change the very co-ordinates of their situation. Today, this 
possibility has become difficult. The politics of the subject – the political of 
particulars that stand for the universal – are diminished. The primary 
discourses of the subject frame the concept in terms of either biological or 
social determinants. (Of course humans are to some degree determined by 
their role in the natural order, but this is not the end of it. They are also 
exceptional, in that they can be free to become subjects, as Malik says, ‘to 
order nature and shape events external to us.’)4 Losing faith in the subject is 
also losing faith in history and the transformative potential of the subject. As 
Furedi puts forward, ‘Contemporary society lacks certainty about its beliefs. It 
finds it difficult to transmit a clear vision of a just world. In particular, there 
seems to be great hesitancy about offering people a clear system of meaning. … 
Today’s cultural elite may lack confidence in telling people what to believe, 
but it feels quite comfortable about instructing people how and what to feel.’5 
In more Žižekian terms, there is a tension around how to, not only map 
oneself in society, but moreover how to design it. This confusion finds its way 
onto the cinema screen, and is most evident in cinematic translations of 
subjective motivation, the most extreme example being terrorism. Terrorism 
becomes a symptom of the post-political, it constitutes society and is 
constituted by it. By using the symptom of terrorism to read the film, one can 
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access the ways the role of the subject is imagined. This extreme subject is 
given an aesthetics determined by the interpretation of this tension around the 
subject altogether. The disparate films discussed in the thesis show this 
confusion about what it means to be a subject today. They show the extent to 
which and the ways in which the universal is foreclosed for the subject.  
In Hollywood cinema, the narrativisation of the ‘war on terror’ shows that 
a loss of historical perspective has led to a contextualising of societal fears and 
moods through mediatized fantasies. In Munich, the desire to evoke empathy 
through an interpassive spectatorial alignment, suggests that there is an 
imperative to understand others through the state of intersubjectivity where 
power relations between subjects are suspended from the outset. 
In Zero Dark Thirty the desire for unmediated representation can be felt 
with not only an emphasis on verisimilitude but also a mandate on it. By 
deliberately avoiding a critical assessment of the ‘war on terror’, the film is 
caught in a confused dramaturgy that fails because it does not know what it 
wants to show. It is failure in the Sontagian sense, in that it is a camp 
interpretation of apoliticalness.  
The examples of Hunger and Four Lions show a different approach. These 
films, like the others, embody the spirit of the foreclosure of the universal in 
post-politics, but also speak of a desire for an alternative. Whether or not this 
derives from their origins as British films is hard to say and is, for this analysis, 
not a prime consideration.  
The analysis of the German films The Baader Meinhof Complex and Die 
Kommenden Tage indicate that there is a decided laxity in the borders 
between fact and fiction, myth and truth, subjective and collective beliefs. This 
is, on the one hand, determined by the country’s particular historical 
circumstance, and on the other by the general post-political climate. The 
visual translation of this mixture brings about a need to fill the gaps of a 
possible misunderstanding of radicalism; the foreclosure of ideas that are 
concerned with universalising, historical principles, which are understood as 




The films chosen for this thesis are too small a sample as to categorically 
indicate any cultural distinction within each national cinema towards a 
particular depiction of the post-political through terrorism. What this analysis 
shows is that there are trends displayed by these films that hint at a cultural 
preoccupation with the certain themes and subjects. However, the dynamics of 
these trends requires further study and should be undertaken in a greater 
scope than this analysis can provide. 
 One of these themes, articulated especially by Hunger and Four Lions, is 
the foreclosure of a particular possibility, that of the subject leaving the 
symbolic. This provides those films with a greater potential to provide 
meaning. Hunger focuses on the body, but in doing so it becomes clear how 
closely the idea of the body is related to the ideas of freedom; it becomes the 
instrument for the act and so the instrument for becoming a political subject.  
Four Lions is directly about the exclusion of the subject from history. By 
creating a certain relationship with the characters, the film creates meaning 
around their alienation, an alienation which can only be expressed in acting 
out and, ultimately, in a passage à l’acte. 
These two films, rather than trying to explore subjects’ motifs (as is done 
in Zero Dark Thirty, The Baader Meinhof Complex, Die Kommenden Tage) or 
the subjects’ motives within the subjects themselves, as a subjective 
experience (as it happens in Munich)), contextualise their motives in a more 
meaningful way in that they expose the subjects to the gap between the 
subject and the material world. Examining the approaches of filming the 
subject in the post-political in the Hollywood and German examples are 
helpful in their own right, as they provide an insight into the ways in which 
subjects are portrayed and societal fears and preoccupations are given shape. 
Hunger and Four Lions, however, go beyond this and have become 
examinations of the post-political in themselves.  
Hunger and Four Lions could perhaps be held up as examples of, what 




camera as a partial object, as an “eye” torn from the subject and freely thrown 
around.’6  
Film has the ability to look at the subject in society from outside the 
subject and show this reflection – of how the subject is in their own right – 
back to the subject, giving them the possibility of seeing themselves as they 
are seen from the outside. In this way, the subject is handed the opportunity to 
be directly confronted with its alienation – the gap between how it sees itself 
and how it is positioned in society. The camera allows us to see ourselves from 
the viewpoint of the partial object which is not attached to the strings of a 
particular subject – the camera eye has the potential to be truly objective. 
Cinema, in this sense, becomes that space from which the subject can access 
the real, the space where they can transcend the symbolic and become free 
subjects. Žižek says,  
… once the fantasy object is subtracted from reality, it is not only the 
observed reality which changes, but also the observing subject himself: 
he is reduced to a gaze observing how things look in his own absence … 
we see ourselves “from outside,” from this impossible point, the 
traumatic feature is not that I am objectivised, reduced to an external 
object for the gaze, but, rather, that it is my gaze itself which is 
objectivised, which observes me from the outside; which, precisely, 
means that my gaze is no longer mine, that it is stolen from me.7  
These tactics of looking at the subject, and in turn at oneself/society from an 
objectivised viewpoint, can be seen to be employed by those filmmakers that 
seek to express the limits of subjectivity in the post-political. McQueen shows 
this spirit in his desire to throw ‘the camera in the air’ in his art, most notably 
in his artistic piece Catch – where the camera literally becomes an ‘eye torn 
from the subject thrown around’?8  
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In his films, including Hunger, McQueen focuses on the alienation of the 
subject, by producing an artistic experience – rather than an analytical, 
critical or narrative one – of the idea of the subject who finds him/herself in a 
world of unreason.  
Similarly, the comedic style of Morris makes us see ourselves from the 
outside. Looking at the habits of the characters, we are confronted with our 
own habits, their alienation is our alienation. By putting the subject, confused 
by the tensions of the post-political, centre-stage, the film gives (film)form to 
the desires of overcoming this limited subjectivity.  
In this light, the most revolutionary character in Four Lions is Waj. Waj 
wants to find out if he is confused by taking a picture of himself to check if his 
face is his confused face. He takes the camera eye to look at himself and to 
examine his own confusion in society by looking at himself from outside. It is 
one of the subversive pleasures of the film that he is the most subversive of all 
the characters. This image of the terrorist as confused – who they are and 
what they are doing – is a succinct condensation of the analysis in this thesis.  
This study outlines the profound confusion of the role of the subject in 
society and ideology, and the ways in which this confusion is given a distinct 
cinematic vocabulary. This vocabulary informs how we are to understand and 
ultimately to relate to the subject. Rather than relying on understanding the 
film form of the post-political through its formative elements such as technical 
preferences, such as run-and-gun style shooting, or idealistic principles such 
as empathy, or ideological goals such as demystification, it is vital that these 
methods are analysed in the context of their own making.  
When all is considered, the study of the visual language of the post-
political through the lens of its symptoms, such as terrorism, is a fruitful 
exercise. Not only does it provide access to a contextualisation of the post-
political in film but also truly transgressive film forms can be determined. Here 
Žižek’s methods do not just explore a mapping of the subject in society, but 
also an exploration of the possibilities of analysing and articulating the artistic 




equipped for these topics and, with his ability to rapidly produce volumes of 
material, it seems to become more fitting as time goes on. To contribute to a 
field of study that contemplates Žižekian perspectives in film studies will, with 
luck, engender further research into a revolutionary cinema of the post-
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